They can, but only if there is no one listening. There have been two lese majeste cases in recent years where “friends” have reported “friends” for their comments on the monarchy, and the cases have been processed by the police.
Ah Vichai N, so having told us first that Thais “can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals” you admit to us that actually there are laws against that. And our only option is to run and hide if we don’t wish to participate in these royal rituals because “The King after all personifies Thailand”.
The more you write the more you reveal the deceit within your argument.
Since international observers are unlikely to be invited by the Malaysian government to observe Malaysia’s most crucial elections, Malaysians will have to ensure that electoral fraud is minimised, themselves.
As much as I do believe that there is an overwhelming adoration for the king, it is an incredibly naive statement to make that:-
‘they can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals or whatever’
There is no choice for anyone in Thailand. Either join in or face legal charges – and the risk of mob vengeance. Ok, you may choose not to attend royal parades, but you cannot choose to stay seated in a cinema, you cannot choose to stay seated when the royal motorcade passes, and you cannot choose to voice any displeasure of the royal family. The punishments are severe and well known for such actions.
Now, whilst I do believe that the royal family have very little to do with the actual use of these laws (lest we not forget that both political sides have used them in the past), certainly they will be used by powerful forces if you ‘choose not to participate’.
PeteS if you don’t like a Thai law (like standing for the royal anthem in cinemas), you could always ask your Peau Thai MP (Thaksin’s personal-servant party overwhelmingly dominating the Thai parliament) to delete that particular law that offends you.
Seems to me that standing for the royal anthem is common civil behaviour in Thai society. The King after all personifies Thailand . . . and when you PeteS stand for the royal anthem, think of it as standing for your beloved Thailand. Or you could just leave/or enter the cinema just before this ritual … no problem!
Thais can dispute the praise of the monarchy privately. The coercive power of mass support for the monarchy doesn’t mean it is less authentic. What’s interesting in your comment is that you’ve applied your own liberal standing to imaginings of a ‘true self’ for other Thais. As though if all Thais where as free-thinking as you, they would apply the same criteria to the monarchy as their political institutions and this would be more authentic. Authenticity is a disasterous idea to apply to anything political. Authenticity and love is different though. I imagine many, even you (and even Patrick Jory!), authentically love the story of the monarchy irrespective of your thoughts on the particular characters in the drama, or what the institution is doing to Thailand. Without loving the story, you wouldn’t have spent so many hours thinking of it. There’s some authenticity to that.
“Thais ….. can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals or whatever”
Vichai N, as much as anybody on this forum you know that is a lie.
Chotisak Onsoong was pursued with lese majeste charges for 5 years for not participating in that most trivial of royal rituals, standing for the royal anthem in cinemas. And who knows how many actually languish silently in jail today for the same offence?
Refer http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/3299
Somsak J. is much ado about some glaring truth that everyone can see: the love by the Thais for their King Bhumibhol is real period.
But for the Thais who are offended by anything royal, there’s the silent disobedience (they can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals or whatever) or the vocal disobedience (the ones the Red/Black shirts do on their protests and rampage).
” I don’t see anything particularly inauthentic about the esteem in which the king is held by many Thais. The blind spot in royalist ideology is not the claim that King Bhumibol is a sacred figure deserving of respect.”
Since I cannot dispute the last sentence without incurring the LM charge (a fact which is also relevant to what I’m saying below), I’ll have to pass it in silent. But let’s examine the first.
What kind of loyalty is or is not ‘authentic’, according to our modern standard? I’d argue that it’s something FREELY given; that is to say the decision to give loyalty to anyone or anything is one’s own. It’s the exercise of one’s right: one HAS the power to do OTHERWISE, but still chooses to do the thing one do (in this case, give loyalty to someone or something).
Take this example: Everybody can (a) cheer, support, praise Yingluck/Abhisit OR (b) oppose, attack, denouce Yingluck/Abhisit. To do either (a) or (b) is entirely one’s own; no harm in choosing one or the other, especially in legal terms. Hence if one still chooses (a); the support, praise, loyalty one gives to Yingluck/Abhisit IS an authentic one, according to modern standards.
