It’s baffling that he asked why we haven’t done anything to cut the fuel subsidy. Is he aware that PDIP was the party that strongly opposed SBY’s repeated proposals for fuel subsidy cut?
One cannot but smile when one hears such terms as “perfect democracy” or “absolute democracy”. Persons using such terms do not have a clue about the nature of democracy or what the concept entails. Here one is dealing with rather na├пve persons with a basic education, or no education in the political sciences. However they do know where their interests lie and how to manipulate the existing laws to their benefit.
“Corruption” was Suthep┬┤s cry to battle, and now that the Red-shirts are no longer calling the tune, I wonder where the corruption money for infrastructure projects will flow. Are the “Yellow-shirt” tenders getting all the contracts now, and will the army have to open more branches of the Thai Military Bank to cope with the windfall?
Following Sceptic: if anyone wants to translate any New Mandala content into Thai then feel free to get in touch. In the old days much of our content was translated within hours. Sadly, some of the agile and anonymous folks who did that work have moved on.
But if anyone else wants to take up the challenge please feel free. If you send us any links to translated content we’ll do our best to help get out the word through New Mandala‘s usual channels.
That is really excellent. What about an accurate translation into Thai? I believe it should be widely disseminated, not least to those who are going to be responsible for drafting the nineteenth constitution
Robert Dayley has hit the nail on the head. By “reforms”, the military/royalist Thai elite actually means Thailand regressing backwards to the time of Prem, Kittikachorn and Sarit. An “undemocracy” or as Suthep often said, an “Absolute Democracy”. Basically, an authoritarian government dressed up in a “democracy” sounding name in an attempt to maintain Thailand’s standing with the prosperous liberal democracies of Europe, North America and Australia/NZ.
The military Junta have made a fine start by putting discipline and total obedience into schools and civil service.
Happiness is really a controlled society that lives in fear of being arrested if they express different views.
The next constitution will probably be no different and like the 2007 constitution voted on with rifles pointed at the population.
Ikagil. Thailand has or had under the 1997 and 2007 charters extensive mechanisms to deal with vote buying and corruption but none of them have been able to prevent the things you mention. Only one minister (a democrat) has every been imprisoned for corruption and he was only a bit part player who got careless and was caught taking a tiddly 5 million baht bribe. Therefore crime committed by politicians has paid on an absolutely massive scale. Contrast this with Western democracies where ministers routinely resign in shame because they are found to have accepted a gift of a bottle of wine, built a duck house in their garden at taxpayer expense or even something so banal (to a Thai) as paying for sex with a prostitute.
Perhaps there is just something in the Thai psyche that precludes this or is it that feudalism and the desire for feudal power is too deeply entrenched? Thus everyone tries to obtain power (with the main objective of looting the taxpayer) by whatever means available and will then hang on for dear life suborning all the mechanisms of law and order and never admit to anything.
In such a depressing environment it matters little whether corrupt politicians buy their way into power or venal generals simply seize it. A positive outcome from either scenario is purely a matter of chance. Since 2001 we have had: 5 grossly corrupt Thaksinite administrations; 1 ineffectual Democrat administration that could only be in power by giving free rein to Bhum Jai Thai and Chart Thai Pattana to steal anything they could move; and 1 completely ineffectual military appointed government. Yingluck could have made other choices but gave up her seat at the trough as a result of the Amnesty Bill. Now it’s the military’s turn to see if they can make a better score than their last innings. Democracy, as Westerners know it, is not really a feature on the landscape.
@ Niphon: As you concede, the Election Commission, the Constitution Court and the military were all working against the elected government. Presuming you don’t mean for them to ‘bend over’ in readiness, I’m interested to hear what compromises you think the government could or should have made in addition to withdrawing the amnesty bill, dissolving parliament and taking a gentle approach with the ‘protected’ protesting mob?
