[…] openly political, a contrast from the past. Prof. Pavin’s essay analyzes the barely concealed online political discourse of Princess Chulabhon, who in recent weeks has appeared in a wide variety…. Her activities follow on the heels of Queen Sirikit’s open rhetorical support of the […]
A quite interesting analysis. However, due to the heterogeneity I find it difficult to speak of one middle class. As the least it should be middle classes.
One distinction is quite crucial, namely between middle classes and petty bourgoisie. The rise of fascism was based on the combination of old elites and the petty bourgoisie as popular base.
The comparisions to Egypt, Ukrainia etc. are quite misleading:
1. Many “middle class” protests had the objective to have elections, not to stop them;
2. Many “middle class” protests aimed against established elites and for enhanced political participation, not to reduce it and strengthen the old elites;
3. The protests were against authoritarian governments. So far, the current government is certainly not authoritarian;
4. Many protests demanded legalism (or an independent legal system), not to apply political interests (of old elites) through the courts.
Marc’s piece is an outstanding contribution to the debate on the roots of Thailand’s crisis and the current stalemate.
But the point Bernard SG raises is important and I would argue that it is here where culture comes in. Christine Gray’s concept of Thailand’s “moral geography” might be useful to explain the differences between the middle class in Bangkok and in the provinces: “moral beings are at the civilized center of the kingdom, in the capital, and uncontrolled, chaotic beings are at the uncivilized edges” (Gray 1986: 560).
This introduces a spatial/geographical dimension to the conflict which I tried to highlight in my recent article “Working towards the Monarchy: Anti-Royal Graffiti in Downtown Bangkok”. I argue that “[t]hose furthest away from Bangkok’s royal centres … are more prone to look for new orders and charismatic leaders.” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.842260
Mr. Saxer gives an astute analysis. This is especially dead-on and succint: The majority of whistle blowers seems to be unaware of the power struggle behind the scenes and may genuinely believe to be on a crusade to purge Thailand from the scourge of corruption. In the bigger picture, however, the role of the protests is to lend legitimacy to an illegitimate power grab.
It is important to note how….. naive, to put it gently, these protesters are, jumping when Suthep says jump and running when Suthep says run and doing what Suthep tells them to do (even though every single protester or protest sympathizer you talk to will say “I don’t like Suthep”). It is important to note this because the elites have either always known it or have had it made clear to them by recent events: the middle class are lemmings who follow the power, who choose one side and are breathtakingly incapable of analytical thinking.
When Thais stop running every single question of any kind asked of them through the dual filters of “What does this person REALLY want” and “What answer allows me to save face most” before answering, when Thais stop paying police bribes, when Thais – at least the ones not working at multinationals – can give their name when asked, the lack of transparency and scofflaw attitude that is the real source of corruption here might begin to reverse. In other words, it will never happen. The corruption is part of the culture and blame for it is just a ball of mud to be slung at political opponents for convenience.
While it’s edifying to read articles like this, we ought to bear in mind that this country will never change without a dictator of some probity who has the resolve to take off a few heads and make the people scared to commit any felony-level corruption. The ideas presented, no matter how reasonable, no matter how brilliant, will be ignored because the elites want what they want.
The elites will continue to do as they please. The middle class will continue to be bamboozled by the kleptocracy. The best of Thailand may very well be behind us.
[…] openly political, a contrast from the past. Prof. Pavin’s essay analyzes the barely concealed online political discourse of Princess Chulabhon, who in recent weeks has appeared in a wide variety…. Her activities follow on the heels of Queen Sirikit’s open rhetorical support of the previous […]
Very articulate and interesting analysis. I have some little criticism, though: Towns like Udon Thani, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Korat have populations that are pretty much “middle-class” for a great proportion but they adhere to the Red movement.
Thailand’s conflict at the non-elite level definitely has underlying class issues but I wonder if the ethnic factor is not much stronger. Issaan and Lanna seem to be considered at lower level of “thainess” than Bangkokian and Southern heritage.
The eminent Thirayuth Boonmee of Thammasat University is on record as saying very recently that the only two outcomes he can envisage are reconciliation or revolution, and as reconciliation between the two main protagonists is very unlikely, he favors revolution.
Interpreting ‘kalar’ is difficult indeed. And that’s the point – it’s a matter of interpretation, by the listener. I’m no linguist so I won’t try and enter into such a debate, other than to say that I think context makes all the difference.
