“BTW, notice that “comments” had been turned off for the video. I think if you don’t want alternate interpretations to ruin your dubious expose, the first thing you do is turn off the comments.”
Comments were not disabled on the English subtitles version which has also proved highly popular. Even without the sentence about the edible benefits of democracy enjoyed under Thai Rak Thai the comments comprise very few alternate interpretations, rather a copious list of hate messages for Thaksin. The reactions seem to be as much to his revolting facial expressions and aggressive body language as to the 500 baht queues.
I had gleaned a similar impression from some of the Prachatai, etc, coverage and discussion of Boonyuen’s case. Thanks for confirming these elements.
Perhaps some of the Bangkok-based journalists reading the comments on this thread will be in a position to find out more about how both Khun Boonyuen and Khun Suwicha are now faring.
When Harry Nicolaides was arrested Andrew Walker used a mixed metaphor to sum up his situation: “a very small fish who’s been caught in the crossfire”. I’m afraid that these two Thais who have been convicted of lese majeste and given these heavy sentences are even smaller fish, with even fewer friends to offer support. It is tragic, and so easily ignored when so much else is going on.
tom boy and Nick mentioning of Boonyuen’s case reminds me of something sad, though not unexpected.
Let me add a bit of info first. I was told from reliable source that Khun Boonyuen was persuaded (either by her lawers, her family or some authorities I’m not sure) to confess and get the conviction, so that she could ask for royal pardon. This way, she had been told, she could be out of prison within a relatively short time, whereas if she fought the charge, the case could drag on for years and yeas during which time the chance of her being free on bail would be nil. So she confessed and got that six year term on 6 November 2008. It has been nearly six months now after that conviction.
Harry Nicolaides, a farang, got convicted on 19 January 2009. He received a royal pardon and was released on 21 February 2009, i.e., just a month after the sentencing.
Don’t get me wrong, I’m more than happy for Harry. In fact I don’t think any one should be put in jail for a single day for the LM charge. But it should be obvious what this difference in treatment means.
P.S. I was also told that, Khun Boonyuen had apparently been persuaded that, in order to increase her chance of freedom, she should stay away from the political circles she used to belong. So she actually cut off all contact with former friends and political activists (She was a ‘regular’ of the Sanam Luang protest rally, as was ‘Da Torpido’.)
Agree with Portman. ML or Mister Lousy is anti-Democrats – they didn’t want him, and he’s using all ways and means to ensure its downfall. Which is what politicians do. And the piece on “consoling hearts of reds” is merely to be on the so-called right or “winning” side, so he can look like the White Knight when the time comes. Be careful with the Mon whatevers… they’re all about wealth and personal interests and status.
Of course, the fact that that video went viral — with some 600,000+ views — does not prove anything one way or another about the intention of the speaker.
First, lots of people share a certain view of Thaksin, and alleged nature of his comments certainly feeds into their preconceptions.
Second, the Thaksin video was presented in such a way as to encourage viewers to interpret Thaksin’s comments in a certain way.
When people are given information prior to viewing the video (before viewing it you are told what it means) they will tend to see in it what they have been encouraged to see, and interpret it as they are encouraged to interpret it. This is especially the case when the suggested interpretations feed into a familiar narrative (Thaksin only has so many supporters because he has bought them).
Somsak Jeamteerasakul’s observation about the translation adds to our understanding as to why an alternate interpretation makes sense.
BTW, notice that “comments” had been turned off for the video. I think if you don’t want alternate interpretations to ruin your dubious expose, the first thing you do is turn off the comments.
I expect the prisoner you remember is Boonyuen Prasertying (р╕Ър╕╕р╕Нр╕вр╕╖р╕Щ р╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╣Ар╕кр╕гр╕┤р╕Рр╕вр╕┤р╣Ир╕З) who received a 6 year term in late 2008. Some information on her case is available here, here and here.
There was another woman – not the famous Da Torpedo – who also got locked up but only for six years. For something she said at Sanam Luang. I forget her name. And I guess that’s the way it goes. I hope somebody can remember it. My recollection from what I read in the newspapers and the blogs at the time is that she was a fairly ordinary woman with an ordinary job who got inspired or carried away and made a fatal move to say some thing when people were saying some things. She’s paying for that now.
After reading this I cannot feel that this site is more often than not a political site to dissemble and repeat ad nauseum apoint of view la Fox news in the USA, as opposed to a place to explore issues and possibilities.
This shallow polemic above discourages any real possiblility to engage, other then to get into an argument about unprovable historical allegations, lack of fact checking, and stretched logical conclusions.
In addition, being “at the heart of ” many issues in Thailand does not at all have to mean that the monarchy is inherently negative or evil. Neither is it logical to conclude causality – that is to say that being at the heart of things makes it the absolute cause of issues, i.e. stymies to democracy such as corrupt practices or politicians, double standards in the legal system, nasty divisions in society, extrajudical killings, violent thug-like intimidation, and other nasty realities of most developing or many middle income countries.
The light, unbalanced, and inflammatory interpretation of “history” above at best discourages meaningful analysis; at worst it preempts it by primarily eliciting equally unbalanced and jaded responses. (Which perhaps is its true purpose).
