This might be an end game of one sort or another, but let’s not forget where this particular round of PADism began. They could not accept the election result. PAD has been used by others and has had their own agenda to get rid of the government since it won the election. This is one more push.
“http://thaicrisis.wordpress.com/2008/03/18/samak-burma-killings-are-normal-and-dictators-are-good-buddhists/”>Dictators are good Buddhists .
“http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?cat_id=2/”>Aung San Suu Kyi as a political tool of the West .
But of course Andrew Walker had not forgotten that Samak’s “http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1402&Itemid=31”> democracy credentials . were forged from battles alongside Thai dictators during the October 1976 massacres (alongside Thanom) and 1992 bloody suppression of pro-democracy protests (alongside Suchinda).
Showing ‘restraint’ is NOT in the Samak Sundaravej character, his past form considering and his dubious concern to defend Thai democracy.
I suspect Samak Sundaravej is NOT really ‘in control’ of the situation is why ‘restraint’ had prevailed so far.
there are singpho (jingpaw) people here in india to as you know and there are resturent too….ther is one resturent at mergherita assam near borgolai …..you can taste indian singpho crusine there….
Sorry for not being a good blogger,
I am not sure whether Ardrew correctly read my text. Anyway that is not a point.
If there is some meanings that would be implied from my text, when I hit my keyboard, and expose ed it “not surprise, lots of Han prostitutes dressed in Dai costumes in Banna!,
it would be something like, in China thesedays the state power is so flexbile, perhaps just like the flexible accumulation of the capitals in this age, it could allow Han become the Others, of course ‘within’, and also it could also take a blind eyes to see Han prostitutes dress in [a minority] Dai costumes. For whatever it, the State, needs to persue, seduce, dig, and suck!
I have to say that the issues on ethnicity, at least in a way that you have tried to say here, A.Andrew, is far from my concerns.
the better word, or way to deal with this, perhapos, if I havr to elaborate my text a little more, should be some thing about cultural identities and poltitics of essentialism.
I think jonfernquist and nganadeeleg are missing Andrew’s point here.
He is clearly not comparing the politics of Thailand and Australia, he is talking about what the Australian response would be to a similar incursion by an opposition group (perhaps with our recently enacted anti-terrorist laws in mind).
Are you saying that, because the government has been doing those ugly things, a group of thugs now has the right to seize a state TV station, trespass government properties, beat up a completely innocent man like Mr Kitti (TV3 news anchor), and prevent elected officials from carrying out their duties?
Jon, you have raised some good points about why comparing the Thai situation with Australia is ludicrous, however I think the PAD went too far this time.
I note the commentary about violence & thuggery has been a little over the top (3 guns amongst 82 rebels does not seem that extra-ordinary to me), but IMO they should have waited until PPP/Thaksin actually did the constitutional/73 billion baht dirty deeds before making an all out protest.
The current assault seems premature to me (rather like an unjustified preemptive strike).
Comparing Australia with the current political situation in Thailand is absolutely ridiculous.
In Australia elected governments do not:
1. Spend all their time trying to throw out the constitution.
2. The parliament actually debates and votes on laws
3. Elected officials do not consider themselves above the law
4. The Prime Minister is not out on bail, already sentenced to 2 years in prison on appeal.
5. Elected officials abide by judicial decisions, even if they do not
go in their favour.
Read Shadow Finance minister Korn Chatikavanij for reasons why electoral politics are currently defective in Thailand. If PAD did not keep up the pressure to prevent consitutional amendment, it would be Thaksin-land, not Thailand. Don’t think anyone is going to let that happen.
About the backers, what about Gen.Phanlop and Prasong? Yesterday Nattawood (deputy govt spokesman and ex-UDD leader) let slip these two names during an NBT live broadcast.
Agree with you Andrew, should such a protest have occurred in Canberra, I doubt it would lasted a matter of minutes.
The wily Samak no doubt will have a strategy (already negotiated with military allies yesterday) to perhaps lull the PAD leadership into a false sense of security.
All the signals from the military and police tell us that violence will be avoided. That is, unless pro-Samak protests don’t get out of hand.
Polo solved that little problem and has pointed to the more interesting one.
Any ideas?
I suspect that the leaders of the Sept 06 coup that are able to get marginalized in the next transfer are the key backers – Saprang, Chalit, etc.
