Okay, settle down. All you paranoid posters.
I was able to access Not The Nation at my office today (not TrueISP) and on my phone (AIS).
When I came home, I checked again and still could not open the page.
I rang True’s help line and a very helpful woman walked me through a couple of steps and gave me some proxy settings to enter.
Now, all is fine.
To me it shows how easy it to let your paranoias about “big brother” take over – which doesn’t help a lot in a land like this.
What next after nuclear Myanmar – nuclear Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia??? Myanmar seems to now want to take the N.Korean route to geopolitical ‘respectability’ – and the N.Koreans are more than happy to aid them… The Junta can deter future Thai and/or ASEAN governments from raising the issue of ‘democracy’ and/or Aung San Suu Kyi by ‘testing’ a missile into the Gulf of Thailand or the Strait of Malacca???
The house dissolution card is PMAbhisit’s main power bargaining chip (maybe the only one) against the deep influence of Suthep and Newin and he has/will certainly maximize it. It was a tool to deter unwarranted, unreasonable demands from coalition partners first and foremost. As I’ve mentioned before, the loss of BJT (and their nominee in the CTP) in the by-elections may have the effect of, ironically, strengthening the coalition. The previous over-eagerness of BJT ministers to push through huge controversial projects suggest a party filling up their ‘war chest’ to prepare for an expected election.
In fact, the NGV bus deal is almost like shooting two birds with one stone. The BJT can discredit/kill the Democrats in Bangkok (who tend to vote for the party perceived to be less corrupt) and use the money to dominate rural elections – thus they may be able to form government and put their man in the position of prime minister. It is now back to the drawing board for BJT and they must find a way to ‘out-sincere’ PMThaksin in the eyes of Isan voters. A bigger, brasher version of Thaksin’s ‘reality show’ at Artsamart clearly does not suffice.
It seems that PMAbhisit can now use the house dissolution at the most advantageous time for the Democrats – but all is not that simple as the Election Commission have seek to disqualify a sizable number of coalition MPs for holding shares in companies with government concessions. I think this is good development against corruption (does the rule now cover some of the loopholes and extend to immediate family too?).
“I think he was suggesting that Maria and others would be disappointed to not find Askew’s material cited in the ICG report.” > Yes, this was what I meant.
I appreciate the details chronological of the events. I would like to add a few comments:
1. I think it is beneficial to explain the Burma military regime’s perception from Robert Jervis’s psychological approach dealing with motivational bias. However, I think the same approach should be applied to the U.S. and U.K. but from cognitive bias perspective because at the time their scholars were flirting with the “democratic peace” approach, which had led to the mishandling of Burma.
2. Both Albright and Rice were Russian experts with little knowledge of Asia, plus they were the product of the Cold War education, while the emergence of the 1988 Aug San Suu Kyi pro-democracy movement was the Post-Cold War Japan’s hegemonic challenge objective. The continue lacking of the theoretical knowledge of the Post-Cold War new strategic landscape and the changing of main actors in the arena, had led to the September 11, 2001 attacks. I feel the article did not differentiate between the two very different theoretical frameworks: the Cold War and the Post-Cold War. Japan, the main actor behind Aung San Suu Kyi, was completely not even mentioned in the article.
3. Maintaining the Cold War approach has made the article missed the crucial explanatory tools to explain the strategic interaction of the events. In other words, it can only explain half of the underlie reasons of why the events occurred. For example, the article continued to explain about China from the Cold War attitude when China’s role in the Post-Cold War is just the opposite i.e. India-China relationship.
4. I think it’s time to begin positive and constructive engagement with Burma. Isolating Burma would simply leave political and military vacuum to an undesirable outcome. In order to achieve that, the analyst needs to understand the Post-Cold War Grand Strategy of Hegemon. The hegemonic challengers and the Hegemon have the same Grand Strategy because we just have one world.
Thank you for the details information, I hope to have a chance for intellectual exchange at some point in the near future.
Abhisit will also face less problems from BJT as they lick their wounds and realise they need a longer period to get their message across. Indeed the government looks here for a while.
A big win for PTP but Abhisit probably wont be too worried. PTP and Dems remain the big players and the BJT experience is still developing. Now it looks likely to be a small to medium sized party rather than teh potentially big one a few short weeks ago some analysts were predicting.
One problem all face is that come the general election it is quite likely that there will be no outright winner and another messy interfered with and weak coalition is the result. That may well suit certain non-parliamentary players.
