“a black swan is a large-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare event beyond the realm of normal expectations”
It encapulates a limitation of induction. All swans were white until they found a black one in Australia, I believe. Relevant to the current political situation. Multiple regressions (statistics) won’t tell you what is going to happen. No one knew (or perhaps, still do not know) what shape the black swan that will deliver Thailand from all its current problems will take. Maybe the courts break the deadlock or maybe things will just keep getting worse as the Northeast continues to beat the center Bangkok demographically.
Taleb’s first book is just as interesting and describes in detail the kind of cyclical arrogance of big traders in financial markets. IMHO His ideas can be used to read and interpret other areas of human activity such as warfare and leadership.
Even the greatest generals such as Napoleon have built bubbles of power that were in the end unsustainable. The same could be said of Thailand’s self-styled Gengis Khan who has hit some speed bumps recently.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2001/2005). Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets. New York: Random House.
I was present at the Prem compound clashes, not at the Udon incident. I have though asked a lot about the Udon incident. I have not done so about the World Trade Center incident, therefore i just do not feel competent enough to comment.
I will ask NM if they are interested in posting photos of the Prem compound clashes. But these photos are not that different than what was seen already, the only photos i have that were not widely published are a few images where UDD protesters Wai to police, and where UDD protesters hold back their fellow protesters from attacking after police have been beaten back already.
“karmablues”:
Yes, Thaksin was not ‘coerced’ into the drugwar, but it still was a collaboration between the different networks of power. As proof of this i have cited the speech. And regarding PAD – at the time of the drugwar, Sondhi Limthongkul’s media machine was one of the main supporters of the drugwar killings. I do clearly remember that Sondhi Limthongkul chided Thaksin at the first Royal Plaza speech for having given up on the drugwar.
Also Chamlong Srimuang, at his first speech after openly joining the PAD, has called Thaksin an excellent Prime Minister for the the first four years (those were the years during which all the severe human rights violations happened).
The military installed government was not one bit less hardline than Thaksin in the southern provinces, even the person responsible for the Krue Sue attack, Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, was elevated to Special Advisor to ISOC. The main thing that Thaksin has done was to give the South back to police control. That may have been a mistake, but there were very clear reasons for this as well – the massive corruption and collaboration with the smuggling and illegal logging operations down there.
I do not want to defend Thaksin here. I only want to introduce facts into the debate. For all of Thaksin’s shortcomings and failings – many of the things that radical opponents make him responsible for, he simply isn’t. Better concentrate on what he really did wrong, and who has actively collaborated at the time. Many of those collaborators and beneficiaries are now some of the loudest opponents. You also should analyze the agendas of his loud opponents, and really think hard if their aims correspondent to what you would wish for Thailand’s future.
“Sidh S”:
First of all, i am not a very skilled journalist, i am foremost a photographer. I can’t pretend what i am not, and my style of interviewing is trying to draw out people, draw them into a conversation, i like to provoke them slightly with criticism, and see how they react.
In this way, i felt a lot less intimidated during UDD or TRT events. Most there have accepted without a problem that i have said that i am not a supporter of Thaksin, and this has generally led to very interesting conversations about Thailand’s difficulties, patronage networks, and similar topics. A very common view especially under the more simple people was that they knew about Thaksin’s corruption, but felt that for the first time that they have under his rule also benefited from the state.
It is not my style to use the “farang” benefit. I think that this is using an unfair advantage, and it will not lead to meaningful conversation. I don’t want people to compliment me on my language abilities, i want them to converse with me an an equal footing. And there i found the majority of the PAD not reacting very well to any sort of criticism, or uncomfortable questions. Negative reactions tell me more than meaningless compliments, or “VIP” treatment.
So were the comments of the UDD person about the Udon incident not an excuse or justification, but an explanation. And that is all i can give here as well – explanations, not excuses or justifications.
The UDD rallies are not very regular anymore. I am not aware of any bigger event since the coup, only one at Lumpini about the constitution change. From what i see – the main leadership holds itself back at the moment. The relatively regular rallies are now just held by small splinter groups. Their attendance is not more than 50 to 300 people. At their heyday during the coup there up to 20 000 protesters. Most of the daily events drew about 2000 to 5000 people.
The socio economic make up was clearly lower than PAD, i would say most were lower middle class and working class.
The PAD supporters have changed though a lot compared to pre coup days. Pre coup it was more people, up to 80 000 at the largest events (the at that time reported figures were exaggerated), while now there are a few hundred to 2000 at regular days, and maybe 10 000 to 20 000 at larger events such as marches.
Also some of my contacts told me that many of the present PAD supporters now are dependents of army supporters of the PAD sent there.
I do not listen too much to the public speeches of either, they bore me to death, generally. What i listen to at the PAD events though is an increased praise for the military, extreme nationalism. The UDD splinter group events are mostly rather repetitive praises for Thaksin (the more able speakers such as Jakrapop Penkair, Mor Weng, Nattawut, Veera Musikapong or assorted academics are not appearing at the present time – during the coup days they have held some very intelligent speeches).
A very interesting facet now is the so called “Sanam Luang Voice”, or “Siang Prachachon”, who have built the stage at Sanam Luang. Unfortunately only Da Torpedo reached notoriety because of her mostly incoherent rants. But there are others who have surprising views on things here. It is a tiny group of individuals, and most of their spectators are Sanam Luang bums (and some very independent thinkers).
Anyhow, these are just my impressions – i am foremost a photographer. It would be very helpful, also for me, if there would be some independent academic research on these groups. I personally find them fascinating. Especially under these groups which are generally lumped together as “reds” there is a mostly unreported multifaceted developing political consciousness that regularly breaches the limits of forbidden territory. It started as a mostly pro-Thaksin/anti-coup movement, and has morphed now into surprising fields of thought.
I would wish that academics take these groups as serious as the different intelligence services do.
In Tachileik I know that some government positions were purchased by people just setting off on their careers in the late 1990s. Some positions were lucrative. Also when high officials came on visits to Tachileik there was more discussion through the grapevine of the unofficial “taxes” that were being extracted.
Burmese newspapers may imitate certain parts of the historical chronicles in which the king distributes gifts. The parts of the chronicle where the Than Shwe taxes and consults on strategy with his close advisors, of course, are not to be seen. Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière argues in some of her papers that modern politics (esp. rituals) imitates the much older patterns. It might be the case here too.
For an old Burmese like me, that patronizing cash practice is not uncommon in the Burmese society as a whole, but it is, I think, quite recent for the Burmese officialdom.
When I was working for Burma Irrigation Department in the eighties, the standard practice was, whenever the Military Divisional Commander or even the Minister or the deputy ministers gave our region a visit we had to prepare and spend thousands and thousands of dollars to report to him about our activities and to entertain him.
The reward for a good performance was a quick promotion or/and more budget and expenditure for the projects we were implementing. Of course what it means was more money into our pockets as every government official is corrupt. Getting a wad of cash direct from your senior officials would even be considered rude and unthinkable then.
Cash doesn’t come down from top to bottom. But, the official budget is. The cash then goes up from bottom to top.
