Good point, but if things get weighted towards BKK, I imagine a lot of people would change their voter reg., as was done in the last one. Our son registered to vote in the advance vote in BKK where he works and lives.
“I think people are becoming victims of mainstream media”
True, this is what happens currently in Indonesia social media. Twitter is dominated by youngsters(under 40), and from what I believe, current generation is fonder to read so-called kultweet (collective tweets from someone about particular issue) from someone instead of reading the real information source. And, they consider it as reliable source. Why? Because it’s easy to read, less than 140 characters for each, then you put number, get it collected altogether in chirpstory.Once, my lecture sarcastically stated that Indonesian youngsters were now in the era of “generasi instan” (instant generation).
For example, my friends, big fan of Prabowo said he didn’t believe Prabowo violated the human rights during reformation, when I asked why (when the evidence is visible!), he answered lightly, “Oh, I read it on Twitter.”
The online media is not quite helping. Many online news/media contributed banality (spreading ethnic/religious-based hatred, black campaign considered as negative — still an impediment in Indonesia) among these youngster.
They didn’t experience New Order authoritarianism, yet they said it might be lovely to live under such regime.
We still have long road to go.
With an attitude like that , what do you expect? Personal Rants and insults are not respected in a discussion amongst rational people who are discussing facts a opinions, you don’t see Vichai pouting.
I must applaud the efforts of both “Doubting Thomas” and “notdisappointed” in generating plenty of meaningless noise to divert the attention of the audience . Well done, mates. As a fellow member of the conservative Thai elite, I understand the intention of both “Doubting Thomas” and “notdisappointed”. Bring up frivolous and unrelated points and cloud the issue (in this case, lese majeste) so that substantive examination and discussion of the matter does not take place. Query them directly and they either cannot or will not respond for their positions are so full of holes that a tank can be driven through at top speed! I am familiar with this strategy. Being married to a Thai woman whose family is embedded firmly in high society here in Bangkok, I have to deal with this priggish behaviour everyday. Indeed, both of the aforementioned contributors remind me of my wife whenever the issue of politics is discussed at home. A simple comment or a simple question that challenges her sensibilities (or intelligence) sends her into an illogical frenzy and a flurry of retreaded accusations of my alleged infidelities. To which I reply, “Dear, you lost your form a long time ago, and you have been devoid of substance since we decided to wed. I continue with this charade only because of convenience.” The Thai Establishment and its defenders are shallow and rotten to the core. But they do compensate well.
I wonder why the ruling military junta could not have rolled out someone like Kraisak Choonhavan like they did back in 2006. He speaks flawless English and loves the sound of his own voice. Where is he now? I know for a fact that he partook in the PDRC-led protests earlier this year but he has gone quiet. Has he dedicated himself to playing his guitar to a sold-out crowd of deaf-mutes? Maybe.
My point here is that the NCPO needs more “respectable” Thais to speak up for the “democratic” transition and to convince the international community that the National Security State is the Future.
It may be unfair to criticize a five-minute video for over-simplification, but Prof. Walker unfortunately fails to mention many factors that contribute to the weakness of Thai democratic institutions.
Most obvious is the military itself. How can an analysis of a military coup fail to note the central role of military? The Thai military since 1932 appointed itself main role in judging governments — both elected and royal — and removing those that fail to meet the military’s own definition of satisfactory performance. In the process, the military, especially the army, has become a vast network that not only has more generals than the US army, but controls many state enterprises, radio stations, television stations and a huge budget out of proportion to any external threat. Analysis of most of Thailand’s coups would show that a key factor in most of them has been a threat (or at least a perceived threat) to the military or a key faction in the military. Prime Minister Thaksin’s effort to influence the military promotions in 2006 is one example. Repeated military coups are the main reason for the weakeness of Thai democratic institutions, not the monarchy or the Democrats.