There are many examples in which ‘kalar’ is not taken as derogatory – just as there are many examples in which it is. When considering such interpretive questions – as a matter of context and intent, rather than linguistics and etymology – I think perhaps the most important issue is one of power. We are, after all, discussing whether or not the word is insulting or disrespectful. Whatever its origins and histories of use, how is it seen now, particularly by those who are so labeled? Even when I see it used between friends with no ill-intent – and this is of course still common – I am increasingly starting to wonder about the underlying power dynamics. Is the one who is referred to as ‘kalar’ in a position to accept, laugh at, appreciate, such a name? I hope so. But even close cross-religion friendships are being increasingly tested. And even if some who are called ‘kalar’ take no umbrage at this, does that mean it is illegitimate that others do? In any case, in Myanmar’s current climate, I prefer to err on the side of seeing the term as derogatory and taking care to avoid it. But I do appreciate the helpful examples of contexts in which I should understand it differently.
Thanks in particular for the point about whether or not “kalar ma” is an insulting name for a pet. My friends certainly take very good care of the dogs on the block, as I sought to make clear. They do not, in fact, mean the name in an insulting fashion. It is of course common to give dogs human names; my own family in the US has a dog named ‘Sam’ – though it is less common to give a pet the name of a people, an ethnicity, a religion. For such reasons, I was careful not to condemn their choice in pet names, or even say that it is insulting to give an animal (as opposed to a human) such a name – though it might be.
Instead, I wanted to ask a question: what does it mean to give a dog such a name?
I asked this question because I am not sure of the answer. What I *am* sure of is that it we should be very concerned about speech that erases a people’s humanity and likens them to snakes, viruses – dogs. Calling a dog “kalar ma” is not equivalent to calling a Muslim, “dog” – the latter is much worse. But I asked because we should be considering whether there are longer-running and more subtle misperceptions, biases, habits that are common in Myanmar and make it easier for dehumanization to be accepted. Such things are often much more subtle, gentle. They may be meant without ill intent, as with my friends – but they are worth considering carefully.
Finally, a quick note to make clear that there is no attack on Buddhism in this piece. I think we should also consider carefully the inherent tensions and contradictions that are in all religions, including Buddhism. Some of the same religious leaders who are calling for peace are also making clear calls to arms. How can these two seemingly conflicting discourses coexist? The point is not that this is hypocrisy. Quite the opposite! The point is that I think it is possible for both discourses to exist under the belief that they *do not* conflict. And if the most prominent attempts at preventing further violence are to be inter-faith, if they are to invoke the ‘religious roots of social harmony,’ this point is important.
The protesters are certainly creating an impression that they are standing against corruption; however, this is not real. There is no evidence of them turning against corrupt politicians in the Democrat camp; therefore no evidence of the matter being more than an ex-post rationalization of their established attitude.
The attention given here to the Bangkok/”periphery” divide seems to be more to the point. I’m inclined to believe that the underlying cause of Bangkok mass mobilization is their frustration at the political “game” being now played largely out of the primate city. This is understandable, but as it is a result of longstanding developments, there is no easy remedy in sight. In the long run, perhaps, giving the city a greater fiscal autonomy might attenuate the pressure.
By the way: Speaking about “populism”, we might note that in many European countries this label is frequently given to parties and movements who claim to have a radical solution for corruption. One (admittedly extreme) example was Lukashenko riding to power in Belarus on an anti-corruption wave. Most recently, a host of anti-corruption “populist” parties have emerged all over EU during the current crisis.
Yes, you are correct. This monarch, meant to be under the constitution, exceeded his mandate and engaged in rather base politics, establishing the groundwork for the 2006 coup.
Coming back to the chilling heading of “sleeping dog”, yes, there is always a fault line in a society, any society, in any family, in any marriage which will always and always and always be susceptible to explosive and mutually disastrous conflict by cunning and resourceful exploitative outsider/ bystander/ evil forces appealing to evil side of the humanity- the very basis of the idea of “smart power” or Gene Sharp’s “non- violence as an explosive weapon” exploiting the naive as currently clearly demonstrated in Ukraine as these words are written.
In Burma, having already captured the ready made explosive and destructive army of (delusional, power-mad -but still being revered by the populace) young monks, by the same crowd- Sharp, Helvey, Ackerman via the Embassy of the United States of America in Rangoon, the situation is dire. Unless these young followers, monks, not practising for abandonment of Lawba, Dawtha, Mawha but the total opposite, wise up and mend their way from conducting affairs nothing whatsoever to do with Buddha’s teaching, not only they themselves will end up in the cesspool, but the country will as well and the centuries old regard and reverence felt by the laity to the Sangha in general will be lost in a flash never to regain. That will be a worse fate for the Burmese populace even more than the imminant and inevitable loss of the Mother Irrawaddy.
