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One of Malaysia’s top economist, Dr. Shankaran Nambiar discusses fiscal reforms in Malaysia, over at EAF:

For a long time, Malaysian policymakers have tip-toed around the question of budget discipline. But the need for fiscal consolidation is pressing, and although the government has recently announced changes that will help reduce the deficit, it needs to make sure that these reforms don’t hit the middle class unfairly.

Dr. Jory is overoptimistic when he says “To put it in old Marxist terms, the royalists still have an ideological hegemony, but real power is with the Thaksin camp…” Has he forgotten another Marxist maxim: “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun?” Gun can mean gun on a tank turret or mob intimidation that paralyzes opponents, and half the city for good measure. These weapons of destruction of the masses are even more formidable when one side decides to use all means possible while the other fights with bare hands and reason.

According to Dr. Jory, the reds have junior and middle-ranking officers in the military as well as rank-and-file soldiers; the blues/yellows have the military leadership. In the Thai military, where seniority is everything, there’s no way the middle-ranking officers are going to countermand their commanders, unless the field commanders decide to get together to stage a coup; impossible since blue officers were jockeyed into key positions after the 2006 coup.

Jory says the reds have the police. But the police are no match for the military, as clearly seen by the events of February 17, when the government attempted to reclaim five areas occupied by Suthep’s mob, in which two police officers were killed. The riot police were unarmed except for rubber bullets, batons and shields; there was an armed police unit on standby to protect the riot police should things get out of hand, but they were not used on that day. Suthep pulled out his guards, leaving only chanting, praying women and old men, and making the police look like bullyboys; but it is believed he had professional gunmen, military or ex-military types, surreptitiously assisting him; a Youtube clip shows a hand grenade lobbed at the police, exploding just as it is being kicked away, and wounding dozens. The government was forced to call off the operation or risk heavier casualties.

Jory may also be underestimating the effectiveness of the courts and the “independent organizations” in hamstringing the caretaker government, which could inevitably result in their removal, by foul means or fair. The very next day the courts declared that Suthep’s mobs were in their rights to demonstrate “peacefully” and issued a dozen strictures against the government in dealing with mob, in practice emasculating it. Emboldened, Suthep declared he would henceforth hound Yingluck everywhere she goes and, for good measure, target the Shinawatra family businesses. The next day they surrounded the Shinawatra III Tower, rattling the stock market. On February 27 Yingluck is to appear before another court to be read criminal charges filed against her in her role in the rice pledging scheme. Aphisit faces similar accusations for his government’s failed rice policy, but five years on the courts somehow haven’t found time to look into his case. And, perhaps most insidious, the Election Commission is dragging its feet in finalizing the elections; it appears that by not completing the election process within the specified time, the inevitable lack of a quorum to open parliament will lead to Yingluck’s removal as premier and the appointment of a “neutral” or royally-appointed premier. So whichever way you look at it, the end game is foregone. But I hope I’m wrong.

And why, if I may ask, can’t 10,000 farmers rally spontaneously? Aren’t they allowed to do so under the current regime? They have been rallying locally for weeks, only stopping when the physical threats from red thugs became to serious.

Nich and Andrew, if you can cough up a few bucks from the money that the “man from Dubai” has been sending you, I’m sure Michael Yon will write an article for you.

Or do you want to hide behind the idea of free comment and expression? And suppress Michael’s insights?

QUOTE: By now, the whole outside world (outside of Thailand) has worked out that there are two sets of “law” in Thailand. One for the Democrats and one for everyone else.UNQUOTE

😉 Why bother with the boneheads in North Korea, when there is already a fully-fledged kleptocratic elite at home to suck up to?

Let’s see. You are asking me to believe that this regime is in some way better than the Democrats. 555,55. Thaksin and his latest incarnation of Palang Tham represent nothing new in local politics. They learned all of their tricks from working with all the other previous crappy coalition governments in this country. Most MPs are just a bunch of flies who have learned how to swarm around the current smelliest and most profitable money-midden. However, I think we are all capable of admitting here that the Democrats are no longer any great shakes at either lining their own pockets or at spinning out the myth that they are good at lining other people’s. A rather more proactive set of parasites has usurped the rather archaic Democrat Party in milking the exchequer.

There is only one set of laws in Thailand, but NO one with any power takes a blind bit of notice of it. It’s always negotiable for rich people and their pet politicians & policemen. Indeed, you could spend years carefully and considerately rewriting the constitution for the umpteenth time and they would still piss all over it in the very next government. Reform, regardless of which party-party initiates it, is not going to create any improvement in the crappy system of government here.

All the more reason NOT to support or act as an apologist for either succession faction.