The data available regarding farmers is that only a few hundred farmers from both the north and Isarn have joined the PDRC protests. That is a miniscule percentage of farmers in Thailand. In Pichit and Pitsanulok for example, both provinces where i have relatives – it was only farmers of the extended clans of Democrat Party MP’s and their canvasser networks. Yet of the same provinces many farmers joined the UDD rally at Aksa Road. This may be anecdotal evidence and not data, but this is anecdotal evidence which i have heard from all over the country from both researchers located in these areas, and from sources in the security agencies.
I know that at the time newspaper articles in both Bangkok Post and Nation suggested otherwise, but the numbers simply failed to materialize.
Was the blanket amnesty actually just a move solely driven by Pueah Thai? I very much doubt that. If you want to try to analyze, i would suggest to look into this quite essential question of how the blanket amnesty actually came to place, including which backroom deals may have led to this.
To find common ground (such as averting a coup)? Really? What makes you think that the PDRC/Democrat Party wanted to avert a coup? Suthep quite early on has on numerous occasions asked the military to take their side, such as during the PDRC visit to the supreme commander.
If you would like to understand and make other understand, then i would suggest to look at the entire period of the red/yellow conflict starting from late 2005 until now, at the names that continue to crop up (many in the article here, and all of them have extensive networks as well), and agendas that are re-branded but essentially the same ill- or never defined notions – such as “new politics” in 2008, and “reform before elections” in 2014 – and what ideas are actually hiding behind them.
Yes, indeed, the situation is enormously complex, far beyond a mere conflict between two political parties.
How can I with a straight face try to twist this into being some kind of gerrymandered result in favour of the ‘democrats’? Quite simply.
There seems to be little doubt that the creation of new two- and three-member constituencies was designed to encourage the electorate to split_their votes between different parties and so reduce the dominance of any single one. Knowing that they feared most of all a Thaksinite victory, I think it is fair to call it gerrymandering. On the face of things it failed, although it may have partially succeeded in as much as it prevented PPP from securing the absolute majority that they might otherwise have done had single-member constituencies been the order of the day. The fact that this rather complicated manoeuvre didn’t achieve its objective may explain the return to single-member constituencies in 2011, when their new ploy was to greatly increase the number of national list_seats from 80 to 125, that is to say from 1/6 to 1/4 of the whole House. They did this because it had appeared to work against the Thaksinites in 2007. Of course it is amusing that both plans failed, the second one abjectly.
We know that the junta and the establishment behind it set out to hobble Thaksin’s support. Are you really in any doubt about that? If this was not their purpose why else design such a complicated method of election? Surely there is no other logical explanation.
Of course I appreciate that if there was 100% PR and no constituency seats, the “Democrats” might have secured a single seat advantage over PPP in 2007 and would probably have kept PT below an absolute majority in July 2011. But I find it a little fatuous to state that “Thais overwhelmingly voted against the PPP” You can only ever play a game by the rules in force at the time – rules that were established by Thaksin’s bitter opponents. whose only real objective was to eradicate his support. Even so the voters came out in large numbers to support his party, despite the fact that, for instance, most areas where PPP polled strongest were kept under martial law throughout the election. Pretty inhibiting, I’d say.
Mr. Nostitz, thanks for your comments, but I think you see something in my comment that is not there. I try not to support making myth. If you read carefully, I never wrote that “a large portion of farmers” were on Suthep’s side. Clearly some were, some were not. Many farmers were angry as a result of the payment delay — as they had a right to be. As you noted in another context, there should be data to support such statements. I think there is no objective data to support that “myth”, but also none I know of to support your statement that most farmers blamed the PDRC for the rice pledging payment problems. You might be correct, but I haven’t seen data supporting your assessment.
You might also be correct that the amnesty was used as a trigger rather than actually being a trigger by Suthep, but I don’t have access to thinking and planning of Suthep. In any case, my point was that amnesty, especially the ways it was done, was a move by Pheua Thai that antagonized some supporters and “allowed Suthep to launch protests with big support.” It was not so smart to do that and helped Suthep alot.