Ghost of Jit Phoomisak imagines the British monarchy to be similar to the Thai, which is completely mistaken. The British have not taken their monarchy seriously for 300 years. 100 years ago when H. G. Wells wrote of Britain’s “alien and uninspiring (royal)court” (highly inflammatory given the anti-German feeling at the time), the King (George V) responded in typical sailors’ language: “I may be uninspiring but I’m damned if I’m alien”. He didn’t take himself seriously either.
The difference is due mainly to the Thai lèse majesté law. Because of it, only flattery is allowed. Because of it, the truth, when unflattering will get you sent to prison. Because of it, with any mistakes covered up, the Thai monarchy cannot resist interfering in politics. Who can possibly know, under this law, whether any of the actions of the King or of the people he (rather than the Government) has chosen for powerful positions are good or bad? Any worldly person will suspect that enough of them are bad to necessitate the law’s retention. All powerful people do some bad things. If they are well intentioned, they do bad things by mistake. True constitutional monarchs don’t do bad things because they don’t do anything at all, apart from looking benevolent and keeping the snobs happy. The British monarchy are masters of this. The Thai monarchy has been aping the British for 150 years, but without success. The Thai snobs are far from happy at the moment.
“Online debate hosted by the Economist on the GDP in 2010 concluded that’ GDP is a poor measure of improving living standards’,cited in Fioramonti,L.2013.Gross Domestic Problem-the politics behind the world’s most powerful number.Zed Books.
As I recall, the general consensus of critical comment here in Bangkok was “Nothing new”.
This was the same reaction that the eminent Michael Porter’s analysis and recommendations on the future of Thailand for the Thai government received.
I happen to concur with both views, and I disagree with Frank’s speculation that those farangs most qualified to comment exercise some kind of misguided self-censorship on this subject – more likely they, like me, are generally inclined to avoid discourse on this subject with those who are not, so to speak, old hands.
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Princess Chulabhorn’s politics
[…] openly political, a contrast from the past. Prof. Pavin’s essay analyzes the barely concealed online political discourse of Princess Chulabhon, who in recent weeks has appeared in a wide variety…. Her activities follow on the heels of Queen Sirikit’s open rhetorical support of the […]
Middle class rage threatens democracy
A quite interesting analysis. However, due to the heterogeneity I find it difficult to speak of one middle class. As the least it should be middle classes.
One distinction is quite crucial, namely between middle classes and petty bourgoisie. The rise of fascism was based on the combination of old elites and the petty bourgoisie as popular base.
The comparisions to Egypt, Ukrainia etc. are quite misleading:
1. Many “middle class” protests had the objective to have elections, not to stop them;
2. Many “middle class” protests aimed against established elites and for enhanced political participation, not to reduce it and strengthen the old elites;
3. The protests were against authoritarian governments. So far, the current government is certainly not authoritarian;
4. Many protests demanded legalism (or an independent legal system), not to apply political interests (of old elites) through the courts.
Middle class rage threatens democracy
Don’t take the “oracle of Thammasat” too serious and think for yourself!
Middle class rage threatens democracy
Marc’s piece is an outstanding contribution to the debate on the roots of Thailand’s crisis and the current stalemate.
But the point Bernard SG raises is important and I would argue that it is here where culture comes in. Christine Gray’s concept of Thailand’s “moral geography” might be useful to explain the differences between the middle class in Bangkok and in the provinces: “moral beings are at the civilized center of the kingdom, in the capital, and uncontrolled, chaotic beings are at the uncivilized edges” (Gray 1986: 560).
This introduces a spatial/geographical dimension to the conflict which I tried to highlight in my recent article “Working towards the Monarchy: Anti-Royal Graffiti in Downtown Bangkok”. I argue that “[t]hose furthest away from Bangkok’s royal centres … are more prone to look for new orders and charismatic leaders.” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.842260
Middle class rage threatens democracy
Mr. Saxer gives an astute analysis. This is especially dead-on and succint: The majority of whistle blowers seems to be unaware of the power struggle behind the scenes and may genuinely believe to be on a crusade to purge Thailand from the scourge of corruption. In the bigger picture, however, the role of the protests is to lend legitimacy to an illegitimate power grab.
It is important to note how….. naive, to put it gently, these protesters are, jumping when Suthep says jump and running when Suthep says run and doing what Suthep tells them to do (even though every single protester or protest sympathizer you talk to will say “I don’t like Suthep”). It is important to note this because the elites have either always known it or have had it made clear to them by recent events: the middle class are lemmings who follow the power, who choose one side and are breathtakingly incapable of analytical thinking.