Not really gramscian, but related to hegemony: Because foreign western media provide only biased information, I went to Bangkok to see for myself. My visits were limited to Asoke and Siam. In the local media and several comments it had been written that the educated Bangkok middle class is the main supporter of the protests. If those I saw at the spots during the day time and in the evening are the educated Bangkok middle class, the educational system of Thailand certainly has very serious problems. The Thai used on the stage and when I spoke with some members of the middle class, was quite distinct from what I learned as “polite” middle class Thai.
Definitely the strong nationalist orientation of the middle class was visible with the many flags, the “tri-colore” bands, gloves etc. that were used to cover the bodies and keep the hair together. The strong believe in Buddhism was shown by the men in numerous amulets around their necks. However, in Europe we would describe those middle class people rather as hooligans, thugs or something like that. Is this the new dress-code of the Bangkok middle class? I do appreciate this change to informality, as I found the middle class dress-code quite formal.
I was strongly impressed by the hardship the middle class is willing to take, like living in a very noisy encironment, sleeping in small tents, having only very limited hygienic facilities etc. I interpret this that they want to show how “sufficiency economy” can become reality.
Probably the description as “thugs” or rough criminals fits most of those I encountered to some degree. The vendors at the stalls and those at the shops told me that “protection money”, or donations are asked for. The news presented the case that a hotel manager was asked to pay 120.000 (plus if I remember right 4.200) Baht to some visitors lead by a monk. Again some surprise for me. My travel guide explained that monks are living a life of meditation and wisdom. They are not even allowed to touch money! Thus, I did not expect them to be involved in extortion rackets. But, this closeness between at least this monk and the hooligans might explain the prominence of the Buddhist amulets among them. It was explained to me that this extortion was justified, as the hotel was owned by Thaksin. I was slightly worried. May be tomorrow such a justification may be that the property is owned by a foreigner or so. This does not really assure investment.
I went again to the places at about 22:00. Although it was Friday, not many people were around. I was asked to show some kind of ID. I was surprise and asked whether the person is a policeman. He did not look like it, but you never know. He was not, but assumed that he has the same authority as policemen have. May be this kind of blurredness between police as state organ and hooligan explains that public places can be occupied and regular persons be assaulted. However, I found it very polite when I read at their banners that they asked for understanding and excuse for the in-convenience caused by paralysing Bangkok.
Usually it can be assumed that the police and military have the responsible to protect the state administration, public spaces and private property (f.e. against extortion). I was surprised that hardly any attempt has been made. Of course, I find it highly appropriate that the state tries to avoid escalation, but does this allow that a city of a few million can be terrorized by a few gangsters? Somebody explained to me that they are afraid of the military, and that military and police are on different sides. Aren’t both supposed to fulfil their functions as state organs to protect the state and provide security for the people?

An article in a newspaper provide some answers. They reported that the courts had decided that it is not allowed to push those occupying the crossroads and the state buildings (the thugs and hooligans) from their places. Obviously, the legal system in Thailand does not have any laws protecting property (private as well as public), public peace, the working of the state, and personal security. Naively I though f.e. traffic law would prohibit the occupation of roads for an extended time. I remembered that a few years ago, the occupation of the airports was as well regarded as protected under the constitution as freedom to express once opinion. Obviously, this article of the constitution is held in very high esteem and is even ranked higher than international law. (Because I am not well versed in legal issues, I am not sure, whether this might imply that the airports in Thailand will loose their IATA certification). At least so far nobody has been tried for it as far as I know. Today I read that farmers are heading to the airport again. They probably learned the lesson of how the freedom of expression can be applied.
I read and heard that all Thai highly respect and love their king, and that the king is the head of the state. As such, the state organs are in a special relationship to the king, and, as a consequence, they should be respected as well. I interpret this that one shows respect to the king as head of state by respecting his executive organs, or vice versa by respecting the state organs one shows respect to the king. Is the occupation of state organs and making their work impossible such a show of respect?

When I asked some people why they were at Asoke and Siam, they explained to me that Thaksin is very bad and corrupt. In some older articles I had read that corruption was or perhaps still is quite wide spread in Thailand. There was a funny saying about the government headed by Chatchai as “buffet-government”. Coruption was cited as reason for the coup by Suchinda. Neverthless his government was called “fast food” and one former prime minister was not allowed entry into the US. Thus, is corruption specific and limited to Thaksin? And, if he is such a bad person, and much of the arguments indicated that he in fact is, why were these not used as political arguments to convince people? When I spoke with several other persons, they were not very fond of the “paralysing Bangkok” action, even though they were certainly no friends of Thaksin.
Perhaps someone might explain some of these issues to a farang who faces a difficulties to understand Thailand.

