Well I arrived back in Oz, last week from Singapore via Phnom Phen and Laos. Singapore seems an island of stability and sanity, which Hun Sen’s Cambodia especially seems to be copying, allowing for local conditions.
Singapore seems more relaxed than before – I first visited in 1963 !!
Australian criticisms of Singapore take no account of Singapore’s local conditions. If you don’t like it – leave !!
It beats me why the Thai Royalist elite persist with these image-destroying LM laws. It makes Thailand look like some backward, fuedal state – somewhat akin to Saudi Arabia !!
(Remember that jewel case !!?).
Surely it would achieve everything they want, but appear more modern and sophisticated simply with Singapore-style defamation laws !
And remember – Thailand already has extremely onerous defamation laws.
It is great to see at the top of these postings, a mention of King Juan Carlos and Spain.
I’ve talked awhile among Thai and farang friends about whether there could be some hope for Thailand in the example of Juan Carlos’ Spain, which I re-visited some years ago – after having been there during the Franco era (including the day Chile’s Allende was overthrown).
Spain’s monarchy is now stronger than ever, due to :
1) the King’s support of democracy, and rejection of fascism.
2) his support for limited regional autonomy – eg. Catalonia, etc.
This has not stopped a few continuing separatist outrage bombings, etc. from Basque ETA extremists – Spain’s equivalent of Pattani murderers. But it has won over the huge majority of Spaniards.
Is it too much to hope that His Royal Highness The Crown Prince will be wisely guided, perhaps by Her Majesty The Queen and General Prem, in this modernising direction. ?
After all, it was Nixon who went to China.
Or are Thais going to face October 1976-style reaction, which this time will split Thailand to smithereens ?
Does anybody know if there will be some conference papers available online? I am particularly interested in what Professor Bhanupong has to say about military budget cycles and the coup. A google search didn’t help me find anything on the topic from his hand.
They have identified Rayong as a potential stronghold. It will beinteresting to see how they paly the environmentalist card down there. Previosuly Democrats did well there on this issue but now in government they are compromised on it. The NPP in the short term may concentrate on issues like this.
No doubt they will also try to hit the party list as they will likely have a lot of votes but spread thin across the constituencies. They are national in a way that not even Banharn’s private party are. However dont expect them to win many seats at all. They arent PTP or Dems.
The pressure group side of NPP also exists. They can wreck any Democrat strategy to win just by standing in every central, eastern and lower northern constituency and split the potential anti-PTP vote. If Dems dont do what NPP like at least much of the time then the Dems are going to find that the odds on their victory next time are suddenly very very long and they already are pretty bad odds imho.
I recently finished vol. 1, Nation (Siam Mapped, by Prof. Thongchai Winichakul), and agree it is an excellent, fascinating history of the formation of what we know now as the nation of Siam/Thailand. It explains the interplay of the colonial powers’ designs on S.E. Asia, the hegemonic reaction of the monarchy (esp. Rama V), and the new (to Siam) science of geography, which Siam had to learn quickly as the colonial powers demanded the mapping of borders, itself a new concept to Siam.
I followed that with The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy, by Prof. Chaiyan Rajchagool, published by White Lotus, also in 1994. It dovetails well in many ways with Thongchai’s Siam Mapped. It also dovetails well with King.
In my opinion, the discussion here lacks theoretical framework of analysis concerning democracy, growth, and the role of the State. Analysis based on personal opinions without theoretical foundation offers no solution. Of course, everyone carries his/her own philosophical preference and bias i.e. liberal, conservative, realist, Marxist, etc. However, if we analyze the situation with knowledge regardless of our biases, we can agree with solution best suitable for Myanmar. Theory gives clarity and order.
I have two pertinent issues that I would like to address:
1. Chicken-and-egg debate
When we review the literature, there are many scholarly works on this debate. Western countries become economic powers because they were democratic societies or they are democratic society because they became economic powers. Which comes first? The choice has policy implications. Economic growth should come first or political reforms and democratization should come first. Hong Kong succeeded with laissez-faire while Singapore succeeded with strong one-man rule.
