Ten ways Myanmar’s military can make life very difficult for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
Over the past few months, articles and op-eds by experts and others on Myanmar’s general elections have covered almost every conceivable aspect of the subject. Also, it seems a shame to dampen down the wave of euphoria that has swept around the world since the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) stunning victory on 8 November, which promises a new beginning for a country and people that have suffered for decades.
In considering where recent developments might lead, however, it is important to take a broad view and keep the election outcome in perspective. As Nicholas Farrelly wrote in The Myanmar Times on 9 November, this is just the beginning of a very long and difficult process. The harsh realities of power in Myanmar – at least as far as they have been seen until now – demand a fair degree of caution.
It might be helpful to list a few basic facts of life in Myanmar, just to set the scene.
First, the armed forces (Tatmadaw) have long been and arguably remain the most powerful political institution in Myanmar. As Robert Taylor has written, ‘Only the army can end its own role in Myanmar’s politics, and that decision is dependent on its perception of the civilian political elite’s ability to manage the future’. He might have added, ‘and protect the Tatmadaw as a national institution’.
Second, it is also important to bear in mind that the elections were relatively free and fair, and produced a reasonably accurate result, only because the leaders of the armed forces permitted them to occur and did not interfere. It may not have been easy, but they could have intervened at any stage of the process and ensured that the elections were cancelled, postponed, or manipulated to give a different outcome.
Third, given their resources and control of Myanmar’s internal affairs, the generals must have known that a free and fair election would result in a decisive victory for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. The final statistics may have come as a bit of a surprise (before the poll some respected analysts were questioning whether the NLD could achieve a landslide), but the outcome could not have been in doubt.
Fourth, this being the case, it can be assumed that, well before the election took place, the Tatmadaw’s senior leadership, probably in consultation with the president, took a collective decision to accept the results. There is no real tradition in Myanmar of sharing political power, but they must also have faced the prospect of negotiating the future governance of the country with Aung San Suu Kyi and her party.
And, rest assured, it will be a matter of the Tatmadaw and the NLD having to strike a deal of some kind. The massive show of popular support for Aung San Suu Kyi and her party on 8 November gives them enormous moral authority and a strong bargaining position, but it does not guarantee them a free hand to shape Myanmar’s future. Under current circumstances, that can only be done in cooperation with the armed forces.
Neither the Tatmadaw’s leadership, nor Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, would gain anything from a direct confrontation. That would only cause internal turmoil, hurt the Myanmar people and see Myanmar condemned internationally. If it got out of hand, such a clash of wills would inevitably slow down the democratic transition process. In certain circumstances, it could even halt it. That would benefit no-one.
While she has her critics, Aung San Suu Kyi enjoys strong support both inside Myanmar and outside it. Until now, however, her ability to work the levers of power has been heavily circumscribed. The NLD’s expected control of the national parliament opens up a number of intriguing possibilities, but there are still many ways in which the Tatmadaw could make life very difficult for her and the party, if it chose to do so.
Let me point out 10 of the more obvious ones.
One, the 2008 constitution could have been written with the current scenario in mind. The generals clearly anticipated the possibility that the armed forces might one day be faced with a potentially hostile parliament. So they built in various measures to protect the Tatmadaw’s position and core interests, and to guarantee its central role in national affairs. That is why the generals view the constitution as ‘the main or mother law’ of Myanmar, which they are determined to safeguard.
Two, any attempt to challenge the Tatmadaw’s status will be resisted. It has already rejected moves to reduce the guaranteed 25 per cent military representation in all national and regional assemblies. It has also opposed moves to amend the constitution so that Aung San Suu Kyi can become president. Amendments have not been ruled out entirely, but military spokesmen have said they will only occur when Myanmar’s democracy has ‘matured’. The Tatmadaw will decide when that stage has been reached.
Three, under the 2008 constitution, the Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of Defence Services has wide discretion to intervene in Myanmar’s internal affairs. With the president’s approval (and remember Thein Sein will remain in office until March 2016) he can even declare an emergency and take over the entire government. However, there is a lot the Tatmadaw can do to influence events short of such an extreme step.
Four, the constitution specifies that the portfolios of defence, home affairs and border affairs are filled by serving military officers recommended by the CinC. Also, if the Vice Commander-in-Chief is included, the CinC exercises effective control over at least five of the 11 members of the powerful National Defence and Security Council. These arrangements give the Tatmadaw effective control over Myanmar’s internal affairs.
Five, should a NLD parliament put pressure on the Tatmadaw, by trying to reduce its share of the national budget, there is bound to be pushback from the armed forces on the grounds that they have a duty to ensure the country’s unity, stability and sovereignty. In any case, under a 2011 law, the Tatmadaw is permitted to use other means to find the resources they need to meet their responsibilities. They already receive funds from a range of off-budget sources.