@James.P
a very reasonable response. In the event that you are not eligible to be P.M. Perhaps Khun Suthep “The Farmers Friend”, brown skinned son of the southern soil will step forward and accept the tiara/mace or whatever they’re doling out these days. He seems to have touched a raw nerve with the rice pledging and I think some behind the scenes agrarian handouts. Not too patrician and not afraid to get his hands dirty…. A man who literally screams “Unity!!” watch this space. We may yet all be surprised….
After all, this is Thailand, To paraphrase Jeff Wayne or H.G.Wells- “Who would have believed, in the last years of the twentieth century” to see Abhisit and Newin holding hands or Samak as P.M?

and whilst I’m on a roll:

“No-one could have dreamed that we were being scrutinized, as someone with a microscope studies creatures that swarm and multiply in a drop of water. …and yet, across the gulf of space, minds immeasurably superior to ours regarded this earth with envious eyes; and slowly, and surely, they drew their plans against us.”
🙂

It should be obvious that Surapong was emphasizing the five permanent security council members: US, Russia, China, France and Britain.

While I appreciate and agree with many points in Patrick’s comment, let me offer a different perspective.

Patrick argues that the sufficiency economy discourse is “not particularly Buddhist at all” and in fact “owed more to Socialism than Buddhism”. I am not fully convinced, and believe the situation is more ambiguous than that. It seems to me there is a tradition of interpreting sufficiency economy in Thailand which highlights how such a lifestyle approximates the admittedly idealized vision of renunciatory asceticism and modest, minimal material livelihood exemplified by the normative monastic career. From this interpretive perspective, therefore, sufficiency economy can claim to be grounded in “indigenous Buddhist tradition”.

Interestingly, this is a reading of the Thai Buddhist past, present and future which is quite resonant with the Westernized Thai elites that Patrick speaks of. For this reading of Buddhism resonates with other ideological and historiographic interpretations prevalent within a modernist Buddhist sensibility that emerged as a global phenomenon in the intellectual encounter of Buddhism and the West in the 19th century, both in Siam and elsewhere in Asia. Modernist Buddhism frequently seeks to hold up the normative ideal of the monastic life and the institution of the Sangha as a virtuous and socially appropriate model applicable to the laity. Thus, renunciatory asceticism, meditation, the pursuit of liberation from samsara and a range of other ‘traditionally’ monastic vocational orientations (such as modest material livelihood) are seen as worth emulating by the laity in particular, if not all social actors in general. The monastic, renunciatory ideal is thus seen as having general social value and exemplifies how, in the modernist’s mind, the recovery of an ancient Buddhist ideal renders Buddhism socially relevant and socially engaged in the modern world. And that in fact this social relevance is an indication of the vitality of Eastern wisdom against Western material decadence and excess, and the destruction it brings in its wake. Such a vision is, in fact, often seen as a direct rebuke of a Western capitalism which in a very anti-Buddhist fashion valorizes greed, egotism and material accumulation. In all of this, I think one can hear the echoes of Thai discourses about sufficiency economy.

This modernist rethinking and reinvention of the Buddhist imaginary has taken root in Thailand in the modern age. It is now “indigenous” if not “traditional”. To what degree and with what salience is an unclear empirical question. One obviously sees it in religious movements like Santi Asoke, but also elsewhere across the religious landscape. And it certainly resonates with how some Westernized Thai elites (in part, but not solely) have come to envision their “indigenous Buddhism” and its failed or thwarted promise in responding to modern woes and crises.

If accurate, this raises questions about how Patrick framed the whole debate over “Khon dii” between two traditions of moral reflection, one Buddhist and traditional and one Socialist and modern. It seems to me that part of the problem lies in imagining that there is a Buddhist tradition in the singular, in fact. That was certainly not the case in pre-modern Siamese and affiliated kingdoms. Nor is it the case in the colonial and post-colonial eras. “Buddhism” after all is a vast, complex and contradictory enterprise capable of containing many moral visions and political imaginaries. And that diversity expanded in the colonial era when, I would argue, there emerged historically new Buddhist moral visions and political projects rooted in new readings of the religious past and present. “Modernist Buddhism” was one of those, but there were others as well, such as the project of “Establishment Buddhism” grounded in a nationalist project of civilizational superiority and the reformation of backwards folk religiosity.

A final thought: there are also moral-cum-political imaginaries and social projects in Thailand that are rooted in non-religious/non-Buddhist sources of ethical reasoning and judgment as well. And these also have pre-modern or “traditional” foundations as well, although also inevitably re-interpreted in the modern age as well. From this perspective then, Buddhism was not the only or even always the most dominant resource for moral reasoning within the pre-modern Siamese world, in my opinion. And that certainly is not the case today either. Thus, there are multiple moral imaginaries within Thai Buddhism and outside it as well. Therefore, seeing the debate as between a religious and a non-religious sensibility, or between only two moral cultures, seems to my eyes as unduly restrictive.

I wonder why Michael Yon isn’t posting on New Mandala?