2. Stage of development
U.S. and U.K. were the first to industrialize with market led economy and democratic form of governance. However, Germany and Japan were the second wave, they know that in order to catch up with U.S. and U.K., they cannot use the same mode. Germany and Japan had strong State (Developmental State) in collaboration with the Bank. They had Zaibatsu played the key role with the State in its development. Most developing countries follow this model: authoritarian Developmental State for the short cut to economic growth.
I thin the debate should focus on these two issues: chicken-and-egg, and the role of the State: Developmental State or Laissez-faire. An which is best for Myanmar.
Is Burmese Army seen as a colonial rulers by its own people? No, most Burmese do not think so. They are rather seen as a revival of old imperial class by the brutally patronizing ways they behave and treat their own people.
The generals started from Ne Win and now Than Shwe also consider themselves as stepping on the traditional foot-steps of Burmese warrior kings. Almost all of the famous Burmese kings were self-made generals like them, not from the blood lines of kings.
The current Burmese administrative system based on the divisional warlords is very similar to the old imperial system in which every village and town is classified as a group of basic military unit.
In the old imperial system every ten households in a village has a group leader, Sae-ein-goung in Burmese, and as a group they had to provide ten voluntary soldiers complete with their own weaponry, bed rolls, and cooking utensils whenever the king of the day summoned his volunteer or people army.
Villages are classified as 50 or 100 village depending on the number of soldiers they had to send. Towns also are classified as 1000, 2000, or 5000 town.
Traditionally every Burmese boy had to learn martial arts and been tattooed heavily for protection in the battle and also for exciting mindless aggression and extreme violence when they face the enemy. War is in their blood and they will madly fight to death for no reason other than just for the sake of fighting.
The Burmese armies which looted and destroyed Thailand’s Ayutaya were these volunteer soldier villagers. For Burmese then these regular marauding expeditions into Thailand or Assam or Manipur not only quenched their serious militaristic aggression but also the at least 20% of the loot they could customarily keep as wages for their voluntary service.
Even now the Burmese army is still a volunteer army, unlike Thailand, as there are plenty of young men and boys willing to fight for pittance. Still almost every town, large or small, in Burma has an army unit stationed there. The way the army recruits, trains, and places new troops also has a heavy local flavor as most soldiers are locals.
Even when a soldier retires from the army for disability or old age he gets a post in the local civilian administration or the militia and still serves the army till his death as a part of the overreaching tentacles of the army.
I once read that during the century-long rule of India by the British-East-India Company, only 5000 odd British officers and just over 350,000 Indian soldiers were needed to brutally govern almost half-a-billion natives.
Now Burmese army has over 400,000 strong active army and almost triple that number ex-soldiers among the populace the 60 million people of Burma has a serious trouble shaking these blood suckers off their society.
I think your last sentence concisely gets at what I was trying to say, Than Shwe can get what he wants done, just not on a regular basis. I might expand it a bit and suggest that he is the only person in Burma who can, and in that sense he controls every thing in Burma.
As for what would happen if he were removed from the equation, that is the question isn’t it? I would agree that the main problem is the lack of competence and capacity, although I do think the chaos is sometimes purposeful, particularly in the ethnic minority areas. My guess, and it is only a guess, is that after Than Shwe the lack of capacity and competence will mix with the purposeful chaos in ways that the biggest faction won’t be able to control.
It’s not just the government, of course. There are sychophants all over who are more than happy to jump on the lese majeste band wagon. They are the spearhead of a sharpened sense of illusory self-importance that members of Thai society ascribe to themselves, later in history molded out of the Divine virtues assigned to the king and then, amazingly enough, transposing those same virtues unto themselves.
This is why you are quite wrong, Taro Mongkoltip. In genuine democracies, political leaders stand up and take the kind of mud Suzie Wong is throwing, and think nothing of it. Throwing political mud at any political player is allowed in a democracy. And do not come out with that worn-out lie that the King of Thailand is above politics. The Queen of England may be above politics, but the King of Thailand is still a big-time player in the great political struggle between monarchy (the rule of men) and constitutionalism (the rule of law). Genuine constitutional monarchs, who can justly claim to be above politics, have all gracefully admitted defeat in that struggle.
However, I think Suzie Wong is a bit over the top heaping blame on an individual rather than on the system, which is incurably corrupt. The King is human, and it is hard to expect him to willingly give up political power, some of which he used to do good. In his heyday, the King’s particular influence was to transmit the values of Buddhist kingship into policy, for which he was justly esteemed. Now he is old and frail, and more-or-less out of it, it is unfair to pin much of the blame for the train wreck on him personally.