Six, the role of the armed forces in the national economy has been gradually declining since 2011, as the Tatmadaw has given up some of its monopolies and its two main conglomerates, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd and Myanmar Economic Corporation, have begun paying taxes. Should it wish to do so, however, the armed forces and their powerful ‘cronies’ could still exert pressure on the government by exercising their considerable economic power.
Seven, Aung San Suu Kyi knows that an early resolution of the country’s long-running insurgencies will be one of the NLD’s most pressing policy issues once it takes office. Yet, there is no hope of a more comprehensive ceasefire agreement – let alone a nation-wide peace settlement – without the full cooperation and support of the armed forces which, under the constitution, are guaranteed complete autonomy in all military affairs.
Eight, it is also relevant that the government and civil service are dominated by ex-military and military personnel. Out of 46 ministers at the national level, 37 are currently from the Tatmadaw, including five on active duty. Of the 14 Chief Ministers of Myanmar’s states and regions, all but one are retired military officers. These numbers will change as a result of the latest elections, but at least 170 retired senior officers stood for parliament on 8 November and some will probably secure a seat, if not official appointments.
Nine, in addition, 80 per cent of senior civil service positions in Myanmar are filled by ex-servicemen and women. Of the 33 permanent secretary positions created this year, 23 are held by former military personnel. As Renaud Egreteau has written, over decades the senior officer corps has been socialised into believing that the Tatmadaw is the sole and uncontested embodiment of the state. Even under a NLD government, many positions of authority will be under the influence of former military officers with a strong institutional loyalty to their old employer.
Last, but by no means least (and the country’s non-state armed groups aside), the Tatmadaw exercises a monopoly of the means of applying physical force in Myanmar. The CinC not only controls the powerful 350,000 strong armed forces but also the 80,000 strong Myanmar Police Force (with its 30-plus armed security battalions), militia units and other paramilitary forces, the Fire Brigades and even the Myanmar Red Cross.
Through these and various other measures, the armed forces have the means to exercise a powerful influence over Myanmar’s political, economic and social affairs, short of direct intervention. In considering the way ahead, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD will need to make due allowance for this reality, and come to some kind of modus vivendi with the military leadership. To reject such a course of action would see everyone suffer.
Individuals on both sides of the political divide are convinced of the validity of their respective positions. Also, they can be very stubborn, and prone to saying and doing unhelpful things. There is a risk, for example, that Aung San Suu Kyi will appeal to the armed forces over the head of the CinC, counting on the apparent support in the ranks for further reform. Any challenge to the loyalty and cohesion of the Tatmadaw, however, would arouse the generals’ deepest concerns, with possibly dire consequences.
All that said, both sides have shown that they can be pragmatic when it suits them. If they accept that their best option is to work together for the good of the country, and permit each side to pursue their core interests without threatening the other, then Myanmar may be able to look forward to happier times.
Should one side insist on exercising its perceived prerogatives over the objections of the other, however, or strong personalities adopt rigid and uncompromising positions, then the outlook will be much darker.
Whatever happens, Myanmar’s future will continue to defy confident prediction.
Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, the Australian National University.
This article forms part of New Mandala’s ‘Myanmar and the vote‘ series.
[…] the full “The realities of power in Myanmar” article authored by Associate Professor Andrew […]
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I agree every concern of Professor Andrew on this matter. In fact, I was worrying about the coming g power transfer since I woke up this morning. I’ve written a M.A Thesis in 2010 and as my topic is National Reconciliation and to bridge the two sides, I read a lot of papers and a few books on similar transitions. Professor Andrew reminds me of O’Donnell and Schmitter’s Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. I think our, Myanmar, situation is similar in many ways with Chilean transition. I hope the leadership of NLD could balance between its desire and reality.
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I had talked to some of today’s top military personnel nearly twenty years ago while at their junior ranks. They were upset of their top echelon and dreamt to change since then. Therefore I’m optimistic of the present transformation of our political arena. No more wolf and a lamb story I suppose.
No matter what the outside perspective may view from their own aspect.
Only the wearer knows where the shoe is pinched. But I could say it is early to predict.
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Playing happy families is easier said than done even in the case of a blood family.
Realities aren’t immune to being overturned as the military itself had done to gain a stranglehold on Burmese society. You have the guns you make the rules. You can blow hot and cold, and only you matter. So better behave or else.
The constitution as it stands is patently inimical to democracy. The real mettle of the Lady will show in the way she overthrows the military yoke, and all means are fair here in this instance.
May the force be with her.
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Renaud Egreteau suggests in The Diplomat that the challenge to the NLD govt will now come from above – the CIC and his men in the chambers, and from below – the USDP rump in parliament, the troops and also the civil society groups, since political proxies have outlived their use.