Nevertheless why not consider alternative theses as well.
Certainly, the monarchy has taken public positions contributing to, or appearing to legitimize, some tragic and disappointing events over the decades (which also must be analyzed in the context of their historical timeframe) and royal survival instincts (perhaps read networking here) have been strong. However “facts” and legends can also fit other scenarios.
For example, what if perhaps by survival instinct, or by desire (consider the youth spent abroad, western education, and parental influences of this present king), or by pragmatic choice the institution has not strayed too far from a roadmap (albeit long and winding) to “real” democracy (please save another debate on what participatory democracy is, and is not, for another thread).
If, in fact, a primary long term goal is to aim for democracy and accept the need (and defacto reality) to diminish, limit, or more clearly define the monarchy’s historical influence and role, then the palace must directly, or at least indirectly, support an evolving political system of decentralization of power and participatory decisionmaking (i.e. elections, establishing democracratic values with checks and balances, and local community decisionmaking on taxes and budget). Thai history in the late 1980s and the 1990’s might support this.
However, also inherent in this long term goal is to ensure that, although the royal institution may be “diminished” in its role, it is not to be merely replaced by another family (literally or figuratively) that would perpetuate (and perhaps greatly abuse) an expanded role – to be more specific any continuing concentration of unchecked power. (One might consider the progress of the 1990’s culminating in the 97 constitution juxtaposed with concerns since 2002, when the increasing extra legislative policymaking through PM decrees, purposefully less tranparent budget allocations, and extra legal activities for personal benefit revealed Thaksin’s serious ethical character flaws and massive ambitions).
Perhaps the fear was that leadership lacking ethics and character would regress the country into models of kleptocracy and extreme crony capitalism supported by blatant abuse of power and the rule of law, not too mention eliminating any attempts at institutional checks and balances or free press. Think power models emulating Marcos, Suharto, or Mahathir in the best case.
Perhaps this is why Thaksin continues to elicit such a visceral negative response in many. He was perceived to be rolling back the clock.
While others have tried to assert (check the Economist articles -comments section) that the palace is jealous of Thaksin’s popularity; the case may be rather that Thaksin (or anyone else aspiring to dominating, unaccountable power in Thailand) is arguably jealous of the potential absolute power of an old stye king. The ex PM has never been a proponet of democracy, much less its champion, but rather an extraordinarily disappointing run of the mill unethical Thai politician at best. At worst he is a regressive, potential “usurper of the throne” who would sidetrack Thailand off of any realistic and peaceful roadmap to democracy .
I have smoked marijuana on occasion (I’m not proud of it) but thankfully masked men haven’t visited my home to blast my brains over all over the room in front of my wife and young child. But these things did happen to real people far, far too often during the Thai Rak Thai years. I know this isn’t news too you, and you have expressed your misgivings, but when you stand shoulder to shoulder with the rice farmers who hold icons of Thaksin Shinawatra (noticeably absent from Mr Nostitz’s images) are you truly confident that you are fighting for the democratic rights of the poor, rather than acting as an apologist for a monster?
The most astonishing (and disturbing) thing I find about the drug war is not that Thaksin managed to pull it off and get away with it, but that it was one of his single most popular policies, not just upcountry but also in Bangkok, where much of his present opposition is based. If you check the more detailed opinion polls taken just before the 2005 election, it definitely ranked among the top 3 most popular policies (and many were aware that not everyone who was killed was necessarily a drug dealer). This shows to me that the problems you talk about are more than just about Thaksin. This attitude can only come about by a decades-long failure of Thai legal/political institutions to protect the people, build up their trust and cultivate a “rule of law” culture. I’m not trying to absolve Thaksin of responsibility for the drug war. But the problems that made such a horrendous crime possible run much deeper than Thaksin.
BTW, it’s quite ironic accuse Nick of ignoring Thaksin’s crimes during the war on drugs. He is probably more knowledgeable about the details of the drug war on the ground than any other journalist in town. It’s just not part of the story he set out to tell in this instance – his post was already quite long, and my impression was he wanted to limit it by discussing nothing more than what he actually saw during the Red Uprising.
“The high body count was part of the premeditated plan to paint to the international media that the Democrat government colluded with the military in ’suppressing with extreme violent unarmed protestors fighting for democracy resulting in truckloads of deaths’. ”
Not many on NM like to acknowledge the obvious but, indeed, it seems most probable that Thaksin and some (but not all) other red shirt leaders were desperately hoping to provoke the military to unleash a massacre on the red shirt demonstrators. Considering the past record of the military in riot control and their poor discipline and training, it should have been a very safe bet that this would happen, once the red shirts had aborted the Pattaya conference, attacked Abhisit’s car at the Interior Ministry and started setting fire to buses and threatening to blow up gas tankers. In fact, it is nothing short of miraculous that it didn’t happen. The fact it didn’t and they lost their bet is the sort of low probability outcome with disastrous results that has unseated many a hedge fund manager in recent years. Everything was clearly prepared to trumpet the massacre to the foreign media and petition the king. Thaksin and the red shirt leaders were so dumbfounded and confused by the lack of massacre that they proceeded with the media interviews and the petition to the king anyway in the vain hope that what they were reporting might actually turn out to be true and they could move into position for the final push, whatever form that was supposed to take.