Mmm..argh… What I asked for the proof was when you said “In Thailand today, there are security professionals whose job is to figure ways to silence and discredit people like Suzie.”
I was asking for the proof about those professional who trying to discredit people like Susie. No one would care about people like Susie Wong at all, if she or he doesn’t start slandering the king first.
And those professional that keep monitoring people like Susie Wong, because they are doing their job. Because it’s the law of the country, therefore, of course they have to keep monitoring them. Like every police department and defend service around the world. They wouldn’t do it just for fun.
The discussion since my last comment raises, for me at least, a couple of important points. The first is in response to Suzie Wong’ s provocative comparison of Thailand and Burma. Certainly Ms. Wong has a point, namely, that Burma and Thailand, when viewed from a sufficiently high level of abstraction are both not models of liberal pluralism. True enough there are authoritarian aspects of the Thai system, but I think the difference between the to countries are more important than their similarities. I am not a Thai specialist so my comments on Thailand are more impressionistic than they are based on extensive research. Given that I think it best that I shift the specifics of my point from a Burma-Thailand comparison to China-Burma comparison. (This is the area I work on.) No doubt that will not be to the liking of people who want to use the example of Burma to comment on — neighboring, cultural similar, historically mutually deeply involved — Thailand. But, nonetheless, I think it serves to make the point.
China is obviously an authoritarian regime and in that it is similar to Burma. They both imprison political opponents, have government controlled press, and brook no serious public criticism of the system. But in China the legitimacy of the government is based on nationalism validated by and grounded in economic growth and the growing prestige of the nation on the international stage. (Not being a Thai specialist I can’t really say too much about what this is in Thailand but it is certainly wrapped up with the monarchy and the present king. That explains much including Ms. Wong’s use of the king’s name and the reaction others have too it.) What is the equivalent narrative in Burma? Maybe something about the Tatmadaw saving the union from disintegration at the hands of internal (often but not solely ethnic minority) and neo-colonial enemies. In China the rhetoric of the CCP as saving the nation; bringing it back from national humiliation to (cultural-historical deserved) greatness has purchase; people believe it. Does anyone in Burma believe the Tatmadaw saved the nation from disintegration or neo-colonial domination? Does Than Shwe even believe this? I can’t say for sure but it seems to me that most people in Burma think of the Tatmadaw as a sort of colonial government that is exploiting, not saving, the nation. In my experience this included people in or connected to the Tatmadaw. Many seem to be cooperating with the military because they want to get ahead in life, provide for their family, have food, etc. So the key difference between China and Burma is that, broadly speaking, the party-state has legitimacy and the Tatmadaw dictatorship does not. Economic development and opportunity factor into this but I would suggest that that is a contingent and not a necessary relationship. In other words, the dominant narrative of government legitimacy in China is based, in part, on economic development, but, in theory, it could be otherwise, and the key point is the how accepted (or not) the narrative is.
So In Thailand I would re-frame Ms. Wong’s argument being that oligarchy that rules Thailand is not benevolent in the way it portrays itself as being. The thing is there seem to be real constituencies that see it as benevolent or at least potentially more benevolent than the populist (and benevolent authoritarian [?]) narrative on offer by the other side. But in Thailand both sides have numerically non-insignificant constituencies. (And, yes, I know a lot of people are just thinking of how either of these regimes of governance might directly affect their economic interests, but that too is part of the narrative in many cases.) In Burma, the system might as well be colonial, with the army having colonized the country. And I doubt that the real ideological supporters of the regime could fill a stadium or even perhaps a large auditorium.
I hope that was not too convoluted and/or confused (confusing).