On the question of compromise, I completely agree that Suthep offered no compromises (although Abhisit did, but late in the game). My understanding is that neither the dissolution of Parliament nor the pulling back the amnesty bill were offered by Prime Minister Yingluck as compromises with Suthep. Pheua Thai was confident it would win new elections so elections would be good for it. Pheua Thai was forced to withdraw the amnesty by problems in the Senate and in its own support base. Anyway, my point was not that no compromises were ever floated, but that “neither side seemed interested in discussions to find compromises that maybe have averted a coup.” It was failure to meet, to discuss, bargain and work things out for the greater good of the country that I was criticizing. The ability to find common ground in the national interest (such as averting coup) — “the art of compromise” — is a key skill of democratic politicians. Niether side seemed to have either the skill or the will to do this. This lack of skill and will by the civilian politicians led to a situation that gave military the opening for the coup. I think they lacked will because each thought it could win without compromise and each had used distorted claims in non-objective media to make the other to look like terrible people, corrupt and murderous — not worthy of talking to.
I try to analyze what happens; not to blame only one side. I want to understand and help others understand. It seemed to me that there was more to complex situation that led to coup than that military protected one side.
Ok, Mr. Junta, the Bangkok Post reports that Thai Agriculturists Association president Wichian Phuanglamjiak states “the junta must help farmers if it abolishes the rice-pledging scheme, since the production cost of rice is currently 7,000-7,700 baht per tonne, compared to an average market price of 4,000-6,000…”
I am quite sure that the protests would, even without the amnesty issue, have not just taken place anyhow, but also with the same impact and result.
There were only a few days when the protests had approximately 200 000 protesters on the streets, which were a mix of people who joined themselves, and people cleverly mobilized and stationed by democrat party canvasser networks, local politicians and MP’s from both Bangkok and the south. In addition to that, especially during the Bangkok shutdown period, many soldiers were ordered to bolster the number of protesters by their superiors (such as several neighbors of mine) when sufficient numbers of protesters could not be kept up.
In the late stages of the protests, the protests were to the most part driven by southerners brought in through the southern democrat party networks (there are indications that many Bangkok Democrat Party MPs refused to send in any of their people).
Over the months i have regularly noted the number of protesters from my sources as no numbers could be published by the media since the initial attacks against journalists who reported numbers different from what the stages propagated. The average number of protesters were far lower than what many assume.
Yes, without doubt the blanket amnesty was a massive miscalculation on the side of Thaksin. But it also has to be pointed out that there are indications that the blanket amnesty may not just have been driven by Thaksin, but were a result of high level negotiations. That the blanket amnesty was withdrawn so quickly was not just because the Pueah Thai Party having miscalculated the mobilization capabilities of the Democrat Party/Yellow Alliance, but also the resistance of the majority of the Red Shirts – including of the most influential leaders, such as Jatuporn and Nattawut. Matter of fact is that the Amnesty was quckly off the table, and this should have been the end of the at the time perfectly legitimate protests. Or latest, when the government dissolved parliament.
I have closely followed the build up period over more than 2 years, before i was beaten up and barred from following the PDRC protests on the street. Especially in the last months of the build up period it has been pointed out repeatedly to me that they were planning primarily for the Preah Vihaer judgement, and the possible amnesty issue was only cited as a secondary and contributing factor.
The plan was from the beginning – and that means from late 2011 – to oust the pro-Thaksin government by any means. Initially it was hoped to oust it via a “people’s revolution” to avoid the stink of a military coup, but when that failed to materialize, either a judicial coup or a military coup was to be triggered.
Space is small, but there is a lot more to say about this subject matter.
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So what is Jokowi’s message?
It’s baffling that he asked why we haven’t done anything to cut the fuel subsidy. Is he aware that PDIP was the party that strongly opposed SBY’s repeated proposals for fuel subsidy cut?
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
One cannot but smile when one hears such terms as “perfect democracy” or “absolute democracy”. Persons using such terms do not have a clue about the nature of democracy or what the concept entails. Here one is dealing with rather na├пve persons with a basic education, or no education in the political sciences. However they do know where their interests lie and how to manipulate the existing laws to their benefit.
