Comments

  1. stewoolf says:

    Two solutions of extreme measures:

    1. To assimilate or to face ethnic cultural genocide like what happened to the American native 1870-1920.

    2. Be independent or be part of Malaysia.

    Both very unlikely.

    What else:

    1. The “kampung” chief a-la Malaysia style. Let a Malay be the head of “state”, as mentioned in the second video clip, in localized area where Malays are the majority. Peace would prevail and sustain, like in Malaysia, where Malay-Muslim centric type of justice is discharged. The Thai/Chinese “minority” have to compromise not to seek the Western/Anglo-Saxon kind of “fairness” or “equality” unless it is of serious matter.

    2. Urbanize the Malays. Empty the “kampung” Provide scholarships for non-Malay-Muslim centric study in universities; Encourage companies in urban areas to provide employments for Malays; Ease access to internet and social media; etc, etc.

    With peace and economic progress, the younger generation of Malays would galvanize toward the Western ideals without sacrificing their ethnic or religious values.

  2. Sam Deedes says:

    “It is not as if these crimes aren’t taught in Thai history books…”

    It’s not so much whether they are taught, but rather how they are taught, I would say.

    I think this piece should be read in conjunction with Thongchai Winichakul’s recent critique of Thai style history. education.

    http://prachatai.com/english/node/3649

  3. Sandy D. says:

    The girls are kept in her facility for a period of time to avoid being arrested for prostitution. It is an arrrangement Somaly made with the local police during raids. Otherwise the raids would be ineffective if the girls were allowed to walk right back into the brothels without any attempted interventions. Everyone knows the pimps get off without any charges.

    The effort is to focus on rehabilitating the girls rather than punishing them. If Somaly did not provide support for rehabilitation, these girls who suffered unimaginable indignities would easily return to a life they were all too familiar with.

    Also, in my opinion of the way she handled her daughters abduction, it is likely she struggled with preserving her daughters privacy while also trying to expose the lengths the brothels would go to in order to hurt her, and capitalize on the sex trade.

    Somaly is not perfect, she’s a human being. But at least she has the courage to stand in the trenches and fight this battle.

  4. Dr Dennis Walker MAI/PSI Monash University says:

    From Dr Dennis Walker MAI/PSI Monash University:

    A few errata to my above:

    Youth whom monolingualizing time-machine brainwashing by Thai governmental school left unable to genuinely understand their Malay-speaking parents, relatives and the traditional ISLAMIC PREACHERS (not “pracher”).

    “a new generation moving away XXXXX the “hardened anger of their elders” = “a new generation moving away FROM the “hardened anger of their elders”

    Westerners might not like — if Patani became independent, like the Baltic states from the USSR — to have “an Islamic socialist Arabophone pocket-republic in Patani”. The struggle could of course adopt a nominal monarch, given that the old Sultanate of Patani headed the Nation’s golden age. But there has been long tension or at least tugs of war between Patani’s Arabophophone Islamic clerical class and the royal aristocrats. The clergy and modernist rebels would likely tightly control any royal figurehead. Grandpa Sukarno, Grandpa Nasser, uncles Saddam Husayn and Hafiz al-Asad are in the ideological bloodline of the rebels — hero Great Leaders of the Nusantara and Arab republics of post WWII decolonization.

  5. Reggie says:

    “Scholars voice support for missing Lao activist”

    Radio Australia

    July 23, 2013

    http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/asia-pacific/scholars-voice-support-for-missing-lao-activist/1165238

  6. John Grima says:

    I’m just reading Tomomi’s first chapter, and it seems to me that the two approaches — Tomomi’s and Kamala’s — are in some ways very similar. In particular, both use the same sources for the early years, Buddhadasa’s and his compatriots life narratives, and derive the same conclusions from them, identifying the major themes of their motivation and their sense of themselves as developing thinkers. They have roughly the same lack of skepticism about these narratives. Tomomi has consulted a broader range of sources and cited a more detailed set of environmental factors and is more explicit about the social aspirations that could be at play in pursuing religious life. …

  7. NguyenVietnam says:

    Interesting indeed.