But can one do the same with regard the monarchy? In fact, does one even have a choice to do otherwise? For example, if one grows up hearing teachers in schools sing the praise of the monarchy, can one dispute it? Can one even question it? Does one even EVER hear other facts and perspectives about the monarchy from teachers (or even lecturers)?
It’s sad that Prof. Andrew who definitely should have known better, cannot understand this.
A belated response to this exchange. First, on the question of Thawatt Mokarapong’s history, while it serves as a starting point in the literature, I am not so sure that it can be characterized as the “fullest” account of events in English. It depends on what one means by “full”; Judith Stowe’s 1991 narrative, Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue constitutes a more detailed documentary record. Federico Ferrara’s 2012 JSEAS article, the Legend of King Prajadhipok, although short, is arguably “fuller” in the sense of providing a more compelling interpretative framework. A number of reasonably comprehensive English-language accounts have also been published between these two dates, albeit as sections of broader works ( see, for example, Nattapoll Chaiching’s, “The Monarchy and the Royalist Movement in Thai Politics 1932-1957”, in Ivarsson and Isager’s 2010 Saying the Unsayable. )
This said, I still prefer Nakharin Mektrairat – for replacing the “small group of conspirators” story with a narrative of a broader revolutionary movement, for treating the 1932-33 period as an organic whole, and for providing the best assessments of related historiography. His articles and books are all written in Thai but worth the trouble.
With respect to Craig’s query on the promoters’ failure to “wrap things up”, my understanding is that this was never really an option, at least not after it was agreed that Prajadhipok would act as the kingdom’s first constitutional monarch. In staying on, he lent legitimacy to a government that might otherwise have faced potentially lethal opposition, at home and abroad. In 1932, the state bureaucracy was largely a function of royal patronage and elements loyal to the old order not only refused to follow People’s Part directives but also immediately began organizing for a counter-coup. At the same time Bangkok was awash with rumors of an imminent foreign intervention to restore absolutism, a possibility that several members of the Seventh Reign court were actively encouraging.
In remaining on the throne, Prajadhipok gained some major concessions from the promoters, concessions that significantly narrowed the scope of what they could subsequently do. Henceforth, the monarchy was to be respected, not disparaged as it had been in the 24 June communiqué. Royal wealth was to be left intact, possibly subject to taxation but most certainly not confiscated. Princely ranks were not to be tampered with, leaving the prestige of the extended family intact. And finally, Pridi’s draft constitution was reclassified (by Prajadhipok) as temporary, setting the stage for a post-24 June debate over the powers of the king.
On the matter of Batson, his book served as an early “target” of mine when I was working on my MA thesis, a study of the 1932-33 period. The last of a peculiar genre – the English-language Thai reign history – it so effectively represented Prajadhipok’s perspective as to render the whole 24 June 32 affair inexplicable. Structurally, it also lent support to the fallacious notion that R7’s political role all but ended in June of 1932. Finally, it tended to showcase the king’s democratic reform efforts without, to my mind, drawing some of the more obvious conclusions. Here was a ruler who openly questioned whether the Siamese people would ever be ready for self-rule, who justified his tentative reform initiatives by suggesting that only thereby could the court preclude more radical/substantive changes, and who failed during the course of his first six and a half years on the throne to make any significant changes anyway. Batson rightly blames this lack of headway on the more conservative members of R7’s court yet he fails to take note its immediate consequence. Deeply frustrated, Prajadhipok initially sought to regain control of his government through constitutional means. His draft plan called for the elimination of the Supreme Council of Princes in favor of a parliamentary-like body that derived virtually all its powers from the king. And when this effort too was blocked, the king went one step further – approaching his cousin and former Minister of War, Bowaradej about the possibility of forcing a constitution on his own government. A part of the historical record, this parallel coup plan added to the general confusion surrounding the events of 24 June 1932. It also provides a starting point for any discussion of the Bowaradej Rebellion of October 1933.