I’m not so sure about support at the next level up. I would guess that Prem’s camp has let them know that he will deiver backing if they pull it off. If they don’t they are on their own. All tacit, of course.
“I was granted an audience with His Majesty the King. His Majesty asked me to enforce the law with extreme caution, to be soft and gentle. I beg all of you to understand and sympathise with me,” Samak was quoted by an official source as telling the Cabinet.
1. “I was granted an audience” – PM Samak requested to see the King to ask for advice. This is in line with the constitutional principle that the King can “be consulted”, ie. he can give advice on specific issues to the PM upon being expressly requested. PM Samak probably did this to cover his as* in case things go wrong.
2. King said “enforce the law”, ie. arrest, fine, jail, etc. those who break the law. Good advice. The 82 who raided NBT have already been arrested and not granted bail. Now it’s time for the PAD Leaders to face up to the music.
3. King advises to enforce the law “with extreme caution, to be soft and gentle.” ie., arrest those law breakers, but don’t fall into the PAD Leader’s trap of trying to provoke a coup.
“Samak has reached an accommodation with top-ranking military leaders, including army commander General Anupong Paochinda and First Army commander Prayuth Chan-ocha, but a hardline camp has reportedly refused to fall in step. [Crispin also says later on that Anupong and Prayuth are also both known to have close personal ties with Queen Sirikit].”
“What is known is that the PAD has powerful backing from a hardline faction inside the military that lost out at last year’s reshuffle, which most significantly saw the promotion of Anupong over the ambitious General Saprang Kalayanamitr. A key player in the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin, Saprang has been quoted in the local press as saying that he personally has given orders to the PAD.”
“There is no evidence that he or other military figures played any role in stoking Tuesday’s violence, but there are worrying indications that a hardline military camp may bid to capitalize on the chaos and its aftermath at more moderate military rivals’ expense.”
Quoting the Ministry: “… Forbes included land and other assets belonging to the Crown Property Bureau, which is not part of His Majesty’s personal net worth.”
Which raises the question, who really does control the CPB. Is there any clear cut explanation? If it’s under His Majesty’s direct control, then it should belong to his net worth.
The king is now waiting for his que. He won’t come out just yet because his troopers are having the upperhand. But you’ll see him when his troopers are on the defensive. Then he will come out and whisper coded words that translate to “reconcilliation” and exornerate the right wingers and his troopers. He is like a referee on the take who fixes matches. It never fails, just watch.
Andrew: F.Y.I.
“The all-important wild card is the royal household, which by law is above Thai politics. The highly revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej has on at least two nationally televised occasions endorsed Samak and his administration, notably on the eve of a previous PAD-declared “doomsday”
(from Crispin’s latest in AsiaTimes per Bangkok Pundit’s site)
I’m not sure endorsed is the right word to describe the monarch recognizing the legitimacy of an elected government, and I think there would be concern if the monarch got any more involved than that.
LSS: I’ve never claimed he was perfect, but how will the ignorance you mentioned ever end if he has to continually sort things out for them?
He won’t be around forever!
He already gives speeches about behaving correctly & do the right thing etc
Are you & Andrew calling for him to address just the PAD?
or do you want him mediating in all matters confronting the government?
Anything else you would like him to do?
Where would it stop?
Ooops! refer to my #8:
When the conflicting info cannnot be left “undecided” and needed ultimate decision, the court (ICJ) is a way to resolve it when the two countries cannot talk. This is why we should respect the ICJ decision; in so many cases a territorial dispute may not be resolved by treaties, maps or natural features themselves. In the PV case, the court cannot reach decision based on the treaty and maps alone. It finally arrived at the final decision by additional evidence (actions that indicated precedented jurisdiction and sovereignty).
If one doesn’t accept the ICJ’s decision, there are so many cases that are “unsolvable”. Even a military approach would bring only a short term occupation.
In the movie ” Moonhunter” about Seksan Presertkul’s political life, when Seksan had to travel in hurry from Laos back to Thailand in 1979 0r 80 after the Lao party told all Thai comrades to go (thansk to conflicts among the parties), Seksan crossed from laos to Thai soil at Nam Heung (the Heung River, read comment above). In the movie, once he crossed it, he kneeled down and kissed the soil, “Ahh…Home”.