In the meantime it is quite likely everyone will avoid trying to make a mistake or misstep. PTP and the Dems seem to have their turf staked out. Maybe the battle lies in trying to eat the ground of others.
I think I actually misunderstood Srithanochai’s first comment. I think he was suggesting that Maria and others would be disappointed to not find Askew’s material cited in the ICG report. I mistakenly thought he was saying that people would be disappointed in Askew’s work, so I assumed that you were probably referring to his controversial view (that is posted in New Mandala) that no other area studies specialist has offered on the south. Here it is again: “The insurgents (if they can be so named) are fighting an Islamic people’s war, notwithstanding the fact that most Malay Muslims in the south are not terribly interested in this cause, though they are all affected” (see http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2007/08/31/nothing-much-new/#more-1452).
The point I was getting at was that Askew’s comment might be heavily criticized because of the moralism guiding area studies specialists and human rights activists take on the south. More specifically, I think it’s likely that — in general — area studies specialists and human rights activists are highly critical of Askew’s take because of the overwhelming consensus in these intellectual circles that ethnicity trumps religion as a causal factor, and that the Muslims in the south are determined to see their identity given more legitimacy. In the current politics of representation of the movement in southern Thailand, suggesting Islam as a causal factor in these intellectual circles is generally considered academically, politically, and morally incorrect – ultimately considered a conservative vilification of an ethnic minority group that has been marginalized by the Thai state and its apparatus.
But I think that when area studies specialists and human rights activists (and some others) tend to downplay Islam by saying 1) that Islam is “merely” a “mobilization tool”; and 2) that specific strands of Islam and/or links to Al Queda or JI do not exist, they are falling prey to the classical error in social science research of argumentum ad populum, in which a thesis is asserted, even acclaimed, because it resonates with the moral schemas and expectations of its audience.
I think these kinds of arguments can in part be understood as a kind of reactionary analysis to the alarmist literature (produced by the likes of Rohan and Abuza) and the US “war on terror.” In other words, many who work on the south feel not only obligated to address the public and policy debates on Islam, but to do so in a way that reduces cause for alarm. (The highly-respected John Sidel has gone to great lengths to minimize alarmist concerns in a few articles on the Islamic threat in SEA and in his book on violence in Indonesia.)
Ironically, even at a time when area studies specialists and human rights activists are committed to emphasizing the local factors at the expense of international ones, historians do not take any heat for producing work that emphasizes the significance of SEA Muslims associational activities in the Middle East and how these ties shaped nationalist movements in SEA. In fact, Michael Laffan’s book (http://www.amazon.com/Islamic-Nationhood-Colonial-Indonesia-Below/dp/0415297575/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1246242818&sr=8-1) has received a lot of well-deserved praise. But you don’t see any area studies academics talking about these contemporary activities abroad, do you?
When I first put this Thai article and its translation in, I wasn’t paying much attention to the fact that I had touched upon the crux of the matter of the Thai politics from 1932 to the current situation.
Because I had mentioned in my earlier comments somewhere in NM that in order to understand Thai political events, the focus must be put on Phumipon Adunyadet not the Military or the Politicians, so I assumed that every one knows that the real usual suspect is Phumipon. For example, when I glanced through the earlier comments in this article, at the time, I recognized that they were trying to discredit Marc Askew’s translation, not because of his translation but because he posted the matter relates to Phumipon. Here I am in the same boat as Marc Askew but heavier because I translated the root cause of the problem; Phumipon and his connection of Thai politics to international politics, in academic term, it is called the two-level game. In other words, Phumipon in connection to the external power (not the U.S. , the U.K., or China) but Japan. So my translation of what it seems a simple matter becomes a serious issue.
At issue are two main points:
1. Understanding Thai politics of present day, scholars have to go back to the origin of the 1932 Coup d’etat because its divergence stems from the conflict of the Allied and the Axis. For example, in order to understand why the article “Eat Thainess” that NM posted, occurred on 24th June 2009, and why Phumipon against foreigners’ rice, one needs to trace back to the 1932 Coup d’etat and the death of his brother Rama 8. The country was celebrating the 24th June 1932, the first constitution that put the Monarchy under the Constitution. But Phumipon wanted the country to celebrate himself not the significant of the 24th June 1932, so the “eat thainess” occurred to arouse nationalistic against Westerners and on the date 24th June 2009.