Since there is still some stake money left and the potential return on a winning bet that doesn’t run up against the wrong end of another fat tailed probability distribution curve is so large, we will have to wait and see what the next wager will be.
“Such a perspective forgets the entire period from the final twenty years of the absolute monarchy to the first twenty years after the 1932 Revolution. During the forty years before and after the 1932 Revolution, the monarchy was definitely not the stabiliser. In the political context of the time, the monarchy itself was the central issue of the battle between the status quo and change. It was one side of those years of political and civil war.”
You cannot say whether the monarchy was a political stabiliser or not in the 20 years prior to the revolution because there was no other political force under absolute monarchy. For most of the 20 years following the revolution, this was equally irrelevant because the monarch was virtually out of the picture with first an absent monarch who then abdicated in favour of a young prince who lived abroad. On the other hand, Pridi Banomyong, as regent in the post revolution period, was as left wing as you got in Thai politics and was locked in a struggle with the right wing fascists who were against the monarchy, led by Phibulsongkran. The reference to the monarchy’s involvement in the political and civil wars in the period 1912 to 1952 is confusing. What political and civil wars took place in 1912-32? Apart from Prince Paribatra’s ill fated attempt at a counter revolution, which didn’t seem to have the blessing of the monarch, what political and civil wars took place in 1932-52 with involvement from the monarchy?
The author seems to concur grudgingly that the monarchy has been a stabilising influence from 1960s to the 1990s, no mean achievement, if true, given the turbulence in neighbouring countries in that period. He then suddenly interjects his final conclusion that the monarchy is obviously at the heart of Thailand’s current political instability without giving any reasons for this view.
“Can “Careful Observer” tell us what he thinks about Khun Nattakorn’s father? Is that true epitomy of paternalist governance also “a shallow, muddled thinker” (recently, he expressed his desire to have a guy like Sarit Thanarat back, because, after all, that was a truly decisive leader!)?”
I agree with Careful Observer that ML Nattakorn’s father is also “a shallow, muddled thinker”. MR Pridyatorn was arguably the worst finance minister in over 20 years and made stupid and damaging mistakes through his refusal to listen to people with more knowledge and experience than himself. Then he resigned in a sulk, leaving others to try to clean up the messes he had created. His performance as governor of the Bank of Thailand and chairman of Exim Bank was more non-descript but is marred by credible allegations of conflicts of interest. His articles in the English language Thai press, including the one about Sarit are close to pure drivel.
Neither father nor son would ever have got the jobs they have had or anywhere to publish their vacuous thoughts, if they were not born to privilege and wealth. If anything, they are ideal motivators for those who would like a bolshevik revolution in Thailand to liquidate the aristocracy and redistribute their wealth. That a poser like Nattakorn can jump on the red shirt bandwagon without being rejected as a fake emphasises that the red shirt movement is led and manipulated by the elite for their own ends and lack a credible leadership of intellectuals with working class backgrounds.
Thanks Sidh S., well, frankly I find Keyes’ piece a bit baffling. Thaksin sought out mediums in much the same way as he attended the occasional ritual at the invitation of monks and laity at Wat Thammakaai- as indeed had other political leaders, military, business persons and civic elites, including royalty, and many continue to do so. The media also tried to accuse Thaksin of overriding the Supreme Patriarch & king in making the appointment of an Acting Supreme Patriarch (Somdet Kiew from Wat Saket, the second in seniority after the Supreme Patriarch at the Supreme Sangha Council). This was done according to seniority and nothing to do with sect/nikai. The current Supreme Patriarch is not capable of functioning and has not been capable for some years due to his health. It was not because, as some made out, of Thaksin favouring Mahanikai (or specifically Wat Thammakaai) monks over Dhammayut monks.
As for the link between Thaksin and King Taksin? This was an ignoble attempt by the opposition to discredit Thaksin after he went to pay respects to the well-known Northeastern mystical monk Luang Puu Kuun. LP Kuun was reputed to have said that that Thaksin was one of the important Thai ancestors in this lifetime who has come here to help the people. The unscrupulous Thai media since tried to make a link in this statement in an attempt at making Thaksin appear guilty of lese majesty- suggesting he wanted to raise himself to the level of a rebel Buddha-King to oppose the legitimacy of the current king; fiction, and Biff should know that. In much the same way as the media made out that Thaksin tried to place himself at the level of royalty at the royal Emerald Buddha temple. Sondhi Lim then went on to defame Thaksin through his media saying that he was mimicking the king himself and should be punished. Then the Office of the Royal Secretariat had to come out and explain that in fact Thaksin had done nothing wrong and that his government had been granted permission to perform this ceremony. Did that get reported? [And Biff, I’d like to ask: how did Thaksin try and subvert the 1997 Constitution? It was the 2006 Coup & khor Mor Chor cronies who subverted the 1997 Constitution].