“Corruption” was Suthep┬┤s cry to battle, and now that the Red-shirts are no longer calling the tune, I wonder where the corruption money for infrastructure projects will flow. Are the “Yellow-shirt” tenders getting all the contracts now, and will the army have to open more branches of the Thai Military Bank to cope with the windfall?
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
Following Sceptic: if anyone wants to translate any New Mandala content into Thai then feel free to get in touch. In the old days much of our content was translated within hours. Sadly, some of the agile and anonymous folks who did that work have moved on.
But if anyone else wants to take up the challenge please feel free. If you send us any links to translated content we’ll do our best to help get out the word through New Mandala‘s usual channels.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
That is really excellent. What about an accurate translation into Thai? I believe it should be widely disseminated, not least to those who are going to be responsible for drafting the nineteenth constitution
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
Robert Dayley has hit the nail on the head. By “reforms”, the military/royalist Thai elite actually means Thailand regressing backwards to the time of Prem, Kittikachorn and Sarit. An “undemocracy” or as Suthep often said, an “Absolute Democracy”. Basically, an authoritarian government dressed up in a “democracy” sounding name in an attempt to maintain Thailand’s standing with the prosperous liberal democracies of Europe, North America and Australia/NZ.
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
Another witty reply that obfuscates the facts of massive corruption and graft uner thaksin and his sister.
Talk about flaming by NM members!!
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
The military Junta have made a fine start by putting discipline and total obedience into schools and civil service.
Happiness is really a controlled society that lives in fear of being arrested if they express different views.
The next constitution will probably be no different and like the 2007 constitution voted on with rifles pointed at the population.
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
Such wit from such a prestigious NM?
Days of future past in Thailand
Or ‘bangkok noir’ or ‘Many Lives’
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
Ikagil. Thailand has or had under the 1997 and 2007 charters extensive mechanisms to deal with vote buying and corruption but none of them have been able to prevent the things you mention. Only one minister (a democrat) has every been imprisoned for corruption and he was only a bit part player who got careless and was caught taking a tiddly 5 million baht bribe. Therefore crime committed by politicians has paid on an absolutely massive scale. Contrast this with Western democracies where ministers routinely resign in shame because they are found to have accepted a gift of a bottle of wine, built a duck house in their garden at taxpayer expense or even something so banal (to a Thai) as paying for sex with a prostitute.
Perhaps there is just something in the Thai psyche that precludes this or is it that feudalism and the desire for feudal power is too deeply entrenched? Thus everyone tries to obtain power (with the main objective of looting the taxpayer) by whatever means available and will then hang on for dear life suborning all the mechanisms of law and order and never admit to anything.
In such a depressing environment it matters little whether corrupt politicians buy their way into power or venal generals simply seize it. A positive outcome from either scenario is purely a matter of chance. Since 2001 we have had: 5 grossly corrupt Thaksinite administrations; 1 ineffectual Democrat administration that could only be in power by giving free rein to Bhum Jai Thai and Chart Thai Pattana to steal anything they could move; and 1 completely ineffectual military appointed government. Yingluck could have made other choices but gave up her seat at the trough as a result of the Amnesty Bill. Now it’s the military’s turn to see if they can make a better score than their last innings. Democracy, as Westerners know it, is not really a feature on the landscape.
So what is Jokowi’s message?
“Those who know do not speak. Those who speak do not know.”
тАХ Lao Tzu, Tao Teh Ching
Days of future past in Thailand
Susilo or Jokowi in 2018?
Who’s who in the Thai coup?
@ Niphon: As you concede, the Election Commission, the Constitution Court and the military were all working against the elected government. Presuming you don’t mean for them to ‘bend over’ in readiness, I’m interested to hear what compromises you think the government could or should have made in addition to withdrawing the amnesty bill, dissolving parliament and taking a gentle approach with the ‘protected’ protesting mob?
Who’s who in the Thai coup?