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“Unique” must be the defining term for the next steps.
Barring DASSK making the same mistake of:
1) Threatening the existing power with any ’empty’ power especially from the west HR org. and worst UN, in short “from the outside/the west.
2) Inciting previously proven method of protests e.g. Mass aimless protest that has become meaningless even with the involvement of monk, which are unlikely to join these with Ma Ba Ta.
3) Using ‘self defiance’ again that has serve no one in Myanmar that need help other than the west and cronies to enrich themselves.
Nick
Every time there is a comparison of Myanmar future it galls this protagonist and the ilks to see countries that are not more similar in most respects.
Myanmar is Unique in burdens that can be compared any where outside Asia.
The closest comparisons are Thailand and China.
Holding one chagrins, Thailand and China with similar burden of “ethnicity” has overcome most problem through economic development i.e. enlarging piece of pie that defuses too little for too many problems.
Thailand has long sole much of the ethnic problems thus:
1) Stop interference by the west.
2) Using military/police as a matter of fact even for mass execution.
The ethnicity problem was justly solved by using 2 category of citizenship:
1) Thai(ask anyone in Bangkok who look fairer or Dravidian than real Thai, they all insist on being Thai).
2) The Hill Peoples. Potpourri of A-Z ethnicity that are supposedly co equal but discriminated.
Until Myanmar citizenry, which has very similar make up as Thai in ethnicity, realize the common destiny the chance of peaceful transition is doubtful at best.
DASSK will best serve Myanmar by promoting “common destiny” at every turn and as the economic pie grow to accommodate every group the military will be seen as a yole my all and itself.
The “common destiny” will require the west recognize Myanmar as a unique Asian country instead of some far away western entity like Chile, Argentina or else where.
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Clear as mud. And who’s Nick? If you meant Nich he didn’t write this one.
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Apology to Mr Andrew Seth for the mistaken attribution.
Thank you for the indicated erratum Ko Moe Aung.
Simply put:
1) If DASSK even at conclusive victory do not repeat the mistakes of previous ’88 lesser victory.
Even within the constraints highlighted by Mr Selth her victory can easily accommodate the military/the guns with the help of other democracy.
This will be a unique way to “freedom from fear” that she espouse so dearly that every body can agree with. One step at a time, not gingerly but with dignity.
2) “Common causes/destiny” i.e. For peace and prosperity to the Myanmar Citizenry as the mantra in every actions she will take legislatively.
As Thailand goes, the “Buddha above King” has been a successful model to unite Thai.
For Myanmar similar model of “Buddha above —- &—-” model to unite is viable and will even be better.
I hope this make some things clearer.
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Plan B,
“Buddha above King model” could not be applied to our problem since Myanmar has more population of Christian and Muslim. In Thailand, 96% are Buddhist whilst 89% or less in Myanmar.
The best way I could imagine at present is to educate our people about Democracy, its value, principles, and responsibilities.
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These are the realities aimed to inform people of Myanmar and the NLD. I suggest Andrew could write a sequel to inform the military for the same to complete adapted title of this piece.
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Ko Htay
The burdens are on NLD shoulders. The citizenry has spoken.
1) Need to win over the military without seemingly capitulating DASSK’s ‘Freedom From Fear”.
2) Appropriately prioritize which FFF elements can be implemented that will benefit the most that will also win over military trust. “Common Causes” are plenty.
No need for Mr Selth to further educate the military.
The ball is squarely in the victor court.
SPDC and present establishment had proven that it is very aware of every aspect of not just surviving but coming out ahead always at the expense of the citizenry.
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Plan B,
The piper has delivered his service upon invitation and children are now with him. It’s time for the king to keep his promise and pay the bill.
You have no message for the king because you are not one among the parents.
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Oh, but he thinks he is. The rats are still rampant and he wants the king to leave them alone, just pay the bill and stop being careless useless. The piper and the children should lose their fear of the rats and instead appreciate their unassailable position and invaluable role in moving on.
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Ko Moe Aung
Such intense spilled over righteous anger, is not good for ones heath.
Just keeping up with and tending Nargis results alone, still ongoing, neglected still by ALL, will have kill everyone at Newmandala a thousand times over from alternate angers and sorrow.
Ko Htay
Great parabolic attempt. Now can you and your ilk convey same message to the rural/70% of the citizenry, mostly/mainly Buddhists, unlike others, pretty rich in understanding Buddhist parabolic message.
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[…] The military continues to dominate key state agencies. […]
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[…] based at the Australian National University in Canberra, has argued that Suu Kyi and her party will need to think realistically about how to accommodate their prerogatives. “In considering the way ahead, Aung San Suu Kyi and […]
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