Changes to to current system of voter registration are definitely not in the elites interest as it disadvantages mainly “Red” workers in industrial suburbs who have to take a long distance trip “home” to vote.
While this posting certainly does use “network analysis”, it comes, first, to a rather obvious conclusion: that channels of formal power in the current Thai constitutional order minimize the authority of parliament. Well, yes, that was the whole point! Second, the posting really very badly misses the significance that McCargo attached to the term “network”. This significance lies in the _informal_ nature of the relationships through with Thailand has been governed. The use of network analysis to come to conclusions that are not obvious requires the consideration of informal relationships, not formal ones.
And there was I thinking Suthep was the best thing Isaarn-Lanna separatism had going for it. But Dr. Rienthong Nanna is far better for the separatists, than even Suthep. Just wait till red-shirt revenge hits for this poet’s murder – then the country really will be locked in civil war, with the royalists facing a second Patani-style front.
And further to this discussion, which intersects with the parallel one on vote buying, I wonder if all (or both?) sides are not really rather satisfied with maintaining the status quo regarding protecting the existing tabien baan and electoral ties to birthplace through the political patronage system? The royalists do not desire to adjust their mindsets to recognise the material change in the demographic and socio-political reality of Thailand, where the majority of the populace are no longer rural “sufficient” farmers tilling the mythical bountiful (irrigated) paddies of Por Ramkhamhaeng; while the Redshirt Thaksinista groups can maintain a similar myth of rural solidarity amongst dissatisfied anti-Bangkok elite farmers (also happily tilling triply subsidised irrigated paddy fields under the direction of a benevolent Shinawatra clan network), if it means keeping the present political patronage system alive and well. It is often claimed by commentators that Bangkok citizens’ votes are considered hard to buy, while those in the Isaan boondocks can be bought for a few hundred baht a head, and there is more than a grain of truth in this perception, as I have observed for myself on several occasions during fieldwork.
In fact, during fieldwork in three villages in upper Isaan during 2010, I often would ask the interviewee how many members of their registered household were not actually resident for most of the time. The results indicated in the small sample interviewed (not large enough to be significant, but just indicative), that between a quarter and a fifth of the registered household were absent. My sense was that these villages were relatively representative of these particular provinces, but in some areas the level of absentee voters might be higher.
The general point I am would like to make is that Isaan politicians are actually considerably over-represented in parliament in relation to their actual resident electorate, as opposed to Bangkok politicians relative under-representation. And if the electorate were allowed to vote where they are actually domiciled (hence, the mention of “rotten boroughs”), there would be a considerable shift of power away from the periphery to the centre, and from the countryside to the urban. The rural MPs clearly do not want to concede any of this power and so are quite happy to maintain the present status quo through vote buying (and making impossible promises, exemplified by the rice subsidy programme), which for many households is seen as a way of covering the cost of bringing the absent voter back home to plant their cross on the ballot sheet, with some money left over besides. The more elections the better, as far as they are concerned (the spoils of democracy?), given that even most village headmen and TAO elections, also now involve considerable sums of money to compete (the going rate was 500 B a head in two of the villages I surveyed in 2010 – and of course, usually paid for by a political patronage network). So the rural electorate are also complicit in maintaining the present status quo and business of cultural mythmaking, and as I mentioned earlier, there does not seem to be any politician outspoken enough to challenge this patently unbalanced and undemocratic form of governance. I would expect to hear it from Bangkok and Central Thai politicians first, who have vast numbers of people in their constituencies who they do not need to represent under the present system. It will be the Isaan patron politicians, who no doubt resist it the most, as it would threaten their rather lucrative gravy train the most, especially in the field of water resources infrastructure construction (but also other poorly constructed and often little needed infrastructure).
Thank-you for this insightful article under a nom de plume which already speaks volumes. Your description of the current socio-political conflict in Thailand is quite chilling. Since it appears that the lese majeste law is at the very epi-centre of the font of power for the Thai elites, I am very pessimistic of its chances of ever being revoked. What do you make of the fact that the King himself seemed to criticize this law, and yet it is still in force? The selfserving elite would rather seem to risk a civil war before they are going to concede to any change. The law seems to be the kingpin of their legitimacy as “born to rule”.