Second, is the notion of how power is exercised in Burma. At first I thought aiontay had misunderstood what I was trying to say above. But on further consideration I think he is correct. The Tatmadaw might or might not want to run an Orwellian state but it does not seem capable of doing so now. I suppose one line of reasoning is that the chaos that is administration in Burma is purposeful, that it is a plan to keep control but keep those who would oppose the government off balance. But I doubt this. I think it is a lack of competence and capacity. They would like to have some sort of Orwellian control – the discipline flourishing bit – and legitimacy -that is the democracy part, but they can’t get either project going too well. So the result is one in which local actors get a lot of autonomy a lot of the time, but have to snap into line when “biggest and most cohesive faction in the country” chooses to focus some specific case/area/problem. Here there is an interesting similarity to China. Often local actors (government and commercial) have a lot of autonomy. But the authority of the central state can be brought to bear with great effect during specific campaigns. So, it seems to me that the way power is exercised in both polities (China and Burma, [I don’t know enough about Thailand to say]) has two seemingly contradictory aspects: (1) a high degree of (statutorily questionable) local autonomy most of the time; (2) the possibility for central authority focus on a problem/area/case and override the usual local autonomy. Than Shwe can certainly get any particular thing he wants done done in Burma, but he can’t get things running in the way he wants in a regularized way.
SRT union is already allied with PAD. Somsak Kosaisuk, one of the PAD core leaders is a former SRT union leader, and still involved. Half a year ago i photographed him during a union event being celebrated on the stage.
Re “All parties here are just business consortiums.” I think that this is too simplistic an approach. Anyway, here is a nice quote on the matter by expert Sondhi Limthongul:
“Nowadays, political parties are limited companies. They depend on who holds the majority shares. The Democrat party is perhaps better, because it has a more varied set of shareholders. Still, however varied it is, there are major shareholders. The People’s Power party has only one single main shareholder, who thus directly is the owner. This group of people [the shareholders; faction bosses] gives money to the phuak [cliques] of electocrats to stand [in elections]. This is not politics. It is investing in the business of democracy. That is, [we are dealing here with] the establishment of political party companies in order to take over Thailand.” (Nation Weekend, July 11, 2008)
I think Hla Oo and Semuren hit on a very important point, namely that the military regime has as one of its goals to fragment the country as a means of control. This is very clear in the minority areas very a variety of militias and paramilitaries have been support by the regime. This may seem an odd strategy for a regime that brooks no opposition, but given the constraints on the military, it is proabably the best strategy. Rather than attempt an all out Orwellian state, the regime simply makes sure it is the biggest and most cohesive faction in the country. Than Shwe controls everything in the country, not through some rigid system. but a patronage system whereby everyone, even the regime’s opponents, must cut with the military or be crushed.
Off topic, but it will be interesting to see which group backs the SRT workers first. Will it be yellow or red? Or do they all want a bit of the SRT land bank?
This was an interesting interview and much needed to add context to David Steinberg’s research, especially for those who haven’t had chance to interact with him in face-to-face public gatherings. Perhaps it’s an idea to ask readers to submit questions for consideration beforehand to ask interviewees. Thanks.
As for proof, I would encourage you to review the evidence for yourself. Several of the recent and well publicized cases:
Most recently, a report published in September 2009 suggested that the Thai military will monitor the internet and community radio stations for acts of lèse majesté.
It’s what has happened to individual people that is most disturbing: Harry Nicolaides (someone managed to track down a paragraph he had written in an obscure book and go to the trouble to prosecute him for it) , Giles Ji Ungpakorn (charged with a crime for his scholarly work), Jonathan Head (journalist). A number of people have recently been tracked down, harassed/charged/arrested for Internet-related activity: Chiranuch Premchaiporn, Theepakorn Wutthiphitthayamongkol, or Thossaporn Ruethaiprasertsung. Chiranuch was arrested when the offices of Prachatai were raided by the Crime Suppression police on 6 March 2009. Theepakorn Wutthiphitthayamongkol was questioned twice by Crime Suppression Division police in April 2009 for a comment posted on a website. Thossaporn was arrested for printing leaflets in a photocopying shop in April.
I think the evidence pointing to a serious and concerted state initiative is quite compelling.
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Lee Kuan who?
Well I arrived back in Oz, last week from Singapore via Phnom Phen and Laos. Singapore seems an island of stability and sanity, which Hun Sen’s Cambodia especially seems to be copying, allowing for local conditions.
Singapore seems more relaxed than before – I first visited in 1963 !!
Australian criticisms of Singapore take no account of Singapore’s local conditions. If you don’t like it – leave !!
The lese majeste circus continues
It beats me why the Thai Royalist elite persist with these image-destroying LM laws. It makes Thailand look like some backward, fuedal state – somewhat akin to Saudi Arabia !!