Amazing. As you pointed out, over 606,000 people have viewed the Thai only version without English subtitles which has been disabled for comments, perhaps because it might overload the system. The English subtitle version unfortunately cut off Thaksin’s appeal to those who had enjoyed those delicious edible benefits from democracy during the years of the Thaksin regime immediately following the comment about not having to join the queue to received 500 baht. However, I agree with you that it is quite significant and mitigates rather against Acharn Somsak’s interpretation. Acharn Somsak’s intricate parsing of Thaksin’s literary accomplishment is one possible interpretation but by no means the only one or necessarily even the correct one. It requires quite a bit of thought and the ability to blank out Thaksin’s body language and obvious annoyance at whoever is providing the commentary into his ear piece to arrive at Acharn Somsak’s conclusion. I agree with you that most of the 606,000 will probably not have given Thaksin the benefit of the doubt, even if the Acharn is right. This along with Thaksin’s “shrillness” and poor performance in his BBC and CNN interviews cannot have helped his case much but it is not over until he either wins or his money runs out.
“Often I hear the comments like LAND’s and I have to wonder if he has ever spent even one day working on a rice farm or spent a night talking to a group of rice farmers. I would hazard a guess he has not or he would realize that the brightest people in the country are not educated, but they understand immeasurably what’s going on. Something some groups do not want you to know. If thailand ever wants to become a great nation instead of an emerging one they have to develop this people resource not just as labor but as a brain trust as well.”
Aside from the romantic schmaltz of those who feel they know better just because they have talked to villagers, married poor village girls or perhaps even dared to violate the Working of Aliens Act by working on a rice farm themselves, I agree that education is the key to Thailand’s social and economic development. This is not something that Thaksin or other elitists from his political parties or the red shirts have shown any interest in because they know that better education would eventually mean less votes for corrupt, self serving politicians, as much as it would mean less unquestioning acceptance for other elites. Hopefully, it is something that will emerge from the red shirt movement, if they can ever cut loose from Dr Evil’s apron strings.
Ralph#101, apparently not too much for the 600,000+ Thais who clicked into youtube to watch. Look, I was quite convinced the first time that I saw it until AjarnSomsak’s comments got me to have a closer look – which then gave me second thoughts as expressed in #99. Look, at the end of the day, it’s only two Thai’s interpretation of the VDO clip stated in Thai, aimed at a Thai crowd – there are certainly many more possible interpretations. At the very least I don’t think it will be good enough for lawyers to prosecute!
I can take this further and interpret that the following sentence – right after the 500 baht statement, the pause, the turn of the head, lifting of the left arm, that facial expression etc. – was meant to cover up for the apparent slip ‘did that went out right?’ which I translate as:
“Brothers and sisters that have received benefits from the Democracy that can be eaten during ThaiRakThai years”
Look, I already said that I agree with AjarnSomsak on what the actual message of the ‘script’ intended. This comes down to ‘abysmal acting’ on PMThaksin’s part that the VDO turned out to be such a classic for hundreds of thousands of Thais.
David Brown#11. Yes, the police should collect evidences and question witness – unfortunately they have not gone far on any cases that I’ve mentioned nor, it is likely, the case at Nang Learng and the SiamGas gas truck cases. On the latter, I only hear that GenChaiyasit, PMThaksin’s cousin and Board Director at SiamGas, is suing DPMSuthep for accusing him that he is behind the gas truck saga:
At the end of day, it may just be that the simple universal fact that the lives of the poor cost less – and the police will likely be preoccupied with TycoonSonthi’s attempt assasination case than any that we have mentioned concerning Red and Yellow foot soldier’s deaths. For PMThaksin, PheuThai and Red Elites, the poor Red crowds were mere sacrificial lambs for their very personal interests – wounded and dead bodies on photographs and VDO to peddle to the local and global media. You can also see that, interestingly, the gas tanks were parked near the urban poor communities – which then precipitated into a very local war of the locals fighting the Reds for their survival and nothing to do with political leanings…
Agreed. The tone of the cases seems to be set at the time bail is requested. No connections > no bail > no foot dragging by prosecutors > intense pressure to plead guilty > no lawyer willing to risk a vigorous defence > no acquittal. Although precedents are not very important in Thailand’s civil law system, there are old precedents of acquittals based on lack of intent in LM cases going back even to the early days of the law under absolute monarchy. Althought the trials are largely held in camera, lack of intent doesn’t seem to have been a viable defence in recent years. This defence might not have helped Suwicha but, if available, could help or have helped others in this predicament.
The crushing of the Red Shirts
Jotman #106
“BTW, notice that “comments” had been turned off for the video. I think if you don’t want alternate interpretations to ruin your dubious expose, the first thing you do is turn off the comments.”
Comments were not disabled on the English subtitles version which has also proved highly popular. Even without the sentence about the edible benefits of democracy enjoyed under Thai Rak Thai the comments comprise very few alternate interpretations, rather a copious list of hate messages for Thaksin. The reactions seem to be as much to his revolting facial expressions and aggressive body language as to the 500 baht queues.
Suwicha Thakor still locked up
Thanks Ajarn Somsak,
I had gleaned a similar impression from some of the Prachatai, etc, coverage and discussion of Boonyuen’s case. Thanks for confirming these elements.