The Monarchy, Buddhism and the Army seem to be the very foundations of the Thai state, and abolishing the lese majeste law would leave the political landscape open to radical democratic reform. Over the dead bodies of those who have wielded power and kept Thais in their place over the centuries!
P.S. I’ve been agonizing since his murder whether to give a fuller account of the possible cause of his murder. Still unable to decide. But one thing I can assure readers: his murder has nothing to do with 112. Everybody knows me and I certainly would not lessen the murderous consequences of that law. But to give a mistaken account of what happened will not serve the cause of abolishing it.
While certainly well-meaning (from a democratic standpoint), the article is, I’m afraid, not sufficiently well-informed. The case of Mainung’s murder is more complicated than the article implies. It CERTAINLY is NOT ” surely the first such case of a pre-emptive hit on a detractor of Thailand’s odious Article 112″. For one thing, Mainung’s stance on the 112 was NOT as strait forward as the author thinks (“his prominence among a small but outspoken chorus of Red Shirt voices calling for the abolition of Article 112”). To give just one example, he was a fierce DEFENDER of that “disaster” blanket amnesty bill, in which the Phua Thai Party (to its shame) voluntarily added a clause specifically EXCLUDED the prisoners of 112 to the bill. The original bill – which Mainung also “supported” (as I just implied, his politics was a complicated one)was vague enough to leave room for interpretation.
[…] An anonymous post on the Australian National University’s New Mandala blog considers the possibility of an outbreak of more violence in Thailand. This time very targeted and specific attempts to silence anti-establishment elements among the Red Shirts movement. Click here to read the post […]
To note, half the parliament itself is appointed, although based on general election results.
As of late, Parliament is denied passing any legislature that the judiciary does not approve of. As such, the judiciary controls the wording of all legislature.
Finally, the network analysis approach (not only the word “network”) is introduced ti Thai studies. The final sentence also refers to the significance of informal networks (as different frim formal structures). On the latter, see also Joseph Harris. 2014. “Who governs? Autonomous Political Networks as a Challenge to Power in Thailand.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, March 2014, 1-23.
The more I think about this, the more the idea of what networks gave birth to the ones just mentioned becomes important to understand. Although these cited networks indeed exist, their formation, and indeed, formulation, was itself a result of social networks working on their own and coming together to establish these institutions that network in their cause.
Between the eastern capitalist devil and the western capitalist devil perhaps we can now opt for the lesser of two evils since one has evolved over a few centuries and a lot smarter if no less voracious in its appetite for exploitation and the other little more beyond the robber barons stage.
You have virtual colonies in the New World Order, and the Chinese (a fully paid up member of the club) just manifest less finesse and more blatant materialistic bent.
As the old Burmese expression goes – earn like the Chinese, save like the Indian, don’t spend like the Burmese.
The elite are not going to support any change from the present situation where the reds are kept as much as possible to north-eastern and northern constituencies with very large majorities. The alternative is more red seats overall, with slimmer majorities, as reds register in Bangkok and central electorates now held by the Democrats and others.
Thaksin might not openly support changes that clearly undermine the power of northern and north-eastern patrons whose loyalty he now depends on. However, my guess is that he would adapt quickly to a new situation in which he didn’t need them any more.
The dislike is mutual, and there is mutual dismissal of any intrinsic values in the other in a general sense. Unfortunate for communication and respect, social reform, etc. It’s not a lack of respect that occurred by accident. Built-in.
On the contrary, if people were allowed to vote where they actually lived and worked, it would change the social and political landscape of Thailand significantly. For this to happen, it would first imply that it was made far simpler and more convenient to change one’s house registration away from one’s home village to where one currently happens to work and reside. Under present conditions, people are reluctant to do this for one reason or another, and thus they continue to be electorally tied to the upcountry constituencies where they often may spend less than 5 % of their time in the case of millions of Bangkok and Central Thailand de facto residents, who only occasionally go “home”.
