actually the comment was made that Thaksin’s (tlecommunications) shares gained less in value than did those investing in banks in this period… you might like to check the wealth increases of other even more wealthy investors on the SET for this period
Bialao – I’ve been saying it could develop into an ethno-regional civil war, resulting in Isaarn and Lanna seceding, for well over five years now. New Mandala – its immense credit – was just about the ONLY place where this otherwise ignored possibility which I raised, began to be discussed. NM was way ahead of eg. The Economist, which now openly discusses it.
Vichai:
I apologize for lecturing you.
I have let my irritation with the yellow half of my family- your comments unfortunately echoed their rants verbatim – seep through, to you. That is wrong, and I am sorry.
Thank you for pointing this out. I shall be more mindful of my comments online after family gatherings.
I also hope, for all my posts here, I have never relegate another person of dissenting view, to less than human.
He did not apologize for imaginary misdeeds, he was explaining the presence of the police in BLACK UNIFORMS, and that the officers that damaged a vehicle were chasing a protester who had shot at them, and was hiding in cars. You should try speaking facts once in a while.
Grant – the “more difficult questions” include, the possible – indeed increasingly likely, break-up of the country. Nobody can go back to Bangkok – and presumably Andrew wants to – if they mention this. I’ve given up on Bangkok. If I go back to “Thailand”, it will be through the liberated areas.
Lanna has already revolted once, I have read some articles, and cannot remember the sources, but it was sometime around the turn of the century into the 20th, and before the north was “annexed by the Thai king, and the people made into Thai citizens, and the Royal family of Chiang Mai was not allowed to continue calling themselves with royal titles
Grant Evans- While there are significant numbers of people ‘fed up’ with the current government, the numbers are nowhere near as great as the opposition suggests, and when calculated as a percentage of the total electorate are form at best 1-2%. The opposition influences/controls a lot of entities that mold perceptions of the success/failure of the current government. An obvious example is the media, which often offers a totally distorted picture of what is going on. In the English language press both the Nation and Post have dropped any pretense of neutrality and will run with the most ridiculous news stories and editorials. Actually, most of their news stories should really run in the opinion section. For example, they are really pushing the ‘men in black on the rooftop’ theory that they are the ones responsible for the death of the policeman, even though it has been clearly established that he could not have been shot from that building due to the fact that the trajectory any bullet would have had to take would have been blocked by other buildings. You won’t see that in the press however. Remember, these same people claim, to this day, that the military were not responsible for a single death when 90+ people were mowed down in Bangkok. The Thai language press is often even worse, with few exception. Another advantage the opposition has is that being from the elite means that they have many of their people in key positions. Imagine the governor/mayor of a large metropolitan area who not only aids in the shutdown of his city, but has nary a bad word to say about it. The current protests are doing immense current and long-term damage to the Thai economy in almost every sector now. Hopefully cooler heads in the business community will lean on Suthep to pack it in. Having said that, the backers of this movement undoubtedly have immense fortunes in overseas banks, second passports, and foreign homes so they are probably more than willing to see it all cave in rather than concede any ground, so I wouldn’t count on this situation being resolved in a sensible manner.
Had Andrew Walker focussed on ‘Isaan’ then the growth would have been even higher, underlining the benefits that Thaksin’s supporters have gained.
But none of this helps explain why so many people, mainly in Bangkok but elsewhere too, are fed up with the government. And here I am talking about people who are not Democrats but who feel disenfranchised.
I must say that I have found most of the commentary on the current crisis in Thailand (and it looks very serious this time) incredibly weak. Chris Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit wrote a good short piece on the weakness of the party system in Thailand, but that’s about it.
I’m sick of reading cliches about the Bangkok ‘middle class’. It is worthwhile asking seriously why many people are following a crook like Suthep.
Walker’s continued apologetics for Thaksin don’t get us very far. Would he please turn his attention and analytic skills to more difficult questions.
Jaidee – am not sure why Nomi chose to lecture me about the Democrat Party. I could NOT vote against the Democrat Party (which I presume was Nomi’s intention) because as as usual this party, dubbed aptly by Andrew Walker as ‘The-Democrat-Party-that-could-not-win-elections’, had withdrawn (again!, is this the third time these undemocratically-minded-Democrats to scorn the elections?). Nomi merely wasted his or her bad breath with his/her long-winded story about the Democrat Party that had left a very deep impression on me. I repeat: I will never ever vote for the Democrat Party ever, cross my un-Red heart.
