While it is true that tensions between Thammayut and Mahanikai have decreased, on the other hand in the last ten years of Red/Yellow conflict the Sangha has been also politicized to some degree, an increasing amounts of monks have given support to this or the other side. The row is not just over Dhammakaya’s links to Thaksin and the Red side, but also, for example, the late Luang Dta Maha Bua – a very prominent Thammayut monk – strongly supported the PAD and Sondhi Lim (remember his controversial sermon in 2005). From what i was told, also Buddha Issara is a Thammayut monk.
While i am aware that the support of monks to Red or Yellow may not be exactly linear according to the lines of the main sects, it nevertheless is an avenue worth looking into. Another shift took place after the coup, with the efforts of the junta to control the Sangha, which many monks are not too happy about.
I would like to read more details on the situation in the Sangha written by someone more knowledgeable than me on this subject.
Peter Cohen, your question is important. Yet it is also important not to oversimplify, by saying “so many to be brainwashed” and that Indonesians imitate Arabs and are insecure. (Btw, have you ever lived in or done research on Indonesia like Jeremy Menchik did?). It is many in numbers, yet not many in ratio: As a whole, Indonesian Islam is still better, if not much better, than Islam in Arab countries–though of course it doesn’t mean Indonesia is already ideal and perfect. One thing for you to look in the mirror too: Compare sectarianism in Indonesia with Islamophobia in the West. I hope you will find similarities in the way how it is politically instrumentalized.
The far important question, which will help define Islam in Indonesia, is what is WRONG with Islam in Indonesia. Specifically, who and why allows so many to be brainwashed into believing that Shi’a, Ahmadi, Ismaili Muslims and Bahai’s should be persecuted in Indonesia. Like Malaysia, perhaps some Sunni Muslims (the normal branch of Islam in Indonesia) are unwilling that they are insecure and, like fellow Malays, have to bash Islamic sects, to prove both zealotry and manhood. One thing that typifies Islam, from Morocco to Indonesia, is the inability to Sunni (all schools) and 12ther Shi’a (in Iran and Lebanon) to tolerate each other, and neither sect can tolerate, smaller non-violent Islamic sects. Instead of bashing Ahmadiyya people, Indonesians would do well to learn WHY Ahmadiyyah and Ismaili Muslims, Bahai’s, Hindus, Christians (mostly) are NON-VIOLENT in Indonesia and self-examine (look in the mirror) why you ARE violent. ISIS is not recruiting Ahmadiyya Muslims or Bahai’s or Hindus, and there is a fairly obvious reason for that, that lies in the Quran, Hadith, Sunnah, Sira and Fiqh. Indonesians and Malays are simply not (for the most part) courageous enough to admit they are insecure, afraid of other Muslims, and waste time imitating Arabs, which makes both Indonesian and Malay Muslims look immature, insecure and self-mockeries of what Islam was originally in the Archipelago, a far more tolerant variant of Sufi Islam
There’s a curious statement in this piece: “The growing popularity of Christianity among the population is another possible danger.” What Christianity? There are, of course, especially among Rama V’s descendents, a strong belief in Catholicism but as a cruical factor in Thailand’s addiction to Buddhism, this seems rather odd.
And while there have been long-standing tensions between the rival Thammayut and Mahanikai orders that have declined over the years, “whatever role Buddhism as [a] state religion plays in this feeble charter is quite irrelevant. The document lacks credibility, having only military, royalist lackeys writing it. It is undemocratic…The presence or not of Buddhism as state religion in this new [d]raft constitution, with little or no outside input from the people, makes little difference.”
We beg to differ. The charter will always have been written with the elite at heart but Thailand’s royalty is derived from Hinduism and the deveraja concept of the divine rule kings, which really has no place in Buddhist thinking, although long ago the two were merged into a social panoply of equal respect. One only needs to look back at the bombing of the Erawan Shrine, or “Shrine of Lord Brahma the Great” to realise this.