(Remember that jewel case !!?).
Surely it would achieve everything they want, but appear more modern and sophisticated simply with Singapore-style defamation laws !
And remember – Thailand already has extremely onerous defamation laws.
Can Southeast Asia’s royals survive?
It is great to see at the top of these postings, a mention of King Juan Carlos and Spain.
I’ve talked awhile among Thai and farang friends about whether there could be some hope for Thailand in the example of Juan Carlos’ Spain, which I re-visited some years ago – after having been there during the Franco era (including the day Chile’s Allende was overthrown).
Spain’s monarchy is now stronger than ever, due to :
1) the King’s support of democracy, and rejection of fascism.
2) his support for limited regional autonomy – eg. Catalonia, etc.
This has not stopped a few continuing separatist outrage bombings, etc. from Basque ETA extremists – Spain’s equivalent of Pattani murderers. But it has won over the huge majority of Spaniards.
Is it too much to hope that His Royal Highness The Crown Prince will be wisely guided, perhaps by Her Majesty The Queen and General Prem, in this modernising direction. ?
After all, it was Nixon who went to China.
Or are Thais going to face October 1976-style reaction, which this time will split Thailand to smithereens ?
ANU Thailand Update
Does anybody know if there will be some conference papers available online? I am particularly interested in what Professor Bhanupong has to say about military budget cycles and the coup. A google search didn’t help me find anything on the topic from his hand.
Sondhi Limthongkul takes the helm of the New Politics Party
They have identified Rayong as a potential stronghold. It will beinteresting to see how they paly the environmentalist card down there. Previosuly Democrats did well there on this issue but now in government they are compromised on it. The NPP in the short term may concentrate on issues like this.
No doubt they will also try to hit the party list as they will likely have a lot of votes but spread thin across the constituencies. They are national in a way that not even Banharn’s private party are. However dont expect them to win many seats at all. They arent PTP or Dems.
The pressure group side of NPP also exists. They can wreck any Democrat strategy to win just by standing in every central, eastern and lower northern constituency and split the potential anti-PTP vote. If Dems dont do what NPP like at least much of the time then the Dems are going to find that the odds on their victory next time are suddenly very very long and they already are pretty bad odds imho.
Agree with Nick on the real being about ideology
A Thai studies trilogy
I recently finished vol. 1, Nation (Siam Mapped, by Prof. Thongchai Winichakul), and agree it is an excellent, fascinating history of the formation of what we know now as the nation of Siam/Thailand. It explains the interplay of the colonial powers’ designs on S.E. Asia, the hegemonic reaction of the monarchy (esp. Rama V), and the new (to Siam) science of geography, which Siam had to learn quickly as the colonial powers demanded the mapping of borders, itself a new concept to Siam.
I followed that with The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy, by Prof. Chaiyan Rajchagool, published by White Lotus, also in 1994. It dovetails well in many ways with Thongchai’s Siam Mapped. It also dovetails well with King.
One man to rule them all
In my opinion, the discussion here lacks theoretical framework of analysis concerning democracy, growth, and the role of the State. Analysis based on personal opinions without theoretical foundation offers no solution. Of course, everyone carries his/her own philosophical preference and bias i.e. liberal, conservative, realist, Marxist, etc. However, if we analyze the situation with knowledge regardless of our biases, we can agree with solution best suitable for Myanmar. Theory gives clarity and order.
I have two pertinent issues that I would like to address:
1. Chicken-and-egg debate
When we review the literature, there are many scholarly works on this debate. Western countries become economic powers because they were democratic societies or they are democratic society because they became economic powers. Which comes first? The choice has policy implications. Economic growth should come first or political reforms and democratization should come first. Hong Kong succeeded with laissez-faire while Singapore succeeded with strong one-man rule.
2. Stage of development
U.S. and U.K. were the first to industrialize with market led economy and democratic form of governance. However, Germany and Japan were the second wave, they know that in order to catch up with U.S. and U.K., they cannot use the same mode. Germany and Japan had strong State (Developmental State) in collaboration with the Bank. They had Zaibatsu played the key role with the State in its development. Most developing countries follow this model: authoritarian Developmental State for the short cut to economic growth.