If they were allowed to easily switch their “tabien baan” and hence electoral constituency to their de facto domiciles, then not only would they be entitled to a far higher level of public goods and services there, but it would mean that the urban political candidates would have to court a massively increased (and perhaps more sophisticated and economically secure) electorate to get elected, rather than the present political patronage system and electoral hi-jinx and endemic vote buying in the rotten boroughs of Isaan. Personally, I’ve always been rather sceptical about the claimed high voter turnouts at elections in Isaan, knowing that vast numbers of people don’t travel home for elections (and they certainly don’t have the privilege of a postal vote, as many more sophisticated democracies allow their electorate).
So perhaps it would up the game of all candidates in the urban and peri-urban provinces of Central Thailand filled with Isaan and Northern Thais, including the Democrats, which would surely be a good thing. The political godfathers of the upcountry provinces would be less pleased, but it is they who I suspect are blocking any reform of the present system, as much as the ultra-royalists who want to indefinitely prolong the cultural myth of the happy and porpiang Thai rice farmer.
It would of course, radically alter the demographic map of Thailand, to more accurately reflect the size and status of Bangkok as one of the world’s mega-primate cities, above and beyond its present form. That might allow more rational and equitable solutions to be applied in rebalancing the nation’s socio-economic disparities, than the current myth-making hotch-potch of largely failed reforms that have partly led to the present political impasse.
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Network monarchy’s twilight
Changes to to current system of voter registration are definitely not in the elites interest as it disadvantages mainly “Red” workers in industrial suburbs who have to take a long distance trip “home” to vote.
The power of Thailand’s networks
While this posting certainly does use “network analysis”, it comes, first, to a rather obvious conclusion: that channels of formal power in the current Thai constitutional order minimize the authority of parliament. Well, yes, that was the whole point! Second, the posting really very badly misses the significance that McCargo attached to the term “network”. This significance lies in the _informal_ nature of the relationships through with Thailand has been governed. The use of network analysis to come to conclusions that are not obvious requires the consideration of informal relationships, not formal ones.
Kamol, Rienthong, and 112
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/406917/mai-nueng-killers-identified. Be interesting to see if the police actually get convictions.
Kamol, Rienthong, and 112
And there was I thinking Suthep was the best thing Isaarn-Lanna separatism had going for it. But Dr. Rienthong Nanna is far better for the separatists, than even Suthep. Just wait till red-shirt revenge hits for this poet’s murder – then the country really will be locked in civil war, with the royalists facing a second Patani-style front.
Network monarchy’s twilight
And further to this discussion, which intersects with the parallel one on vote buying, I wonder if all (or both?) sides are not really rather satisfied with maintaining the status quo regarding protecting the existing tabien baan and electoral ties to birthplace through the political patronage system? The royalists do not desire to adjust their mindsets to recognise the material change in the demographic and socio-political reality of Thailand, where the majority of the populace are no longer rural “sufficient” farmers tilling the mythical bountiful (irrigated) paddies of Por Ramkhamhaeng; while the Redshirt Thaksinista groups can maintain a similar myth of rural solidarity amongst dissatisfied anti-Bangkok elite farmers (also happily tilling triply subsidised irrigated paddy fields under the direction of a benevolent Shinawatra clan network), if it means keeping the present political patronage system alive and well. It is often claimed by commentators that Bangkok citizens’ votes are considered hard to buy, while those in the Isaan boondocks can be bought for a few hundred baht a head, and there is more than a grain of truth in this perception, as I have observed for myself on several occasions during fieldwork.
In fact, during fieldwork in three villages in upper Isaan during 2010, I often would ask the interviewee how many members of their registered household were not actually resident for most of the time. The results indicated in the small sample interviewed (not large enough to be significant, but just indicative), that between a quarter and a fifth of the registered household were absent. My sense was that these villages were relatively representative of these particular provinces, but in some areas the level of absentee voters might be higher.