2. The death of Phumipon’s brother, Rama 8, of which only Phumipon knows how his brother died, no one else in the world knows, was not accident. The death was indeed directly related to the Allied versus the Axis. Prachatipok (Rama 7) went to Japan to sign the pact with Japan, (the trip also available on YouTube) which led to the 1932 Coup d’etat. Without military force, the “turning point” would not have happened. Rama 8 was close to Pridi (the Allied) while Phumipon was with Phibunsongkram (the Axis), this led to the death of Rama 8.
Because of the above reasons, my translation of this subject becomes issue of contention, and also Chandra Aditya is trying to dilute the meaning of the article, or the importance of the 24th June 1932.
With the help of Susie Wong and Sidh S, maybe the following translation.
What is the real meaning of 24 July 1932 in the present moment? Simply put, it would be democracy in its most complete form. In another sense, [the date] has been regarded as the most important turning point for the country in which [the coup leaders] had the courage to affirm for the first time the principle that the supreme power in the land belonged to all the people. This brought it into the real world for us, even though democracy in the form that the People’s Party wanted to create had never really existed previously in Thai society.
Calm down, Susie#24. Any one well versed in Thai will know that your translation in the last part in #22 is inaccurate. I am merely pointing that out and ask you to be more consistent, as your handling of Thai is obviously very good. No need to get over-emotional there and make a mountain out of a mole hill.
For the record, for me, AjarnPridi and King Prajadhibok both deserves equal credit for the Siam/Thailand’s first step towards democracy and the 24th of June is a celebration of both their legacies. One is impossible without the other. You can, of course, accuse me of leaving out FMPibul – as at the end of the day it was a coup d’etat that was not possible without military teeth provided by FMPibul. Yes, Thai Democracy – as the paragraph you attached suggests – is a bastard child of imported democratic ideals that does not exist in Siamese/Thai political culture prior AND a military coup. Democracy as a mass movement came much later and has, since 1973 at least, been negotiating power away from the traditional groups. Yes, whatever sensationalists that compare Thai Democracy to Myanmar’s or N.Korea’s say, Thailand has, in her specific way, never been more democratic. The future post-PMThaksin, post-Newin, post-military influence actually looks alright…
About The Talented Mr.Newin, I am certain that your English is also good enough to know my real thoughts towards his ways and methods. I see him as PMThaksin’s #1 student with attributes that Thaksin does not have that makes him a potentially (more) dangerous figure. Remember that he served time in military prison right after the 2006 coup – and here he is now establishing allies in the military as his political base. Remember that he maintained his loyalty to PMThaksin until PMSamak’s “Gang of Four” was literally dismantled by the courts last year and he lost favor with Thaksin who has since only trust his family to manage party affairs.
Thanks very much for your detailed and interesting comment. You are correct re the meaning of my comment. It was indeed about rather different perceptions/interpretations amongst academics on what the “Southern Fire” actually is about.
Sidh S, I suggest you read the whole article in Prachatai News and also write to the author of the article and ask him. Your misleading intention is clear when you avoid the words “р╕Эр╣Ир╕▓р╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕бр╣Др╕Ы” and “р╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╕Цр╕╢р╕З”.
At issue here is your intention to discredit the 1932 Coup d’etate Group’s visions and objectives, and to play a psychological game of doubt against me because I write about Phumipon. Don’t try your cheap shot with me, would you? Stick to the issue instead of personal attacks, because I have no intention to play your games.
Your agenda in promoting Newin Chidchob in comment #8 is pathetic, don’t you get that Puea Thai Party won by a landslide. No one in the country trusts Newin Chidchob. Stabbing others in the back is simply unacceptable in any society. Newin’s political future is finished.
As for Phumipon’s Thai State, the country is saying this:
From the Thai E-News website, I learn that Amnesty International is getting involved in this case. Attached message below is some sections from Reuters’ Headline and Amnesty International.
“Thailand: Closed trial threatens justice
25 June 2009
The Thai authorities should immediately allow a public trial for Darunee Charnchoengsilpakul, who is charged with violating Thailand’s lese majeste law for allegedly insulting the monarchy, Amnesty International said today.
Judge Prommat Toosang of the Criminal Court in Bangkok ordered a closed trial as proceedings began on Tuesday against Darunee Charnchoengsilpakul for comments she made during a speech at a demonstration in July 2008.
“Under international law, public hearings are crucial for protecting an individual’s right to a fair trial and due process,” said Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International’s Asia-Pacific director. “When a judge closes the doors on a trial it significantly raises the risk of injustice taking place.”