I thin the debate should focus on these two issues: chicken-and-egg, and the role of the State: Developmental State or Laissez-faire. An which is best for Myanmar.
One man to rule them all
Is Burmese Army seen as a colonial rulers by its own people? No, most Burmese do not think so. They are rather seen as a revival of old imperial class by the brutally patronizing ways they behave and treat their own people.
The generals started from Ne Win and now Than Shwe also consider themselves as stepping on the traditional foot-steps of Burmese warrior kings. Almost all of the famous Burmese kings were self-made generals like them, not from the blood lines of kings.
The current Burmese administrative system based on the divisional warlords is very similar to the old imperial system in which every village and town is classified as a group of basic military unit.
In the old imperial system every ten households in a village has a group leader, Sae-ein-goung in Burmese, and as a group they had to provide ten voluntary soldiers complete with their own weaponry, bed rolls, and cooking utensils whenever the king of the day summoned his volunteer or people army.
Villages are classified as 50 or 100 village depending on the number of soldiers they had to send. Towns also are classified as 1000, 2000, or 5000 town.
Traditionally every Burmese boy had to learn martial arts and been tattooed heavily for protection in the battle and also for exciting mindless aggression and extreme violence when they face the enemy. War is in their blood and they will madly fight to death for no reason other than just for the sake of fighting.
The Burmese armies which looted and destroyed Thailand’s Ayutaya were these volunteer soldier villagers. For Burmese then these regular marauding expeditions into Thailand or Assam or Manipur not only quenched their serious militaristic aggression but also the at least 20% of the loot they could customarily keep as wages for their voluntary service.
Even now the Burmese army is still a volunteer army, unlike Thailand, as there are plenty of young men and boys willing to fight for pittance. Still almost every town, large or small, in Burma has an army unit stationed there. The way the army recruits, trains, and places new troops also has a heavy local flavor as most soldiers are locals.
Even when a soldier retires from the army for disability or old age he gets a post in the local civilian administration or the militia and still serves the army till his death as a part of the overreaching tentacles of the army.
I once read that during the century-long rule of India by the British-East-India Company, only 5000 odd British officers and just over 350,000 Indian soldiers were needed to brutally govern almost half-a-billion natives.
Now Burmese army has over 400,000 strong active army and almost triple that number ex-soldiers among the populace the 60 million people of Burma has a serious trouble shaking these blood suckers off their society.
One man to rule them all
Semuren,
I think your last sentence concisely gets at what I was trying to say, Than Shwe can get what he wants done, just not on a regular basis. I might expand it a bit and suggest that he is the only person in Burma who can, and in that sense he controls every thing in Burma.
As for what would happen if he were removed from the equation, that is the question isn’t it? I would agree that the main problem is the lack of competence and capacity, although I do think the chaos is sometimes purposeful, particularly in the ethnic minority areas. My guess, and it is only a guess, is that after Than Shwe the lack of capacity and competence will mix with the purposeful chaos in ways that the biggest faction won’t be able to control.
The lese majeste circus continues
It’s not just the government, of course. There are sychophants all over who are more than happy to jump on the lese majeste band wagon. They are the spearhead of a sharpened sense of illusory self-importance that members of Thai society ascribe to themselves, later in history molded out of the Divine virtues assigned to the king and then, amazingly enough, transposing those same virtues unto themselves.
Can Southeast Asia’s royals survive?
This is why you are quite wrong, Taro Mongkoltip. In genuine democracies, political leaders stand up and take the kind of mud Suzie Wong is throwing, and think nothing of it. Throwing political mud at any political player is allowed in a democracy. And do not come out with that worn-out lie that the King of Thailand is above politics. The Queen of England may be above politics, but the King of Thailand is still a big-time player in the great political struggle between monarchy (the rule of men) and constitutionalism (the rule of law). Genuine constitutional monarchs, who can justly claim to be above politics, have all gracefully admitted defeat in that struggle.
However, I think Suzie Wong is a bit over the top heaping blame on an individual rather than on the system, which is incurably corrupt. The King is human, and it is hard to expect him to willingly give up political power, some of which he used to do good. In his heyday, the King’s particular influence was to transmit the values of Buddhist kingship into policy, for which he was justly esteemed. Now he is old and frail, and more-or-less out of it, it is unfair to pin much of the blame for the train wreck on him personally.