Regarding Craig’s comments and Scot’s clarifications (?) on the business of our ‘sharing’ research, I recall all kinds of productive collaboration: discussion, critical reading of each other’s stuff, exchange of useful primary and secondary source materials, etc. It seems to me that the process was of benefit to us both. I can only say with certainty that it helped me.
And on a final note, with support from (of all places) Mahidol University I am currently revising my MA and PhD dissertations for publication ( although I am not sure where yet … suggestions?). In the meantime, if somebody would like an unrevised copy of my PhD thesis (Mark Moran?) I do have a PDF and will try to house it for download at academia.edu today.
Even though I’ve heard it was used in the past, I’m under the impression that the term ‘khaek’ isn’t really used much at all in the Malay Muslim south anymore. Malay-speaking Muslims seem to most often be referred to as ‘khon Isalam’ by Buddhists; in recent years the more politically correct term ‘khon Melayu’ has been on the rise.
On a couple of occasions I’ve heard the term ‘pasa khaek’ used by Buddhists to refer to the local Malay language, only to be told that this was not a polite term to use.
Interestingly, I’ve even heard an ethnic Malay man I know use the term ‘pasa khaek’ a couple times. One time he said this to me in front of a group of villagers. Since I had always heard that Malay-speaking Muslims considered this a very derogatory term, I was a bit surprised that no one commented on his choice of terms.
“Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to place too much weight on these negative assessments which, unconsciously or otherwise, mirror the disparagement of pro-Thaksin red-shirt protesters as “buffaloes” and paid stooges.”
This is COMPLETELY mistaken. That Thaksin could not have possibly ‘paid’ for all the hundred of thousands of Red Shirts to protest is just a simple fact. But the so-called ‘negative assessments’ about the coercion on loyalty to the monarchy is DEADLY REAL.
Just take one example: if a red shirt villager who heard a Thaksin’s phone-in expresses his disappointment by saying that ‘today Thaksin’s speech is not very good”, he would be perfectly safe. (Let’s imagine he uses, say, “colorful language’ in expressing his view).
But IF a local school teacher expresses similar sentiment (with similar language) on a speech by HM the King, he would in all certainty be charged with LM.
Thus to say that the coercion is having the effect it’s designed in the latter case in NOT the same as saying that there was a ‘pay out’ in the former case.
It’s just plain sad the Prof Andrew didn’t know the difference.
Thanks for highlighting these new information. Very important and useful.
It is no doubt a contentious issue. Over at the National Geographic site, several experts have also noted that the analysis fails to account for recent development on the impact of radiation on humans (re Chan Chee Khoon’s response).
But most importantly, this analysis concludes that:
“The trust-deficit between the company and the community can be bridged through a more deliberative public-private partnership around community engagement at regular intervals.”
I think that “Trust” is the central issue.
Malaysians do not trust the Government, and by extension, anything that the government does, is not trustworthy.
Lynas is caught in the middle, and its likely that Lynas has not done much to address that “Trust” deficit.
One has to hope that Dr Mazard gets his hands on a copy of the book soon, as his critique is important. All the same, the point about “Tha Khaek” is lost on me, I must say.
That is not much analysis there with specific questions and evaluation in the Malaysian context. The study by the Academy of Sciences quoted is also a generic paper on Rare Earths and its importance – It is available for download –
Everyone knows how important rare earth is. It is how Lynas plat impact Malaysia tha is important to the “anti-Lynas” group.
Several question remains unanswered –
1. Statement – The rare earth plant will help local industry climb up the ladder of “gree” and advanced technology from spin offs?
Fact – The products from the plant have all been earmarked for ecport (statement from Lynas CEO in a public address).There is no quota or priority sale to Malaysian companies nor is there a “buy” priority for companies based in Malaysia. Given this fact, how is Malaysian companies “climbing” the tech ladder arising from the Plant’s spin offs?