Perhaps some of the Bangkok-based journalists reading the comments on this thread will be in a position to find out more about how both Khun Boonyuen and Khun Suwicha are now faring.
When Harry Nicolaides was arrested Andrew Walker used a mixed metaphor to sum up his situation: “a very small fish who’s been caught in the crossfire”. I’m afraid that these two Thais who have been convicted of lese majeste and given these heavy sentences are even smaller fish, with even fewer friends to offer support. It is tragic, and so easily ignored when so much else is going on.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Reconciliation in Thailand?
Ralph #15
I am a bit confused by this apparent non sequitur but appreciate that economics and finance is not a forte of the Thai studies crew.
Suwicha Thakor still locked up
tom boy and Nick mentioning of Boonyuen’s case reminds me of something sad, though not unexpected.
Let me add a bit of info first. I was told from reliable source that Khun Boonyuen was persuaded (either by her lawers, her family or some authorities I’m not sure) to confess and get the conviction, so that she could ask for royal pardon. This way, she had been told, she could be out of prison within a relatively short time, whereas if she fought the charge, the case could drag on for years and yeas during which time the chance of her being free on bail would be nil. So she confessed and got that six year term on 6 November 2008. It has been nearly six months now after that conviction.
Harry Nicolaides, a farang, got convicted on 19 January 2009. He received a royal pardon and was released on 21 February 2009, i.e., just a month after the sentencing.
Don’t get me wrong, I’m more than happy for Harry. In fact I don’t think any one should be put in jail for a single day for the LM charge. But it should be obvious what this difference in treatment means.
P.S. I was also told that, Khun Boonyuen had apparently been persuaded that, in order to increase her chance of freedom, she should stay away from the political circles she used to belong. So she actually cut off all contact with former friends and political activists (She was a ‘regular’ of the Sanam Luang protest rally, as was ‘Da Torpido’.)
Clearly, that doesn’t help her much, so far.
Reconciliation in Thailand?
Agree with Portman. ML or Mister Lousy is anti-Democrats – they didn’t want him, and he’s using all ways and means to ensure its downfall. Which is what politicians do. And the piece on “consoling hearts of reds” is merely to be on the so-called right or “winning” side, so he can look like the White Knight when the time comes. Be careful with the Mon whatevers… they’re all about wealth and personal interests and status.
The crushing of the Red Shirts
Concerning that video:
Of course, the fact that that video went viral — with some 600,000+ views — does not prove anything one way or another about the intention of the speaker.
First, lots of people share a certain view of Thaksin, and alleged nature of his comments certainly feeds into their preconceptions.
Second, the Thaksin video was presented in such a way as to encourage viewers to interpret Thaksin’s comments in a certain way.
When people are given information prior to viewing the video (before viewing it you are told what it means) they will tend to see in it what they have been encouraged to see, and interpret it as they are encouraged to interpret it. This is especially the case when the suggested interpretations feed into a familiar narrative (Thaksin only has so many supporters because he has bought them).
Somsak Jeamteerasakul’s observation about the translation adds to our understanding as to why an alternate interpretation makes sense.
BTW, notice that “comments” had been turned off for the video. I think if you don’t want alternate interpretations to ruin your dubious expose, the first thing you do is turn off the comments.
Suwicha Thakor still locked up
Tom Hoy,
I expect the prisoner you remember is Boonyuen Prasertying (р╕Ър╕╕р╕Нр╕вр╕╖р╕Щ р╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╣Ар╕кр╕гр╕┤р╕Рр╕вр╕┤р╣Ир╕З) who received a 6 year term in late 2008. Some information on her case is available here, here and here.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Suwicha Thakor still locked up
There was another woman – not the famous Da Torpedo – who also got locked up but only for six years. For something she said at Sanam Luang. I forget her name. And I guess that’s the way it goes. I hope somebody can remember it. My recollection from what I read in the newspapers and the blogs at the time is that she was a fairly ordinary woman with an ordinary job who got inspired or carried away and made a fatal move to say some thing when people were saying some things. She’s paying for that now.
I hope somebody can remember her.
Thai monarchy: Political stabiliser or destabiliser?
After reading this I cannot feel that this site is more often than not a political site to dissemble and repeat ad nauseum apoint of view la Fox news in the USA, as opposed to a place to explore issues and possibilities.
This shallow polemic above discourages any real possiblility to engage, other then to get into an argument about unprovable historical allegations, lack of fact checking, and stretched logical conclusions.
In addition, being “at the heart of ” many issues in Thailand does not at all have to mean that the monarchy is inherently negative or evil. Neither is it logical to conclude causality – that is to say that being at the heart of things makes it the absolute cause of issues, i.e. stymies to democracy such as corrupt practices or politicians, double standards in the legal system, nasty divisions in society, extrajudical killings, violent thug-like intimidation, and other nasty realities of most developing or many middle income countries.
The light, unbalanced, and inflammatory interpretation of “history” above at best discourages meaningful analysis; at worst it preempts it by primarily eliciting equally unbalanced and jaded responses. (Which perhaps is its true purpose).