The general point I am would like to make is that Isaan politicians are actually considerably over-represented in parliament in relation to their actual resident electorate, as opposed to Bangkok politicians relative under-representation. And if the electorate were allowed to vote where they are actually domiciled (hence, the mention of “rotten boroughs”), there would be a considerable shift of power away from the periphery to the centre, and from the countryside to the urban. The rural MPs clearly do not want to concede any of this power and so are quite happy to maintain the present status quo through vote buying (and making impossible promises, exemplified by the rice subsidy programme), which for many households is seen as a way of covering the cost of bringing the absent voter back home to plant their cross on the ballot sheet, with some money left over besides. The more elections the better, as far as they are concerned (the spoils of democracy?), given that even most village headmen and TAO elections, also now involve considerable sums of money to compete (the going rate was 500 B a head in two of the villages I surveyed in 2010 – and of course, usually paid for by a political patronage network). So the rural electorate are also complicit in maintaining the present status quo and business of cultural mythmaking, and as I mentioned earlier, there does not seem to be any politician outspoken enough to challenge this patently unbalanced and undemocratic form of governance. I would expect to hear it from Bangkok and Central Thai politicians first, who have vast numbers of people in their constituencies who they do not need to represent under the present system. It will be the Isaan patron politicians, who no doubt resist it the most, as it would threaten their rather lucrative gravy train the most, especially in the field of water resources infrastructure construction (but also other poorly constructed and often little needed infrastructure).
Kamol, Rienthong, and 112
Dear Anonymous,
Thank-you for this insightful article under a nom de plume which already speaks volumes. Your description of the current socio-political conflict in Thailand is quite chilling. Since it appears that the lese majeste law is at the very epi-centre of the font of power for the Thai elites, I am very pessimistic of its chances of ever being revoked. What do you make of the fact that the King himself seemed to criticize this law, and yet it is still in force? The selfserving elite would rather seem to risk a civil war before they are going to concede to any change. The law seems to be the kingpin of their legitimacy as “born to rule”.
The Monarchy, Buddhism and the Army seem to be the very foundations of the Thai state, and abolishing the lese majeste law would leave the political landscape open to radical democratic reform. Over the dead bodies of those who have wielded power and kept Thais in their place over the centuries!
The power of Thailand’s networks
Thanks a lot – this is very useful!
Kamol, Rienthong, and 112
P.S. I’ve been agonizing since his murder whether to give a fuller account of the possible cause of his murder. Still unable to decide. But one thing I can assure readers: his murder has nothing to do with 112. Everybody knows me and I certainly would not lessen the murderous consequences of that law. But to give a mistaken account of what happened will not serve the cause of abolishing it.
Hope, cynicism and Jokowi in a Jakarta slum
[…] Hope, cynicism and Jokowi in a Jakarta slum New Mandala […]
Kamol, Rienthong, and 112
While certainly well-meaning (from a democratic standpoint), the article is, I’m afraid, not sufficiently well-informed. The case of Mainung’s murder is more complicated than the article implies. It CERTAINLY is NOT ” surely the first such case of a pre-emptive hit on a detractor of Thailand’s odious Article 112″. For one thing, Mainung’s stance on the 112 was NOT as strait forward as the author thinks (“his prominence among a small but outspoken chorus of Red Shirt voices calling for the abolition of Article 112”). To give just one example, he was a fierce DEFENDER of that “disaster” blanket amnesty bill, in which the Phua Thai Party (to its shame) voluntarily added a clause specifically EXCLUDED the prisoners of 112 to the bill. The original bill – which Mainung also “supported” (as I just implied, his politics was a complicated one)was vague enough to leave room for interpretation.
Kamol, Rienthong, and 112
[…] An anonymous post on the Australian National University’s New Mandala blog considers the possibility of an outbreak of more violence in Thailand. This time very targeted and specific attempts to silence anti-establishment elements among the Red Shirts movement. Click here to read the post […]
The power of Thailand’s networks
Good work.
To note, half the parliament itself is appointed, although based on general election results.
As of late, Parliament is denied passing any legislature that the judiciary does not approve of. As such, the judiciary controls the wording of all legislature.