The data available regarding farmers is that only a few hundred farmers from both the north and Isarn have joined the PDRC protests. That is a miniscule percentage of farmers in Thailand. In Pichit and Pitsanulok for example, both provinces where i have relatives – it was only farmers of the extended clans of Democrat Party MP’s and their canvasser networks. Yet of the same provinces many farmers joined the UDD rally at Aksa Road. This may be anecdotal evidence and not data, but this is anecdotal evidence which i have heard from all over the country from both researchers located in these areas, and from sources in the security agencies.
I know that at the time newspaper articles in both Bangkok Post and Nation suggested otherwise, but the numbers simply failed to materialize.
Was the blanket amnesty actually just a move solely driven by Pueah Thai? I very much doubt that. If you want to try to analyze, i would suggest to look into this quite essential question of how the blanket amnesty actually came to place, including which backroom deals may have led to this.
To find common ground (such as averting a coup)? Really? What makes you think that the PDRC/Democrat Party wanted to avert a coup? Suthep quite early on has on numerous occasions asked the military to take their side, such as during the PDRC visit to the supreme commander.
If you would like to understand and make other understand, then i would suggest to look at the entire period of the red/yellow conflict starting from late 2005 until now, at the names that continue to crop up (many in the article here, and all of them have extensive networks as well), and agendas that are re-branded but essentially the same ill- or never defined notions – such as “new politics” in 2008, and “reform before elections” in 2014 – and what ideas are actually hiding behind them.
Yes, indeed, the situation is enormously complex, far beyond a mere conflict between two political parties.
Who’s who in the Thai coup?
How can I with a straight face try to twist this into being some kind of gerrymandered result in favour of the ‘democrats’? Quite simply.
There seems to be little doubt that the creation of new two- and three-member constituencies was designed to encourage the electorate to split_their votes between different parties and so reduce the dominance of any single one. Knowing that they feared most of all a Thaksinite victory, I think it is fair to call it gerrymandering. On the face of things it failed, although it may have partially succeeded in as much as it prevented PPP from securing the absolute majority that they might otherwise have done had single-member constituencies been the order of the day. The fact that this rather complicated manoeuvre didn’t achieve its objective may explain the return to single-member constituencies in 2011, when their new ploy was to greatly increase the number of national list_seats from 80 to 125, that is to say from 1/6 to 1/4 of the whole House. They did this because it had appeared to work against the Thaksinites in 2007. Of course it is amusing that both plans failed, the second one abjectly.
We know that the junta and the establishment behind it set out to hobble Thaksin’s support. Are you really in any doubt about that? If this was not their purpose why else design such a complicated method of election? Surely there is no other logical explanation.
Of course I appreciate that if there was 100% PR and no constituency seats, the “Democrats” might have secured a single seat advantage over PPP in 2007 and would probably have kept PT below an absolute majority in July 2011. But I find it a little fatuous to state that “Thais overwhelmingly voted against the PPP” You can only ever play a game by the rules in force at the time – rules that were established by Thaksin’s bitter opponents. whose only real objective was to eradicate his support. Even so the voters came out in large numbers to support his party, despite the fact that, for instance, most areas where PPP polled strongest were kept under martial law throughout the election. Pretty inhibiting, I’d say.
Who’s who in the Thai coup?
Mr. Nostitz, thanks for your comments, but I think you see something in my comment that is not there. I try not to support making myth. If you read carefully, I never wrote that “a large portion of farmers” were on Suthep’s side. Clearly some were, some were not. Many farmers were angry as a result of the payment delay — as they had a right to be. As you noted in another context, there should be data to support such statements. I think there is no objective data to support that “myth”, but also none I know of to support your statement that most farmers blamed the PDRC for the rice pledging payment problems. You might be correct, but I haven’t seen data supporting your assessment.
You might also be correct that the amnesty was used as a trigger rather than actually being a trigger by Suthep, but I don’t have access to thinking and planning of Suthep. In any case, my point was that amnesty, especially the ways it was done, was a move by Pheua Thai that antagonized some supporters and “allowed Suthep to launch protests with big support.” It was not so smart to do that and helped Suthep alot.