“The Thai government will have a very difficult time explaining why the trial of someone charged with making an insulting remark could compromise Thailand’s national security,” said Sam Zarifi.
Judge Prommat reportedly said that he could “guarantee the defendant will get a fair trial”, despite barring the public and the press.
“This guarantee is simply not verifiable if the doors are closed, which is why international and Thai law call for public trials,” said Sam Zarifi. “In this case, a fair trial means that the doors should remain open”.
It’s just standard defensive patenting, nothing unusual or extraordinary, it’s done by many countries. Maybe it’s unusual in that it’s rarely accomplished here to the level where the actual patent is granted, when it should have been done more often and started many years ago. And in this case HM is just doing his job as any head of state would do.
Per Susie’s comment on IFPRI, methink it’s understandable if people who live through the cold war didn’t think they owe anything to the US. It’s not like it’s given to Thailand out of pure altruism. It’s quid pro quo through and through. Look up how deep Thailand got involved in the Vietnam war.
Here’s my disclaimer: I’m a complete dilettante here in Thailand. My training is actually in South Asian studies. Mr. Johnson correctly guessed my place of work. Basically, I’m here for the self-serving reason of postponing grad school. My ‘real’ interest is in Tamil Islamic devotional literature (Whew!) My perception of things here in the south of Thailand is colored by my experiences in India. India, obviously, is a very different place, but it’s still the unconscious standard when I’m thinking about ethnic/linguistic or Muslim minorities.
In other words, I’m totally ready to defer to people with a better systematic understanding, more complete grasp of the literature and longer-standing interest. 🙂 And yes, a lot of the assumptions that I had about politics coming to the south have been thoroughly shaken; now that I’m getting a new perspective on all the above stuff, I’m becoming more excited about going back to school. I love having my assumptions shaken. Please keep shaking.
Yes, the sense that I got from most of what I had seen/read before actually coming here was that Malay Muslims were resisting assimilation into the Thai state (for whatever reasons). Imagine my bemusement when, as I was walking down Narathat Beach, a kid shouted at me in English, “I love Thailand!”
I now realize that I had still been working from my Tamil schema. Maybe that’s why McCargo’s work was appealing to me — the focus on ethnic and linguistic rather than religious issues resonates more with my paradigm.
Next time I’m in Bangkok, I’m definitely going to pick up some of Askew’s books. (I remember seeing them, picking them up, then imagining my total bill at the checkout counter before putting them back!) I did read part of the slim volume on disorderly borders at the library, though mostly for historical stats. Oh, to have more than 24 hours in a day…
This is going a bit off topic, but since we’re talking about McCargo, Askew, the ICG and various other researchers, is there a good, balanced reading list on the south available? (By balanced I mean showing a whole range of thought, sources and opinions.) Not only on the conflict dimensions, either. (I have Thai South and Malay North on my bookshelf right now, just waiting to be read.)
One last thought — I think the scare quotes around “the” Malay people are important. It’s such a duh question, but which Malay people are we talking about? It’s not like everybody has the same interests, beliefs or stakes in the game. Even one individual can have conflicting ideas and priorities. (I certainly do!)
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Okay, settle down. All you paranoid posters.
I was able to access Not The Nation at my office today (not TrueISP) and on my phone (AIS).
When I came home, I checked again and still could not open the page.
I rang True’s help line and a very helpful woman walked me through a couple of steps and gave me some proxy settings to enter.
Now, all is fine.
To me it shows how easy it to let your paranoias about “big brother” take over – which doesn’t help a lot in a land like this.
Burma’s nuclear ambitions
How exactly was Japan the main actor behind ASSK?
Burma’s nuclear ambitions
What next after nuclear Myanmar – nuclear Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia??? Myanmar seems to now want to take the N.Korean route to geopolitical ‘respectability’ – and the N.Koreans are more than happy to aid them… The Junta can deter future Thai and/or ASEAN governments from raising the issue of ‘democracy’ and/or Aung San Suu Kyi by ‘testing’ a missile into the Gulf of Thailand or the Strait of Malacca???
Why Abhisit won’t call an election
The house dissolution card is PMAbhisit’s main power bargaining chip (maybe the only one) against the deep influence of Suthep and Newin and he has/will certainly maximize it. It was a tool to deter unwarranted, unreasonable demands from coalition partners first and foremost. As I’ve mentioned before, the loss of BJT (and their nominee in the CTP) in the by-elections may have the effect of, ironically, strengthening the coalition. The previous over-eagerness of BJT ministers to push through huge controversial projects suggest a party filling up their ‘war chest’ to prepare for an expected election.