  8. […] volume begins with an excellent preface by one of Malaysia’s intellectual giants,Emeritus Professor Datuk Dr. Mohamed Ariff. He provides a broad sweep of Malaysia’s economic history since independence, identifying […]

  9. […] is of no surprise, therefore, that human rights groups in France and the UK, denounced Thein Sein’s visit and urged Cameron and Hollande to press Thein Sein for concrete actions rather […]

  10. Dr Dennis Walker, says:

    Murray Hunter’s exploration of conflict in Southern Thailand/”Patani” shows the multiplicity of issues and categories of Malays, perhaops typical of any people.

    He is right that “external engagement will only raise suspicions in the South as to the motives of the outsiders”. The people of Patani are paranoid about outside researchers, for instance, suspecting us of all being spies of Western intelligence agencies who want to ferret out data about their factional structure so that it can be funneled away to Thailand to enable it terminate, isolate or bribe the resistance. Which is absurd: we only seek the truth for truth’s sake. It can take three years of interacting with a given individual in Patani before enough trust is built up for them to confide anything of substance.

    Nonetheless, outside pressure is essential to pressure the Thai state to negotiate with the Patanian Malays because it outnumbers its Muslims so overwhelmingly.

    I believe that the Thai system might genuinely negotiate if its indispensable allies, the Anglomorph states, who don’t want an Islamic socialist Arabophone pocket-republic in Patani, take part themselves in the current degradation of the Thai state’s authority in its South.

    Culture is a good plane on which to send the necessary signals. If the Western states transform their information and cultural materials that they have in Malay and Indonesian into Arabic script — easily done by the computer program “eJawi” — and pump them into libraries, bookshops and Islamic schools in the South, that would send a powerful message that the post-modern world doesn’t allow member states of the United Nations to abolish the languages of national minorities. The Thai system may then start to concede real things on the plane of languages. At the same time, a presence of Western ideas in the process of saving the Malay language may moderate the thinking of the Malay Jihadist nationalists or at least of the peasnt and student layers that harbor, feed and inform the insurgents.

    The other way to a resolution, which Murray Hunter toys with like many Western researchers before him, is “a changing consciousness at the community level”, the “real change that will only come from within”, a new generation moving away the “hardened anger of their elders” — that daggy discrete nationality and anachronistic language and sour-faced religiousity that can hold people back from the “fun” and entrepreneurial wealth the Thai system and Asean offer small peoples that shrugged off their speech-forms and their identities.

    A possible solution. Maybe. Could come off. Yet it can make some youth whom statal schools made unable to speak with mum and dad and grandma or grandpa or understand the pracher snap into real monsters who set fire to any governmental school they get near. And not just to the buildings.

    And from their magazines the Muslims of central Thailand sound so unhappy with the world — they are not at ease as monolinguals with the world in general.

    I believe that the only solution is a devolved Patanian state unit within Thailand, bilingual and with internationally-supervised control over its own culture and natural resources. In the last ten years many Patanians have intimated to me that this is what they want. Supervised devolution would keep Patani within Thailand, which could build new forms of interaction with the Patani Muslims, which many educated young Buddhist Thais want.

  11. Reggie says:

    “Scholars Call for Sombath probe”

    Pressure on Rudd over missing activist

    The Age (Melbourne)

    July 22, 2013

    http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/scholars-call-for-sombath-probe-20130721-2qchj.html

  12. I’ve been birding in Thailand since 2002, and a little bit in Laos and Singapore as well. I have observed significant changes over that time, especially in Kaeng Krachan National Park which is a particularly famous destination for birders. In 2002, my wife and I received a personal tour from park staff just because we expressed an interest in the birds, whereas now the entire bird-guide system has been professionalized, both among park staff and through the private guest houses and tour services that cater to birders. We mostly bird independently, but we communicate quite a bit with Thai guides and birders that meet as we go, and we also observe guides interacting with foreigners, and there is quite a diversity. We found some highly professional and knowledgable and others quite poor at finding or identifying birds but anxious to tap into the demand for guiding from international birders. I also find the number of domestic Thai birders small but growing, and there have been Thai language guides to bird identification and bird finding published in Thailand in the past decade. The local-knowledge networks that allow for communication of interesting sightings, and the precise counting and tracking of specialities like the Spoon-billed Sandpiper, have become extensive and effective. Every Thai birder we spoke to who was knowledgable knew the names and contacts of other very knowledgable birders in other parts of the country.