On the question of compromise, I completely agree that Suthep offered no compromises (although Abhisit did, but late in the game). My understanding is that neither the dissolution of Parliament nor the pulling back the amnesty bill were offered by Prime Minister Yingluck as compromises with Suthep. Pheua Thai was confident it would win new elections so elections would be good for it. Pheua Thai was forced to withdraw the amnesty by problems in the Senate and in its own support base. Anyway, my point was not that no compromises were ever floated, but that “neither side seemed interested in discussions to find compromises that maybe have averted a coup.” It was failure to meet, to discuss, bargain and work things out for the greater good of the country that I was criticizing. The ability to find common ground in the national interest (such as averting coup) — “the art of compromise” — is a key skill of democratic politicians. Niether side seemed to have either the skill or the will to do this. This lack of skill and will by the civilian politicians led to a situation that gave military the opening for the coup. I think they lacked will because each thought it could win without compromise and each had used distorted claims in non-objective media to make the other to look like terrible people, corrupt and murderous — not worthy of talking to.
I try to analyze what happens; not to blame only one side. I want to understand and help others understand. It seemed to me that there was more to complex situation that led to coup than that military protected one side.
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
“if I knew, I’d be part of the junta”.
Ok, Mr. Junta, the Bangkok Post reports that Thai Agriculturists Association president Wichian Phuanglamjiak states “the junta must help farmers if it abolishes the rice-pledging scheme, since the production cost of rice is currently 7,000-7,700 baht per tonne, compared to an average market price of 4,000-6,000…”
Oh my. What is your next step?
So what is Jokowi’s message?
One word for Jokowi: honesty. And yes, why can’t we be honest that the core problem of Indonesia’s bureaucracy is really on goodwill?
Who’s who in the Thai coup?
I am quite sure that the protests would, even without the amnesty issue, have not just taken place anyhow, but also with the same impact and result.
There were only a few days when the protests had approximately 200 000 protesters on the streets, which were a mix of people who joined themselves, and people cleverly mobilized and stationed by democrat party canvasser networks, local politicians and MP’s from both Bangkok and the south. In addition to that, especially during the Bangkok shutdown period, many soldiers were ordered to bolster the number of protesters by their superiors (such as several neighbors of mine) when sufficient numbers of protesters could not be kept up.
In the late stages of the protests, the protests were to the most part driven by southerners brought in through the southern democrat party networks (there are indications that many Bangkok Democrat Party MPs refused to send in any of their people).
Over the months i have regularly noted the number of protesters from my sources as no numbers could be published by the media since the initial attacks against journalists who reported numbers different from what the stages propagated. The average number of protesters were far lower than what many assume.
Yes, without doubt the blanket amnesty was a massive miscalculation on the side of Thaksin. But it also has to be pointed out that there are indications that the blanket amnesty may not just have been driven by Thaksin, but were a result of high level negotiations. That the blanket amnesty was withdrawn so quickly was not just because the Pueah Thai Party having miscalculated the mobilization capabilities of the Democrat Party/Yellow Alliance, but also the resistance of the majority of the Red Shirts – including of the most influential leaders, such as Jatuporn and Nattawut. Matter of fact is that the Amnesty was quckly off the table, and this should have been the end of the at the time perfectly legitimate protests. Or latest, when the government dissolved parliament.
I have closely followed the build up period over more than 2 years, before i was beaten up and barred from following the PDRC protests on the street. Especially in the last months of the build up period it has been pointed out repeatedly to me that they were planning primarily for the Preah Vihaer judgement, and the possible amnesty issue was only cited as a secondary and contributing factor.
The plan was from the beginning – and that means from late 2011 – to oust the pro-Thaksin government by any means. Initially it was hoped to oust it via a “people’s revolution” to avoid the stink of a military coup, but when that failed to materialize, either a judicial coup or a military coup was to be triggered.
Space is small, but there is a lot more to say about this subject matter.
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
Yes! Yes! hear! hear! – much prefer the “Democrats” way of attaining power!