I wonder which Heung stream he crossed? Was he sure that it was the one that separate Thailand and Laos? Because if he crossed the wrong one, it meant that the soil he kissed could still be the Lao soil, thus definitely not “Ahh…Home” yet. The kiss could have been misplaced, therefore invalid. Unfortunately even if he could remember which stream he crossed, nobody knows for sure if it is the boundary or not since there is no definite answer that both countries agree.
The Kiss is undecided
I never asked Seksan himself because the issue is too Derridean.
“Watershed” This is one of the most misunderstood issue in the recent dispute. Watershed is a common boundary marking. But it is not a clear-cut, scientfic, permanent marking as people might think it is.
1. How does a “watershed” mark a boundary? Does one “watershed” provide a longgggg line over hundreds of kilometers, and perfectly connect to the next long line provided by the next “watershed”, and so on? No. A watershed cannot do that. A watershed provides a section (long or short) of demarcation. Many more sections of boundaries are simply the “logical/reasonable” lines that connect those watershed marks. There are areas where two watersheds are too far apart, thus a boundary must depend on other kinds of marking.
2. Does a watershed remain the same forever? No. I don’t know enough about the PV areas. But a watershed in the dense rainforest mountains can cause headache to boundary demarcation because it can shift. You can imagine the rest of the story over decades or a hundred years. ALL natural features that mark a boundary shift from time to time: streams changing courses, sandbars getting larger and smaller, and so on.
3. Suposed that a watershed remain stable, the precision for boundary marking is not as precise as people think. There is NO precise watershed. The demarcation still needs geometry, geodesies, and, finally, “agreement” by both sides (of equal or unequal powers is beside the point here). The is the same as there is no precise “depth of a stream” that demarcates many rivers and streams, or the precise size of “sandbars” in the Mekong that demarcate Thai-Lao territories. The shifts and changes in 2 and 3 , assuming that there is no other factor in a dispute at all, need to go to a table for human from both sides to agree from time to time. And if they don’t, which are unfortunately often the case because each side want to stick to the original or previous agreements which are no longer supportred by the natural features, what can they do? Continuing negotiation. The citing of generic mantra “watershed” “watershed” “watershed” may or may not be correct in the PV case — I do not know. But in somany cases, such a mantra is not much relevant for a few acres or sq. km.
4. That’s why a treaty (word) that provides the fundamental authority to a demarcation may not be much helpful in deciding a precise demarcation of a few sq. km. Modern states need maps. Unfortunately maps are often conflicitng for so many reasons: human errors, changing natural features over time, and so on. Better tehnology can be a cause of problem because it makes a later map better/ more precise than the earlier one, conflicting the earlier one that was not as accurate.
5. In the case of Siam-French Indochina, the treaties of 1904 and 1907 treaties were concluded BEFORE the detailed surveys were carried out. Yes, the treaties were based on the preliminary surveys and maps. The surveys continued afterward and new maps were made to attach to the treaties. The discrepansies began right there in some spots, for example, the area under dispute between Thailand and Laos in 1988. In that case, the 1907 treaty said the “Hueng River” was the demarcation in a section between Leoi Province and the Lao side. Only one year later 1908, a team of French surveyors found that there were two streams of Hueng — one called Heung Yai, the other Heung Noi. There was no “Hueng” (one word) River. By 1988, one stream dried out, and the name gone from local memory. The new stream emerges but with a new local name. Which one is the boundary line according to the 1907 treaty? As a consequence, about one thousand soldiers from both sides died before both countries agree to settle on the table. Since then, I havn’t heard yet how it is resolved. I guess that it cannot be resolved — same as many other cases. This is only one deadly example how maps cannot help as much either. (More about conflicting maps in this case and how absurd the conflict was — but not here.) Yet the dominant regime of modern political geography assumes that natural features, treaties, and maps (and technology) can solve these problems once and for all.
If anybody wants to instigate more nonsense conflicts over disputed tiny territories that could lead to more nonsense battles and deaths, there are many dozens more locations to choose to die for — from the shrotest boundary between Thailand and Malaysia, to every other boundary of Thailand and its neighbours.
Re: KI #3 “…but I don’t see the connection it could bring with Thai people’s sense of loss of territory due to colonial power.”
To explain the connection, we need to understand three things in Thai historical mentality/ ideology.