The power of Thailand’s networks
Finally, the network analysis approach (not only the word “network”) is introduced ti Thai studies. The final sentence also refers to the significance of informal networks (as different frim formal structures). On the latter, see also Joseph Harris. 2014. “Who governs? Autonomous Political Networks as a Challenge to Power in Thailand.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, March 2014, 1-23.
Kamol, Rienthong, and 112
Some good background information, thank you. So sorry for the loss of Mr. Kamol.
The power of Thailand’s networks
The more I think about this, the more the idea of what networks gave birth to the ones just mentioned becomes important to understand. Although these cited networks indeed exist, their formation, and indeed, formulation, was itself a result of social networks working on their own and coming together to establish these institutions that network in their cause.
The power of Thailand’s networks
nice formal description of the success of the Coup Constitution’s emasculation of the elected representatives of the people of Thailand
question: what is the diagram for the network created under the 1997 Constitution, was it unfairly stacked against and manipulateable by Thaksin?
Boom times and boom gates
Between the eastern capitalist devil and the western capitalist devil perhaps we can now opt for the lesser of two evils since one has evolved over a few centuries and a lot smarter if no less voracious in its appetite for exploitation and the other little more beyond the robber barons stage.
You have virtual colonies in the New World Order, and the Chinese (a fully paid up member of the club) just manifest less finesse and more blatant materialistic bent.
As the old Burmese expression goes – earn like the Chinese, save like the Indian, don’t spend like the Burmese.
Network monarchy’s twilight
The elite are not going to support any change from the present situation where the reds are kept as much as possible to north-eastern and northern constituencies with very large majorities. The alternative is more red seats overall, with slimmer majorities, as reds register in Bangkok and central electorates now held by the Democrats and others.
Thaksin might not openly support changes that clearly undermine the power of northern and north-eastern patrons whose loyalty he now depends on. However, my guess is that he would adapt quickly to a new situation in which he didn’t need them any more.
Network monarchy’s twilight
The dislike is mutual, and there is mutual dismissal of any intrinsic values in the other in a general sense. Unfortunate for communication and respect, social reform, etc. It’s not a lack of respect that occurred by accident. Built-in.
Network monarchy’s twilight
On the contrary, if people were allowed to vote where they actually lived and worked, it would change the social and political landscape of Thailand significantly. For this to happen, it would first imply that it was made far simpler and more convenient to change one’s house registration away from one’s home village to where one currently happens to work and reside. Under present conditions, people are reluctant to do this for one reason or another, and thus they continue to be electorally tied to the upcountry constituencies where they often may spend less than 5 % of their time in the case of millions of Bangkok and Central Thailand de facto residents, who only occasionally go “home”.
If they were allowed to easily switch their “tabien baan” and hence electoral constituency to their de facto domiciles, then not only would they be entitled to a far higher level of public goods and services there, but it would mean that the urban political candidates would have to court a massively increased (and perhaps more sophisticated and economically secure) electorate to get elected, rather than the present political patronage system and electoral hi-jinx and endemic vote buying in the rotten boroughs of Isaan. Personally, I’ve always been rather sceptical about the claimed high voter turnouts at elections in Isaan, knowing that vast numbers of people don’t travel home for elections (and they certainly don’t have the privilege of a postal vote, as many more sophisticated democracies allow their electorate).
So perhaps it would up the game of all candidates in the urban and peri-urban provinces of Central Thailand filled with Isaan and Northern Thais, including the Democrats, which would surely be a good thing. The political godfathers of the upcountry provinces would be less pleased, but it is they who I suspect are blocking any reform of the present system, as much as the ultra-royalists who want to indefinitely prolong the cultural myth of the happy and porpiang Thai rice farmer.
It would of course, radically alter the demographic map of Thailand, to more accurately reflect the size and status of Bangkok as one of the world’s mega-primate cities, above and beyond its present form. That might allow more rational and equitable solutions to be applied in rebalancing the nation’s socio-economic disparities, than the current myth-making hotch-potch of largely failed reforms that have partly led to the present political impasse.