One reason the military has been able to acquire such power (aside from having most of the organized firepower) is failure of elected Thai politicians from almost all parties, most definitely including the Democrats, to perform honestly and effectively. That failure is due, at least in part, to Thai voters being willing to re-elect politicians who provide local benefits even though dishonest and undemocratic means have been used to be able to give out those benefits. Since Prof. Walker is knowledgeable about the changes in political and economic thinking of the rural population he should have given us some insights into why rural voters, despite being better educated and more interested in political affairs, have often supported many of the amoral politician-businessmen in the Pheua Thai party (and other parties). Why did rural voters fail to see (or care) that the rice support policies proposed by Pheua Thai will lead to increased national debt and will ultimately unsustainable?
Prof. Walker fails to mention the crucial role that violence has played in weakening democratic institutions. The Yellow Shirts used violence to seize airports and government buildings, weakening the government in power. Some elements within the Red Shirts used violence in both 2009 and 2010 to undermine the Abhisit government. Opponents of the movement led by Suthep have used violence against the demonstrators (more than 20 killed) and some of Suthep’s hired guards have used violence against perceived threats. This use of violence, allowed to persist by the politicization and incompetence of the police, has undermined rule of law and credibility of elected government. Police ineffectiveness has also enabled the military to expand its already huge role in internal security and allowed the military to claim that it intervened to prevent further violence (in both 2006 and 2014). The viable threat of the use of violence by the military, of course, is ultimately what makes coup possible.
Prof. Walker’s short analysis gives no role to the actions of Yingluck’s government in leading the way to the coup. The pre-dawn approval of a blanket amnesty bill (after a last minute switch in the terms of the amnesty), seemingly aimed at bringing her brother back to Thailand without serving the court sentence for abuse of power, not only launched Suthep’s mass demonstrations, but also undermined support for her government among the Red Shirt movement. Reduced Red Shirt enthusiasm for Yingluck may have emboldened both Suthep and the military.
The Yingluck government expensive policies (rice pledging, transport infrastructure and flood prevention) that appear to allow easier corruption at the expense of heavier national debt undermined support for elected government by the middle-class that pays the majority of Thailand’s income tax.
Another key mistake by Yingluck was the dissolution of Parliament even though the example of 2006 made it likely that Democrat Party would again boycott. This put the government in caretaker mode that led to the failure to pay rice farmers in the pledging program, to the election problems and to the perception of a power vacuum.
Given widespread perception of corruption and incompetence of elected politicians, it would seem that no royal role is needed to explain why the credibility of elected politicians has been undermined. How does praise for a virtuous monarch undermine equally virtuous elected leaders? Leaders are only undermined by their own immorality and incompetence.
Short-sighted self-interest by almost all involved in Thai politics seems a factor in Thailand’s failure to develop more stable and trusted institutions.
The distrust of Thaksin-backed govternment by the urban educated encouraged courts to assume greater and greater power, often by legally questionable judicial activism such as the removal of Prime Minister Yingluck for relatively minor abuse of power. This, along with the nullification of election, led to perception of a power vacuum that the military could fill. No mention of this by Prof. Walker.
Prof. Walker makes much of the King’s formal “endorsement” of coup governments. Others often cite this to support arguments, which otherwise lack clear evidence, that the monarch was secretly behind the coup and supported the military. No one ever talks about the fact that the King also formally endorse all elected governments and formally appoint all elected prime ministers. No one sees this as evidence that the King was secretly behind the elections and support the winning party. It seems possible that the King’s policy, over his long rule, has been simply to extend formal approval to whatever government, elected or not, has de facto control of the country. What was the alternative — to denounce coup leaders Sarit, Pibulsonggram, Thanom, Suchinda, Surayud and Prayuth? That might have been a democratically idealistic policy, but I suspect it would have meant the end of the monarchy and the exile of the royal family long before now.
It also seems strange that analysts such as Prof. Walker have become more insistent on the supposed political power of the monarchy as the current King plays a less and less active role in national affairs — or even royal affairs.
Perhaps Prof. Walker’s analysis was made before Gen. Prayuth gave his explanation of a process leading back to elections. In any case, his comment on “no talk of elections” is no longer true. There is much talk about the processing leading to elections. Whether or not the coup leaders will keep to this process, is still to be seen.
Prof. Walker is correct that Thailand’s democracy is in a “parlous state” but his focus on only two of the many factors involved make his analysis seem superficial. A more balanced, nuanced and detailed analysis would be welcome. Perhaps if Prof. Walker produce a longer video or wrote a substantial article or responded to these comments, he would be able to do that.