Nevertheless why not consider alternative theses as well.
Certainly, the monarchy has taken public positions contributing to, or appearing to legitimize, some tragic and disappointing events over the decades (which also must be analyzed in the context of their historical timeframe) and royal survival instincts (perhaps read networking here) have been strong. However “facts” and legends can also fit other scenarios.
For example, what if perhaps by survival instinct, or by desire (consider the youth spent abroad, western education, and parental influences of this present king), or by pragmatic choice the institution has not strayed too far from a roadmap (albeit long and winding) to “real” democracy (please save another debate on what participatory democracy is, and is not, for another thread).
If, in fact, a primary long term goal is to aim for democracy and accept the need (and defacto reality) to diminish, limit, or more clearly define the monarchy’s historical influence and role, then the palace must directly, or at least indirectly, support an evolving political system of decentralization of power and participatory decisionmaking (i.e. elections, establishing democracratic values with checks and balances, and local community decisionmaking on taxes and budget). Thai history in the late 1980s and the 1990’s might support this.
However, also inherent in this long term goal is to ensure that, although the royal institution may be “diminished” in its role, it is not to be merely replaced by another family (literally or figuratively) that would perpetuate (and perhaps greatly abuse) an expanded role – to be more specific any continuing concentration of unchecked power. (One might consider the progress of the 1990’s culminating in the 97 constitution juxtaposed with concerns since 2002, when the increasing extra legislative policymaking through PM decrees, purposefully less tranparent budget allocations, and extra legal activities for personal benefit revealed Thaksin’s serious ethical character flaws and massive ambitions).
Perhaps the fear was that leadership lacking ethics and character would regress the country into models of kleptocracy and extreme crony capitalism supported by blatant abuse of power and the rule of law, not too mention eliminating any attempts at institutional checks and balances or free press. Think power models emulating Marcos, Suharto, or Mahathir in the best case.
Perhaps this is why Thaksin continues to elicit such a visceral negative response in many. He was perceived to be rolling back the clock.
While others have tried to assert (check the Economist articles -comments section) that the palace is jealous of Thaksin’s popularity; the case may be rather that Thaksin (or anyone else aspiring to dominating, unaccountable power in Thailand) is arguably jealous of the potential absolute power of an old stye king. The ex PM has never been a proponet of democracy, much less its champion, but rather an extraordinarily disappointing run of the mill unethical Thai politician at best. At worst he is a regressive, potential “usurper of the throne” who would sidetrack Thailand off of any realistic and peaceful roadmap to democracy .
So destabiliser or stabiliser?
The crushing of the Red Shirts
I have smoked marijuana on occasion (I’m not proud of it) but thankfully masked men haven’t visited my home to blast my brains over all over the room in front of my wife and young child. But these things did happen to real people far, far too often during the Thai Rak Thai years. I know this isn’t news too you, and you have expressed your misgivings, but when you stand shoulder to shoulder with the rice farmers who hold icons of Thaksin Shinawatra (noticeably absent from Mr Nostitz’s images) are you truly confident that you are fighting for the democratic rights of the poor, rather than acting as an apologist for a monster?
The most astonishing (and disturbing) thing I find about the drug war is not that Thaksin managed to pull it off and get away with it, but that it was one of his single most popular policies, not just upcountry but also in Bangkok, where much of his present opposition is based. If you check the more detailed opinion polls taken just before the 2005 election, it definitely ranked among the top 3 most popular policies (and many were aware that not everyone who was killed was necessarily a drug dealer). This shows to me that the problems you talk about are more than just about Thaksin. This attitude can only come about by a decades-long failure of Thai legal/political institutions to protect the people, build up their trust and cultivate a “rule of law” culture. I’m not trying to absolve Thaksin of responsibility for the drug war. But the problems that made such a horrendous crime possible run much deeper than Thaksin.
BTW, it’s quite ironic accuse Nick of ignoring Thaksin’s crimes during the war on drugs. He is probably more knowledgeable about the details of the drug war on the ground than any other journalist in town. It’s just not part of the story he set out to tell in this instance – his post was already quite long, and my impression was he wanted to limit it by discussing nothing more than what he actually saw during the Red Uprising.
Reconciliation in Thailand?
Yes, Portman, ignore all of those guys who got Thailand into the 1997 crisis. They were all pretty sharp, like bowling balls.
Battle at Dindaeng, Bangkok, 13 April 2009
Sidh S #22
“The high body count was part of the premeditated plan to paint to the international media that the Democrat government colluded with the military in ’suppressing with extreme violent unarmed protestors fighting for democracy resulting in truckloads of deaths’. ”
Not many on NM like to acknowledge the obvious but, indeed, it seems most probable that Thaksin and some (but not all) other red shirt leaders were desperately hoping to provoke the military to unleash a massacre on the red shirt demonstrators. Considering the past record of the military in riot control and their poor discipline and training, it should have been a very safe bet that this would happen, once the red shirts had aborted the Pattaya conference, attacked Abhisit’s car at the Interior Ministry and started setting fire to buses and threatening to blow up gas tankers. In fact, it is nothing short of miraculous that it didn’t happen. The fact it didn’t and they lost their bet is the sort of low probability outcome with disastrous results that has unseated many a hedge fund manager in recent years. Everything was clearly prepared to trumpet the massacre to the foreign media and petition the king. Thaksin and the red shirt leaders were so dumbfounded and confused by the lack of massacre that they proceeded with the media interviews and the petition to the king anyway in the vain hope that what they were reporting might actually turn out to be true and they could move into position for the final push, whatever form that was supposed to take.