When Thais stop running every single question of any kind asked of them through the dual filters of “What does this person REALLY want” and “What answer allows me to save face most” before answering, when Thais stop paying police bribes, when Thais – at least the ones not working at multinationals – can give their name when asked, the lack of transparency and scofflaw attitude that is the real source of corruption here might begin to reverse. In other words, it will never happen. The corruption is part of the culture and blame for it is just a ball of mud to be slung at political opponents for convenience.
While it’s edifying to read articles like this, we ought to bear in mind that this country will never change without a dictator of some probity who has the resolve to take off a few heads and make the people scared to commit any felony-level corruption. The ideas presented, no matter how reasonable, no matter how brilliant, will be ignored because the elites want what they want.
The elites will continue to do as they please. The middle class will continue to be bamboozled by the kleptocracy. The best of Thailand may very well be behind us.
Princess Chulabhorn’s politics
[…] openly political, a contrast from the past. Prof. Pavin’s essay analyzes the barely concealed online political discourse of Princess Chulabhon, who in recent weeks has appeared in a wide variety…. Her activities follow on the heels of Queen Sirikit’s open rhetorical support of the previous […]
Middle class rage threatens democracy
Well, if an eminent elderly Thai man has said something, obviously he must be right. Debate over.
Middle class rage threatens democracy
Very articulate and interesting analysis. I have some little criticism, though: Towns like Udon Thani, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Korat have populations that are pretty much “middle-class” for a great proportion but they adhere to the Red movement.
Thailand’s conflict at the non-elite level definitely has underlying class issues but I wonder if the ethnic factor is not much stronger. Issaan and Lanna seem to be considered at lower level of “thainess” than Bangkokian and Southern heritage.
Middle class rage threatens democracy
The eminent Thirayuth Boonmee of Thammasat University is on record as saying very recently that the only two outcomes he can envisage are reconciliation or revolution, and as reconciliation between the two main protagonists is very unlikely, he favors revolution.
Sleeping dogs
Thanks for the comments.
Interpreting ‘kalar’ is difficult indeed. And that’s the point – it’s a matter of interpretation, by the listener. I’m no linguist so I won’t try and enter into such a debate, other than to say that I think context makes all the difference.
There are many examples in which ‘kalar’ is not taken as derogatory – just as there are many examples in which it is. When considering such interpretive questions – as a matter of context and intent, rather than linguistics and etymology – I think perhaps the most important issue is one of power. We are, after all, discussing whether or not the word is insulting or disrespectful. Whatever its origins and histories of use, how is it seen now, particularly by those who are so labeled? Even when I see it used between friends with no ill-intent – and this is of course still common – I am increasingly starting to wonder about the underlying power dynamics. Is the one who is referred to as ‘kalar’ in a position to accept, laugh at, appreciate, such a name? I hope so. But even close cross-religion friendships are being increasingly tested. And even if some who are called ‘kalar’ take no umbrage at this, does that mean it is illegitimate that others do? In any case, in Myanmar’s current climate, I prefer to err on the side of seeing the term as derogatory and taking care to avoid it. But I do appreciate the helpful examples of contexts in which I should understand it differently.
Thanks in particular for the point about whether or not “kalar ma” is an insulting name for a pet. My friends certainly take very good care of the dogs on the block, as I sought to make clear. They do not, in fact, mean the name in an insulting fashion. It is of course common to give dogs human names; my own family in the US has a dog named ‘Sam’ – though it is less common to give a pet the name of a people, an ethnicity, a religion. For such reasons, I was careful not to condemn their choice in pet names, or even say that it is insulting to give an animal (as opposed to a human) such a name – though it might be.
Instead, I wanted to ask a question: what does it mean to give a dog such a name?
I asked this question because I am not sure of the answer. What I *am* sure of is that it we should be very concerned about speech that erases a people’s humanity and likens them to snakes, viruses – dogs. Calling a dog “kalar ma” is not equivalent to calling a Muslim, “dog” – the latter is much worse. But I asked because we should be considering whether there are longer-running and more subtle misperceptions, biases, habits that are common in Myanmar and make it easier for dehumanization to be accepted. Such things are often much more subtle, gentle. They may be meant without ill intent, as with my friends – but they are worth considering carefully.
Finally, a quick note to make clear that there is no attack on Buddhism in this piece. I think we should also consider carefully the inherent tensions and contradictions that are in all religions, including Buddhism. Some of the same religious leaders who are calling for peace are also making clear calls to arms. How can these two seemingly conflicting discourses coexist? The point is not that this is hypocrisy. Quite the opposite! The point is that I think it is possible for both discourses to exist under the belief that they *do not* conflict. And if the most prominent attempts at preventing further violence are to be inter-faith, if they are to invoke the ‘religious roots of social harmony,’ this point is important.