Actually we in Malaysia already noticed that one side was talking cat and the other side, talking dog, when the Look East Policy was set up, and in the years that ensued. Malaysia looked East and saw Japan. Japan looked West and saw USA, even though it was further seeing USA in the West than if they too had looked East. In both cases we knew they could not see Malaysia.
So Ayame Suzuki, not having noticed what Malaysians had long known about the dissonance of the first LEP would, expectedly be unaware of the talk cat-talk dog issues involved there, and is to be excused for thinking that talk security-talk economics is the first dissonance.
[…] Media commentator Pavin Chachavalpongpun took her comments up. He notes that during her father’s military dictatorship, the relationship between the U.S. and Thailand was close: […]
The reality is that Ahmadiyah and Shi’ite Muslims are persecuted, and occasionally killed, in Indonesia. The State-supported Ulama follow the principles of the Shaf’i school of Islam which states that Amadiyah Islam is heretical. Mainstream Sunnis in the Middle-East may tolerate Shi’a Islam, but Sunni Islamic exegesis regards Shi’a Islam as heretical, irrespective of the thousands
of Iranians in Indonesia and Malaysia, and the excellent nation-to-nation relations between Indonesia/Malaysia and Iran, which has invested $ 250 Million USD in ideological and political propagandising in Southeast Asia. There are several issues here: 1) Can Sunni Islam in Indonesia (and Malaysia) accommodate a minority sect that Qur’anic exegesis says if heretical, according to hukum Shari’a ?; 2) If Ahmadiyah and Shi’ite Muslims can be accommodate, if not actually accepted as full citizens, is this a decision to be made on hukum Shari’a grounds or a political decision made by the State ?; 3) Is the State willing to honour its own Constitution and protect ALL religions, including minority Muslims, which are guaranteed the right of practice of faith by the Indonesian Constitution; 4) Does the State, Muslim organisations, Muslim parties, and individual Indonesians regard hukum Shari’a and Qur’anic exegesis as superseding
civil law and the right of ALL Indonesians to practice their faith freely in a democratic society ?; 5) If it is believed that Islamic Law and Qur’anic exegesis have precedence over civil and secular laws and institutions, is Indonesia sill a secular nation, a partly
secular nation, or an Islamic nation, or even an Islamic state ?; 6) If civil law and secularism (in the Indonesian variant of Pancasila or something analogous) have precedence over Islamic Law and Qur’anic exegesis, then why are Ahmadiyah and Shi’ite Muslims persecuted and why is the Indonesian Constitution not respected, vis-a-vis the right of all Indonesians to practice their faith freely and Indonesian civil and Islamic institutions set-up to protect the right of all Indonesians, including Ahamdiyah and Shi’ite Muslims, to be protected from persecution, as they practice their faith ?
Duality has long existed in Indonesia; it is an integral part of Indonesian society. However, today, such an arrangement may not work in the interests of those least able to defend themselves, culturally and religiously. As Brunei now has Hudud laws for all Bruneians, and Malaysia is wracked with racial and religious conflict, with weak institutions capable of resolving religious and racial issues, the question becomes: Is Indonesia sufficiently prepared to address the question of what type of nation it is ?
And is Indonesia prepared to be the type of nation, that its Constitution sets forth for it, that is, a nation for ALL Indonesians, where freedom of religion (as well as many other freedoms) is both guaranteed, protected, honoured, and most importantly,
respected.
Mr. Green Jeans perceptive recognition of General Prayuth’s agricultural acumen is appreciated. Can’t wait to see images of the General decked out in his chao ban blues, taking in the harvest.
Oh dear, “Do you live in Thailand? Do you have a wide range of Thai contacts? ” this is so tiresome…. one gets the impression that your time in and with all your Thai contacts are not exactly behooving you Matt…
Did you see the latest Bangkok Post about Thailand’s great rice harvest. They imply that this is because the coup happened, that is to say: Good Prayuth, Bad Yingluck.
But they really should give the Junta more credit than that. For the first time in history, thanks to Prayuth, farmers have been able to grow a crop of rice from seed to harvest in less than 10 days.