    Another aspect of birding is that it does compel birders to explore less-visited parts of the country. On our most recent trip, we visited Phu Jong Nayoi NP in Ubon Ratchathani which brought us right through the border conflict area as well as into direct contact with the land-use conflict between local residents of the National Park and park management. I wrote an informal essay about it here:

    http://christopheradler.com/2013MarPhuJongNayoi.html

  13. HRK says:

    Certainly, the issues in the South are complex. However, one might find a few aspects that simplify matters a little bit:
    1. That the talks are stalled might have something to do with little interests on both sides to find a solution. Here two questions are relevant:
    a) who gains and who suffers from the violence?
    b) Is there a need for reconciliation and for whom?
    Those suffering are mainly the farmers and soldiers and lower civil servants. So far killing of higher ranking officials or business men has been the exception. The conflict is still contend in the three provinces. The effects of the conflict on the elections are minimal (the democrat party gets the seats as usual. Wada was an exception). In consequence, the conflicts and violence is a nuisance for the state and politicians, but certainly not a real problem that has to be solved. BRN has a strong influence in the provinces not the least due to fear. Violence and secrecy provide them with a position of relative power. Furthermore one should not forget the material effects. Civil servants and the military get higher wages, a lot of money is spend for the private Islamic schools, the reduced state supervision allows for smuggling and other illegal activities. National and international NGO can engage in peace building etc. In conclusion, the situation as it currently is provides stability! Many gain from the situation as it is. Reconciliation could challenge the positions of all involved, not the least because the fear factor will be lost.
    2. The strategy of BRN failed. BRN tried to escalate the conflict, which initially worked quite well (Khru Sue and Trok Bai). However, the Thai military tried to de-escalate, The killing of children and common people in busses, attacks on soldiers etc. did not lead to massive military interventions, and in general a low profile was maintained. BRN has been trying to de-stabilize the region since nearly ten years without much success. So the question is for how long can it maintain legitimacy to its personnel and motivate old and new recruits? One should be aware though that BRN is currently providing stability! Its break up would make everything far less calculable.
    3. It might be that the Malay want to life their traditional life, however, it is rapidly changing. The increase of rubber prices brought a lot of prosperity to the region. The youth is not at all content to stay in the villages. Drug abuse is a very severe problem in most villages. That many return home after studies might as well be related to what they study. It is difficult to find a job in a company with a degree in Malay or Islamic studies. For many the only options are to work as very low paid teacher in a private Islamic school. In short, changes take place on a large scale and life is changed in a far reaching way without development projects and intervention from the Thai state. Perhaps one aspect of the current violence is that the youth are trying to do something regarded as positive with moral justification (fight for a free Pattani with the Sharia). As the least this struggle provides some “adventures” and they can feel powerful and important at least for some time.
    4. I would agree that it is not primarily or entirely a religious conflict. However, religion can hardly be ignored, as its interpretation justifies the violence, and provides the idea of moral superiority. However, Islam itself is a controversial issue. Besides BRN groups of Whabi try to find followers and quite a substantial amount of money from Islamic sponsors finds its way into the region. At least in a few cases the interpretation is quite alien to Malay culture.
    5. What is Malay cultural identity and how can it be maintained? Even in Malaysia it is disputed what Malay cultural identity is. Looking at the changes in terms of everyday life and in terms of cultural interpretations (f.e. religion) it is very complicated to identify Pattani Malay identity. BRN is certainly not the authorized interpreter of this identity.
    Looking at the different aspects of the current situation, my guess is that reconciliation is still far away.

  14. Alex says:

    The only solution doesn’t need a long article but needs only one word: Independance !

  15. bernd weber says:

    which is then typically thai
    – and therein is a big problem:

    -Hinduism / Brahmanism the teaching of the Upanishads have an “eternal soul” as the basis.