Middle class rage threatens democracy
The protesters are certainly creating an impression that they are standing against corruption; however, this is not real. There is no evidence of them turning against corrupt politicians in the Democrat camp; therefore no evidence of the matter being more than an ex-post rationalization of their established attitude.
The attention given here to the Bangkok/”periphery” divide seems to be more to the point. I’m inclined to believe that the underlying cause of Bangkok mass mobilization is their frustration at the political “game” being now played largely out of the primate city. This is understandable, but as it is a result of longstanding developments, there is no easy remedy in sight. In the long run, perhaps, giving the city a greater fiscal autonomy might attenuate the pressure.
By the way: Speaking about “populism”, we might note that in many European countries this label is frequently given to parties and movements who claim to have a radical solution for corruption. One (admittedly extreme) example was Lukashenko riding to power in Belarus on an anti-corruption wave. Most recently, a host of anti-corruption “populist” parties have emerged all over EU during the current crisis.
The King Never Smiles?
Yes, you are correct. This monarch, meant to be under the constitution, exceeded his mandate and engaged in rather base politics, establishing the groundwork for the 2006 coup.
Sleeping dogs
Coming back to the chilling heading of “sleeping dog”, yes, there is always a fault line in a society, any society, in any family, in any marriage which will always and always and always be susceptible to explosive and mutually disastrous conflict by cunning and resourceful exploitative outsider/ bystander/ evil forces appealing to evil side of the humanity- the very basis of the idea of “smart power” or Gene Sharp’s “non- violence as an explosive weapon” exploiting the naive as currently clearly demonstrated in Ukraine as these words are written.
In Burma, having already captured the ready made explosive and destructive army of (delusional, power-mad -but still being revered by the populace) young monks, by the same crowd- Sharp, Helvey, Ackerman via the Embassy of the United States of America in Rangoon, the situation is dire. Unless these young followers, monks, not practising for abandonment of Lawba, Dawtha, Mawha but the total opposite, wise up and mend their way from conducting affairs nothing whatsoever to do with Buddha’s teaching, not only they themselves will end up in the cesspool, but the country will as well and the centuries old regard and reverence felt by the laity to the Sangha in general will be lost in a flash never to regain. That will be a worse fate for the Burmese populace even more than the imminant and inevitable loss of the Mother Irrawaddy.
The King Never Smiles?
How is the comment biased or factually wrong? Looks accurate to me.
Sleeping dogs
Bravo, Plan B!
The King Never Smiles?
Ghost of Jit Phoomisak imagines the British monarchy to be similar to the Thai, which is completely mistaken. The British have not taken their monarchy seriously for 300 years. 100 years ago when H. G. Wells wrote of Britain’s “alien and uninspiring (royal)court” (highly inflammatory given the anti-German feeling at the time), the King (George V) responded in typical sailors’ language: “I may be uninspiring but I’m damned if I’m alien”. He didn’t take himself seriously either.
The difference is due mainly to the Thai lèse majesté law. Because of it, only flattery is allowed. Because of it, the truth, when unflattering will get you sent to prison. Because of it, with any mistakes covered up, the Thai monarchy cannot resist interfering in politics. Who can possibly know, under this law, whether any of the actions of the King or of the people he (rather than the Government) has chosen for powerful positions are good or bad? Any worldly person will suspect that enough of them are bad to necessitate the law’s retention. All powerful people do some bad things. If they are well intentioned, they do bad things by mistake. True constitutional monarchs don’t do bad things because they don’t do anything at all, apart from looking benevolent and keeping the snobs happy. The British monarchy are masters of this. The Thai monarchy has been aping the British for 150 years, but without success. The Thai snobs are far from happy at the moment.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
“Online debate hosted by the Economist on the GDP in 2010 concluded that’ GDP is a poor measure of improving living standards’,cited in Fioramonti,L.2013.Gross Domestic Problem-the politics behind the world’s most powerful number.Zed Books.
The King Never Smiles?
Allies perhaps, but only in name.
The King Never Smiles?
Occupation, not colonization.
The King Never Smiles?
As I recall, the general consensus of critical comment here in Bangkok was “Nothing new”.
This was the same reaction that the eminent Michael Porter’s analysis and recommendations on the future of Thailand for the Thai government received.
I happen to concur with both views, and I disagree with Frank’s speculation that those farangs most qualified to comment exercise some kind of misguided self-censorship on this subject – more likely they, like me, are generally inclined to avoid discourse on this subject with those who are not, so to speak, old hands.