The standard practice we used to follow in our ministry was quite simple. Let’s say I was supposed to get cash as a junior official, say 5000 dollars, direct from the departmental accountant, for a project or task assigned to me by my direct boss. But I never got full 5ooo, I got only 4500 in my hand. But I had to produce a receipt for full 5ooo. My understanding was the accountant gave my boss at least 400 dollars and he pocketed the rest. That simple.
No wonder all the billion dollars of foreign aid just simply disappeared into thin air.
Thanks for your comments Nicholas. I tried to get this article published during the Howard/Downer years without success. Green left published what Rupert’s editors rejected. At the time I was told by a spokeswoman: “We will print what we want, from whom we want, when we want, and how we want, this has come from the top.” As an undergraduate journalism student I felt sad that Newscorp selected the truth that suited them. But then the reality is that they exist from the profit of advertising. We learnt this in the first year at university – but what are we left with when the silver runs dry?
Congratz to GLW for having the heart to publish the story “Waiting for Suu Kyi”.
Burma seems to be a wounded animal with nations (corporations) the world over feasting from her flesh. This reminds me of the Neil Young song “I’ve seen the needle and the damage done, a little part of it in everyone.”
We in the west should lead by example, and practice Principle before Profit and Ethics before Economics. Otherwise we run the risk of being labeled hypocrites and the International Human Rights Instruments promoted by some of us seen as a smokescreen that obscures a different reality. If we don’t, the likes of Robert Mugabe & General Than Shwe would be quick to point out our hypocrisy.
The reconciliation theme promoted by Australia’s new government offers hope that we all need – especially those in Burma. The world could do with a lot more Aung San Suu Kyi’s, Yoko Ono’s and yes, why not – Kevin Rudd’s!
PS. I enjoyed your review re the Aw Saw & Paramilitary by Desmond Ball et al. I would love to get a copy of the book sometime.
Jon Fernquist stated: “Nicholas Taleb says: daily news is noise (statistical white noise)”
I have just finished reading Taleb’s The Black Swan with his criticism of the the use of the Bell curve (Gaussian) in academic research- its “epistemic arrogamce”. Too often it is used in situations where the bell curve is not relevant (esp. finance)
The title “The Black Swan” comes from when people thought there were no black swans because there was no evidence of them. The past was used to judge the future. No-one predicted the sub-prime disaster as it had never happened before yet so much financial advice, punditry & chatter never takes into account these supposedly once in a million years events. They use the bell curve that treats these events as one in a billion.
Could Jon or anyone else familiar with this work comment on it? – it appears to have great relevance to the validity of much academic research and their methodologies.
Sorry to go off the topic of the excellent interview.
[…] to the State Peace and Development Council I had, from time-to-time, seen Major-General Ohn Myint in action.┬ He was previously the Northern Commander of the tatmadaw and the Chairman of the Kachin State […]
Thanks for your more detailed explanation Nick. Having been around Thailand alot, I think you have highlighted many different geographic-specific aspects of Thai society – from city fringes to provinces – truly worth investigating in greater detail. I look forward to seeing more of your photographs and reports on NM.
I am also glad that you acknowledge the complexity of the situation – and raise the fact that the UDD is a mixed bag of people. The same can be said of the PAD, I have seen photographs my family and friends sent me and they are a significantly different bunch from how you have intentionally representing them here in NM – especially when, as many has noted, they haven’t intentionally physically attacked any other groups with different views (which could not be said of UDD). It was, I observed, almost a carnival atmosphere.
However, I am sure you have seen and heard much more and know more than me. Maybe you can tell us more about the respective UDD and PAD rallies. How often are each held? Where are they held? How many people in attendance in each on average? What kind of socio-economic mix? What proportion are armed? What is the content of the speeches? Who are your sources telling you is supporting/financing each group?
I notice you are generally on good terms with the UDD and, in contrast, felt threatened by the PAD. If you are a farang, I understand that shouldn’t be the case . You know that all you need is a disarming smile, a few words of Thai and most Thais will treat you like a VIP. You also probably won’t start with “Who is funding you?” – and I’m sure as a skilled journalist, you can easily gain informants’ trust…
I also do not buy into the your UDD informant’s justification of the violence in Udon. For me, no violence against peaceful gatherings/protests are justified, as no corruption and lawlessness is justified – nor should they be tolerated. I don’t think any of us here will disagree on that.
Whether they are under some powerful, provincial clique , the government has no excuse not to deal with the violence – as they have no excuse not to respect and follow the written law (and thus are not entitled to change to law to suit their crimes – which has resulted in all these PAD protests in the first place!). It is their job to enforce the law, if they don’t do it then they are fully responsible. It’s the least a Thai citizen should be able to expect from them…
Whether the palace endorses PMThaksin’s War on Drug policy is not relevant here – many of my family and friend also did to my dismay (a natural middle-class reaction I find). PMThaksin initiated the policy and gave the directives and is thus legally accountable – along with all those subordinates who carried out the policy – for the extra-judicial killings in the War on Drugs. The same applies for the Southern crimes – which is even more disappointing as he had appointed a fact-finding committee that advocated peaceful means of conflict resolution. Unfortunately PMThaksin chose the ‘eye for an eye’ path (quite predictable for a trained policeman)…
The drugwar was clearly not just TRT policy, but a collaboration of all power networks existing in Thailand in order to react to a social problem – military, police, civil service, and even the palace
I would have to disagree. My view is that Thaksin and his government implemented the war on drugs out of its own free-will ie. nobody forced them to do it. It is, therefore, clear to me that the resulting bloodshed and gross violations of human rights of thousands of people was a result of government policy.
Also, I am not sure why you cited the King’s speech. Perhaps you agree with what he said? Anyways, I think this is a perfect opportunity for me to accept the King’s open invitation for constructive criticism. And I will have to say that, with due respect to the King and whatever his intentions may have been when he made the comment, my view is that you cannot justify the murder of thousands of lives (many of whom it seems were not even related to drugs trade which included children and a pregnant woman) for Thaksin’s so-called war on drugs.
I don’t think it takes a drug expert to be able to work out that there must be other alternative approaches to solving a country’s drug problems, an approach that respects the people’s human rights. But Thaksin’s preferred approach evidently is one that is brutal, inhumane and cruel.
The war down South. Not just TRT policy, but again the response of the Thai state.
Yes, there are other contributing factors to the escalation of the violence down South, but my view is that Thaksin’s mishandling of the situation (the hardline, tough measures) clearly made things worse. Perhaps Prem got it wrong too and the coup government, but that doesn’t make what Thaksin got wrong, right.
How can you have an “un-networked” network? Your conceptualization would appear on the face of it contradictory and incoherent, and certainly is NOT what McCargo is arguing. It seems in fact to be arguing something directly opposed to his assertions. So I’m not sure where and how you derive inspiration from his arguments. By the way, I’m quite certain that Prof. McCargo believes that network monarchy pre-existed Thaksin’s rise to power.
