Comments

  1. Nigel Woodward says:

    When I read this commentary, I was reminded of a British sitcom which graced the screens in the 70s. It was called Citizen Smith, and for those who missed it, the hero, Wolfie Smith, was a luckless rebel-without-a-clue with delusions that he was Che Guevara.

    Yes, press freedom is a huge concern at the present juncture, but whatever the statistics may show, it is ludicrous to imply that the Thaksin years were in any sense an improvement. Yet, the writer tells us, “…the political situation post-Thaksin (when, incidentally, it was a mere 66th in 2002 showing the media had more actual freedoms then)…” Really? Well, I’m sorry, but all I seem to recall from the Thaksin era is a series of lawsuits brought by Khun Shinawatra against any journalist who dared to cross him. We also have the following offering attributed to Giles Ungpakorn, (whom I now, for some reason, think of as Wolfie): “Five years ago, Thailand had a thriving and developing democracy with freedom of expression, a relatively free press…” Pure fantasy. Alice in Thaksinland.

    I would also question the following: “…a common enemy out there in the countryside (embryonic electoral democracy)…”. The underprivileged living up-country may well be a “common enemy” to some of the bigwigs in central Thailand, but I really think we are, once again, stretching reality into new and even more curious forms of delusion when we mention “embryonic democracy” and Thaksin, or his supporters, in the same breath. An “embryonic democracy” may have existed in Thailand, fleetingly, after the writing of the 1997 constitution. Unfortunately however, Thaksin and company were responsible for the subsequent brutal abortion.

    Although I would be the first to agree with the writer that standards of journalism in Thailand are woefully poor, it seems to me ironic that, while apparently seeking to draw attention to this, he should submit such a one-eyed piece. By writing a piece that ignores Thaksin’s many abuses of power, you will inevitably be seen as supporting his regime. Thailand is indeed in a mess, but the red-wearing Thaksin personality cult is just as toxic as their yellow adversaries. Wake up! This isn’t the “elites” against the poor and oppressed; it’s two cynical groups of robber barons moving pawns around a chessboard and not giving a shit about the consequences.

  2. David Brown says:

    the (terrorist-like) PAD happened in a major way in 2005

    any correlation?

  3. That was up here in Korat. I recall the event. She had to clarify later that she was indeed NOT naked underneath but had worn underwear. Maybe, but it shore don’ look like it!

  4. dave says:

    Hi Jarel,
    glad you enjoyed the book mate and am happy that is spreading the word about what is happening Burma, especially to the Karen. Say hello to Mondo for me, I haven’t seen him for nearly thirty years. Go to my website if you want and put a blog on. Also there is an unpublished chater for you to have a look at. dangerousdaveeverett.com

    Cheers,

    Dave

  5. Terry Commins says:

    Thanks to Leedom for this small window on rural Khon Kaen. While the links with religion and culture might be tenuous, they are certainly not “totally” empty of meaning. It seems there is an industrious abbot at work who has found a way to raise village income by putting on a display for the KK city folk. It would also appear that the temple is acting as a catalyst for involving the village in a community activity. Building a sense of community and community pride is an essential step in any attempt to improve the livelihood of the village.
    Of course it could all just be another excuse for the entire village to get drunk at the end of Lent, but Leedom’s commentary does not seem to suggest this.

  6. Terry Commins says:

    Would have been quite useful if the 3 presentations could have been linked (pdf) to this blog. The debate is ongoing and resources are scarce.
    For anyone with an interest in hydro development in Laos, see Bakker, Karen (1999). The politics of hydropower: developing the Mekong. Political Geography, 18, pp 209-232.

  7. Nobody says:

    For a bit of balance on this aritcle lets look at RWB press ranmkings for Thailand from 2002 – 2009

    2002 66
    2003 82
    2004 59
    2005 107
    2006 122
    2007 135
    2008 124
    2009 130

    Whatever happened between 2004 and 2005? I wonder how that fits this piece of “analysis”

    Unfortuantely RWB doesnt list ranks before 2002 but most media observers usually talk of the hey day of Thai media freedom to have been in the mid to late nineties. (I accept that is as subjective an opinion as most espoused in the piece I am commenting on).

    I am not sure whether the contributor is contributing a piece of supposed reasoned arguement or is just in pure campaign mode. If it is the latter and openly stated then I see little objection. If it is the former then the arguement is flawed without placing it in a wider historical and analytical context and providing more full data.

    if anyone could provide another source that covers rankings going further back it would be interesting and maybe assist in allowing a more accurate hypothesis to be formed.

  8. Matt,

    Thanks for this.

    Of course, I agree with Dave Mathieson’s general point about the importance of timing and calibration in any effort to soften/remove sanctions. In the medium term there is surely something to be said for easing off, if that is smart, at the telling moments. But I wonder what happens if that proves unsuccessful. I have a lingering sense that any “limited, Western, symbolic” sanctions are relatively easy for the Burmese government to manage. They have played this game for many years now; much longer than most of those who plot to unseat them. But are there unexpected moves (summed up, in one sense, by my long-standing speculation on what an influx of Western multinational interest might mean…) that could unsettle the international/domestic situation that the SPDC has come to enjoy. Most of the countries that are currently sanctioning the regime are wealthy, attractive and innovative places. Perhaps we shouldn’t discount what those attributes can mean when the carrots and the sticks are used more aggressively, and with more attention to taking new risks.