In fact, the NGV bus deal is almost like shooting two birds with one stone. The BJT can discredit/kill the Democrats in Bangkok (who tend to vote for the party perceived to be less corrupt) and use the money to dominate rural elections – thus they may be able to form government and put their man in the position of prime minister. It is now back to the drawing board for BJT and they must find a way to ‘out-sincere’ PMThaksin in the eyes of Isan voters. A bigger, brasher version of Thaksin’s ‘reality show’ at Artsamart clearly does not suffice.
It seems that PMAbhisit can now use the house dissolution at the most advantageous time for the Democrats – but all is not that simple as the Election Commission have seek to disqualify a sizable number of coalition MPs for holding shares in companies with government concessions. I think this is good development against corruption (does the rule now cover some of the loopholes and extend to immediate family too?).
Why Abhisit won’t call an election
Thaksin has majority support.
No elections will be held.
Expect a coup when HMK passes.
ICG on Thailand’s deep south
Jason:
“I think he was suggesting that Maria and others would be disappointed to not find Askew’s material cited in the ICG report.” > Yes, this was what I meant.
Burma’s nuclear ambitions
I appreciate the details chronological of the events. I would like to add a few comments:
1. I think it is beneficial to explain the Burma military regime’s perception from Robert Jervis’s psychological approach dealing with motivational bias. However, I think the same approach should be applied to the U.S. and U.K. but from cognitive bias perspective because at the time their scholars were flirting with the “democratic peace” approach, which had led to the mishandling of Burma.
2. Both Albright and Rice were Russian experts with little knowledge of Asia, plus they were the product of the Cold War education, while the emergence of the 1988 Aug San Suu Kyi pro-democracy movement was the Post-Cold War Japan’s hegemonic challenge objective. The continue lacking of the theoretical knowledge of the Post-Cold War new strategic landscape and the changing of main actors in the arena, had led to the September 11, 2001 attacks. I feel the article did not differentiate between the two very different theoretical frameworks: the Cold War and the Post-Cold War. Japan, the main actor behind Aung San Suu Kyi, was completely not even mentioned in the article.
3. Maintaining the Cold War approach has made the article missed the crucial explanatory tools to explain the strategic interaction of the events. In other words, it can only explain half of the underlie reasons of why the events occurred. For example, the article continued to explain about China from the Cold War attitude when China’s role in the Post-Cold War is just the opposite i.e. India-China relationship.
4. I think it’s time to begin positive and constructive engagement with Burma. Isolating Burma would simply leave political and military vacuum to an undesirable outcome. In order to achieve that, the analyst needs to understand the Post-Cold War Grand Strategy of Hegemon. The hegemonic challengers and the Hegemon have the same Grand Strategy because we just have one world.
Thank you for the details information, I hope to have a chance for intellectual exchange at some point in the near future.
Why Abhisit won’t call an election
Abhisit will also face less problems from BJT as they lick their wounds and realise they need a longer period to get their message across. Indeed the government looks here for a while.
A big win for PTP but Abhisit probably wont be too worried. PTP and Dems remain the big players and the BJT experience is still developing. Now it looks likely to be a small to medium sized party rather than teh potentially big one a few short weeks ago some analysts were predicting.
One problem all face is that come the general election it is quite likely that there will be no outright winner and another messy interfered with and weak coalition is the result. That may well suit certain non-parliamentary players.
In the meantime it is quite likely everyone will avoid trying to make a mistake or misstep. PTP and the Dems seem to have their turf staked out. Maybe the battle lies in trying to eat the ground of others.
ICG on Thailand’s deep south
I think I actually misunderstood Srithanochai’s first comment. I think he was suggesting that Maria and others would be disappointed to not find Askew’s material cited in the ICG report. I mistakenly thought he was saying that people would be disappointed in Askew’s work, so I assumed that you were probably referring to his controversial view (that is posted in New Mandala) that no other area studies specialist has offered on the south. Here it is again: “The insurgents (if they can be so named) are fighting an Islamic people’s war, notwithstanding the fact that most Malay Muslims in the south are not terribly interested in this cause, though they are all affected” (see http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2007/08/31/nothing-much-new/#more-1452).