1) The significance or “trauma” of the 1893 defeat that marked a series of the “loss of territories” from 1893 to 1909 to colinial powers — a.k.a. farang, the West. The 1893 defeat — the painful birth of Siam as a territorial state — laid a foundation of the modern Thai nation that so far has escaped our attention, namely a peculiar anti-colinial, anti-farang historical ideology. The trope of the Thai anti-colonial is the “loss of territories”. This anti-colonial ideology has not been properly understood because a) the mantra that Thailand was never colonized, and b) the parallel fact that Thailand has been, comparatively speaking, open and accommodating the West in somany ways.
2. But the anti-colonial (can we call post-colonial?) ideology exploded from time to time. One of them was in 1940-41 when Thailand fought to “reclaimed the lost provinces” from Cambodia/ French Indochina. In that incident, the link to 1893 was vivid. The target was the West in general to some extent, but the French in particular. The Preah Vihear was not under particular attention yet. But the PV was in the area of dispute in 1940-41. More importantly, the “trauma” of losing territories was revived significantly by the dispute over the Thai-Cambodian border areas. The areas were registered in recent Thai memory as Thai’s land that were wrestled away by the farang. The areas become a significant representative of the whole “loss of territories” ideology.
3. Then came the dispute over the Preah Vihear in 1957-1962. Since than, the PV has become an (the?) emblem of the “loss of territories” ideology in Thai history.
My understanding of this comes from the work of Shane Strate, a student of mine, who is writing his dissertation on the significance of the “loss” as a foundation of modern Thai historical ideology. The importance of the geobody is one thing. But the fact that the geo-body was injured, was harmed and seriously hurt, is as much important. A conventional history that celebrates the survivial from colonial threats doesn’t help us understand Thailand’s anti-colonial, anti-West mentality. I would ague that after the end of the Cold War, the anti-West ideology has become stronger among those who see capitalism and globalization as “national threats”. The PAD nationalism is within this context.
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A PAD strategy?
This might be an end game of one sort or another, but let’s not forget where this particular round of PADism began. They could not accept the election result. PAD has been used by others and has had their own agenda to get rid of the government since it won the election. This is one more push.
Remarkable restraint
Some very unusual Samak Sundaravej thoughts:
“http://thaicrisis.wordpress.com/2008/03/18/samak-burma-killings-are-normal-and-dictators-are-good-buddhists/”>Dictators are good Buddhists .
“http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?cat_id=2/”>Aung San Suu Kyi as a political tool of the West .
But of course Andrew Walker had not forgotten that Samak’s “http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1402&Itemid=31”> democracy credentials . were forged from battles alongside Thai dictators during the October 1976 massacres (alongside Thanom) and 1992 bloody suppression of pro-democracy protests (alongside Suchinda).
Showing ‘restraint’ is NOT in the Samak Sundaravej character, his past form considering and his dubious concern to defend Thai democracy.
I suspect Samak Sundaravej is NOT really ‘in control’ of the situation is why ‘restraint’ had prevailed so far.
Would you like Tsa Pi with that?
there are singpho (jingpaw) people here in india to as you know and there are resturent too….ther is one resturent at mergherita assam near borgolai …..you can taste indian singpho crusine there….
Shock! Horror! China dresses non-ethnics as ethnics!
Sorry for not being a good blogger,
I am not sure whether Ardrew correctly read my text. Anyway that is not a point.
If there is some meanings that would be implied from my text, when I hit my keyboard, and expose ed it “not surprise, lots of Han prostitutes dressed in Dai costumes in Banna!,
it would be something like, in China thesedays the state power is so flexbile, perhaps just like the flexible accumulation of the capitals in this age, it could allow Han become the Others, of course ‘within’, and also it could also take a blind eyes to see Han prostitutes dress in [a minority] Dai costumes. For whatever it, the State, needs to persue, seduce, dig, and suck!
I have to say that the issues on ethnicity, at least in a way that you have tried to say here, A.Andrew, is far from my concerns.
the better word, or way to deal with this, perhapos, if I havr to elaborate my text a little more, should be some thing about cultural identities and poltitics of essentialism.
WP
Remarkable restraint
I think jonfernquist and nganadeeleg are missing Andrew’s point here.
He is clearly not comparing the politics of Thailand and Australia, he is talking about what the Australian response would be to a similar incursion by an opposition group (perhaps with our recently enacted anti-terrorist laws in mind).
Remarkable restraint
#2:
Are you saying that, because the government has been doing those ugly things, a group of thugs now has the right to seize a state TV station, trespass government properties, beat up a completely innocent man like Mr Kitti (TV3 news anchor), and prevent elected officials from carrying out their duties?