As for the dogs, servants, goats and yaps yaps …. I must have been listening much too much to all those Red Shirt rallies and Peau Thai Party members parliamentary oration. As you could guess, I possess such soft mind I get easily persuaded to mimic and ape what I watch on youtube, political videoclips and Red Shirts broadcasts.
btw Jaidee … any suggestions how I could improve my terrible lisp and diction?
I do not doubt that there are conversations taking place of some sort, nor that such conversations are restricted to the elite
(a comment I wouldn’t make in any case).
However, I do not think such conversations
are surmounting UMNO’s repeated use of Malay nationalism and religion to cleave society
(which I think there is unanimity on, except
among UMNO). As you well know I am hardly an UMNO supporter, nor am I a fan of much of the opposition, all of which comprise elite groups, by the way. I think, Greg, you do
however underestimate UMNO’s resilience under pressure, when it is often strongest. I know Meredith and Bridget (though it has been a while since I attended an AAS meeting in the US, and they spend little time in the US nowadays anyway). I think, frankly, your last statement is the more accurate reflection of reality. And I think you put it well; there is indeed a long way to go before the conversation becomes genuine and widespread.
I take your meaning of genuine to reflect relevance, rather than literally “genuine,” as I think neither of us questions the sincerity of these conversations, though we may differ on their impact on UMNO, and the degree to which national leadership can some day emanate from such non-elitist groups.
Academic analysis, as I mentioned before, is elitist in itself, as it is not directed towards a kampung audience, in large measure (unlike NGO activities which can actually have a local impact at the village level, though I expect no Prime Minister in Malaysia anytime soon to have NGO membership on his or her curriculum vitae). Yes, conversations are taking place, but I see no current evidence, post-Reformasi (of which there has been some backtracking), that these conversations worry UMNO much (would that they did), nor any signs of leadership potential among those outside the elite groups, having such conversations. There remains two large gaps: One between academic-based social analysis and actual living conditions of average Malaysians; and the gap between those in power and the social discourse among those who have far less power. I do not anticipate that power balance to shift much away from UMNO in favour of non-elites in the near future, short of a sustained national-level people’s revolution that permanently changes the hierarchical political and social structures in Malaysia. I don’t think Malaysians now are game for such a revolution, which is far more harder to organize systematically, without it getting out of control, than localized protests. The CPM tried such a gambit for quite a long time, and did not succeed in the end.
Such a thing did happen nearby (a people’s movement) leading to the collapse of Suharto and Golkar, in Indonesia, and quite shortly thereafter (in a much larger nation than Malaysia), Indonesia returned to its status-quo level of national and social stasis. Dictatorship is gone in Jakarta, but then so
is a strong Rupiah, food security, lowered
infant mortality, high rice production, and actual (not grandiose) nationwide public health measures, which, whatever you may think of him (and I have some sense from New Mandala commentary), Lee Kuan Yew fully predicted would happen if Suharto fell. I do not predict a Malaysian collapse if UMNO fell, I just don’t think they are going to lose Putrajaya for quite some time, and will fight for control, no doubt, until the ‘last Malay standing.’
Your points are valid but it may not be capturing what has been happening since Reformasi (1997/98).
(1) Recent works of Meredith Weiss (on student activism), Bridget Welsh (on social networks), Gaik Cheng Khoo (also on social networks), etc. and my interaction with civil society members do suggest that this conversation is taking place.
Many social movements today are not led by the ruling elite/s on either side of the divide. The New Year day demonstrations were led by students.
(2) That UMNO is using religion as a wedge to the hilt signals its concern that these cleavages (ethnicity, social class, geographical locations, demography) is slowly being surmounted.
I do admit however, that Malaysia has a long way to go before this conversation becomes genuine and widespread.