Nobody disagrees that rice pledging was bad policy, but now Prayuth wants to institute price controls in order to make Thai’s happy.
Good luck with that.
Andrew articulates what many of us feel – he provides a sound analysis. The only bit not mentioned that interests me is the extent of disagreement and even conflict within the Royal network, and what implications that may have.
Chris Beale #4. Thais are free to register themselves wherever they like but there are two reasons why rural Thais working away from home tend to remain registered where they were born: 1) practical difficulties of getting a tabien baan at the address of rented accommodation, which requires the cooperation of the owner who often doesn’t want it on the record that he is renting out property,and the need to re-register on moving to new accommodation; 2) an emotional attachment to the home village which they hope to return to one day. However, rural Thais who become affluent enough in the city to buy their own property will normally re-register there without hesitation.
If authorities could somehow find a way to force registration in the current place of residence, it would make for smaller electorates in villages and larger numbers of voters of rural origin in cities, tourist resorts etc. Personally I wouldn’t want to hazard a guess as to whether that would make a material difference to election results. On the other hand giving Burmese workers votes might make a difference in Phuket and Samui, where Thai is rapidly becoming a minority language!
Khun Songsuda is also well known for defending her father’s brutal and greedy dictatorship. No need to pan her. She is the best promoter the anti-coup group could hope to find.
All these talking-heads are great and I would imagine that Andrew Walker and his academic colleagues are doing all they can to highlight their own expertise but there are two very important questions that must be addressed if this endless analysis is to have much meaning
1) What political action will be necessary to defeat the Thai junta and their associates in the anti-democracy alliance?
2) What is the role of intellectuals – if any – in helping achieve that?
If the answer to 2) is nothing other then career-enhancing monologues then 1) becomes an irrelevance.
As usual – very high quality analysis from Andrew.
I’ve only got one question. Recently on NM there was a post stating that the electoral system is distorted by the fact that voters are registered in their place of birth, i.e. their family origin home – rather than where they are currently living at the time of an election. This of course gives electoral weight to the North, especially Isarn, that it would not under a system which registered voters according to where they are currently living (or so it was argued). I’m just wondering what Professor Walker’s thoughts are on this.
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Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
Good point, but if things get weighted towards BKK, I imagine a lot of people would change their voter reg., as was done in the last one. Our son registered to vote in the advance vote in BKK where he works and lives.
Student Politics in the Selfie-Age
“I think people are becoming victims of mainstream media”
True, this is what happens currently in Indonesia social media. Twitter is dominated by youngsters(under 40), and from what I believe, current generation is fonder to read so-called kultweet (collective tweets from someone about particular issue) from someone instead of reading the real information source. And, they consider it as reliable source. Why? Because it’s easy to read, less than 140 characters for each, then you put number, get it collected altogether in chirpstory.Once, my lecture sarcastically stated that Indonesian youngsters were now in the era of “generasi instan” (instant generation).
For example, my friends, big fan of Prabowo said he didn’t believe Prabowo violated the human rights during reformation, when I asked why (when the evidence is visible!), he answered lightly, “Oh, I read it on Twitter.”
The online media is not quite helping. Many online news/media contributed banality (spreading ethnic/religious-based hatred, black campaign considered as negative — still an impediment in Indonesia) among these youngster.
They didn’t experience New Order authoritarianism, yet they said it might be lovely to live under such regime.
We still have long road to go.
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
With an attitude like that , what do you expect? Personal Rants and insults are not respected in a discussion amongst rational people who are discussing facts a opinions, you don’t see Vichai pouting.
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
I must applaud the efforts of both “Doubting Thomas” and “notdisappointed” in generating plenty of meaningless noise to divert the attention of the audience . Well done, mates. As a fellow member of the conservative Thai elite, I understand the intention of both “Doubting Thomas” and “notdisappointed”. Bring up frivolous and unrelated points and cloud the issue (in this case, lese majeste) so that substantive examination and discussion of the matter does not take place. Query them directly and they either cannot or will not respond for their positions are so full of holes that a tank can be driven through at top speed! I am familiar with this strategy. Being married to a Thai woman whose family is embedded firmly in high society here in Bangkok, I have to deal with this priggish behaviour everyday. Indeed, both of the aforementioned contributors remind me of my wife whenever the issue of politics is discussed at home. A simple comment or a simple question that challenges her sensibilities (or intelligence) sends her into an illogical frenzy and a flurry of retreaded accusations of my alleged infidelities. To which I reply, “Dear, you lost your form a long time ago, and you have been devoid of substance since we decided to wed. I continue with this charade only because of convenience.” The Thai Establishment and its defenders are shallow and rotten to the core. But they do compensate well.