    Goutama Buddha denied this, his core message is:

    There is no “soul” and not “I”

    and only on the understanding of this statement is reached Nibbana

    Anatta: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta

    The questions of King Melinda: http://www.as.miami.edu/phi/bio/Buddha/Milinda.htm

    Although the Palikanon is also full of stories of gods and angels – but Gouthama clearly states that every self can only free itself from the “Samasa” (the wheel of birth, aging, illness, death)

  16. kllau says:

    Most of the Conceivable Social, Economic and Political Features of the Past and Present Have Probably Identified .

    Moving Forward, Where are the Answers to the Springly Resolutions for the Aspiring Ideals, Earthly Simple Wishes, Needs and Wants(Shelters ,Decent Cost of Food, Education and Standards of Living, Without being Constantly Fearful of ‘Macked’ or Robbed, Dubious Security and Judiciary Environment-in Short a Tainted and Corrupt System of Delivery ) of the People of Malaysia ?

    Humbly, (I believe )the Responsibility Lies Squarely on Both the Political Leaders and the Rakyat .

    The Ones who Misconducted and Abused the Power that-be, Had Scandalously Plundered the Trillions of Ringgit Over the Past 30 years, are in Self-Denial, Cannot Reform or Reinvent, but Need to be Retired from Putrajaya. Instead , Continue the ”Trysts”, under the Masters of Puppetry in ”Dead Woods” and the ”Devil you Know”, Without the Respect for the Rakyat’s Wishes.

    The Rakyat and the Leaders who Have Been Unable to Unseat these Rogue Leaders ,… YET .

    Perhaps With Sustained Peaceful Protests,Together, Hopefully, with Sufficiently Courageous Reformed Remanence of the ”Devilish Deadwoods” whom They HAVE NOW KNOW ?

  17. […] We are yet to find out the details of the deal struck between Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill. What we know so far is that the agreement will see all boat arrivals without visas to Australia diverted to PNG for processing and potential resettlement. This sounds like a political and short-term stroke of genius to appeal to an important electoral minority, but regionally and for the long-term sounds like another ‘regional solution’ disaster. […]

  18. tocharian says:

    Perhaps Kevin Rudd would agree with my last sentence about refugees and asylum seekers!

  19. Fionn Travers-Smith says:

    Excellent article and a great read.

    On the Kem Sokha/Vietnamese issue, the opposition party’s response may have been fairly ponderous and inadequate, but the CPP’s decisive response was, perhaps, even more revealing.

    Within a week they had outlawed denials of Khmer Rouge “crimes”, in a bill worded so vaguely you have to wonder whether it will be used as a tool to dampen free speech and electoral opponents. This is especially given Hun Sen et al’s well known KR past and the plethora of government officials with links to that past regime.

    As you mentioned they also organised, subsidised and provided the logistics for a protest against Kem Sokha of a few thousand people, and then broadcast the protest all day on TV. By comparison, when Sam Rainsy returned to Cambodia yesterday after years of self-imposed exile, the TV stations (all controlled by the CPP to greater or lesser extents) didn’t report on it at all, despite estimates of the number of people on the streets being in the hundreds of thousands.

    Moreover, the affair over Kem Sokha’s supposed comments on S-21 were then immediately followed by a series of very public scandals on his person, that were seized on by the CPP and lauded over the opposition by Hun Sen. These included accusations of infidelity, and even pedophilia, as well as suing Kem Sokha for defamation.

    Taken in tandem, it seems more than likely that the CPP have been conducting a coordinated smear campaign against Kem Sokha, and personally I am unconvinced that the comments attributed to him were genuine.

    That leaves the question as to why Hun Sen feels the need to smear – are the CPP feeling more threatened by the CNRP this time around?

  20. It’s the Chatham House, CFR and Brookings circus. Real journalists never point out it’s the think tanks that ignore how MI6 and CIA undermine parts of the world like Myanmar, Balochistan, Chechnya and Dagestan. It doesn’t exist to these warmonger think tanks and vapid journos who use the warmonger think tanks to promote dictators and liars, and their commensurate uprisings or downfalls.