Likewise, it boggles my mind to envision how recent developments show Thai political society inching back towards the model of the 1997 Constitution. Wasn’t that constitution very consciously and quickly ripped up by the military? Wasn’t it replaced with a new version that undermines many of its central provisions, and which is proving very nearly impossible to revise in any fashion back towards the vision of the 1997 constitution? Aren’t there influential voices now calling for even less elected representatives within the halls of parliament? How will politics be more participatory and transparent after the passage of the new security law last year which significantly reduces civilian oversight of the military?
Nick: Thanks for the informative photo’s.
You are not prepared to comment on the World Trade Center event as you were not present, however you have made extensive comments on the Udon & Prem house events, so presumably you were present at those events – would you care to publish some of those photo’s as a companion piece to the one’s you posted above?
(real violence, not weaners!)
I also am somewhat surprised that you find the crowd at the PAD protests so intimidating, yet you think the UDD/pro government mob just has a lunatic fringe – that certainly is a different perspective to the one I am used to hearing, and hopefully there is no bias in that opinion.
I am not a fan of Sondhi L, and do think the PAD have gone too far lately, but unfortunately they are the main opponent to Thaksin, and without them Thaksin would probably still be practicing policy corruption, tax evasion & maybe even extra-judicial killings.
The issues are far more complex than the simplified versions propagated by PAD
This book examines the ideas which have structured half a century of civil war in Burma, and the roles which political elites and foreign networks – from colonial missionaries to aid worker activists – have played in mediating understandings of ethnic conflict in the country.
First, we impute a serious scholar’s views to his “circle of conversation partners.”
Then, we advance our own views on the basis of our experience with three wealthy Thai undergrads so alienated from their country’s intellectual life that they are taking their first degrees, in English, “at an Ivy League university in the U.S.” (as opposed, perhaps, to an Ivy League university in Swaziland, or in Bulgaria?).
Who is really out of touch here?
Not sure who you might be, “Maw Hom,” but I am afraid that you have to do better than this.
Good. Now we start moving into shades of grey – a far more realistic view.
The drugwar was clearly not just TRT policy, but a collaboration of all power networks existing in Thailand in order to react to a social problem – military, police, civil service, and even the palace. Here i wish to cite a key speech, the 2003 birthday speech of H.M. the King, Bangkok Post translation:
“Victory in the war on drugs is good. They may blame the crackdown for more than 2,500 deaths, but this is a small price to pay. If the prime minister failed to curb [the drugs trade], over the years the number of deaths would easily surpass this toll. The lives of many officials are lost in working to bring the drug trade under control. These figures are often not counted, but it could be as high as the number of victims in the war on drugs.”
The war down South: Not just TRT policy, but again the response of the Thai state. The Kru Sue attack was ordered by Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, an outspoken opponent of Thaksin against the orders of Gen. Chavalit to solve the standoff by negotiations.
The Tak Bai deaths were accidental, and not ordered by the government, or anybody. The comments of Thaksin afterwards were indeed of very bad taste, and reflect the attitude of the Thai state. Nevertheless, Prem’s refusal to follow the recommendations of the NRC, such as introducing Yawi as a second official language in the three southern provinces show the same.
During the coup, the tactics against the insurgents were more aggressive even, and the arming of militias were even accelerated. Some militias are not under control of regular army or government, but only under palace control, such as the mostly Buddhist Or Lor Bor.
The issues are far more complex than the simplified versions propagated by PAD.
Again – i will not comment on the World Trade Center event as i was not present.
As to the Prem Clashes, i was there, that is what i have witnessed. I have sent my photos to my agency, but i have no control over what international magazines or newspapers decide to publish. In this event – as usual – nothing was published. I was interviewed though by ASTV, and i have stated exactly what i have stated here.
Why other media outlets in Thailand have reported differently is most likely because during that time all media outlets still had military censors in their offices.
There were very few foreign reporters at the scene – Nirmal Gosh from the Straights Times was briefly there, after i called him, one foreign AP photographer i also saw briefly, and a correspondent of a Vietnamese Agency. This event has escaped the attention of most foreign correspondents.
I have at that time not posted my images at NM as i have at that time not seen NM as an outlet that might wish to see my photos, because i am not an academic.
So, here i have now posted my account on the Prem compound clashes, and i hope you do not imply here that i do misreport these events. I am a in Thailand accredited photojournalist, i do take the ethics of my profession serious, and i comment here under my real name.
Yes, i do have photos of the man displaying his private parts. Personally – i did not feel threatened by this display of a not exactly impressive wiener. He is of a rather lunatic fringe of the pro government protesters known for outrageous stunts.
Again – the UDD is not a very cohesive group – it is an umbrella of many groups with widely differing agendas that was formed as a reaction to the military coup. Within that group there are fanatical pro Thaksin organizations and groups that have always opposed Thaksin. You have staunch royalists there, and also opponents of the monarchy. I am not an academic, but i would welcome field research on these groups.
The more serious issue you raised is the events of the “Udon Lovers” and why the government cannot guarantee the security of protesters upcountry. This is often translated as active government collaboration with those actions.
I would slightly differ though here, i think that this is a dangerous simplification of the event and its underlying mechanics. I have difficulties to summarize my view in a few words here, but my attempt for an explanation is that the real system of Thailand is a complex web of partly competing and partly collaborating semi-independent networks of power.
No government in Thailand can govern the country without those networks, and has to engage in very uncomfortable compromises. The Democrats have done so by forming coalitions with political parties representing those networks, and TRT has incorporated them. These networks are existing, are a huge problem, but dismantling them is very difficult and will take a very long time.
One leader of one of the groups under the UDD has expressed the Udon events to me in this way: “The PAD is well aware that these upcountry networks are the weak point of this government, as of every government, and has purposely provoked this incident, knowing that the government is not able to control those networks.”
Also, my police contacts have confirmed to me that intelligence was relayed to the PAD that attacks were planned, yet this was ignored by the PAD.
The events in Udon have to be seen not just in relation to the ongoing political crises but also have to be set into context of the politics of patronage and informal power networks that make up Thailand’s general socio-political landscape, where extreme violence lurks in every aspect of life here in the Land of Smile.
Also the PAD has to be seen in this context, regardless their self portrayal as a politically conscious group of modern citizens. The PAD is as entrenched in the patronage system, appearances of Puyai such as Gen. Saprang and other high ranked members of Thai society are testament of this.
Thailand outside metropolitan Bangkok is a very difficult territory, informal power networks overshadow formal power distribution. One does not have to look far here – the industrial suburbs of Bangkok are a perfect example.
One day i may attempt a post that somehow reflects this situation as i have extensively photographed there over many years.
Unfortunately there is a lack of academic research into elementary aspects of key developments of contemporary Thailand. You will find research into any folk dance in hinter-Isaarn, but very little recent material i am aware of on the newly developing proletariat in the suburban industrial belt, ongoing migration patterns into the cities, development of political consciousness of those sectors, and how traditional power networks adapt to these developments.
Such research would be eminently important to analyze the ongoing political conflict in Thailand, and the larger social changes behind these conflicts.
My photos cannot replace academic research, but i hope they may inspire such, or give an element of atmosphere to dry data.