“crown princess” . . . . where does this utter nonsense keep coming from? the word “crown” appears nowhere here: р╕кр╕бр╣Ар╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╣Ар╕Чр╕Юр╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕кр╕╕р╕Фр╕▓ р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Яр╣Йр╕▓р╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕Ир╕▒р╕Бр╕гр╕╡р╕кр╕┤р╕гр╕┤р╕Щр╕Шр╕г р╕гр╕▒р╕Рр╕кр╕╡р╕бр╕▓р╕Др╕╕р╕Ур╕▓р╕Бр╕гр╕Ыр╕┤р╕вр╕Кр╕▓р╕Хр╕┤ р╕кр╕вр╕▓р╕бр╕Ър╕гр╕бр╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕Бр╕╕р╕бр╕▓р╕гр╕╡
The evidence presented only suggests that Thaksinomics didn’t sink Thailand over the last decade, not that the country’s economic performance resulted from his policies. And no hint is given as to why we should regard the policies as sustainable under different global dynamics. The talk is that public debt/GDP is going to hit 60% fairly soon, with private debt already way up. This would suggest that no matter the outcome of the current political impasse, whoever is in charge is going to be stuck trying to deal with the economics and politics of the New Normal.
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How bad is Thaksinomics?
actually the comment was made that Thaksin’s (tlecommunications) shares gained less in value than did those investing in banks in this period… you might like to check the wealth increases of other even more wealthy investors on the SET for this period
How bad is Thaksinomics?
Very interesting perspective.
Thank you very much for the numbers.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
For a fairer picture, I would appreciate if anyone please fill in the blanks:
T and wife:
2001 – 15.1 bn
2006 – ?
T and family:
2001 – ?
2006 – 76 bn
Thank you.
– Just a frivolous curiousity, that after accounting for stock price rises and various business ROI, how much is the questionable portion worth.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
Bialao – I’ve been saying it could develop into an ethno-regional civil war, resulting in Isaarn and Lanna seceding, for well over five years now. New Mandala – its immense credit – was just about the ONLY place where this otherwise ignored possibility which I raised, began to be discussed. NM was way ahead of eg. The Economist, which now openly discusses it.
Another big weekend for Thailand
Vichai:
I apologize for lecturing you.
I have let my irritation with the yellow half of my family- your comments unfortunately echoed their rants verbatim – seep through, to you. That is wrong, and I am sorry.
Thank you for pointing this out. I shall be more mindful of my comments online after family gatherings.
I also hope, for all my posts here, I have never relegate another person of dissenting view, to less than human.
Storming the DSI building
He did not apologize for imaginary misdeeds, he was explaining the presence of the police in BLACK UNIFORMS, and that the officers that damaged a vehicle were chasing a protester who had shot at them, and was hiding in cars. You should try speaking facts once in a while.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
Grant – the “more difficult questions” include, the possible – indeed increasingly likely, break-up of the country. Nobody can go back to Bangkok – and presumably Andrew wants to – if they mention this. I’ve given up on Bangkok. If I go back to “Thailand”, it will be through the liberated areas.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
And most of that increase came from his telecom business, not from skimming the budget, plus his sale of assets in 2006.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
Lanna has already revolted once, I have read some articles, and cannot remember the sources, but it was sometime around the turn of the century into the 20th, and before the north was “annexed by the Thai king, and the people made into Thai citizens, and the Royal family of Chiang Mai was not allowed to continue calling themselves with royal titles
How to understand Thailand’s conflict
Excellent article by David Streckfuss, cited above. I agree with it totally.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
Grant Evans- While there are significant numbers of people ‘fed up’ with the current government, the numbers are nowhere near as great as the opposition suggests, and when calculated as a percentage of the total electorate are form at best 1-2%. The opposition influences/controls a lot of entities that mold perceptions of the success/failure of the current government. An obvious example is the media, which often offers a totally distorted picture of what is going on. In the English language press both the Nation and Post have dropped any pretense of neutrality and will run with the most ridiculous news stories and editorials. Actually, most of their news stories should really run in the opinion section. For example, they are really pushing the ‘men in black on the rooftop’ theory that they are the ones responsible for the death of the policeman, even though it has been clearly established that he could not have been shot from that building due to the fact that the trajectory any bullet would have had to take would have been blocked by other buildings. You won’t see that in the press however. Remember, these same people claim, to this day, that the military were not responsible for a single death when 90+ people were mowed down in Bangkok. The Thai language press is often even worse, with few exception. Another advantage the opposition has is that being from the elite means that they have many of their people in key positions. Imagine the governor/mayor of a large metropolitan area who not only aids in the shutdown of his city, but has nary a bad word to say about it. The current protests are doing immense current and long-term damage to the Thai economy in almost every sector now. Hopefully cooler heads in the business community will lean on Suthep to pack it in. Having said that, the backers of this movement undoubtedly have immense fortunes in overseas banks, second passports, and foreign homes so they are probably more than willing to see it all cave in rather than concede any ground, so I wouldn’t count on this situation being resolved in a sensible manner.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
Had Andrew Walker focussed on ‘Isaan’ then the growth would have been even higher, underlining the benefits that Thaksin’s supporters have gained.
