Comments

  1. Stephen says:

    Not much at all on the political economy of Burma.”

    Jon, Sean Turnell has written quite a bit on economics and finance in Burma. His article “Myanmar’s economy in 2006” is available online. His latest (2009 printing date) book Fiery Dragons: Banks, Moneylenders and Microfinance in Burma I’ve yet to read, but it looks quite informative.

    You might also be interested in State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Economy of Industrialisation which is available for viewing on Google books.

  2. […] Food Program to buy rice from other countries and cut back on deliveries in coming months that were cited on New Mandala recently, or the harassment of private Myanmar citizens whom the report lauds for […]

  3. jonfernquest says:

    Ashley: “…there are literatures on these issues…”

    Not much at all on the political economy of Burma. A couple people have attempted to write objectively but they are usually attacked by activists like Moe Aung above, who want everyone to tow their version of the truth, activist group-think.

    Moe Aung: “I feel sorry for you, Jon. You are so fixated with the western way of doing things,…as if the two had not been going hand in hand in Western behaviour and action since the dawn of Western imperialism. ”

    Countries that cut their deals with the West are now able to feed their people. This was almost not the case with Indonesia under Sukarno in the early 1960s or with Burma now, for instance.

    Another socialist “revolution” for Burma? Wonderful.

  4. Frank says:

    That article was pretty well sanitized. No mention of Iraq or Afghanistan. No mention of the fact that the USA would be primarily tasked with doing the heavy lifting – politically, economically, and militarily – during these operations. No mention of the fact that the UN (not NATO) is the only body that has the legal authority to authorize such action. Etc,.

  5. Ralph Cramden says:

    Here’s a real question: why does Wikipedia say this about the NHRC?:

    The Thai National Human Rights Commission functioned from July 13, 2001 until 19 September 2006, when it was closed after the Thai military seized power in a coup. From its inception to May 31, 2005, it received a total of 2,148 complaints of which 1,309 had already been investigated, 559 were still in the process of investigation, and 209 were in the process of gathering evidence. These complaints covered not only civil and political rights but also other spheres of rights including economic, social and cultural rights….

    Saneh Chamarik, chairman of the Commission, defended the coup, stating in an interview: “ I do not think [the coup] is about progression or regression [of democracy], but about problem solving. ”

  6. Vorapoap says:

    The Investigation of Human Rights Protection Subcommittee under National Human Rights Commission found out that….

    At 06:15 (the first police crackdown)

    “Interviewing with the eyewitnesses particularly the media revealed the following. The police officers, before firing the teargas canisters to disperse the crowd at Pichai T-junction opposite the exit gate of the House of Parliament, did not give any warning to the rallying crowd.

    Same as firing at 16;00 and 19:00

    The subcommittee also concluded that the act of police violated human rights and laws,…….and the National Police Office and the government must be responsible for this.

    Read the report summary at PAD.VfLY.NET

    Read the full report at http://www.AntiThaksin.com

  7. Portman says:

    As mentioned in the “What happened thread” (but this is a more appropriate place for it), I have a bit of a problem with the fact that Supreme Administrative Court didn’t refer Potjaman’s case to the appropriate court to try her, if it had no jurisdiction over her, rather than acquit her. I also have a problem with the court’s sudden decision to let Thaksin travel to Japan and China when it had earlier been adamant that the ruling on the case was too imminent to let Thaksin and Potjaman travel. The court can’t have really thought they would meekly show up to face the music on that Monday morning. From recent comments in the Press it seems that the Bank of Thailand on behalf of the FIDF has no intention of trying to recover the piece of land in Ratchadapisek. The BoT didn’t want the case brought in the first place as it didn’t show it and its former governor in a very good light and the acquittal of Potjaman makes it easy for them do do nothing now.

    Sarayudh’s land case is ugly too, even though he was not PM at the time he acquired the land. He was also allegedly given a free house at the Bangkok Royal Golf Course by the developer when he was commander-in-chief but perhaps was OK because there wasn’t anything wrong with the title deed. If they pursue cases like these against the military the entire top brass might have to be nailed for being “unusually wealthy”, bearing in mind that Sarayudh was regarded as “unusually clean” in the military.

  8. Portman says:

    Ralph, Good question and I have also been wondering if another court could hear a case involving the NCCC Act. One would have thought the Supreme Admin Court should have refused to hear the case against Potjaman and let the OAG refer it to the criminal court. I am surprised the court has apparently created or accepted a legal limbo whereby she has apparently broken the law but can’t be tried.

    There are similar problems in the Klong Tan waste water treatment plant case where accomplices of Watana Asavahame will probably avoid being tried completely because the Criminal Court referred their cases to the Supreme Admin Court which is unlikely to hear them because the suspects were not political office. The cases are stuck with the OAG appealing the Criminal Court’s decision and the statute of limitations will expire soon. Unfortunately I don’t think the OAG has done the obvious thing of letting the Supreme Admin Court rule for itself whether it can hear the cases but this may be intentional, in order to let the suspects off the hook.

    Going back to Thaksin’s asset concealment case in 2001, it was also problematic that some judges effectively abstained by ruling there was no case to be heard because the concealment took place when Thaksin was not in office. The final judgment doesn’t seem the appropriate moment to rule on whether the defendant should have been tried at all or he or she has been tried in the right court. Perhaps this is an idiosyncracy of the Thai justice system.

  9. David Brown says:

    Connors suggests “Non-violence works best in a responsive political system where predictable protest routines and signals are measured and fed back into policy outcomes.”