But to postulate that Thailand is so imbued in its power struggles and dismissive of one of the very eminent institutions that empowers its being is somewhat strange, given that, while striving to uphold a feudal system of prestige, why should eschatology be brought into the shining framework of Buddhism itself?
Just kidding. Yingluck of course is guilty of dereliction of duty in that resulted in a staggering Baht 500 billion plus losses to the Thai treasury.
Had PM Yingluck not been derelict in her duties as Thai PM and Chairman of the Rice Pledge Committee, the losses could have been at least Baht 1,000 billion more, the joke among Thai lawyers and politicos goes. Thus if we take the joke a step further, former PM Yingluck should be awarded a medal instead (of facing possible 10-year jail term/asset confiscation)!
JimT, I’m not sure you are right in suggesting that Thaksin’s money was gained independently of the Thai establishment. I get the impression that he was one of its favourites right up until the moment the old boy gave him the thumbs down. Being able to give anybody the thumbs up or the thumbs down is the essence of imperial power. It still worked with the establishment, but what really devastated the old boy, was that the majority of Thais responded by giving Thaksin the thumbs up again, by implication giving the king and his crawlers the thumbs down, at least with respect to political power. Instead of giving way, as the well-advised William IV did to Lord Melbourne in 1835, the king essentially declared war on the Thai people, a war which he has won, with only a few hundred casualties, for the time being.
Pak Nadir, I think Jeremy’s analysis uses the lens similar to that developed in the social theory movement, i.e. the “political opportunity structure”. The main point of his analysis–this is my take–is that the kind of Islam Nusantara can only be developed in the political and cultural context relatively unique to Nusantara, which is not there in Arab countries. It is the “political structure” of Nusantara that has made the development of Islam Nusantara possible. And because of the differing political structure, Islam Nusantara cannot be copied to other contexts.
I also argue that merely looking at the theological and fiqh dimension (e.g. accomodation of local cultures) while overlooking the cultural and political context of respective countries may fall into essentialist fallacy. On this, you can compare NU with, for example, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and then pose a question: What makes MB gain more international influence (having sort of ‘franchises’ in other Arab and non-Arab countries, including Indonesia) than NU yet MB fails to reach a success in the democratization process like that of NU? Most likely it is because the political structure and cultural context of both Egypt and Indonesia is different.
No less important, what you mean by Arab Islam, as compared to Indonesian Islam, should be clearly defined: You didn’t mean IS represents a kind of Arab Islam, did you?
I agree with Keith’s comment. Jeremy’s article missed the core elements of Islam Nusantara –a local Islam; not a global Islam. What we need to export to Middle East or to Australia is not the form of “Javanese Islam” as the article told us, but its idea that Islam accommodates local culture and values; be it in Middle East, America or Australia. So we dont need to transplant Islam Nusantara to other countries –just what US has attempted with its democracy. Instead, what we should do is to develop a local Islam so we will have Islam Nusantara in Indonesia, Australian Islam, American Islam etc. Indeed, Islam has many different faces.
The message is clear: Arab Islam is not the only version of Islam. In this sense, a global Islam as IS tries to spread is not only wrong but does not represent Islam –that’s what the supporters of Islam Nusantara try to claim.
Jeremy’s article not only missed the main issues of Islam Nusantara, but he also mispotrayed NU and its history and development. Too bad 🙁
One point of criticism of the article – i would like to learn a bit more on the Tammayut – Mahanikai issue and the political positioning of some monks of either sect, but which is rarely mentioned and seems to also be at least part of the present conflict over the position of the supreme patriarch, and how it plays with the military junta’s ongoing attempts to control the Sangha.
Thailand’s “dangerous path” is in fact the Draft Constitution itself! Whatever role Buddhism as state religion plays in this feeble charter is quite irrelevant. The document lacks credibility, having only military, royalist lackeys writing it. It is undemocratic (wants to weaken peoples’ rights and ensure that pro-Thaksin elected governments never regain office again). There has been no proper consultation process…The presence or not of Buddhism as state religion in this new Draft constitution, with little or no outside input from the people, makes little difference.