Brilliant intereview as usual Nicholas. Professor McCargo is truly an “ajarn” in the best and truest sense of the word. I really appreciate what he is doing for the “dynamic” Thai academics through collaborations:
“…Thai universities are very bureaucratised institutions, and academics (especially the more dynamic ones) are kept on constant treadmill of activity, much of it rather pointless.”
I find Professor McCargo’s views on Thai politics evenhanded. The military are clearly not angels, but PMThaksin had a clear hand in re-politicizing the military despite the intentions of the 1997 Constitution to keep them in the barracks. I also just realized that “network monarchist” is McCargo’s coining (my own ignorance) – and, gatherting from the interview, it seems to be a phenomenon that arose out of Thaksinization – rather than a group that has always existed and conspired against PMThaksin since 2001. For me, if there is such a network, it is merely a collection of un-networked monarchist and other groups very angry at PMThaksin and TRT. Without PMThaksin as a focus, they’ll splinter in no time (much like PPP is doing now).
While Professor McCargo sounds pessimistic on Thailand’s political prospects, I am much more optimistic. Maybe it is because I am Thai and have family and friends there and can only hope for the best. On the other hand, I observe positive trends, that if encouraged, will take Thai society to a stable democracy with an effective rule of law.
Tulakarnpiwat is one and the PAD, for all their democratic shortcomings, is another (as long as they don’t go to beat up other groups of people with differing views first – self-defense, in a society with underlying violent tendencies, as McCargo acknowledged, is a sane reaction). For years, I was always the odd one amongst family and friends who followed Thai and world politics. Now everyone is talking politics – whether for against the one man – it must be a plus.
In a highly detoured and imperfect sort of way, Thai society seemed to be inching closer to the ideals and intentions of the 1997 Constitution. In the splintering PPP, we are seeing the last struggle of mafia capitalists who hated the checks and balances mechanisms of the 1997 Constitution anyway (whether during elections or in government) and it still shows. Without PMThaksin to unite them, it is a matter of time they will have to succumb and ‘behave’. Without PMThaksin and what he stands for, PAD will quickly fade too. Post-PAD, it is hoped Thai political processes can be much more transparent, participatory and inclusive as the 1997 Constitution envisaged it to be… However, it leaves the military looming in the background (a Turkey scenario it seems) – with the monarchy likely to feature much less in politics in the future. In Thai society, undying love and respect must be earned over a course of a lifetime – as those who studied in Thai institutions under great, compassionate krus and ajarns know well (on the other hand, HMK’s influence and inspiration amongst individual un-network monarchist, the kind that I am very familiar amongst family, friends and colleagues, will continue long, long into the future. That, many in NM will have to tolerate!).
I also agree with Professor McCargo in that the Thai coup may have unintentionally set a bad precedent for other aspiring democracies. However, in 2006 when the GenSonthi carried out his coup, the US had its hand tied as it openly support Pakistan’s GenMusharraf, who had already overstayed in power (as the US did in the 60s and 70s in overthrowing democratically elected socialist governments in the name of the Cold War). At the end of the day, each country will have to deal with its own specific problems and political growth I suppose.
PAD Leaders = advocate aggressive strategies to reclaim Preah Vihear (no deaths or serious injuries yet), advocate unconstitutional means of toppling government ( bloodless coup i think u refering), arming bodyguards in self-defence
TRT/PPP Leadership = implementing aggressive strategies to deal with Southern violence (leading to many deaths of fellow Thais), implementing war on drugs (thousands of fellow Thais dead), hiring of thugs to maim peaceful protesters (many seriously injured, perhaps one dead)
which is the more violent and lawless organization?
yes, the evidence is overwhelming indeed
As the decision to openly carry arms was announced by the leadership of the PAD during a press conference – i do see this therefore as official policy of PAD, and not just a decision of a few thugs within the PAD.
The PAD has by now morphed into a highly cohesive group with a clear policy and a leader oriented philosophy that leaves very little space for discussion and debate outside the small leadership group.
In addition to this, i would suggest reading on Prachathai the article on Sonthi Limthongkul’s position regarding the Preah Vihear issue, where he advocates highly aggressive strategies, not even excluding going to war with Cambodia.
This is further proof that the PAD is not a non-violent group, but an extremely nationalistic organization which openly advocates unconstitutional means to topple the government.
I suggest also to read recent statements regarding the PAD by people that have a proven record of being critical of the government, people such as Supinya Klangnarong, Pravit Rojanaphruk, Giles Ungpakorn, Thongchai Winitchakul, and many others.
Nick, the World Trade event was not way out of proportion as there was clear evidence to show that the police did not do anything to stop the thugs in black beating up an old protestor and a women. Unless you are from the likes of Zimbabwe, I don’t think such action (by both police and black thugs) is acceptable anywhere else.
Let us say that for the UDD protest in front of PMPrem’s house, only you and Asian Sentinel got it ‘right’ against all the watching Thai TV and newspaper medias (do you think they are just backward, suppressed, third world media Nick?), why didn’t you post your photographs in NM then (in mid-2007)? Who were the “agent provocateur” here specifically aiming at one of the most respected figure, at least in the ruling military? Remember that this event occured during a Thai coup government which traditionally had NO QUALMS about killing protesting citizens… For me this is unprecedented.
For the Thammasat event, you probably have photographs of the UDD man who displayed his private parts in protest against PAD. Most will find that kind of action quite threatening – at least rather uncomfortable (not just for the PAD, but also for fellow UDDs or any neutrals watching).
For Udon event, I stick to my ‘schoolyard bully’ analogy. There is a high likelihood that if PAD where armed then, the Udon-lovers will have second thought about attacking. The PAD misunderstood that the 500 or so police would provide protection. And we are talking about a democratically elected government who TURNED A COLLUDING BLIND EYE to this “LAWLESSNESS” to use your word.
You seem to forget that it is the GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY to ensure that protests are PEACEFUL. In failing to do that, they create the conditions for lawlessness. Look Nick, ALL IT TOOK is for students, teachers and parents of a nearby school to file a complaint against the PAD at the courts and they complied (even if with a little initial resistance)…
And besides, if UDD don’t like what they hear, there’s no need to listen nor intentionally confront the PAD. There are many pro-government TV and radio channels anyway. It is also within their democratic rights to set up stage somewhere else to air their anti-PAD, pro-Thaksin views. You’ve mentioned that you’ve followed the UDD more closely – can you let us know exactly what transpires in their rallies to get some “balance” viewpoint against the many people who see the benefits of having the PAD?
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Interview with Professor Duncan McCargo
“a black swan is a large-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare event beyond the realm of normal expectations”
It encapulates a limitation of induction. All swans were white until they found a black one in Australia, I believe. Relevant to the current political situation. Multiple regressions (statistics) won’t tell you what is going to happen. No one knew (or perhaps, still do not know) what shape the black swan that will deliver Thailand from all its current problems will take. Maybe the courts break the deadlock or maybe things will just keep getting worse as the Northeast continues to beat the center Bangkok demographically.