    Best wishes to all,

    Nich

  9. jarel munro says:

    hey David, im nearly finished reading your book, what you did for the karen is truly amazing, you have inspired many and many more to come with more exposure, i wish the “global elite” would see what should be done to the BMI.

    ps; i work with mondo!

  10. Matt says:

    Nich –
    Perhaps we’re better off referring to the arguments themselves, rather than assigning/attributing them to particular, imagined “sides.”

    What do you think about the above Mathieson quote regarding timing? As I said before, I think this has to be a consideration and I’d be curious to hear what you think about it.

    – m

  11. Kevin Hewison says:

    It does look like an interesting programme. I don’t have the energy to learn all this twittering stuff – I can barely keep up with my old-fashioned emails. So I was wondering if there is any chance of papers, even as notes, being posted?

  12. […] machinations of journalists, and their newspaper and tabloid bosses (see earlier posting on NM, “Suthichai Yoon on the state of Thai journalism”, 21 May 2009 by Nicholas Farrelly, in a case where a perpetrator himself cries foul). It is not […]

  13. Somsak Jeamteerasakul says:

    It should be noted that there’s an error at the beginning of the 5th paragraph of the article. It reads : “Pheu Thai‘s proximity to state enterprise unions….” Instead, it should be: “The New Politics Party‘s (i.e. Sondhi L’s party) proximity to state enterprise unions …”

  14. Owen says:

    Are there other pages, forums, reports or papers that explore the wider GLBT world(s) in Myanmar?

    I would certainly appreciate suggestions.

    Thanks.

  15. Thanks Matt,

    This is helpful input. I’m not sure, either, about what language best serves the purpose of this discussion. Fight, boycott, sanction, oppose, pressure, moderate, engage, deal, apologise, legitimise, support, defend — this is the language that has been inherited. And its not quite a spectrum…not quite a perfect circle. As the character of the terrain changes there are, I accept, important changes to the vocabulary that could be required. I am, as ever, open to suggestions about how we best characterise the positions that we see; and how we best calibrate the various “levers” (pressure points, friction points, influences, etc, etc) that are being debated.

    A natural “problem” with much of what we currently discuss is that two decades (plus) of baggage colours the interpretations. Are there good ways of side-stepping that? I am keen to explore the possibility that there might be.

    Best wishes to all,

    Nich

  16. Matt says:

    Nicholas –
    Mathieson makes an important argument that I’m not sure has been addressed:
    “Removing the sanctions too fast sends the wrong message, especially when the SPDC makes their repeal such a prominent condition for negotiation. Sanctions, therefore, have a prime usefulness, and should be scrapped only incrementally in line with significant concessions from the regime.”

    Sanctions haven’t worked, to be sure. Does this automatically mean the reverse is true – that lifting them, now, would be more effective? In some contexts, I think so. In others, I think not; timing is an important consideration.

    An aside: is it necessary to lump people together as “pro-boycott/pro-sanctions advocates”? A boycott and sanctions are not necessarily the same, nor are the positions of many people engaging in this “debate,” on New Mandala and elsewhere. We might be better off having a discussion, and not pushing people to one side or the other.

  17. Srithanonchai says:

    HRK:

    1) It is normally assumed that the respect accorded to the King is, as mostly in Thailand, a rather personal affair and not directed towards the institution as such. Thailand is a society that values personal good deeds and relations, not mainly abstract institutions (apologies if someone thinks that this is an unwarranted generalization, but it is derived from long-term observation). In other words, the monarchy “as an institution” depends for its status on the personal qualities of the king (Chulalongkorn, Vajiravudh, Prajadhipok, Mahidol, Bhumiphol and, in the near future, Vajiralongkorn).

    2) There must be the signature of the king on many documents. However, given your other-wordly approach, I would think that a medium could be employed whose hand could be led by the spiritually eternalized monarch. However, first, the Thai constitution does not provide for such a solution. Second, from your perspective, what role would any successor supposed to play?

  18. David Brown says:

    perhaps Vichai N and HRK (and others?) might like to help us get a better understanding of their attitudes by addressing the issue of succession in the Thai monarchy

    HMK has been revered (and respected) by many, especially Thais, and this reverence (and not so much respect) has extended to the institution and the various hangers-on, the other members of the family and even some of the privy councillors

    however it appears to be “commonly believed” that the Crown Prince would not automatically carry the same reverence and respect into the position of King

    so what of the hangers-on in that case?

  19. David Brown says:

    convincing the countries that purchase Burmas resources, eg Thailand, China, to make their payments directly into the Burmese national accounts (in Kyats) rather than into the US$ accounts of the Burmese Junta would be a real good start

    then there would be more visibility on how much money is withheld from the Burmese people by the Junta… and the international community would have a better handle on the size and type of problem

  20. maransengsar says:

    I wanna know the boarder’s news, Maijayang, laiza with

    burmese military.