The point I was getting at was that Askew’s comment might be heavily criticized because of the moralism guiding area studies specialists and human rights activists take on the south. More specifically, I think it’s likely that — in general — area studies specialists and human rights activists are highly critical of Askew’s take because of the overwhelming consensus in these intellectual circles that ethnicity trumps religion as a causal factor, and that the Muslims in the south are determined to see their identity given more legitimacy. In the current politics of representation of the movement in southern Thailand, suggesting Islam as a causal factor in these intellectual circles is generally considered academically, politically, and morally incorrect – ultimately considered a conservative vilification of an ethnic minority group that has been marginalized by the Thai state and its apparatus.
But I think that when area studies specialists and human rights activists (and some others) tend to downplay Islam by saying 1) that Islam is “merely” a “mobilization tool”; and 2) that specific strands of Islam and/or links to Al Queda or JI do not exist, they are falling prey to the classical error in social science research of argumentum ad populum, in which a thesis is asserted, even acclaimed, because it resonates with the moral schemas and expectations of its audience.
I think these kinds of arguments can in part be understood as a kind of reactionary analysis to the alarmist literature (produced by the likes of Rohan and Abuza) and the US “war on terror.” In other words, many who work on the south feel not only obligated to address the public and policy debates on Islam, but to do so in a way that reduces cause for alarm. (The highly-respected John Sidel has gone to great lengths to minimize alarmist concerns in a few articles on the Islamic threat in SEA and in his book on violence in Indonesia.)
Ironically, even at a time when area studies specialists and human rights activists are committed to emphasizing the local factors at the expense of international ones, historians do not take any heat for producing work that emphasizes the significance of SEA Muslims associational activities in the Middle East and how these ties shaped nationalist movements in SEA. In fact, Michael Laffan’s book (http://www.amazon.com/Islamic-Nationhood-Colonial-Indonesia-Below/dp/0415297575/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1246242818&sr=8-1) has received a lot of well-deserved praise. But you don’t see any area studies academics talking about these contemporary activities abroad, do you?
Signs of the Thai state
When I first put this Thai article and its translation in, I wasn’t paying much attention to the fact that I had touched upon the crux of the matter of the Thai politics from 1932 to the current situation.
Because I had mentioned in my earlier comments somewhere in NM that in order to understand Thai political events, the focus must be put on Phumipon Adunyadet not the Military or the Politicians, so I assumed that every one knows that the real usual suspect is Phumipon. For example, when I glanced through the earlier comments in this article, at the time, I recognized that they were trying to discredit Marc Askew’s translation, not because of his translation but because he posted the matter relates to Phumipon. Here I am in the same boat as Marc Askew but heavier because I translated the root cause of the problem; Phumipon and his connection of Thai politics to international politics, in academic term, it is called the two-level game. In other words, Phumipon in connection to the external power (not the U.S. , the U.K., or China) but Japan. So my translation of what it seems a simple matter becomes a serious issue.
At issue are two main points:
1. Understanding Thai politics of present day, scholars have to go back to the origin of the 1932 Coup d’etat because its divergence stems from the conflict of the Allied and the Axis. For example, in order to understand why the article “Eat Thainess” that NM posted, occurred on 24th June 2009, and why Phumipon against foreigners’ rice, one needs to trace back to the 1932 Coup d’etat and the death of his brother Rama 8. The country was celebrating the 24th June 1932, the first constitution that put the Monarchy under the Constitution. But Phumipon wanted the country to celebrate himself not the significant of the 24th June 1932, so the “eat thainess” occurred to arouse nationalistic against Westerners and on the date 24th June 2009.
2. The death of Phumipon’s brother, Rama 8, of which only Phumipon knows how his brother died, no one else in the world knows, was not accident. The death was indeed directly related to the Allied versus the Axis. Prachatipok (Rama 7) went to Japan to sign the pact with Japan, (the trip also available on YouTube) which led to the 1932 Coup d’etat. Without military force, the “turning point” would not have happened. Rama 8 was close to Pridi (the Allied) while Phumipon was with Phibunsongkram (the Axis), this led to the death of Rama 8.
Because of the above reasons, my translation of this subject becomes issue of contention, and also Chandra Aditya is trying to dilute the meaning of the article, or the importance of the 24th June 1932.
Signs of the Thai state
With the help of Susie Wong and Sidh S, maybe the following translation.