2 – Enviroment – The plant uses in the region of 50,000 M3 of fresh water every hour (not sure if the press release from Lynas is right – maybe daily)This is discharged into the bechok river (more like a stream) post processing. What is the impact of the additional volumn on the stream? Fish? other bo stuff?
The plant also need to have priority for the water supply as a shortage would lead to disastrous consequences. Given the state of regular “dry” taps in Kuantan, wouldn’t the residents suffer more from this? As far as can be ascertained, the Plant is not drawing its own ground water for their processing needs.
Regrettably, the old trope of “semi-divine” appears again. What actually does “semi-divine” mean? Some Thais undoubtedly believe this in some form but it’s past due time to find out how widespread and strong this belief remains, if it ever was. Actually, should be typing “versions of this belief,” as there may be a range of difference among folks such as a Sino-Thai upscale consumer in one of Bangkok’s glittery malls, a low-ranking Army grunt, and a senior bureaucrat, to name a few. Funny how foreigners continue to fall for this rather “cute” anachronism.
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Domesticating royal power
They can, but only if there is no one listening. There have been two lese majeste cases in recent years where “friends” have reported “friends” for their comments on the monarchy, and the cases have been processed by the police.
Domesticating royal power
Ah Vichai N, so having told us first that Thais “can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals” you admit to us that actually there are laws against that. And our only option is to run and hide if we don’t wish to participate in these royal rituals because “The King after all personifies Thailand”.
The more you write the more you reveal the deceit within your argument.
Bob Carr and electoral reforms in Malaysia
Since international observers are unlikely to be invited by the Malaysian government to observe Malaysia’s most crucial elections, Malaysians will have to ensure that electoral fraud is minimised, themselves.
Mr. Haris Ibrahim provides some tips. http://harismibrahim.wordpress.com/2012/12/09/abu-war-phase-1-part-1-neutralising-the-umnobn-electoral-fraud/
Domesticating royal power
As much as I do believe that there is an overwhelming adoration for the king, it is an incredibly naive statement to make that:-
‘they can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals or whatever’
There is no choice for anyone in Thailand. Either join in or face legal charges – and the risk of mob vengeance. Ok, you may choose not to attend royal parades, but you cannot choose to stay seated in a cinema, you cannot choose to stay seated when the royal motorcade passes, and you cannot choose to voice any displeasure of the royal family. The punishments are severe and well known for such actions.
Now, whilst I do believe that the royal family have very little to do with the actual use of these laws (lest we not forget that both political sides have used them in the past), certainly they will be used by powerful forces if you ‘choose not to participate’.
Domesticating royal power
PeteS if you don’t like a Thai law (like standing for the royal anthem in cinemas), you could always ask your Peau Thai MP (Thaksin’s personal-servant party overwhelmingly dominating the Thai parliament) to delete that particular law that offends you.
Seems to me that standing for the royal anthem is common civil behaviour in Thai society. The King after all personifies Thailand . . . and when you PeteS stand for the royal anthem, think of it as standing for your beloved Thailand. Or you could just leave/or enter the cinema just before this ritual … no problem!
Like SomsakJ, much ado for …
Domesticating royal power
Ajarn Somsak,
Thais can dispute the praise of the monarchy privately. The coercive power of mass support for the monarchy doesn’t mean it is less authentic. What’s interesting in your comment is that you’ve applied your own liberal standing to imaginings of a ‘true self’ for other Thais. As though if all Thais where as free-thinking as you, they would apply the same criteria to the monarchy as their political institutions and this would be more authentic. Authenticity is a disasterous idea to apply to anything political. Authenticity and love is different though. I imagine many, even you (and even Patrick Jory!), authentically love the story of the monarchy irrespective of your thoughts on the particular characters in the drama, or what the institution is doing to Thailand. Without loving the story, you wouldn’t have spent so many hours thinking of it. There’s some authenticity to that.
Domesticating royal power
“Thais ….. can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals or whatever”
Vichai N, as much as anybody on this forum you know that is a lie.