Taleb’s first book is just as interesting and describes in detail the kind of cyclical arrogance of big traders in financial markets. IMHO His ideas can be used to read and interpret other areas of human activity such as warfare and leadership.
Even the greatest generals such as Napoleon have built bubbles of power that were in the end unsustainable. The same could be said of Thailand’s self-styled Gengis Khan who has hit some speed bumps recently.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2001/2005). Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets. New York: Random House.
PAD – ready for violence
“nganadeeleg”:
I was present at the Prem compound clashes, not at the Udon incident. I have though asked a lot about the Udon incident. I have not done so about the World Trade Center incident, therefore i just do not feel competent enough to comment.
I will ask NM if they are interested in posting photos of the Prem compound clashes. But these photos are not that different than what was seen already, the only photos i have that were not widely published are a few images where UDD protesters Wai to police, and where UDD protesters hold back their fellow protesters from attacking after police have been beaten back already.
“karmablues”:
Yes, Thaksin was not ‘coerced’ into the drugwar, but it still was a collaboration between the different networks of power. As proof of this i have cited the speech. And regarding PAD – at the time of the drugwar, Sondhi Limthongkul’s media machine was one of the main supporters of the drugwar killings. I do clearly remember that Sondhi Limthongkul chided Thaksin at the first Royal Plaza speech for having given up on the drugwar.
Also Chamlong Srimuang, at his first speech after openly joining the PAD, has called Thaksin an excellent Prime Minister for the the first four years (those were the years during which all the severe human rights violations happened).
The military installed government was not one bit less hardline than Thaksin in the southern provinces, even the person responsible for the Krue Sue attack, Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, was elevated to Special Advisor to ISOC. The main thing that Thaksin has done was to give the South back to police control. That may have been a mistake, but there were very clear reasons for this as well – the massive corruption and collaboration with the smuggling and illegal logging operations down there.
I do not want to defend Thaksin here. I only want to introduce facts into the debate. For all of Thaksin’s shortcomings and failings – many of the things that radical opponents make him responsible for, he simply isn’t. Better concentrate on what he really did wrong, and who has actively collaborated at the time. Many of those collaborators and beneficiaries are now some of the loudest opponents. You also should analyze the agendas of his loud opponents, and really think hard if their aims correspondent to what you would wish for Thailand’s future.
“Sidh S”:
First of all, i am not a very skilled journalist, i am foremost a photographer. I can’t pretend what i am not, and my style of interviewing is trying to draw out people, draw them into a conversation, i like to provoke them slightly with criticism, and see how they react.
In this way, i felt a lot less intimidated during UDD or TRT events. Most there have accepted without a problem that i have said that i am not a supporter of Thaksin, and this has generally led to very interesting conversations about Thailand’s difficulties, patronage networks, and similar topics. A very common view especially under the more simple people was that they knew about Thaksin’s corruption, but felt that for the first time that they have under his rule also benefited from the state.
It is not my style to use the “farang” benefit. I think that this is using an unfair advantage, and it will not lead to meaningful conversation. I don’t want people to compliment me on my language abilities, i want them to converse with me an an equal footing. And there i found the majority of the PAD not reacting very well to any sort of criticism, or uncomfortable questions. Negative reactions tell me more than meaningless compliments, or “VIP” treatment.
So were the comments of the UDD person about the Udon incident not an excuse or justification, but an explanation. And that is all i can give here as well – explanations, not excuses or justifications.
The UDD rallies are not very regular anymore. I am not aware of any bigger event since the coup, only one at Lumpini about the constitution change. From what i see – the main leadership holds itself back at the moment. The relatively regular rallies are now just held by small splinter groups. Their attendance is not more than 50 to 300 people. At their heyday during the coup there up to 20 000 protesters. Most of the daily events drew about 2000 to 5000 people.
The socio economic make up was clearly lower than PAD, i would say most were lower middle class and working class.
The PAD supporters have changed though a lot compared to pre coup days. Pre coup it was more people, up to 80 000 at the largest events (the at that time reported figures were exaggerated), while now there are a few hundred to 2000 at regular days, and maybe 10 000 to 20 000 at larger events such as marches.
Also some of my contacts told me that many of the present PAD supporters now are dependents of army supporters of the PAD sent there.
I do not listen too much to the public speeches of either, they bore me to death, generally. What i listen to at the PAD events though is an increased praise for the military, extreme nationalism. The UDD splinter group events are mostly rather repetitive praises for Thaksin (the more able speakers such as Jakrapop Penkair, Mor Weng, Nattawut, Veera Musikapong or assorted academics are not appearing at the present time – during the coup days they have held some very intelligent speeches).
A very interesting facet now is the so called “Sanam Luang Voice”, or “Siang Prachachon”, who have built the stage at Sanam Luang. Unfortunately only Da Torpedo reached notoriety because of her mostly incoherent rants. But there are others who have surprising views on things here. It is a tiny group of individuals, and most of their spectators are Sanam Luang bums (and some very independent thinkers).
Anyhow, these are just my impressions – i am foremost a photographer. It would be very helpful, also for me, if there would be some independent academic research on these groups. I personally find them fascinating. Especially under these groups which are generally lumped together as “reds” there is a mostly unreported multifaceted developing political consciousness that regularly breaches the limits of forbidden territory. It started as a mostly pro-Thaksin/anti-coup movement, and has morphed now into surprising fields of thought.
I would wish that academics take these groups as serious as the different intelligence services do.
Patronage and power in northern Burma
In Tachileik I know that some government positions were purchased by people just setting off on their careers in the late 1990s. Some positions were lucrative. Also when high officials came on visits to Tachileik there was more discussion through the grapevine of the unofficial “taxes” that were being extracted.
Burmese newspapers may imitate certain parts of the historical chronicles in which the king distributes gifts. The parts of the chronicle where the Than Shwe taxes and consults on strategy with his close advisors, of course, are not to be seen. Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière argues in some of her papers that modern politics (esp. rituals) imitates the much older patterns. It might be the case here too.
Patronage and power in northern Burma
For an old Burmese like me, that patronizing cash practice is not uncommon in the Burmese society as a whole, but it is, I think, quite recent for the Burmese officialdom.
When I was working for Burma Irrigation Department in the eighties, the standard practice was, whenever the Military Divisional Commander or even the Minister or the deputy ministers gave our region a visit we had to prepare and spend thousands and thousands of dollars to report to him about our activities and to entertain him.
The reward for a good performance was a quick promotion or/and more budget and expenditure for the projects we were implementing. Of course what it means was more money into our pockets as every government official is corrupt. Getting a wad of cash direct from your senior officials would even be considered rude and unthinkable then.
Cash doesn’t come down from top to bottom. But, the official budget is. The cash then goes up from bottom to top.
The standard practice we used to follow in our ministry was quite simple. Let’s say I was supposed to get cash as a junior official, say 5000 dollars, direct from the departmental accountant, for a project or task assigned to me by my direct boss. But I never got full 5ooo, I got only 4500 in my hand. But I had to produce a receipt for full 5ooo. My understanding was the accountant gave my boss at least 400 dollars and he pocketed the rest. That simple.