What is the real meaning of 24 July 1932 in the present moment? Simply put, it would be democracy in its most complete form. In another sense, [the date] has been regarded as the most important turning point for the country in which [the coup leaders] had the courage to affirm for the first time the principle that the supreme power in the land belonged to all the people. This brought it into the real world for us, even though democracy in the form that the People’s Party wanted to create had never really existed previously in Thai society.
Signs of the Thai state
Calm down, Susie#24. Any one well versed in Thai will know that your translation in the last part in #22 is inaccurate. I am merely pointing that out and ask you to be more consistent, as your handling of Thai is obviously very good. No need to get over-emotional there and make a mountain out of a mole hill.
For the record, for me, AjarnPridi and King Prajadhibok both deserves equal credit for the Siam/Thailand’s first step towards democracy and the 24th of June is a celebration of both their legacies. One is impossible without the other. You can, of course, accuse me of leaving out FMPibul – as at the end of the day it was a coup d’etat that was not possible without military teeth provided by FMPibul. Yes, Thai Democracy – as the paragraph you attached suggests – is a bastard child of imported democratic ideals that does not exist in Siamese/Thai political culture prior AND a military coup. Democracy as a mass movement came much later and has, since 1973 at least, been negotiating power away from the traditional groups. Yes, whatever sensationalists that compare Thai Democracy to Myanmar’s or N.Korea’s say, Thailand has, in her specific way, never been more democratic. The future post-PMThaksin, post-Newin, post-military influence actually looks alright…
About The Talented Mr.Newin, I am certain that your English is also good enough to know my real thoughts towards his ways and methods. I see him as PMThaksin’s #1 student with attributes that Thaksin does not have that makes him a potentially (more) dangerous figure. Remember that he served time in military prison right after the 2006 coup – and here he is now establishing allies in the military as his political base. Remember that he maintained his loyalty to PMThaksin until PMSamak’s “Gang of Four” was literally dismantled by the courts last year and he lost favor with Thaksin who has since only trust his family to manage party affairs.
The injustice of a closed trial
Pundit has a link to some translated excerpts of Da’s speech, which appear to be quite outrageous, & Dudeist has a nice comment: http://bangkokpundit.blogspot.com/2009/06/more-on-amnestys-statement.html
ICG on Thailand’s deep south
Jason:
Thanks very much for your detailed and interesting comment. You are correct re the meaning of my comment. It was indeed about rather different perceptions/interpretations amongst academics on what the “Southern Fire” actually is about.
Signs of the Thai state
Sidh S, I suggest you read the whole article in Prachatai News and also write to the author of the article and ask him. Your misleading intention is clear when you avoid the words “р╕Эр╣Ир╕▓р╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕бр╣Др╕Ы” and “р╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╕Цр╕╢р╕З”.
At issue here is your intention to discredit the 1932 Coup d’etate Group’s visions and objectives, and to play a psychological game of doubt against me because I write about Phumipon. Don’t try your cheap shot with me, would you? Stick to the issue instead of personal attacks, because I have no intention to play your games.
Your agenda in promoting Newin Chidchob in comment #8 is pathetic, don’t you get that Puea Thai Party won by a landslide. No one in the country trusts Newin Chidchob. Stabbing others in the back is simply unacceptable in any society. Newin’s political future is finished.
As for Phumipon’s Thai State, the country is saying this:
р╕кр╕┤р╕Чр╕Шр╕┤р╕бр╕Щр╕╕р╕йр╕вр╕Кр╕Щ = р╕бр╕╢р╕Зр╕Бр╣Зр╕Др╕Щ р╕Бр╕╣р╕Бр╣Зр╕Др╕Щ…р╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕Кр╕▓р╕Кр╕Щр╣Др╕бр╣Ир╣Гр╕Кр╣Ир╕Эр╕╣р╕Зр╣Бр╕Бр╕░
Sat, 2009-06-27 00:52
р╕Бр╕гр╕Ур╣Мр╕нр╕╕р╕бр╕▓ р╕Юр╕Зр╕йр╣Мр╕Щр╣Йр╕нр╕в
From Prachatai News
Translation:
Human Rights = You are a human being, I am a human being…
People are not a herd of sheep.
If you’re a fan…
Just tried again Sunday morning (8am) Thai time using True high speed WiFi.
Get connection interrupted via FF, IE and Chrome, but amazingly it works using Safari 4. I have no explanation!!!