The meaning of ‘religion’ and it’s etymology does not necessarily point to a God although there are different interpretations. Probably more like ‘worship’ in general or ‘that which bind us together’ (‘religare’ in Latin).
What about the Thai language? Religion is р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓ sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa, used both for Buddhisme р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓р╕Юр╕╕р╕Чр╕Ш sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa phu╠Бt, for Christianity р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓р╕Др╕гр╕кр╕Хр╣М sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa christ and Islam р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓р╕нр╕┤р╕кр╕ер╕▓р╕б sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa islam.
р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╣М sa╠Аat is letter, book, religion, doctrine, practice, faith, treatise, command.
I am Buddhist and I object to my belief system being called a religion.
there is no God in Buddhism, (The defining feature of a religion)
Whilst some will try to correct me by saying “God” is unnecessary. I believe you can be a Roman Catholic Buddhist. I know some Thai’s who are and see NO conflict.
“Thainess” I believe is closely linked to Theravada Buddhism. I believe Buddhism needs a special mention in our constitution – but not as (Dare I say, the western concept of religion).
Everyone loves their “boxes” to place things in. Please do not put Buddhism in your “religion box” it does not belong there.
Which part of the thinking of Islam Nusantara did the mass murderers of 1965 invoke to slaughter PKI & its alleged sympathesisers? The author drifts conveniently between examining Islam Nusantara as an idea and conflating it with the deeds of some NU members in specific epoch without much contextualisation. The implicit assumption seems to be that somehow Islam Nusantara played a role in the 1965-6 mass killing.
One could make very reasonable analysis that exposes the inherent bias and contradictory aspects of Islam Nusantara without resorting to uninformed sensationalism. The statement that it’s not hard to imagine NU taking out the knives again? To slaughter those who they have theological disagreement with? Now that’s some nonesense of the highest order.
Excellent analysis of the current state of religion-state relations in Thailand. It is same as in other Buddhist countries in the region and also others.
There is no exception when it comes to religion-state relations in any part of the world.
A challenge from the fundamentalists to the modern seculars and also religious moderates. All the 3 are modern species.
I would venture to say – by now, malaysia is somewhat worse.. The corruption is now mixed in with Islamic and racial ugly presence.
Recently, the classic folk lore “Journey to the West” movie has its posters modify to not show one of the main character – a man-piggy. I am wondering if the Chinese new Year in 2019 will be suspended as it will be the year of the Pig!! No public holiday, no celebrations allowed etc etc..
You said that “Kyai Haji Said Aqil Sirodj, the general secretary of the central board of Nahdlatul Ulama.” He actually is Chairman of the NU Executive Board.
I have a slight disagreement towards the article. When he said that “ …exporting a partial aspect of Javanese traditionalist Islam without the institutional, familiar, or local structure that supports it is unlikely to have much influence.” He overtly generalized the similarities of culture and local institutions within Indonesia such as the interplay of influence between the Javanese Islam with the outer region such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, or Sulawesi; where, in fact, are fundamentally different.
I am also not very sure whether the benign element of the Islam Nusantara is embedded within the cultural aspect, especially the Javanese culture; hence it is not transferable. I think, to some extent, outer-island Moslems, who are not very familiar and very well expose with Javanese culture, are also benign and tolerant, even more in comparison to some part of Java such as West Java or East Java. I think majority of Moslems in Indonesia (especially outside Java) are used to live in complex and multicultural environment that are continuously changing.
Maybe it is worth exploring whether the credit of success is stemming on the Indonesian government policies or can also because of the shared history that bound the population together.
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Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path
While it is true that tensions between Thammayut and Mahanikai have decreased, on the other hand in the last ten years of Red/Yellow conflict the Sangha has been also politicized to some degree, an increasing amounts of monks have given support to this or the other side. The row is not just over Dhammakaya’s links to Thaksin and the Red side, but also, for example, the late Luang Dta Maha Bua – a very prominent Thammayut monk – strongly supported the PAD and Sondhi Lim (remember his controversial sermon in 2005). From what i was told, also Buddha Issara is a Thammayut monk.