Even The Nation has turned against the PAD now.
Remarkable restraint
Keep up the good work PAD!
Jon, you have raised some good points about why comparing the Thai situation with Australia is ludicrous, however I think the PAD went too far this time.
I note the commentary about violence & thuggery has been a little over the top (3 guns amongst 82 rebels does not seem that extra-ordinary to me), but IMO they should have waited until PPP/Thaksin actually did the constitutional/73 billion baht dirty deeds before making an all out protest.
The current assault seems premature to me (rather like an unjustified preemptive strike).
Remarkable restraint
Comparing Australia with the current political situation in Thailand is absolutely ridiculous.
In Australia elected governments do not:
1. Spend all their time trying to throw out the constitution.
2. The parliament actually debates and votes on laws
3. Elected officials do not consider themselves above the law
4. The Prime Minister is not out on bail, already sentenced to 2 years in prison on appeal.
5. Elected officials abide by judicial decisions, even if they do not
go in their favour.
Read Shadow Finance minister Korn Chatikavanij for reasons why electoral politics are currently defective in Thailand. If PAD did not keep up the pressure to prevent consitutional amendment, it would be Thaksin-land, not Thailand. Don’t think anyone is going to let that happen.
Keep up the good work PAD!
Still no word from the protector of the nation
About the backers, what about Gen.Phanlop and Prasong? Yesterday Nattawood (deputy govt spokesman and ex-UDD leader) let slip these two names during an NBT live broadcast.
Remarkable restraint
Agree with you Andrew, should such a protest have occurred in Canberra, I doubt it would lasted a matter of minutes.
The wily Samak no doubt will have a strategy (already negotiated with military allies yesterday) to perhaps lull the PAD leadership into a false sense of security.
All the signals from the military and police tell us that violence will be avoided. That is, unless pro-Samak protests don’t get out of hand.
Still no word from the protector of the nation
Polo solved that little problem and has pointed to the more interesting one.
Any ideas?
I suspect that the leaders of the Sept 06 coup that are able to get marginalized in the next transfer are the key backers – Saprang, Chalit, etc.
I’m not so sure about support at the next level up. I would guess that Prem’s camp has let them know that he will deiver backing if they pull it off. If they don’t they are on their own. All tacit, of course.
Still no word from the protector of the nation
“I was granted an audience with His Majesty the King. His Majesty asked me to enforce the law with extreme caution, to be soft and gentle. I beg all of you to understand and sympathise with me,” Samak was quoted by an official source as telling the Cabinet.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/08/27/politics/politics_30081617.php
My interpretation:
1. “I was granted an audience” – PM Samak requested to see the King to ask for advice. This is in line with the constitutional principle that the King can “be consulted”, ie. he can give advice on specific issues to the PM upon being expressly requested. PM Samak probably did this to cover his as* in case things go wrong.
2. King said “enforce the law”, ie. arrest, fine, jail, etc. those who break the law. Good advice. The 82 who raided NBT have already been arrested and not granted bail. Now it’s time for the PAD Leaders to face up to the music.
3. King advises to enforce the law “with extreme caution, to be soft and gentle.” ie., arrest those law breakers, but don’t fall into the PAD Leader’s trap of trying to provoke a coup.
Polo: who is encouraging and protecting Sondhi
see:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JH27Ae02.html
a few relevant parts:
“Samak has reached an accommodation with top-ranking military leaders, including army commander General Anupong Paochinda and First Army commander Prayuth Chan-ocha, but a hardline camp has reportedly refused to fall in step. [Crispin also says later on that Anupong and Prayuth are also both known to have close personal ties with Queen Sirikit].”
“What is known is that the PAD has powerful backing from a hardline faction inside the military that lost out at last year’s reshuffle, which most significantly saw the promotion of Anupong over the ambitious General Saprang Kalayanamitr. A key player in the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin, Saprang has been quoted in the local press as saying that he personally has given orders to the PAD.”
“There is no evidence that he or other military figures played any role in stoking Tuesday’s violence, but there are worrying indications that a hardline military camp may bid to capitalize on the chaos and its aftermath at more moderate military rivals’ expense.”
Forbes, the Bangkok Post and the conversation of the day
Quoting the Ministry: “… Forbes included land and other assets belonging to the Crown Property Bureau, which is not part of His Majesty’s personal net worth.”