But none of this helps explain why so many people, mainly in Bangkok but elsewhere too, are fed up with the government. And here I am talking about people who are not Democrats but who feel disenfranchised.
I must say that I have found most of the commentary on the current crisis in Thailand (and it looks very serious this time) incredibly weak. Chris Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit wrote a good short piece on the weakness of the party system in Thailand, but that’s about it.
I’m sick of reading cliches about the Bangkok ‘middle class’. It is worthwhile asking seriously why many people are following a crook like Suthep.
Walker’s continued apologetics for Thaksin don’t get us very far. Would he please turn his attention and analytic skills to more difficult questions.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
Harold, using The Nation and Wikepedia as sources is astoundingly lazy and ignorant.
Another big weekend for Thailand
Jaidee – am not sure why Nomi chose to lecture me about the Democrat Party. I could NOT vote against the Democrat Party (which I presume was Nomi’s intention) because as as usual this party, dubbed aptly by Andrew Walker as ‘The-Democrat-Party-that-could-not-win-elections’, had withdrawn (again!, is this the third time these undemocratically-minded-Democrats to scorn the elections?). Nomi merely wasted his or her bad breath with his/her long-winded story about the Democrat Party that had left a very deep impression on me. I repeat: I will never ever vote for the Democrat Party ever, cross my un-Red heart.
As for the dogs, servants, goats and yaps yaps …. I must have been listening much too much to all those Red Shirt rallies and Peau Thai Party members parliamentary oration. As you could guess, I possess such soft mind I get easily persuaded to mimic and ape what I watch on youtube, political videoclips and Red Shirts broadcasts.
btw Jaidee … any suggestions how I could improve my terrible lisp and diction?
How bad is Thaksinomics?
most of that money was stolen from thailand & its poor people in isaan
Moving away from the consociational model
Greg,
I do not doubt that there are conversations taking place of some sort, nor that such conversations are restricted to the elite
(a comment I wouldn’t make in any case).
However, I do not think such conversations
are surmounting UMNO’s repeated use of Malay nationalism and religion to cleave society
(which I think there is unanimity on, except
among UMNO). As you well know I am hardly an UMNO supporter, nor am I a fan of much of the opposition, all of which comprise elite groups, by the way. I think, Greg, you do
however underestimate UMNO’s resilience under pressure, when it is often strongest. I know Meredith and Bridget (though it has been a while since I attended an AAS meeting in the US, and they spend little time in the US nowadays anyway). I think, frankly, your last statement is the more accurate reflection of reality. And I think you put it well; there is indeed a long way to go before the conversation becomes genuine and widespread.
I take your meaning of genuine to reflect relevance, rather than literally “genuine,” as I think neither of us questions the sincerity of these conversations, though we may differ on their impact on UMNO, and the degree to which national leadership can some day emanate from such non-elitist groups.