While i am aware that the support of monks to Red or Yellow may not be exactly linear according to the lines of the main sects, it nevertheless is an avenue worth looking into. Another shift took place after the coup, with the efforts of the junta to control the Sangha, which many monks are not too happy about.
I would like to read more details on the situation in the Sangha written by someone more knowledgeable than me on this subject.
An escapist view of extremism
Peter Cohen, your question is important. Yet it is also important not to oversimplify, by saying “so many to be brainwashed” and that Indonesians imitate Arabs and are insecure. (Btw, have you ever lived in or done research on Indonesia like Jeremy Menchik did?). It is many in numbers, yet not many in ratio: As a whole, Indonesian Islam is still better, if not much better, than Islam in Arab countries–though of course it doesn’t mean Indonesia is already ideal and perfect. One thing for you to look in the mirror too: Compare sectarianism in Indonesia with Islamophobia in the West. I hope you will find similarities in the way how it is politically instrumentalized.
An escapist view of extremism
The far important question, which will help define Islam in Indonesia, is what is WRONG with Islam in Indonesia. Specifically, who and why allows so many to be brainwashed into believing that Shi’a, Ahmadi, Ismaili Muslims and Bahai’s should be persecuted in Indonesia. Like Malaysia, perhaps some Sunni Muslims (the normal branch of Islam in Indonesia) are unwilling that they are insecure and, like fellow Malays, have to bash Islamic sects, to prove both zealotry and manhood. One thing that typifies Islam, from Morocco to Indonesia, is the inability to Sunni (all schools) and 12ther Shi’a (in Iran and Lebanon) to tolerate each other, and neither sect can tolerate, smaller non-violent Islamic sects. Instead of bashing Ahmadiyya people, Indonesians would do well to learn WHY Ahmadiyyah and Ismaili Muslims, Bahai’s, Hindus, Christians (mostly) are NON-VIOLENT in Indonesia and self-examine (look in the mirror) why you ARE violent. ISIS is not recruiting Ahmadiyya Muslims or Bahai’s or Hindus, and there is a fairly obvious reason for that, that lies in the Quran, Hadith, Sunnah, Sira and Fiqh. Indonesians and Malays are simply not (for the most part) courageous enough to admit they are insecure, afraid of other Muslims, and waste time imitating Arabs, which makes both Indonesian and Malay Muslims look immature, insecure and self-mockeries of what Islam was originally in the Archipelago, a far more tolerant variant of Sufi Islam
Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path
There’s a curious statement in this piece: “The growing popularity of Christianity among the population is another possible danger.” What Christianity? There are, of course, especially among Rama V’s descendents, a strong belief in Catholicism but as a cruical factor in Thailand’s addiction to Buddhism, this seems rather odd.
And while there have been long-standing tensions between the rival Thammayut and Mahanikai orders that have declined over the years, “whatever role Buddhism as [a] state religion plays in this feeble charter is quite irrelevant. The document lacks credibility, having only military, royalist lackeys writing it. It is undemocratic…The presence or not of Buddhism as state religion in this new [d]raft constitution, with little or no outside input from the people, makes little difference.”
We beg to differ. The charter will always have been written with the elite at heart but Thailand’s royalty is derived from Hinduism and the deveraja concept of the divine rule kings, which really has no place in Buddhist thinking, although long ago the two were merged into a social panoply of equal respect. One only needs to look back at the bombing of the Erawan Shrine, or “Shrine of Lord Brahma the Great” to realise this.
But to postulate that Thailand is so imbued in its power struggles and dismissive of one of the very eminent institutions that empowers its being is somewhat strange, given that, while striving to uphold a feudal system of prestige, why should eschatology be brought into the shining framework of Buddhism itself?
Impeaching Yingluck Shinawatra
Will General Prayuth’s ‘inquisition’ condemn Thailand’s Joan-of-Arc to the gallows?
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/827728/rice-pledging-hearing-begins
Just kidding. Yingluck of course is guilty of dereliction of duty in that resulted in a staggering Baht 500 billion plus losses to the Thai treasury.