Their latest:
Thaksin Phone-In Sways Academy Fantasia Voting
http://www.notthenation.com/pages/news/getnews.php?id=803
David Carradine Murdered By Secret Shaolin Masturbation Sect
http://www.notthenation.com/pages/news/getnews.php?id=799
The injustice of a closed trial
From the Thai E-News website, I learn that Amnesty International is getting involved in this case. Attached message below is some sections from Reuters’ Headline and Amnesty International.
“Thailand: Closed trial threatens justice
25 June 2009
The Thai authorities should immediately allow a public trial for Darunee Charnchoengsilpakul, who is charged with violating Thailand’s lese majeste law for allegedly insulting the monarchy, Amnesty International said today.
Judge Prommat Toosang of the Criminal Court in Bangkok ordered a closed trial as proceedings began on Tuesday against Darunee Charnchoengsilpakul for comments she made during a speech at a demonstration in July 2008.
“Under international law, public hearings are crucial for protecting an individual’s right to a fair trial and due process,” said Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International’s Asia-Pacific director. “When a judge closes the doors on a trial it significantly raises the risk of injustice taking place.”
“The Thai government will have a very difficult time explaining why the trial of someone charged with making an insulting remark could compromise Thailand’s national security,” said Sam Zarifi.
Judge Prommat reportedly said that he could “guarantee the defendant will get a fair trial”, despite barring the public and the press.
“This guarantee is simply not verifiable if the doors are closed, which is why international and Thai law call for public trials,” said Sam Zarifi. “In this case, a fair trial means that the doors should remain open”.
The injustice of a closed trial
Let us not kid ourselves, open or closed trial, the outcome is certain.
It will be a kangaroo court.
The reason: There is no way in hell a Thai court will allow that type of political speech to be legal.
If acquitted, the speech can be legally disseminated.
It will just open a can of worms that the powers at be don’t want opened.
Aturan Permainan DominoQQ buat Pemula
It’s just standard defensive patenting, nothing unusual or extraordinary, it’s done by many countries. Maybe it’s unusual in that it’s rarely accomplished here to the level where the actual patent is granted, when it should have been done more often and started many years ago. And in this case HM is just doing his job as any head of state would do.
Per Susie’s comment on IFPRI, methink it’s understandable if people who live through the cold war didn’t think they owe anything to the US. It’s not like it’s given to Thailand out of pure altruism. It’s quid pro quo through and through. Look up how deep Thailand got involved in the Vietnam war.
ICG on Thailand’s deep south
Here’s my disclaimer: I’m a complete dilettante here in Thailand. My training is actually in South Asian studies. Mr. Johnson correctly guessed my place of work. Basically, I’m here for the self-serving reason of postponing grad school. My ‘real’ interest is in Tamil Islamic devotional literature (Whew!) My perception of things here in the south of Thailand is colored by my experiences in India. India, obviously, is a very different place, but it’s still the unconscious standard when I’m thinking about ethnic/linguistic or Muslim minorities.
In other words, I’m totally ready to defer to people with a better systematic understanding, more complete grasp of the literature and longer-standing interest. 🙂 And yes, a lot of the assumptions that I had about politics coming to the south have been thoroughly shaken; now that I’m getting a new perspective on all the above stuff, I’m becoming more excited about going back to school. I love having my assumptions shaken. Please keep shaking.
Yes, the sense that I got from most of what I had seen/read before actually coming here was that Malay Muslims were resisting assimilation into the Thai state (for whatever reasons). Imagine my bemusement when, as I was walking down Narathat Beach, a kid shouted at me in English, “I love Thailand!”
I now realize that I had still been working from my Tamil schema. Maybe that’s why McCargo’s work was appealing to me — the focus on ethnic and linguistic rather than religious issues resonates more with my paradigm.
Next time I’m in Bangkok, I’m definitely going to pick up some of Askew’s books. (I remember seeing them, picking them up, then imagining my total bill at the checkout counter before putting them back!) I did read part of the slim volume on disorderly borders at the library, though mostly for historical stats. Oh, to have more than 24 hours in a day…
This is going a bit off topic, but since we’re talking about McCargo, Askew, the ICG and various other researchers, is there a good, balanced reading list on the south available? (By balanced I mean showing a whole range of thought, sources and opinions.) Not only on the conflict dimensions, either. (I have Thai South and Malay North on my bookshelf right now, just waiting to be read.)
One last thought — I think the scare quotes around “the” Malay people are important. It’s such a duh question, but which Malay people are we talking about? It’s not like everybody has the same interests, beliefs or stakes in the game. Even one individual can have conflicting ideas and priorities. (I certainly do!)