Songsuda Yodmani and the 2014 coup
I wonder why the ruling military junta could not have rolled out someone like Kraisak Choonhavan like they did back in 2006. He speaks flawless English and loves the sound of his own voice. Where is he now? I know for a fact that he partook in the PDRC-led protests earlier this year but he has gone quiet. Has he dedicated himself to playing his guitar to a sold-out crowd of deaf-mutes? Maybe.
My point here is that the NCPO needs more “respectable” Thais to speak up for the “democratic” transition and to convince the international community that the National Security State is the Future.
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
It may be unfair to criticize a five-minute video for over-simplification, but Prof. Walker unfortunately fails to mention many factors that contribute to the weakness of Thai democratic institutions.
Most obvious is the military itself. How can an analysis of a military coup fail to note the central role of military? The Thai military since 1932 appointed itself main role in judging governments — both elected and royal — and removing those that fail to meet the military’s own definition of satisfactory performance. In the process, the military, especially the army, has become a vast network that not only has more generals than the US army, but controls many state enterprises, radio stations, television stations and a huge budget out of proportion to any external threat. Analysis of most of Thailand’s coups would show that a key factor in most of them has been a threat (or at least a perceived threat) to the military or a key faction in the military. Prime Minister Thaksin’s effort to influence the military promotions in 2006 is one example. Repeated military coups are the main reason for the weakeness of Thai democratic institutions, not the monarchy or the Democrats.
One reason the military has been able to acquire such power (aside from having most of the organized firepower) is failure of elected Thai politicians from almost all parties, most definitely including the Democrats, to perform honestly and effectively. That failure is due, at least in part, to Thai voters being willing to re-elect politicians who provide local benefits even though dishonest and undemocratic means have been used to be able to give out those benefits. Since Prof. Walker is knowledgeable about the changes in political and economic thinking of the rural population he should have given us some insights into why rural voters, despite being better educated and more interested in political affairs, have often supported many of the amoral politician-businessmen in the Pheua Thai party (and other parties). Why did rural voters fail to see (or care) that the rice support policies proposed by Pheua Thai will lead to increased national debt and will ultimately unsustainable?
Prof. Walker fails to mention the crucial role that violence has played in weakening democratic institutions. The Yellow Shirts used violence to seize airports and government buildings, weakening the government in power. Some elements within the Red Shirts used violence in both 2009 and 2010 to undermine the Abhisit government. Opponents of the movement led by Suthep have used violence against the demonstrators (more than 20 killed) and some of Suthep’s hired guards have used violence against perceived threats. This use of violence, allowed to persist by the politicization and incompetence of the police, has undermined rule of law and credibility of elected government. Police ineffectiveness has also enabled the military to expand its already huge role in internal security and allowed the military to claim that it intervened to prevent further violence (in both 2006 and 2014). The viable threat of the use of violence by the military, of course, is ultimately what makes coup possible.
Prof. Walker’s short analysis gives no role to the actions of Yingluck’s government in leading the way to the coup. The pre-dawn approval of a blanket amnesty bill (after a last minute switch in the terms of the amnesty), seemingly aimed at bringing her brother back to Thailand without serving the court sentence for abuse of power, not only launched Suthep’s mass demonstrations, but also undermined support for her government among the Red Shirt movement. Reduced Red Shirt enthusiasm for Yingluck may have emboldened both Suthep and the military.
The Yingluck government expensive policies (rice pledging, transport infrastructure and flood prevention) that appear to allow easier corruption at the expense of heavier national debt undermined support for elected government by the middle-class that pays the majority of Thailand’s income tax.