Chotisak Onsoong was pursued with lese majeste charges for 5 years for not participating in that most trivial of royal rituals, standing for the royal anthem in cinemas. And who knows how many actually languish silently in jail today for the same offence?
Refer http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/3299
Domesticating royal power
Somsak J. is much ado about some glaring truth that everyone can see: the love by the Thais for their King Bhumibhol is real period.
But for the Thais who are offended by anything royal, there’s the silent disobedience (they can choose to NOT participate in any royal rituals or whatever) or the vocal disobedience (the ones the Red/Black shirts do on their protests and rampage).
Domesticating royal power
Let me add another comment.
Prof. Andrew writes:
” I don’t see anything particularly inauthentic about the esteem in which the king is held by many Thais. The blind spot in royalist ideology is not the claim that King Bhumibol is a sacred figure deserving of respect.”
Since I cannot dispute the last sentence without incurring the LM charge (a fact which is also relevant to what I’m saying below), I’ll have to pass it in silent. But let’s examine the first.
What kind of loyalty is or is not ‘authentic’, according to our modern standard? I’d argue that it’s something FREELY given; that is to say the decision to give loyalty to anyone or anything is one’s own. It’s the exercise of one’s right: one HAS the power to do OTHERWISE, but still chooses to do the thing one do (in this case, give loyalty to someone or something).
Take this example: Everybody can (a) cheer, support, praise Yingluck/Abhisit OR (b) oppose, attack, denouce Yingluck/Abhisit. To do either (a) or (b) is entirely one’s own; no harm in choosing one or the other, especially in legal terms. Hence if one still chooses (a); the support, praise, loyalty one gives to Yingluck/Abhisit IS an authentic one, according to modern standards.
But can one do the same with regard the monarchy? In fact, does one even have a choice to do otherwise? For example, if one grows up hearing teachers in schools sing the praise of the monarchy, can one dispute it? Can one even question it? Does one even EVER hear other facts and perspectives about the monarchy from teachers (or even lecturers)?
It’s sad that Prof. Andrew who definitely should have known better, cannot understand this.
1932/2012: Reflecting on revolution
A belated response to this exchange. First, on the question of Thawatt Mokarapong’s history, while it serves as a starting point in the literature, I am not so sure that it can be characterized as the “fullest” account of events in English. It depends on what one means by “full”; Judith Stowe’s 1991 narrative, Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue constitutes a more detailed documentary record. Federico Ferrara’s 2012 JSEAS article, the Legend of King Prajadhipok, although short, is arguably “fuller” in the sense of providing a more compelling interpretative framework. A number of reasonably comprehensive English-language accounts have also been published between these two dates, albeit as sections of broader works ( see, for example, Nattapoll Chaiching’s, “The Monarchy and the Royalist Movement in Thai Politics 1932-1957”, in Ivarsson and Isager’s 2010 Saying the Unsayable. )
This said, I still prefer Nakharin Mektrairat – for replacing the “small group of conspirators” story with a narrative of a broader revolutionary movement, for treating the 1932-33 period as an organic whole, and for providing the best assessments of related historiography. His articles and books are all written in Thai but worth the trouble.
With respect to Craig’s query on the promoters’ failure to “wrap things up”, my understanding is that this was never really an option, at least not after it was agreed that Prajadhipok would act as the kingdom’s first constitutional monarch. In staying on, he lent legitimacy to a government that might otherwise have faced potentially lethal opposition, at home and abroad. In 1932, the state bureaucracy was largely a function of royal patronage and elements loyal to the old order not only refused to follow People’s Part directives but also immediately began organizing for a counter-coup. At the same time Bangkok was awash with rumors of an imminent foreign intervention to restore absolutism, a possibility that several members of the Seventh Reign court were actively encouraging.