Academic analysis, as I mentioned before, is elitist in itself, as it is not directed towards a kampung audience, in large measure (unlike NGO activities which can actually have a local impact at the village level, though I expect no Prime Minister in Malaysia anytime soon to have NGO membership on his or her curriculum vitae). Yes, conversations are taking place, but I see no current evidence, post-Reformasi (of which there has been some backtracking), that these conversations worry UMNO much (would that they did), nor any signs of leadership potential among those outside the elite groups, having such conversations. There remains two large gaps: One between academic-based social analysis and actual living conditions of average Malaysians; and the gap between those in power and the social discourse among those who have far less power. I do not anticipate that power balance to shift much away from UMNO in favour of non-elites in the near future, short of a sustained national-level people’s revolution that permanently changes the hierarchical political and social structures in Malaysia. I don’t think Malaysians now are game for such a revolution, which is far more harder to organize systematically, without it getting out of control, than localized protests. The CPM tried such a gambit for quite a long time, and did not succeed in the end.
Such a thing did happen nearby (a people’s movement) leading to the collapse of Suharto and Golkar, in Indonesia, and quite shortly thereafter (in a much larger nation than Malaysia), Indonesia returned to its status-quo level of national and social stasis. Dictatorship is gone in Jakarta, but then so
is a strong Rupiah, food security, lowered
infant mortality, high rice production, and actual (not grandiose) nationwide public health measures, which, whatever you may think of him (and I have some sense from New Mandala commentary), Lee Kuan Yew fully predicted would happen if Suharto fell. I do not predict a Malaysian collapse if UMNO fell, I just don’t think they are going to lose Putrajaya for quite some time, and will fight for control, no doubt, until the ‘last Malay standing.’
Islamist conservatism in Malaysia
No Muslim country ranked in the top 40 of the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment, including Malaysia.
Malaysian opposition leader offers his thoughts on this.
I’m wondering if poor quality educational performance in Muslim countries has correlation with high levels of poor governance?
http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/pisa-results-and-stark-reality-of-muslim-countries-anwar-ibrahim
Moving away from the consociational model
Very pertinent points Peter.
Your points are valid but it may not be capturing what has been happening since Reformasi (1997/98).
(1) Recent works of Meredith Weiss (on student activism), Bridget Welsh (on social networks), Gaik Cheng Khoo (also on social networks), etc. and my interaction with civil society members do suggest that this conversation is taking place.
Many social movements today are not led by the ruling elite/s on either side of the divide. The New Year day demonstrations were led by students.
(2) That UMNO is using religion as a wedge to the hilt signals its concern that these cleavages (ethnicity, social class, geographical locations, demography) is slowly being surmounted.
I do admit however, that Malaysia has a long way to go before this conversation becomes genuine and widespread.
How bad is Thaksinomics?
“crown princess” . . . . where does this utter nonsense keep coming from? the word “crown” appears nowhere here: р╕кр╕бр╣Ар╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╣Ар╕Чр╕Юр╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕кр╕╕р╕Фр╕▓ р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Яр╣Йр╕▓р╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕Ир╕▒р╕Бр╕гр╕╡р╕кр╕┤р╕гр╕┤р╕Щр╕Шр╕г р╕гр╕▒р╕Рр╕кр╕╡р╕бр╕▓р╕Др╕╕р╕Ур╕▓р╕Бр╕гр╕Ыр╕┤р╕вр╕Кр╕▓р╕Хр╕┤ р╕кр╕вр╕▓р╕бр╕Ър╕гр╕бр╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕Бр╕╕р╕бр╕▓р╕гр╕╡
unlike here: р╕кр╕бр╣Ар╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕Ър╕гр╕бр╣Вр╕нр╕гр╕кр╕▓р╕Шр╕┤р╕гр╕▓р╕К р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Яр╣Йр╕▓р╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕зр╕Кр╕┤р╕гр╕▓р╕ер╕Зр╕Бр╕гр╕Ур╕п р╕кр╕вр╕▓р╕бр╕бр╕Бр╕╕р╕Ор╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕Бр╕╕р╕бр╕▓р╕г
further, to use “logical” in a sentence concerning Sirinthon can only make a reader raise his eye-brows . . .
How bad is Thaksinomics?
The evidence presented only suggests that Thaksinomics didn’t sink Thailand over the last decade, not that the country’s economic performance resulted from his policies. And no hint is given as to why we should regard the policies as sustainable under different global dynamics. The talk is that public debt/GDP is going to hit 60% fairly soon, with private debt already way up. This would suggest that no matter the outcome of the current political impasse, whoever is in charge is going to be stuck trying to deal with the economics and politics of the New Normal.