One man to rule them all
Jotman,
Mmm..argh… What I asked for the proof was when you said “In Thailand today, there are security professionals whose job is to figure ways to silence and discredit people like Suzie.”
I was asking for the proof about those professional who trying to discredit people like Susie. No one would care about people like Susie Wong at all, if she or he doesn’t start slandering the king first.
And those professional that keep monitoring people like Susie Wong, because they are doing their job. Because it’s the law of the country, therefore, of course they have to keep monitoring them. Like every police department and defend service around the world. They wouldn’t do it just for fun.
Sondhi Limthongkul takes the helm of the New Politics Party
Sondhi’s membership number says it all.
What can the PAD / NPP achieve without the support of “members of a revered institution”?
– zilcho.
Even if they joined hands again that would guarantee the destruction of them both – if their doom is not already inevitable.
One man to rule them all
The discussion since my last comment raises, for me at least, a couple of important points. The first is in response to Suzie Wong’ s provocative comparison of Thailand and Burma. Certainly Ms. Wong has a point, namely, that Burma and Thailand, when viewed from a sufficiently high level of abstraction are both not models of liberal pluralism. True enough there are authoritarian aspects of the Thai system, but I think the difference between the to countries are more important than their similarities. I am not a Thai specialist so my comments on Thailand are more impressionistic than they are based on extensive research. Given that I think it best that I shift the specifics of my point from a Burma-Thailand comparison to China-Burma comparison. (This is the area I work on.) No doubt that will not be to the liking of people who want to use the example of Burma to comment on — neighboring, cultural similar, historically mutually deeply involved — Thailand. But, nonetheless, I think it serves to make the point.
China is obviously an authoritarian regime and in that it is similar to Burma. They both imprison political opponents, have government controlled press, and brook no serious public criticism of the system. But in China the legitimacy of the government is based on nationalism validated by and grounded in economic growth and the growing prestige of the nation on the international stage. (Not being a Thai specialist I can’t really say too much about what this is in Thailand but it is certainly wrapped up with the monarchy and the present king. That explains much including Ms. Wong’s use of the king’s name and the reaction others have too it.) What is the equivalent narrative in Burma? Maybe something about the Tatmadaw saving the union from disintegration at the hands of internal (often but not solely ethnic minority) and neo-colonial enemies. In China the rhetoric of the CCP as saving the nation; bringing it back from national humiliation to (cultural-historical deserved) greatness has purchase; people believe it. Does anyone in Burma believe the Tatmadaw saved the nation from disintegration or neo-colonial domination? Does Than Shwe even believe this? I can’t say for sure but it seems to me that most people in Burma think of the Tatmadaw as a sort of colonial government that is exploiting, not saving, the nation. In my experience this included people in or connected to the Tatmadaw. Many seem to be cooperating with the military because they want to get ahead in life, provide for their family, have food, etc. So the key difference between China and Burma is that, broadly speaking, the party-state has legitimacy and the Tatmadaw dictatorship does not. Economic development and opportunity factor into this but I would suggest that that is a contingent and not a necessary relationship. In other words, the dominant narrative of government legitimacy in China is based, in part, on economic development, but, in theory, it could be otherwise, and the key point is the how accepted (or not) the narrative is.
So In Thailand I would re-frame Ms. Wong’s argument being that oligarchy that rules Thailand is not benevolent in the way it portrays itself as being. The thing is there seem to be real constituencies that see it as benevolent or at least potentially more benevolent than the populist (and benevolent authoritarian [?]) narrative on offer by the other side. But in Thailand both sides have numerically non-insignificant constituencies. (And, yes, I know a lot of people are just thinking of how either of these regimes of governance might directly affect their economic interests, but that too is part of the narrative in many cases.) In Burma, the system might as well be colonial, with the army having colonized the country. And I doubt that the real ideological supporters of the regime could fill a stadium or even perhaps a large auditorium.
I hope that was not too convoluted and/or confused (confusing).