No wonder all the billion dollars of foreign aid just simply disappeared into thin air.
Green Left Weekly on Burma
Thanks for your comments Nicholas. I tried to get this article published during the Howard/Downer years without success. Green left published what Rupert’s editors rejected. At the time I was told by a spokeswoman: “We will print what we want, from whom we want, when we want, and how we want, this has come from the top.” As an undergraduate journalism student I felt sad that Newscorp selected the truth that suited them. But then the reality is that they exist from the profit of advertising. We learnt this in the first year at university – but what are we left with when the silver runs dry?
Congratz to GLW for having the heart to publish the story “Waiting for Suu Kyi”.
Burma seems to be a wounded animal with nations (corporations) the world over feasting from her flesh. This reminds me of the Neil Young song “I’ve seen the needle and the damage done, a little part of it in everyone.”
We in the west should lead by example, and practice Principle before Profit and Ethics before Economics. Otherwise we run the risk of being labeled hypocrites and the International Human Rights Instruments promoted by some of us seen as a smokescreen that obscures a different reality. If we don’t, the likes of Robert Mugabe & General Than Shwe would be quick to point out our hypocrisy.
The reconciliation theme promoted by Australia’s new government offers hope that we all need – especially those in Burma. The world could do with a lot more Aung San Suu Kyi’s, Yoko Ono’s and yes, why not – Kevin Rudd’s!
PS. I enjoyed your review re the Aw Saw & Paramilitary by Desmond Ball et al. I would love to get a copy of the book sometime.
Regards
Dennis
Interview with Professor Duncan McCargo
Jon Fernquist stated: “Nicholas Taleb says: daily news is noise (statistical white noise)”
I have just finished reading Taleb’s The Black Swan with his criticism of the the use of the Bell curve (Gaussian) in academic research- its “epistemic arrogamce”. Too often it is used in situations where the bell curve is not relevant (esp. finance)
The title “The Black Swan” comes from when people thought there were no black swans because there was no evidence of them. The past was used to judge the future. No-one predicted the sub-prime disaster as it had never happened before yet so much financial advice, punditry & chatter never takes into account these supposedly once in a million years events. They use the bell curve that treats these events as one in a billion.
Could Jon or anyone else familiar with this work comment on it? – it appears to have great relevance to the validity of much academic research and their methodologies.
Sorry to go off the topic of the excellent interview.
Armed groups at the Myitkyina Manau
[…] to the State Peace and Development Council I had, from time-to-time, seen Major-General Ohn Myint in action.┬ He was previously the Northern Commander of the tatmadaw and the Chairman of the Kachin State […]
PAD – ready for violence
What’s happining here? Is there anyone who really knows Thiland here? Interesting site. Really.
PAD – ready for violence
Thanks for your more detailed explanation Nick. Having been around Thailand alot, I think you have highlighted many different geographic-specific aspects of Thai society – from city fringes to provinces – truly worth investigating in greater detail. I look forward to seeing more of your photographs and reports on NM.
I am also glad that you acknowledge the complexity of the situation – and raise the fact that the UDD is a mixed bag of people. The same can be said of the PAD, I have seen photographs my family and friends sent me and they are a significantly different bunch from how you have intentionally representing them here in NM – especially when, as many has noted, they haven’t intentionally physically attacked any other groups with different views (which could not be said of UDD). It was, I observed, almost a carnival atmosphere.
However, I am sure you have seen and heard much more and know more than me. Maybe you can tell us more about the respective UDD and PAD rallies. How often are each held? Where are they held? How many people in attendance in each on average? What kind of socio-economic mix? What proportion are armed? What is the content of the speeches? Who are your sources telling you is supporting/financing each group?
I notice you are generally on good terms with the UDD and, in contrast, felt threatened by the PAD. If you are a farang, I understand that shouldn’t be the case . You know that all you need is a disarming smile, a few words of Thai and most Thais will treat you like a VIP. You also probably won’t start with “Who is funding you?” – and I’m sure as a skilled journalist, you can easily gain informants’ trust…
I also do not buy into the your UDD informant’s justification of the violence in Udon. For me, no violence against peaceful gatherings/protests are justified, as no corruption and lawlessness is justified – nor should they be tolerated. I don’t think any of us here will disagree on that.
Whether they are under some powerful, provincial clique , the government has no excuse not to deal with the violence – as they have no excuse not to respect and follow the written law (and thus are not entitled to change to law to suit their crimes – which has resulted in all these PAD protests in the first place!). It is their job to enforce the law, if they don’t do it then they are fully responsible. It’s the least a Thai citizen should be able to expect from them…
Whether the palace endorses PMThaksin’s War on Drug policy is not relevant here – many of my family and friend also did to my dismay (a natural middle-class reaction I find). PMThaksin initiated the policy and gave the directives and is thus legally accountable – along with all those subordinates who carried out the policy – for the extra-judicial killings in the War on Drugs. The same applies for the Southern crimes – which is even more disappointing as he had appointed a fact-finding committee that advocated peaceful means of conflict resolution. Unfortunately PMThaksin chose the ‘eye for an eye’ path (quite predictable for a trained policeman)…
PAD – ready for violence
The drugwar was clearly not just TRT policy, but a collaboration of all power networks existing in Thailand in order to react to a social problem – military, police, civil service, and even the palace
I would have to disagree. My view is that Thaksin and his government implemented the war on drugs out of its own free-will ie. nobody forced them to do it. It is, therefore, clear to me that the resulting bloodshed and gross violations of human rights of thousands of people was a result of government policy.
Take a look at Human Right Watch’s report on the drug war. It is easy to see that Thaksin and his government were to blame for this.
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm
Also, I am not sure why you cited the King’s speech. Perhaps you agree with what he said? Anyways, I think this is a perfect opportunity for me to accept the King’s open invitation for constructive criticism. And I will have to say that, with due respect to the King and whatever his intentions may have been when he made the comment, my view is that you cannot justify the murder of thousands of lives (many of whom it seems were not even related to drugs trade which included children and a pregnant woman) for Thaksin’s so-called war on drugs.
I don’t think it takes a drug expert to be able to work out that there must be other alternative approaches to solving a country’s drug problems, an approach that respects the people’s human rights. But Thaksin’s preferred approach evidently is one that is brutal, inhumane and cruel.
The war down South. Not just TRT policy, but again the response of the Thai state.
Yes, there are other contributing factors to the escalation of the violence down South, but my view is that Thaksin’s mishandling of the situation (the hardline, tough measures) clearly made things worse. Perhaps Prem got it wrong too and the coup government, but that doesn’t make what Thaksin got wrong, right.
Interview with Professor Duncan McCargo
Sidh,
How can you have an “un-networked” network? Your conceptualization would appear on the face of it contradictory and incoherent, and certainly is NOT what McCargo is arguing. It seems in fact to be arguing something directly opposed to his assertions. So I’m not sure where and how you derive inspiration from his arguments. By the way, I’m quite certain that Prof. McCargo believes that network monarchy pre-existed Thaksin’s rise to power.