Another key mistake by Yingluck was the dissolution of Parliament even though the example of 2006 made it likely that Democrat Party would again boycott. This put the government in caretaker mode that led to the failure to pay rice farmers in the pledging program, to the election problems and to the perception of a power vacuum.
Given widespread perception of corruption and incompetence of elected politicians, it would seem that no royal role is needed to explain why the credibility of elected politicians has been undermined. How does praise for a virtuous monarch undermine equally virtuous elected leaders? Leaders are only undermined by their own immorality and incompetence.
Short-sighted self-interest by almost all involved in Thai politics seems a factor in Thailand’s failure to develop more stable and trusted institutions.
The distrust of Thaksin-backed govternment by the urban educated encouraged courts to assume greater and greater power, often by legally questionable judicial activism such as the removal of Prime Minister Yingluck for relatively minor abuse of power. This, along with the nullification of election, led to perception of a power vacuum that the military could fill. No mention of this by Prof. Walker.
Prof. Walker makes much of the King’s formal “endorsement” of coup governments. Others often cite this to support arguments, which otherwise lack clear evidence, that the monarch was secretly behind the coup and supported the military. No one ever talks about the fact that the King also formally endorse all elected governments and formally appoint all elected prime ministers. No one sees this as evidence that the King was secretly behind the elections and support the winning party. It seems possible that the King’s policy, over his long rule, has been simply to extend formal approval to whatever government, elected or not, has de facto control of the country. What was the alternative — to denounce coup leaders Sarit, Pibulsonggram, Thanom, Suchinda, Surayud and Prayuth? That might have been a democratically idealistic policy, but I suspect it would have meant the end of the monarchy and the exile of the royal family long before now.
It also seems strange that analysts such as Prof. Walker have become more insistent on the supposed political power of the monarchy as the current King plays a less and less active role in national affairs — or even royal affairs.
Perhaps Prof. Walker’s analysis was made before Gen. Prayuth gave his explanation of a process leading back to elections. In any case, his comment on “no talk of elections” is no longer true. There is much talk about the processing leading to elections. Whether or not the coup leaders will keep to this process, is still to be seen.
Prof. Walker is correct that Thailand’s democracy is in a “parlous state” but his focus on only two of the many factors involved make his analysis seem superficial. A more balanced, nuanced and detailed analysis would be welcome. Perhaps if Prof. Walker produce a longer video or wrote a substantial article or responded to these comments, he would be able to do that.
Dissonance in Malaysia-Japan relations
Actually we in Malaysia already noticed that one side was talking cat and the other side, talking dog, when the Look East Policy was set up, and in the years that ensued. Malaysia looked East and saw Japan. Japan looked West and saw USA, even though it was further seeing USA in the West than if they too had looked East. In both cases we knew they could not see Malaysia.
So Ayame Suzuki, not having noticed what Malaysians had long known about the dissonance of the first LEP would, expectedly be unaware of the talk cat-talk dog issues involved there, and is to be excused for thinking that talk security-talk economics is the first dissonance.
Kaypohchee
Songsuda Yodmani and the 2014 coup
[…] Media commentator Pavin Chachavalpongpun took her comments up. He notes that during her father’s military dictatorship, the relationship between the U.S. and Thailand was close: […]
Belief in One God
The reality is that Ahmadiyah and Shi’ite Muslims are persecuted, and occasionally killed, in Indonesia. The State-supported Ulama follow the principles of the Shaf’i school of Islam which states that Amadiyah Islam is heretical. Mainstream Sunnis in the Middle-East may tolerate Shi’a Islam, but Sunni Islamic exegesis regards Shi’a Islam as heretical, irrespective of the thousands
of Iranians in Indonesia and Malaysia, and the excellent nation-to-nation relations between Indonesia/Malaysia and Iran, which has invested $ 250 Million USD in ideological and political propagandising in Southeast Asia. There are several issues here: 1) Can Sunni Islam in Indonesia (and Malaysia) accommodate a minority sect that Qur’anic exegesis says if heretical, according to hukum Shari’a ?; 2) If Ahmadiyah and Shi’ite Muslims can be accommodate, if not actually accepted as full citizens, is this a decision to be made on hukum Shari’a grounds or a political decision made by the State ?; 3) Is the State willing to honour its own Constitution and protect ALL religions, including minority Muslims, which are guaranteed the right of practice of faith by the Indonesian Constitution; 4) Does the State, Muslim organisations, Muslim parties, and individual Indonesians regard hukum Shari’a and Qur’anic exegesis as superseding
civil law and the right of ALL Indonesians to practice their faith freely in a democratic society ?; 5) If it is believed that Islamic Law and Qur’anic exegesis have precedence over civil and secular laws and institutions, is Indonesia sill a secular nation, a partly
secular nation, or an Islamic nation, or even an Islamic state ?; 6) If civil law and secularism (in the Indonesian variant of Pancasila or something analogous) have precedence over Islamic Law and Qur’anic exegesis, then why are Ahmadiyah and Shi’ite Muslims persecuted and why is the Indonesian Constitution not respected, vis-a-vis the right of all Indonesians to practice their faith freely and Indonesian civil and Islamic institutions set-up to protect the right of all Indonesians, including Ahamdiyah and Shi’ite Muslims, to be protected from persecution, as they practice their faith ?