Since there is still some stake money left and the potential return on a winning bet that doesn’t run up against the wrong end of another fat tailed probability distribution curve is so large, we will have to wait and see what the next wager will be.
Thai monarchy: Political stabiliser or destabiliser?
“Such a perspective forgets the entire period from the final twenty years of the absolute monarchy to the first twenty years after the 1932 Revolution. During the forty years before and after the 1932 Revolution, the monarchy was definitely not the stabiliser. In the political context of the time, the monarchy itself was the central issue of the battle between the status quo and change. It was one side of those years of political and civil war.”
You cannot say whether the monarchy was a political stabiliser or not in the 20 years prior to the revolution because there was no other political force under absolute monarchy. For most of the 20 years following the revolution, this was equally irrelevant because the monarch was virtually out of the picture with first an absent monarch who then abdicated in favour of a young prince who lived abroad. On the other hand, Pridi Banomyong, as regent in the post revolution period, was as left wing as you got in Thai politics and was locked in a struggle with the right wing fascists who were against the monarchy, led by Phibulsongkran. The reference to the monarchy’s involvement in the political and civil wars in the period 1912 to 1952 is confusing. What political and civil wars took place in 1912-32? Apart from Prince Paribatra’s ill fated attempt at a counter revolution, which didn’t seem to have the blessing of the monarch, what political and civil wars took place in 1932-52 with involvement from the monarchy?
The author seems to concur grudgingly that the monarchy has been a stabilising influence from 1960s to the 1990s, no mean achievement, if true, given the turbulence in neighbouring countries in that period. He then suddenly interjects his final conclusion that the monarchy is obviously at the heart of Thailand’s current political instability without giving any reasons for this view.
NON SATIS. Please do again.
Reconciliation in Thailand?
Srithanonchai #4
“Can “Careful Observer” tell us what he thinks about Khun Nattakorn’s father? Is that true epitomy of paternalist governance also “a shallow, muddled thinker” (recently, he expressed his desire to have a guy like Sarit Thanarat back, because, after all, that was a truly decisive leader!)?”
I agree with Careful Observer that ML Nattakorn’s father is also “a shallow, muddled thinker”. MR Pridyatorn was arguably the worst finance minister in over 20 years and made stupid and damaging mistakes through his refusal to listen to people with more knowledge and experience than himself. Then he resigned in a sulk, leaving others to try to clean up the messes he had created. His performance as governor of the Bank of Thailand and chairman of Exim Bank was more non-descript but is marred by credible allegations of conflicts of interest. His articles in the English language Thai press, including the one about Sarit are close to pure drivel.
Neither father nor son would ever have got the jobs they have had or anywhere to publish their vacuous thoughts, if they were not born to privilege and wealth. If anything, they are ideal motivators for those who would like a bolshevik revolution in Thailand to liquidate the aristocracy and redistribute their wealth. That a poser like Nattakorn can jump on the red shirt bandwagon without being rejected as a fake emphasises that the red shirt movement is led and manipulated by the elite for their own ends and lack a credible leadership of intellectuals with working class backgrounds.
Buddhism and postmodern imaginings
Thanks Sidh S., well, frankly I find Keyes’ piece a bit baffling. Thaksin sought out mediums in much the same way as he attended the occasional ritual at the invitation of monks and laity at Wat Thammakaai- as indeed had other political leaders, military, business persons and civic elites, including royalty, and many continue to do so. The media also tried to accuse Thaksin of overriding the Supreme Patriarch & king in making the appointment of an Acting Supreme Patriarch (Somdet Kiew from Wat Saket, the second in seniority after the Supreme Patriarch at the Supreme Sangha Council). This was done according to seniority and nothing to do with sect/nikai. The current Supreme Patriarch is not capable of functioning and has not been capable for some years due to his health. It was not because, as some made out, of Thaksin favouring Mahanikai (or specifically Wat Thammakaai) monks over Dhammayut monks.
As for the link between Thaksin and King Taksin? This was an ignoble attempt by the opposition to discredit Thaksin after he went to pay respects to the well-known Northeastern mystical monk Luang Puu Kuun. LP Kuun was reputed to have said that that Thaksin was one of the important Thai ancestors in this lifetime who has come here to help the people. The unscrupulous Thai media since tried to make a link in this statement in an attempt at making Thaksin appear guilty of lese majesty- suggesting he wanted to raise himself to the level of a rebel Buddha-King to oppose the legitimacy of the current king; fiction, and Biff should know that. In much the same way as the media made out that Thaksin tried to place himself at the level of royalty at the royal Emerald Buddha temple. Sondhi Lim then went on to defame Thaksin through his media saying that he was mimicking the king himself and should be punished. Then the Office of the Royal Secretariat had to come out and explain that in fact Thaksin had done nothing wrong and that his government had been granted permission to perform this ceremony. Did that get reported? [And Biff, I’d like to ask: how did Thaksin try and subvert the 1997 Constitution? It was the 2006 Coup & khor Mor Chor cronies who subverted the 1997 Constitution].