Second, is the notion of how power is exercised in Burma. At first I thought aiontay had misunderstood what I was trying to say above. But on further consideration I think he is correct. The Tatmadaw might or might not want to run an Orwellian state but it does not seem capable of doing so now. I suppose one line of reasoning is that the chaos that is administration in Burma is purposeful, that it is a plan to keep control but keep those who would oppose the government off balance. But I doubt this. I think it is a lack of competence and capacity. They would like to have some sort of Orwellian control – the discipline flourishing bit – and legitimacy -that is the democracy part, but they can’t get either project going too well. So the result is one in which local actors get a lot of autonomy a lot of the time, but have to snap into line when “biggest and most cohesive faction in the country” chooses to focus some specific case/area/problem. Here there is an interesting similarity to China. Often local actors (government and commercial) have a lot of autonomy. But the authority of the central state can be brought to bear with great effect during specific campaigns. So, it seems to me that the way power is exercised in both polities (China and Burma, [I don’t know enough about Thailand to say]) has two seemingly contradictory aspects: (1) a high degree of (statutorily questionable) local autonomy most of the time; (2) the possibility for central authority focus on a problem/area/case and override the usual local autonomy. Than Shwe can certainly get any particular thing he wants done done in Burma, but he can’t get things running in the way he wants in a regularized way.
Sondhi Limthongkul takes the helm of the New Politics Party
“Les Abbey”
SRT union is already allied with PAD. Somsak Kosaisuk, one of the PAD core leaders is a former SRT union leader, and still involved. Half a year ago i photographed him during a union event being celebrated on the stage.
Sondhi Limthongkul takes the helm of the New Politics Party
WLH:
Re “All parties here are just business consortiums.” I think that this is too simplistic an approach. Anyway, here is a nice quote on the matter by expert Sondhi Limthongul:
“Nowadays, political parties are limited companies. They depend on who holds the majority shares. The Democrat party is perhaps better, because it has a more varied set of shareholders. Still, however varied it is, there are major shareholders. The People’s Power party has only one single main shareholder, who thus directly is the owner. This group of people [the shareholders; faction bosses] gives money to the phuak [cliques] of electocrats to stand [in elections]. This is not politics. It is investing in the business of democracy. That is, [we are dealing here with] the establishment of political party companies in order to take over Thailand.” (Nation Weekend, July 11, 2008)
One man to rule them all
I think Hla Oo and Semuren hit on a very important point, namely that the military regime has as one of its goals to fragment the country as a means of control. This is very clear in the minority areas very a variety of militias and paramilitaries have been support by the regime. This may seem an odd strategy for a regime that brooks no opposition, but given the constraints on the military, it is proabably the best strategy. Rather than attempt an all out Orwellian state, the regime simply makes sure it is the biggest and most cohesive faction in the country. Than Shwe controls everything in the country, not through some rigid system. but a patronage system whereby everyone, even the regime’s opponents, must cut with the military or be crushed.
Sondhi Limthongkul takes the helm of the New Politics Party
Off topic, but it will be interesting to see which group backs the SRT workers first. Will it be yellow or red? Or do they all want a bit of the SRT land bank?
Interview with Professor David Steinberg
This was an interesting interview and much needed to add context to David Steinberg’s research, especially for those who haven’t had chance to interact with him in face-to-face public gatherings. Perhaps it’s an idea to ask readers to submit questions for consideration beforehand to ask interviewees. Thanks.
One man to rule them all
Taro,
As for proof, I would encourage you to review the evidence for yourself. Several of the recent and well publicized cases:
Most recently, a report published in September 2009 suggested that the Thai military will monitor the internet and community radio stations for acts of lèse majesté.
It’s what has happened to individual people that is most disturbing: Harry Nicolaides (someone managed to track down a paragraph he had written in an obscure book and go to the trouble to prosecute him for it) , Giles Ji Ungpakorn (charged with a crime for his scholarly work), Jonathan Head (journalist). A number of people have recently been tracked down, harassed/charged/arrested for Internet-related activity: Chiranuch Premchaiporn, Theepakorn Wutthiphitthayamongkol, or Thossaporn Ruethaiprasertsung. Chiranuch was arrested when the offices of Prachatai were raided by the Crime Suppression police on 6 March 2009. Theepakorn Wutthiphitthayamongkol was questioned twice by Crime Suppression Division police in April 2009 for a comment posted on a website. Thossaporn was arrested for printing leaflets in a photocopying shop in April.
I think the evidence pointing to a serious and concerted state initiative is quite compelling.