In remaining on the throne, Prajadhipok gained some major concessions from the promoters, concessions that significantly narrowed the scope of what they could subsequently do. Henceforth, the monarchy was to be respected, not disparaged as it had been in the 24 June communiqué. Royal wealth was to be left intact, possibly subject to taxation but most certainly not confiscated. Princely ranks were not to be tampered with, leaving the prestige of the extended family intact. And finally, Pridi’s draft constitution was reclassified (by Prajadhipok) as temporary, setting the stage for a post-24 June debate over the powers of the king.
On the matter of Batson, his book served as an early “target” of mine when I was working on my MA thesis, a study of the 1932-33 period. The last of a peculiar genre – the English-language Thai reign history – it so effectively represented Prajadhipok’s perspective as to render the whole 24 June 32 affair inexplicable. Structurally, it also lent support to the fallacious notion that R7’s political role all but ended in June of 1932. Finally, it tended to showcase the king’s democratic reform efforts without, to my mind, drawing some of the more obvious conclusions. Here was a ruler who openly questioned whether the Siamese people would ever be ready for self-rule, who justified his tentative reform initiatives by suggesting that only thereby could the court preclude more radical/substantive changes, and who failed during the course of his first six and a half years on the throne to make any significant changes anyway. Batson rightly blames this lack of headway on the more conservative members of R7’s court yet he fails to take note its immediate consequence. Deeply frustrated, Prajadhipok initially sought to regain control of his government through constitutional means. His draft plan called for the elimination of the Supreme Council of Princes in favor of a parliamentary-like body that derived virtually all its powers from the king. And when this effort too was blocked, the king went one step further – approaching his cousin and former Minister of War, Bowaradej about the possibility of forcing a constitution on his own government. A part of the historical record, this parallel coup plan added to the general confusion surrounding the events of 24 June 1932. It also provides a starting point for any discussion of the Bowaradej Rebellion of October 1933.
Regarding Craig’s comments and Scot’s clarifications (?) on the business of our ‘sharing’ research, I recall all kinds of productive collaboration: discussion, critical reading of each other’s stuff, exchange of useful primary and secondary source materials, etc. It seems to me that the process was of benefit to us both. I can only say with certainty that it helped me.
And on a final note, with support from (of all places) Mahidol University I am currently revising my MA and PhD dissertations for publication ( although I am not sure where yet … suggestions?). In the meantime, if somebody would like an unrevised copy of my PhD thesis (Mark Moran?) I do have a PDF and will try to house it for download at academia.edu today.
Review of Buddhist Fury
Even though I’ve heard it was used in the past, I’m under the impression that the term ‘khaek’ isn’t really used much at all in the Malay Muslim south anymore. Malay-speaking Muslims seem to most often be referred to as ‘khon Isalam’ by Buddhists; in recent years the more politically correct term ‘khon Melayu’ has been on the rise.
On a couple of occasions I’ve heard the term ‘pasa khaek’ used by Buddhists to refer to the local Malay language, only to be told that this was not a polite term to use.
Interestingly, I’ve even heard an ethnic Malay man I know use the term ‘pasa khaek’ a couple times. One time he said this to me in front of a group of villagers. Since I had always heard that Malay-speaking Muslims considered this a very derogatory term, I was a bit surprised that no one commented on his choice of terms.
Lynas Corporation for dummies (and Australians)
Lynas halts trading on stock exchange.
Shares in Lynas Corporation Ltd have been placed in a trading halt, following another, potentially critical, setback with its Malaysian operations.
Welcome to doing business in Malaysia.
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Lynas-shares-placed-in-trading-halt-pd20121211-2UV29?OpenDocument&src=hp1#.UMZ4CDepIkE.twitter
Domesticating royal power
Prof. Andrew writes:
“Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to place too much weight on these negative assessments which, unconsciously or otherwise, mirror the disparagement of pro-Thaksin red-shirt protesters as “buffaloes” and paid stooges.”
This is COMPLETELY mistaken. That Thaksin could not have possibly ‘paid’ for all the hundred of thousands of Red Shirts to protest is just a simple fact. But the so-called ‘negative assessments’ about the coercion on loyalty to the monarchy is DEADLY REAL.