Which raises the question, who really does control the CPB. Is there any clear cut explanation? If it’s under His Majesty’s direct control, then it should belong to his net worth.
Still no word from the protector of the nation
The king is now waiting for his que. He won’t come out just yet because his troopers are having the upperhand. But you’ll see him when his troopers are on the defensive. Then he will come out and whisper coded words that translate to “reconcilliation” and exornerate the right wingers and his troopers. He is like a referee on the take who fixes matches. It never fails, just watch.
Still no word from the protector of the nation
Andrew: F.Y.I.
“The all-important wild card is the royal household, which by law is above Thai politics. The highly revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej has on at least two nationally televised occasions endorsed Samak and his administration, notably on the eve of a previous PAD-declared “doomsday”
(from Crispin’s latest in AsiaTimes per Bangkok Pundit’s site)
I’m not sure endorsed is the right word to describe the monarch recognizing the legitimacy of an elected government, and I think there would be concern if the monarch got any more involved than that.
Still no word from the protector of the nation
LSS: I’ve never claimed he was perfect, but how will the ignorance you mentioned ever end if he has to continually sort things out for them?
He won’t be around forever!
He already gives speeches about behaving correctly & do the right thing etc
Are you & Andrew calling for him to address just the PAD?
or do you want him mediating in all matters confronting the government?
Anything else you would like him to do?
Where would it stop?
Phra Viharn: the dividing line in Thailand
Ooops! refer to my #8:
When the conflicting info cannnot be left “undecided” and needed ultimate decision, the court (ICJ) is a way to resolve it when the two countries cannot talk. This is why we should respect the ICJ decision; in so many cases a territorial dispute may not be resolved by treaties, maps or natural features themselves. In the PV case, the court cannot reach decision based on the treaty and maps alone. It finally arrived at the final decision by additional evidence (actions that indicated precedented jurisdiction and sovereignty).
If one doesn’t accept the ICJ’s decision, there are so many cases that are “unsolvable”. Even a military approach would bring only a short term occupation.
Phra Viharn: the dividing line in Thailand
One last posting in a long time:
In the movie ” Moonhunter” about Seksan Presertkul’s political life, when Seksan had to travel in hurry from Laos back to Thailand in 1979 0r 80 after the Lao party told all Thai comrades to go (thansk to conflicts among the parties), Seksan crossed from laos to Thai soil at Nam Heung (the Heung River, read comment above). In the movie, once he crossed it, he kneeled down and kissed the soil, “Ahh…Home”.
I wonder which Heung stream he crossed? Was he sure that it was the one that separate Thailand and Laos? Because if he crossed the wrong one, it meant that the soil he kissed could still be the Lao soil, thus definitely not “Ahh…Home” yet. The kiss could have been misplaced, therefore invalid. Unfortunately even if he could remember which stream he crossed, nobody knows for sure if it is the boundary or not since there is no definite answer that both countries agree.
The Kiss is undecided
I never asked Seksan himself because the issue is too Derridean.
Phra Viharn: the dividing line in Thailand
“Watershed” This is one of the most misunderstood issue in the recent dispute. Watershed is a common boundary marking. But it is not a clear-cut, scientfic, permanent marking as people might think it is.
1. How does a “watershed” mark a boundary? Does one “watershed” provide a longgggg line over hundreds of kilometers, and perfectly connect to the next long line provided by the next “watershed”, and so on? No. A watershed cannot do that. A watershed provides a section (long or short) of demarcation. Many more sections of boundaries are simply the “logical/reasonable” lines that connect those watershed marks. There are areas where two watersheds are too far apart, thus a boundary must depend on other kinds of marking.
2. Does a watershed remain the same forever? No. I don’t know enough about the PV areas. But a watershed in the dense rainforest mountains can cause headache to boundary demarcation because it can shift. You can imagine the rest of the story over decades or a hundred years. ALL natural features that mark a boundary shift from time to time: streams changing courses, sandbars getting larger and smaller, and so on.
3. Suposed that a watershed remain stable, the precision for boundary marking is not as precise as people think. There is NO precise watershed. The demarcation still needs geometry, geodesies, and, finally, “agreement” by both sides (of equal or unequal powers is beside the point here). The is the same as there is no precise “depth of a stream” that demarcates many rivers and streams, or the precise size of “sandbars” in the Mekong that demarcate Thai-Lao territories. The shifts and changes in 2 and 3 , assuming that there is no other factor in a dispute at all, need to go to a table for human from both sides to agree from time to time. And if they don’t, which are unfortunately often the case because each side want to stick to the original or previous agreements which are no longer supportred by the natural features, what can they do? Continuing negotiation. The citing of generic mantra “watershed” “watershed” “watershed” may or may not be correct in the PV case — I do not know. But in somany cases, such a mantra is not much relevant for a few acres or sq. km.