The crushing of the Red Shirts
Sidh S #102
Amazing. As you pointed out, over 606,000 people have viewed the Thai only version without English subtitles which has been disabled for comments, perhaps because it might overload the system. The English subtitle version unfortunately cut off Thaksin’s appeal to those who had enjoyed those delicious edible benefits from democracy during the years of the Thaksin regime immediately following the comment about not having to join the queue to received 500 baht. However, I agree with you that it is quite significant and mitigates rather against Acharn Somsak’s interpretation. Acharn Somsak’s intricate parsing of Thaksin’s literary accomplishment is one possible interpretation but by no means the only one or necessarily even the correct one. It requires quite a bit of thought and the ability to blank out Thaksin’s body language and obvious annoyance at whoever is providing the commentary into his ear piece to arrive at Acharn Somsak’s conclusion. I agree with you that most of the 606,000 will probably not have given Thaksin the benefit of the doubt, even if the Acharn is right. This along with Thaksin’s “shrillness” and poor performance in his BBC and CNN interviews cannot have helped his case much but it is not over until he either wins or his money runs out.
The crushing of the Red Shirts
Marty #86
“Often I hear the comments like LAND’s and I have to wonder if he has ever spent even one day working on a rice farm or spent a night talking to a group of rice farmers. I would hazard a guess he has not or he would realize that the brightest people in the country are not educated, but they understand immeasurably what’s going on. Something some groups do not want you to know. If thailand ever wants to become a great nation instead of an emerging one they have to develop this people resource not just as labor but as a brain trust as well.”
Aside from the romantic schmaltz of those who feel they know better just because they have talked to villagers, married poor village girls or perhaps even dared to violate the Working of Aliens Act by working on a rice farm themselves, I agree that education is the key to Thailand’s social and economic development. This is not something that Thaksin or other elitists from his political parties or the red shirts have shown any interest in because they know that better education would eventually mean less votes for corrupt, self serving politicians, as much as it would mean less unquestioning acceptance for other elites. Hopefully, it is something that will emerge from the red shirt movement, if they can ever cut loose from Dr Evil’s apron strings.
The crushing of the Red Shirts
Ralph#101, apparently not too much for the 600,000+ Thais who clicked into youtube to watch. Look, I was quite convinced the first time that I saw it until AjarnSomsak’s comments got me to have a closer look – which then gave me second thoughts as expressed in #99. Look, at the end of the day, it’s only two Thai’s interpretation of the VDO clip stated in Thai, aimed at a Thai crowd – there are certainly many more possible interpretations. At the very least I don’t think it will be good enough for lawyers to prosecute!
I can take this further and interpret that the following sentence – right after the 500 baht statement, the pause, the turn of the head, lifting of the left arm, that facial expression etc. – was meant to cover up for the apparent slip ‘did that went out right?’ which I translate as:
“Brothers and sisters that have received benefits from the Democracy that can be eaten during ThaiRakThai years”
Look, I already said that I agree with AjarnSomsak on what the actual message of the ‘script’ intended. This comes down to ‘abysmal acting’ on PMThaksin’s part that the VDO turned out to be such a classic for hundreds of thousands of Thais.
Reconciliation in Thailand?
David Brown#11. Yes, the police should collect evidences and question witness – unfortunately they have not gone far on any cases that I’ve mentioned nor, it is likely, the case at Nang Learng and the SiamGas gas truck cases. On the latter, I only hear that GenChaiyasit, PMThaksin’s cousin and Board Director at SiamGas, is suing DPMSuthep for accusing him that he is behind the gas truck saga:
http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1240840742&grpid=00&catid=01
At the end of day, it may just be that the simple universal fact that the lives of the poor cost less – and the police will likely be preoccupied with TycoonSonthi’s attempt assasination case than any that we have mentioned concerning Red and Yellow foot soldier’s deaths. For PMThaksin, PheuThai and Red Elites, the poor Red crowds were mere sacrificial lambs for their very personal interests – wounded and dead bodies on photographs and VDO to peddle to the local and global media. You can also see that, interestingly, the gas tanks were parked near the urban poor communities – which then precipitated into a very local war of the locals fighting the Reds for their survival and nothing to do with political leanings…
Suwicha Thakor still locked up
Nich
Agreed. The tone of the cases seems to be set at the time bail is requested. No connections > no bail > no foot dragging by prosecutors > intense pressure to plead guilty > no lawyer willing to risk a vigorous defence > no acquittal. Although precedents are not very important in Thailand’s civil law system, there are old precedents of acquittals based on lack of intent in LM cases going back even to the early days of the law under absolute monarchy. Althought the trials are largely held in camera, lack of intent doesn’t seem to have been a viable defence in recent years. This defence might not have helped Suwicha but, if available, could help or have helped others in this predicament.