Likewise, it boggles my mind to envision how recent developments show Thai political society inching back towards the model of the 1997 Constitution. Wasn’t that constitution very consciously and quickly ripped up by the military? Wasn’t it replaced with a new version that undermines many of its central provisions, and which is proving very nearly impossible to revise in any fashion back towards the vision of the 1997 constitution? Aren’t there influential voices now calling for even less elected representatives within the halls of parliament? How will politics be more participatory and transparent after the passage of the new security law last year which significantly reduces civilian oversight of the military?
PAD – ready for violence
Nick: Thanks for the informative photo’s.
You are not prepared to comment on the World Trade Center event as you were not present, however you have made extensive comments on the Udon & Prem house events, so presumably you were present at those events – would you care to publish some of those photo’s as a companion piece to the one’s you posted above?
(real violence, not weaners!)
I also am somewhat surprised that you find the crowd at the PAD protests so intimidating, yet you think the UDD/pro government mob just has a lunatic fringe – that certainly is a different perspective to the one I am used to hearing, and hopefully there is no bias in that opinion.
I am not a fan of Sondhi L, and do think the PAD have gone too far lately, but unfortunately they are the main opponent to Thaksin, and without them Thaksin would probably still be practicing policy corruption, tax evasion & maybe even extra-judicial killings.
The issues are far more complex than the simplified versions propagated by PAD
I will agree with you on that point.
Dominic Faulder on 8-8-88
sorry Charles,
Ethnic Politics in Burma
States of Conflict
By Ashley South Publication Date: 20th June 2008
This book examines the ideas which have structured half a century of civil war in Burma, and the roles which political elites and foreign networks – from colonial missionaries to aid worker activists – have played in mediating understandings of ethnic conflict in the country.
Reynolds on Handley’s The King Never Smiles
First, we impute a serious scholar’s views to his “circle of conversation partners.”
Then, we advance our own views on the basis of our experience with three wealthy Thai undergrads so alienated from their country’s intellectual life that they are taking their first degrees, in English, “at an Ivy League university in the U.S.” (as opposed, perhaps, to an Ivy League university in Swaziland, or in Bulgaria?).
Who is really out of touch here?
Not sure who you might be, “Maw Hom,” but I am afraid that you have to do better than this.
PAD – ready for violence
“Karmablues”:
Good. Now we start moving into shades of grey – a far more realistic view.
The drugwar was clearly not just TRT policy, but a collaboration of all power networks existing in Thailand in order to react to a social problem – military, police, civil service, and even the palace. Here i wish to cite a key speech, the 2003 birthday speech of H.M. the King, Bangkok Post translation:
“Victory in the war on drugs is good. They may blame the crackdown for more than 2,500 deaths, but this is a small price to pay. If the prime minister failed to curb [the drugs trade], over the years the number of deaths would easily surpass this toll. The lives of many officials are lost in working to bring the drug trade under control. These figures are often not counted, but it could be as high as the number of victims in the war on drugs.”
The war down South: Not just TRT policy, but again the response of the Thai state. The Kru Sue attack was ordered by Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, an outspoken opponent of Thaksin against the orders of Gen. Chavalit to solve the standoff by negotiations.
The Tak Bai deaths were accidental, and not ordered by the government, or anybody. The comments of Thaksin afterwards were indeed of very bad taste, and reflect the attitude of the Thai state. Nevertheless, Prem’s refusal to follow the recommendations of the NRC, such as introducing Yawi as a second official language in the three southern provinces show the same.
During the coup, the tactics against the insurgents were more aggressive even, and the arming of militias were even accelerated. Some militias are not under control of regular army or government, but only under palace control, such as the mostly Buddhist Or Lor Bor.
The issues are far more complex than the simplified versions propagated by PAD.
PAD – ready for violence
“Sidh S.”:
Again – i will not comment on the World Trade Center event as i was not present.
As to the Prem Clashes, i was there, that is what i have witnessed. I have sent my photos to my agency, but i have no control over what international magazines or newspapers decide to publish. In this event – as usual – nothing was published. I was interviewed though by ASTV, and i have stated exactly what i have stated here.
Why other media outlets in Thailand have reported differently is most likely because during that time all media outlets still had military censors in their offices.
There were very few foreign reporters at the scene – Nirmal Gosh from the Straights Times was briefly there, after i called him, one foreign AP photographer i also saw briefly, and a correspondent of a Vietnamese Agency. This event has escaped the attention of most foreign correspondents.
I have at that time not posted my images at NM as i have at that time not seen NM as an outlet that might wish to see my photos, because i am not an academic.
So, here i have now posted my account on the Prem compound clashes, and i hope you do not imply here that i do misreport these events. I am a in Thailand accredited photojournalist, i do take the ethics of my profession serious, and i comment here under my real name.
Yes, i do have photos of the man displaying his private parts. Personally – i did not feel threatened by this display of a not exactly impressive wiener. He is of a rather lunatic fringe of the pro government protesters known for outrageous stunts.
Again – the UDD is not a very cohesive group – it is an umbrella of many groups with widely differing agendas that was formed as a reaction to the military coup. Within that group there are fanatical pro Thaksin organizations and groups that have always opposed Thaksin. You have staunch royalists there, and also opponents of the monarchy. I am not an academic, but i would welcome field research on these groups.
The more serious issue you raised is the events of the “Udon Lovers” and why the government cannot guarantee the security of protesters upcountry. This is often translated as active government collaboration with those actions.
I would slightly differ though here, i think that this is a dangerous simplification of the event and its underlying mechanics. I have difficulties to summarize my view in a few words here, but my attempt for an explanation is that the real system of Thailand is a complex web of partly competing and partly collaborating semi-independent networks of power.
No government in Thailand can govern the country without those networks, and has to engage in very uncomfortable compromises. The Democrats have done so by forming coalitions with political parties representing those networks, and TRT has incorporated them. These networks are existing, are a huge problem, but dismantling them is very difficult and will take a very long time.
One leader of one of the groups under the UDD has expressed the Udon events to me in this way: “The PAD is well aware that these upcountry networks are the weak point of this government, as of every government, and has purposely provoked this incident, knowing that the government is not able to control those networks.”
Also, my police contacts have confirmed to me that intelligence was relayed to the PAD that attacks were planned, yet this was ignored by the PAD.
The events in Udon have to be seen not just in relation to the ongoing political crises but also have to be set into context of the politics of patronage and informal power networks that make up Thailand’s general socio-political landscape, where extreme violence lurks in every aspect of life here in the Land of Smile.
Also the PAD has to be seen in this context, regardless their self portrayal as a politically conscious group of modern citizens. The PAD is as entrenched in the patronage system, appearances of Puyai such as Gen. Saprang and other high ranked members of Thai society are testament of this.
Thailand outside metropolitan Bangkok is a very difficult territory, informal power networks overshadow formal power distribution. One does not have to look far here – the industrial suburbs of Bangkok are a perfect example.
One day i may attempt a post that somehow reflects this situation as i have extensively photographed there over many years.