    But this implies that “Non-violent protesters” should expect the satisfaction of seeing some response in policy outcomes in some short term …

    but i suggest that in many cases governments around the world are generally not as tractable as that sounds

    in many cases protests that i am aware of or been involved in will be ignored or suppressed and ignored and the protesters are left with the hard slog of challenging at the next election, and the one after, etc (eg various anti-war movements)

    it takes real acceptance of failure and dedication in the long term to move democratically elected governments very far

    and this seems not to have entered the Thai psyche… the PAD, their backers and supporters seem to be after instant gratification, without the long hard grind of convincing the electorate

    I believe this is psychopathic behaviour without regard for the well-being of individual human beings

    this is usually associated with far-right fascist and extreme capitalist individuals, I wonder if in Thailand its a product of the old feudal patronage attitudes still poisoning peoples minds or the more modern reasons

  10. David Brown says:

    “Thaksin was trying and succeeding in establishing an absolute dictatorship.”

    or was he just winning elections…

    as pointed out he was not winning by a huge margin (except when the opposition ran away… hahahaha) …

    in fact the margin was such that a half-competent opposition should have been able to seriously challenge

    he seemed to be willing to continue to put himself up for election … surely this cannot be classed as even approaching “absolute dictatorship”. …

    except I suppose by someone that is not willing to put in the effort to challenge … imagines they can still do it the easy way using military or whatever force… and need an excuse so label it “absolute dictatorship”

  11. Bounme Kambang says:

    What is it specifically about the market economy that creates uncertainty? Is it ‘marginal access’ to this economy or is it something about the relationships produced by this economy more generally that produces the experience of ‘uncertainty’? Is this uncertainty something that prevents people from gaining mastery over the material relationships that sustain their lives? Is it just the same feeling of uncertainty that we all have, the residue of the transition to a flexible modernity? Was the former subsistence lifestyle of these villages characterised by certainty of livelihood? What is the alternative model to current practices of project-related resettlement? Would a model emphasising sustainable subsistence work better than one emphasising market integration? Is there really a way to give villagers more control over their lives when the whole point of these projects is to remove them from the resources that formerly allowed such control?

  12. Moe Aung says:

    There is now the credibility gap to contend with, like you said, Ashley. And true, Burmese simply have to rely on themselves without appearing to be beholden or proxy to any outsiders. A fine line to walk on. And they could do with some concrete help, not just being patronised.

    I feel sorry for you, Jon. You are so fixated with the western way of doing things, you contradict yourself in the same breath by juxtaposing such interventions as the willpower sapping Iraq war and webs of economic dependence as if the two had not been going hand in hand in Western behaviour and action since the dawn of Western imperialism. They just happen to be two sides of the same coin. White superiority complex and liberal angst very obviously on display here.

  13. HC lau says:

    Fonzi,

    Sind- response to your question about General Surayud is classic PAD member logic. Its okay for the generals, democratic party and PAD to commit any crime, but not anyone else! He did not even attempt to decry the general’s purchase (maybe he did not purchase, just ‘suggest’ the land office to change the title deed)

    Sind simply say -Oh that’s different, he’s not a Prime minister – implying he’s a general, so its Okay.

    Now you know why the situation in Thailand is what it is. I have stated before and will state it again – The reason Democratic party / PAD cannot win an election in Thailand is because of this twisted logic NOT TRT / PPP votes buying. The average Thai is not so stupid as to not see through such hogwash

  14. Srithanonchai says:

    Jon:

    “Stresses photos (what exactly doaction photos of riots prove? particularly when they are restricted to one street in a particular part of town), character assassination/ad hominem attacks (against Sonti, for instance), cheerleading.”

    Even given your usual predispositions, this merely is a rather thoughtless remark.

  15. Srithanonchai says:

    “In the Post this week, Korn claimed that the DP has done this kind of analysis and knows which regions/constituencies to target.” > Wow – the Democrats have become this professional?

  16. mamallmighty says:

    I would love to see MOC comments about the ridiculously funny group Ponglang…

  17. Sidh S. says:

    Fonzi, I agree – the big difference here is that GenSurayud did not acquire the land while being prime minister.

    Maybe you can also help answer my simple question to Ralph: Is it considered a “conflict of interest” in Australia, Britain, America etc. for the wife of an incumbent prime minister/president to buy government owned/controlled prime real estate? Would the general population in those mature democracies be OK with it?

    BBC and Thairath speculates on the possibility of extradiction:

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7686729.stm

    http://www.thairath.co.th/news.php?section=politics03&content=108869

    “Impossible” they say – and I agree. Besides, if things are not favorable for PMThaksin in the UK, he already has back up plans. The last option of which is much closer to home – where Kamnan Poh and Vattana Asavaheme resides…

  18. David Brown says:

    there was a border issue which was not properly resolved but long dormant…

    the Thai military junta sensibly supported the Cambodian application for world heritage status…

    the Samak government reaffirmed this …

    then the PAD raised the border as an issue they used to beat their own government and now we have hostilities with Cambodia….

    as our baboon friend says…. a mess created by the PAD

  19. R. N. England says:

    If it is unethical for the prime minister or his wife to buy and sell land in Bangkok, why is it not unethical for the king to do so?

  20. Ashley says:

    Hi Jon. As you point out, there are literatures on these issues, but the wordcount limit on a short op-ed article precludes lengthier discussion.