4. That’s why a treaty (word) that provides the fundamental authority to a demarcation may not be much helpful in deciding a precise demarcation of a few sq. km. Modern states need maps. Unfortunately maps are often conflicitng for so many reasons: human errors, changing natural features over time, and so on. Better tehnology can be a cause of problem because it makes a later map better/ more precise than the earlier one, conflicting the earlier one that was not as accurate.
5. In the case of Siam-French Indochina, the treaties of 1904 and 1907 treaties were concluded BEFORE the detailed surveys were carried out. Yes, the treaties were based on the preliminary surveys and maps. The surveys continued afterward and new maps were made to attach to the treaties. The discrepansies began right there in some spots, for example, the area under dispute between Thailand and Laos in 1988. In that case, the 1907 treaty said the “Hueng River” was the demarcation in a section between Leoi Province and the Lao side. Only one year later 1908, a team of French surveyors found that there were two streams of Hueng — one called Heung Yai, the other Heung Noi. There was no “Hueng” (one word) River. By 1988, one stream dried out, and the name gone from local memory. The new stream emerges but with a new local name. Which one is the boundary line according to the 1907 treaty? As a consequence, about one thousand soldiers from both sides died before both countries agree to settle on the table. Since then, I havn’t heard yet how it is resolved. I guess that it cannot be resolved — same as many other cases. This is only one deadly example how maps cannot help as much either. (More about conflicting maps in this case and how absurd the conflict was — but not here.) Yet the dominant regime of modern political geography assumes that natural features, treaties, and maps (and technology) can solve these problems once and for all.
If anybody wants to instigate more nonsense conflicts over disputed tiny territories that could lead to more nonsense battles and deaths, there are many dozens more locations to choose to die for — from the shrotest boundary between Thailand and Malaysia, to every other boundary of Thailand and its neighbours.
Phra Viharn: the dividing line in Thailand
Re: KI #3 “…but I don’t see the connection it could bring with Thai people’s sense of loss of territory due to colonial power.”
To explain the connection, we need to understand three things in Thai historical mentality/ ideology.
1) The significance or “trauma” of the 1893 defeat that marked a series of the “loss of territories” from 1893 to 1909 to colinial powers — a.k.a. farang, the West. The 1893 defeat — the painful birth of Siam as a territorial state — laid a foundation of the modern Thai nation that so far has escaped our attention, namely a peculiar anti-colinial, anti-farang historical ideology. The trope of the Thai anti-colonial is the “loss of territories”. This anti-colonial ideology has not been properly understood because a) the mantra that Thailand was never colonized, and b) the parallel fact that Thailand has been, comparatively speaking, open and accommodating the West in somany ways.
2. But the anti-colonial (can we call post-colonial?) ideology exploded from time to time. One of them was in 1940-41 when Thailand fought to “reclaimed the lost provinces” from Cambodia/ French Indochina. In that incident, the link to 1893 was vivid. The target was the West in general to some extent, but the French in particular. The Preah Vihear was not under particular attention yet. But the PV was in the area of dispute in 1940-41. More importantly, the “trauma” of losing territories was revived significantly by the dispute over the Thai-Cambodian border areas. The areas were registered in recent Thai memory as Thai’s land that were wrestled away by the farang. The areas become a significant representative of the whole “loss of territories” ideology.
3. Then came the dispute over the Preah Vihear in 1957-1962. Since than, the PV has become an (the?) emblem of the “loss of territories” ideology in Thai history.
My understanding of this comes from the work of Shane Strate, a student of mine, who is writing his dissertation on the significance of the “loss” as a foundation of modern Thai historical ideology. The importance of the geobody is one thing. But the fact that the geo-body was injured, was harmed and seriously hurt, is as much important. A conventional history that celebrates the survivial from colonial threats doesn’t help us understand Thailand’s anti-colonial, anti-West mentality. I would ague that after the end of the Cold War, the anti-West ideology has become stronger among those who see capitalism and globalization as “national threats”. The PAD nationalism is within this context.