Had PM Yingluck not been derelict in her duties as Thai PM and Chairman of the Rice Pledge Committee, the losses could have been at least Baht 1,000 billion more, the joke among Thai lawyers and politicos goes. Thus if we take the joke a step further, former PM Yingluck should be awarded a medal instead (of facing possible 10-year jail term/asset confiscation)!
A state of madness
The “legs” on this debate are quite remarkable. How I wish we could have a debate like this in Thailand.
Most contributors would have either been imprisoned or disappeared by now… How terribly sad!
Mythai
Review of Unequal Thailand
JimT, I’m not sure you are right in suggesting that Thaksin’s money was gained independently of the Thai establishment. I get the impression that he was one of its favourites right up until the moment the old boy gave him the thumbs down. Being able to give anybody the thumbs up or the thumbs down is the essence of imperial power. It still worked with the establishment, but what really devastated the old boy, was that the majority of Thais responded by giving Thaksin the thumbs up again, by implication giving the king and his crawlers the thumbs down, at least with respect to political power. Instead of giving way, as the well-advised William IV did to Lord Melbourne in 1835, the king essentially declared war on the Thai people, a war which he has won, with only a few hundred casualties, for the time being.
An escapist view of extremism
Pak Nadir, I think Jeremy’s analysis uses the lens similar to that developed in the social theory movement, i.e. the “political opportunity structure”. The main point of his analysis–this is my take–is that the kind of Islam Nusantara can only be developed in the political and cultural context relatively unique to Nusantara, which is not there in Arab countries. It is the “political structure” of Nusantara that has made the development of Islam Nusantara possible. And because of the differing political structure, Islam Nusantara cannot be copied to other contexts.
I also argue that merely looking at the theological and fiqh dimension (e.g. accomodation of local cultures) while overlooking the cultural and political context of respective countries may fall into essentialist fallacy. On this, you can compare NU with, for example, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and then pose a question: What makes MB gain more international influence (having sort of ‘franchises’ in other Arab and non-Arab countries, including Indonesia) than NU yet MB fails to reach a success in the democratization process like that of NU? Most likely it is because the political structure and cultural context of both Egypt and Indonesia is different.
No less important, what you mean by Arab Islam, as compared to Indonesian Islam, should be clearly defined: You didn’t mean IS represents a kind of Arab Islam, did you?
An escapist view of extremism
I agree with Keith’s comment. Jeremy’s article missed the core elements of Islam Nusantara –a local Islam; not a global Islam. What we need to export to Middle East or to Australia is not the form of “Javanese Islam” as the article told us, but its idea that Islam accommodates local culture and values; be it in Middle East, America or Australia. So we dont need to transplant Islam Nusantara to other countries –just what US has attempted with its democracy. Instead, what we should do is to develop a local Islam so we will have Islam Nusantara in Indonesia, Australian Islam, American Islam etc. Indeed, Islam has many different faces.
The message is clear: Arab Islam is not the only version of Islam. In this sense, a global Islam as IS tries to spread is not only wrong but does not represent Islam –that’s what the supporters of Islam Nusantara try to claim.
Jeremy’s article not only missed the main issues of Islam Nusantara, but he also mispotrayed NU and its history and development. Too bad 🙁
Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path
One point of criticism of the article – i would like to learn a bit more on the Tammayut – Mahanikai issue and the political positioning of some monks of either sect, but which is rarely mentioned and seems to also be at least part of the present conflict over the position of the supreme patriarch, and how it plays with the military junta’s ongoing attempts to control the Sangha.
Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path
Thailand’s “dangerous path” is in fact the Draft Constitution itself! Whatever role Buddhism as state religion plays in this feeble charter is quite irrelevant. The document lacks credibility, having only military, royalist lackeys writing it. It is undemocratic (wants to weaken peoples’ rights and ensure that pro-Thaksin elected governments never regain office again). There has been no proper consultation process…The presence or not of Buddhism as state religion in this new Draft constitution, with little or no outside input from the people, makes little difference.
Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path
The meaning of ‘religion’ and it’s etymology does not necessarily point to a God although there are different interpretations. Probably more like ‘worship’ in general or ‘that which bind us together’ (‘religare’ in Latin).
What about the Thai language? Religion is р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓ sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa, used both for Buddhisme р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓р╕Юр╕╕р╕Чр╕Ш sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa phu╠Бt, for Christianity р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓р╕Др╕гр╕кр╕Хр╣М sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa christ and Islam р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓р╕нр╕┤р╕кр╕ер╕▓р╕б sa╠Аatsa╠Аna╠Мa islam.
р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╣М sa╠Аat is letter, book, religion, doctrine, practice, faith, treatise, command.
Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path
I am Buddhist and I object to my belief system being called a religion.
there is no God in Buddhism, (The defining feature of a religion)
Whilst some will try to correct me by saying “God” is unnecessary. I believe you can be a Roman Catholic Buddhist. I know some Thai’s who are and see NO conflict.
“Thainess” I believe is closely linked to Theravada Buddhism. I believe Buddhism needs a special mention in our constitution – but not as (Dare I say, the western concept of religion).
Everyone loves their “boxes” to place things in. Please do not put Buddhism in your “religion box” it does not belong there.
Daesh, Islam Nusantara and shades of grey
Which part of the thinking of Islam Nusantara did the mass murderers of 1965 invoke to slaughter PKI & its alleged sympathesisers? The author drifts conveniently between examining Islam Nusantara as an idea and conflating it with the deeds of some NU members in specific epoch without much contextualisation. The implicit assumption seems to be that somehow Islam Nusantara played a role in the 1965-6 mass killing.
One could make very reasonable analysis that exposes the inherent bias and contradictory aspects of Islam Nusantara without resorting to uninformed sensationalism. The statement that it’s not hard to imagine NU taking out the knives again? To slaughter those who they have theological disagreement with? Now that’s some nonesense of the highest order.
Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path
Excellent analysis of the current state of religion-state relations in Thailand. It is same as in other Buddhist countries in the region and also others.
There is no exception when it comes to religion-state relations in any part of the world.
A challenge from the fundamentalists to the modern seculars and also religious moderates. All the 3 are modern species.
Daesh, Islam Nusantara and shades of grey
Mr. Loveard, this was a very informative article. Thank you for that.
Review of Palace, Political Party and Power
I would venture to say – by now, malaysia is somewhat worse.. The corruption is now mixed in with Islamic and racial ugly presence.
Recently, the classic folk lore “Journey to the West” movie has its posters modify to not show one of the main character – a man-piggy. I am wondering if the Chinese new Year in 2019 will be suspended as it will be the year of the Pig!! No public holiday, no celebrations allowed etc etc..
Daesh, Islam Nusantara and shades of grey
You said that “Kyai Haji Said Aqil Sirodj, the general secretary of the central board of Nahdlatul Ulama.” He actually is Chairman of the NU Executive Board.
An escapist view of extremism
The argument of Islam Nusantara is not that Indonesian culture can be exported, but that Islam is justifiably influence by culture wherever it exists.
An escapist view of extremism
I have a slight disagreement towards the article. When he said that “ …exporting a partial aspect of Javanese traditionalist Islam without the institutional, familiar, or local structure that supports it is unlikely to have much influence.” He overtly generalized the similarities of culture and local institutions within Indonesia such as the interplay of influence between the Javanese Islam with the outer region such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, or Sulawesi; where, in fact, are fundamentally different.
I am also not very sure whether the benign element of the Islam Nusantara is embedded within the cultural aspect, especially the Javanese culture; hence it is not transferable. I think, to some extent, outer-island Moslems, who are not very familiar and very well expose with Javanese culture, are also benign and tolerant, even more in comparison to some part of Java such as West Java or East Java. I think majority of Moslems in Indonesia (especially outside Java) are used to live in complex and multicultural environment that are continuously changing.
Maybe it is worth exploring whether the credit of success is stemming on the Indonesian government policies or can also because of the shared history that bound the population together.