Just take one example: if a red shirt villager who heard a Thaksin’s phone-in expresses his disappointment by saying that ‘today Thaksin’s speech is not very good”, he would be perfectly safe. (Let’s imagine he uses, say, “colorful language’ in expressing his view).
But IF a local school teacher expresses similar sentiment (with similar language) on a speech by HM the King, he would in all certainty be charged with LM.
Thus to say that the coercion is having the effect it’s designed in the latter case in NOT the same as saying that there was a ‘pay out’ in the former case.
It’s just plain sad the Prof Andrew didn’t know the difference.
Mekong bridge at Chiang Khong
Initially, it was hope that the bridge would be opened on 12-12-12 but now it will only be joined. And the official opening will be in June 2013.
Lynas – with love from Perth!
Neptunian,
Thanks for highlighting these new information. Very important and useful.
It is no doubt a contentious issue. Over at the National Geographic site, several experts have also noted that the analysis fails to account for recent development on the impact of radiation on humans (re Chan Chee Khoon’s response).
But most importantly, this analysis concludes that:
“The trust-deficit between the company and the community can be bridged through a more deliberative public-private partnership around community engagement at regular intervals.”
I think that “Trust” is the central issue.
Malaysians do not trust the Government, and by extension, anything that the government does, is not trustworthy.
Lynas is caught in the middle, and its likely that Lynas has not done much to address that “Trust” deficit.
Review of Buddhist Fury
One has to hope that Dr Mazard gets his hands on a copy of the book soon, as his critique is important. All the same, the point about “Tha Khaek” is lost on me, I must say.
Lynas Corporation for dummies (and Australians)
One died of leukimia due to LYNAS and 100s plus their family live in properity with LYNAS salary, which ever people die anyway.
To kill one person at the expanse of a whole nation, just because of one man’s notion. This is what happened to Sadam Hussein & the Iraqi population.
Personnaly I support the LYNAS operation. Manusia merancang, Allah SWT menentukan.
Lynas – with love from Perth!
Hai Greg,
That is not much analysis there with specific questions and evaluation in the Malaysian context. The study by the Academy of Sciences quoted is also a generic paper on Rare Earths and its importance – It is available for download –
Everyone knows how important rare earth is. It is how Lynas plat impact Malaysia tha is important to the “anti-Lynas” group.
Several question remains unanswered –
1. Statement – The rare earth plant will help local industry climb up the ladder of “gree” and advanced technology from spin offs?
Fact – The products from the plant have all been earmarked for ecport (statement from Lynas CEO in a public address).There is no quota or priority sale to Malaysian companies nor is there a “buy” priority for companies based in Malaysia. Given this fact, how is Malaysian companies “climbing” the tech ladder arising from the Plant’s spin offs?
2 – Enviroment – The plant uses in the region of 50,000 M3 of fresh water every hour (not sure if the press release from Lynas is right – maybe daily)This is discharged into the bechok river (more like a stream) post processing. What is the impact of the additional volumn on the stream? Fish? other bo stuff?
The plant also need to have priority for the water supply as a shortage would lead to disastrous consequences. Given the state of regular “dry” taps in Kuantan, wouldn’t the residents suffer more from this? As far as can be ascertained, the Plant is not drawing its own ground water for their processing needs.
Domesticating royal power
Rama 6, 7 and 8 had no childred (or eligible children) to succeed them. The crown went to their brother or brother’s son.
“What’s all the fuss about?”
Regrettably, the old trope of “semi-divine” appears again. What actually does “semi-divine” mean? Some Thais undoubtedly believe this in some form but it’s past due time to find out how widespread and strong this belief remains, if it ever was. Actually, should be typing “versions of this belief,” as there may be a range of difference among folks such as a Sino-Thai upscale consumer in one of Bangkok’s glittery malls, a low-ranking Army grunt, and a senior bureaucrat, to name a few. Funny how foreigners continue to fall for this rather “cute” anachronism.