Unfortunately there is a lack of academic research into elementary aspects of key developments of contemporary Thailand. You will find research into any folk dance in hinter-Isaarn, but very little recent material i am aware of on the newly developing proletariat in the suburban industrial belt, ongoing migration patterns into the cities, development of political consciousness of those sectors, and how traditional power networks adapt to these developments.
Such research would be eminently important to analyze the ongoing political conflict in Thailand, and the larger social changes behind these conflicts.
My photos cannot replace academic research, but i hope they may inspire such, or give an element of atmosphere to dry data.
Interview with Professor Duncan McCargo
Brilliant intereview as usual Nicholas. Professor McCargo is truly an “ajarn” in the best and truest sense of the word. I really appreciate what he is doing for the “dynamic” Thai academics through collaborations:
“…Thai universities are very bureaucratised institutions, and academics (especially the more dynamic ones) are kept on constant treadmill of activity, much of it rather pointless.”
I find Professor McCargo’s views on Thai politics evenhanded. The military are clearly not angels, but PMThaksin had a clear hand in re-politicizing the military despite the intentions of the 1997 Constitution to keep them in the barracks. I also just realized that “network monarchist” is McCargo’s coining (my own ignorance) – and, gatherting from the interview, it seems to be a phenomenon that arose out of Thaksinization – rather than a group that has always existed and conspired against PMThaksin since 2001. For me, if there is such a network, it is merely a collection of un-networked monarchist and other groups very angry at PMThaksin and TRT. Without PMThaksin as a focus, they’ll splinter in no time (much like PPP is doing now).
While Professor McCargo sounds pessimistic on Thailand’s political prospects, I am much more optimistic. Maybe it is because I am Thai and have family and friends there and can only hope for the best. On the other hand, I observe positive trends, that if encouraged, will take Thai society to a stable democracy with an effective rule of law.
Tulakarnpiwat is one and the PAD, for all their democratic shortcomings, is another (as long as they don’t go to beat up other groups of people with differing views first – self-defense, in a society with underlying violent tendencies, as McCargo acknowledged, is a sane reaction). For years, I was always the odd one amongst family and friends who followed Thai and world politics. Now everyone is talking politics – whether for against the one man – it must be a plus.
In a highly detoured and imperfect sort of way, Thai society seemed to be inching closer to the ideals and intentions of the 1997 Constitution. In the splintering PPP, we are seeing the last struggle of mafia capitalists who hated the checks and balances mechanisms of the 1997 Constitution anyway (whether during elections or in government) and it still shows. Without PMThaksin to unite them, it is a matter of time they will have to succumb and ‘behave’. Without PMThaksin and what he stands for, PAD will quickly fade too. Post-PAD, it is hoped Thai political processes can be much more transparent, participatory and inclusive as the 1997 Constitution envisaged it to be… However, it leaves the military looming in the background (a Turkey scenario it seems) – with the monarchy likely to feature much less in politics in the future. In Thai society, undying love and respect must be earned over a course of a lifetime – as those who studied in Thai institutions under great, compassionate krus and ajarns know well (on the other hand, HMK’s influence and inspiration amongst individual un-network monarchist, the kind that I am very familiar amongst family, friends and colleagues, will continue long, long into the future. That, many in NM will have to tolerate!).
I also agree with Professor McCargo in that the Thai coup may have unintentionally set a bad precedent for other aspiring democracies. However, in 2006 when the GenSonthi carried out his coup, the US had its hand tied as it openly support Pakistan’s GenMusharraf, who had already overstayed in power (as the US did in the 60s and 70s in overthrowing democratically elected socialist governments in the name of the Cold War). At the end of the day, each country will have to deal with its own specific problems and political growth I suppose.
PAD – ready for violence
Ok,
PAD Leaders = advocate aggressive strategies to reclaim Preah Vihear (no deaths or serious injuries yet), advocate unconstitutional means of toppling government ( bloodless coup i think u refering), arming bodyguards in self-defence
TRT/PPP Leadership = implementing aggressive strategies to deal with Southern violence (leading to many deaths of fellow Thais), implementing war on drugs (thousands of fellow Thais dead), hiring of thugs to maim peaceful protesters (many seriously injured, perhaps one dead)
which is the more violent and lawless organization?
yes, the evidence is overwhelming indeed
PAD – ready for violence
“nganadeeleg”:
As the decision to openly carry arms was announced by the leadership of the PAD during a press conference – i do see this therefore as official policy of PAD, and not just a decision of a few thugs within the PAD.
The PAD has by now morphed into a highly cohesive group with a clear policy and a leader oriented philosophy that leaves very little space for discussion and debate outside the small leadership group.
In addition to this, i would suggest reading on Prachathai the article on Sonthi Limthongkul’s position regarding the Preah Vihear issue, where he advocates highly aggressive strategies, not even excluding going to war with Cambodia.
This is further proof that the PAD is not a non-violent group, but an extremely nationalistic organization which openly advocates unconstitutional means to topple the government.
I suggest also to read recent statements regarding the PAD by people that have a proven record of being critical of the government, people such as Supinya Klangnarong, Pravit Rojanaphruk, Giles Ungpakorn, Thongchai Winitchakul, and many others.
The evidence is overwhelming.
PAD – ready for violence
Nick, the World Trade event was not way out of proportion as there was clear evidence to show that the police did not do anything to stop the thugs in black beating up an old protestor and a women. Unless you are from the likes of Zimbabwe, I don’t think such action (by both police and black thugs) is acceptable anywhere else.
Let us say that for the UDD protest in front of PMPrem’s house, only you and Asian Sentinel got it ‘right’ against all the watching Thai TV and newspaper medias (do you think they are just backward, suppressed, third world media Nick?), why didn’t you post your photographs in NM then (in mid-2007)? Who were the “agent provocateur” here specifically aiming at one of the most respected figure, at least in the ruling military? Remember that this event occured during a Thai coup government which traditionally had NO QUALMS about killing protesting citizens… For me this is unprecedented.
For the Thammasat event, you probably have photographs of the UDD man who displayed his private parts in protest against PAD. Most will find that kind of action quite threatening – at least rather uncomfortable (not just for the PAD, but also for fellow UDDs or any neutrals watching).
For Udon event, I stick to my ‘schoolyard bully’ analogy. There is a high likelihood that if PAD where armed then, the Udon-lovers will have second thought about attacking. The PAD misunderstood that the 500 or so police would provide protection. And we are talking about a democratically elected government who TURNED A COLLUDING BLIND EYE to this “LAWLESSNESS” to use your word.
You seem to forget that it is the GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY to ensure that protests are PEACEFUL. In failing to do that, they create the conditions for lawlessness. Look Nick, ALL IT TOOK is for students, teachers and parents of a nearby school to file a complaint against the PAD at the courts and they complied (even if with a little initial resistance)…
And besides, if UDD don’t like what they hear, there’s no need to listen nor intentionally confront the PAD. There are many pro-government TV and radio channels anyway. It is also within their democratic rights to set up stage somewhere else to air their anti-PAD, pro-Thaksin views. You’ve mentioned that you’ve followed the UDD more closely – can you let us know exactly what transpires in their rallies to get some “balance” viewpoint against the many people who see the benefits of having the PAD?