Duality has long existed in Indonesia; it is an integral part of Indonesian society. However, today, such an arrangement may not work in the interests of those least able to defend themselves, culturally and religiously. As Brunei now has Hudud laws for all Bruneians, and Malaysia is wracked with racial and religious conflict, with weak institutions capable of resolving religious and racial issues, the question becomes: Is Indonesia sufficiently prepared to address the question of what type of nation it is ?
And is Indonesia prepared to be the type of nation, that its Constitution sets forth for it, that is, a nation for ALL Indonesians, where freedom of religion (as well as many other freedoms) is both guaranteed, protected, honoured, and most importantly,
respected.
Songsuda Yodmani and the 2014 coup
Mr. Green Jeans perceptive recognition of General Prayuth’s agricultural acumen is appreciated. Can’t wait to see images of the General decked out in his chao ban blues, taking in the harvest.
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
Oh dear, “Do you live in Thailand? Do you have a wide range of Thai contacts? ” this is so tiresome…. one gets the impression that your time in and with all your Thai contacts are not exactly behooving you Matt…
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
This just in, Joe Gordon has been summoned by the Junta. This is not Not-the-nation!
Return to the fold
Notice Thein Sein attire among the $3000 suited ASEAN leaders ?
Anyone that believe or expecting Myanmar to “come back to the fold” has better think again especially knowing:
1) What he said about Rohingyas
2) Understanding what exactly SG Than Shwe (Ret) “Discipline Democracy” meant.
Shwedagon is for sale, incidentally.
Songsuda Yodmani and the 2014 coup
Did you see the latest Bangkok Post about Thailand’s great rice harvest. They imply that this is because the coup happened, that is to say: Good Prayuth, Bad Yingluck.
But they really should give the Junta more credit than that. For the first time in history, thanks to Prayuth, farmers have been able to grow a crop of rice from seed to harvest in less than 10 days.
Nobody disagrees that rice pledging was bad policy, but now Prayuth wants to institute price controls in order to make Thai’s happy.
Good luck with that.
After the coup
Eric – there must be a lot more resistance happening in the North than we are being told, for an international Golf Tournament such as this to be cancelled : http://www.nationmultimedia.com/sports/Chiangmai-Classic-postponed-after-Thai-unrest-30235437.html
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
Andrew articulates what many of us feel – he provides a sound analysis. The only bit not mentioned that interests me is the extent of disagreement and even conflict within the Royal network, and what implications that may have.
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
Chris Beale #4. Thais are free to register themselves wherever they like but there are two reasons why rural Thais working away from home tend to remain registered where they were born: 1) practical difficulties of getting a tabien baan at the address of rented accommodation, which requires the cooperation of the owner who often doesn’t want it on the record that he is renting out property,and the need to re-register on moving to new accommodation; 2) an emotional attachment to the home village which they hope to return to one day. However, rural Thais who become affluent enough in the city to buy their own property will normally re-register there without hesitation.
If authorities could somehow find a way to force registration in the current place of residence, it would make for smaller electorates in villages and larger numbers of voters of rural origin in cities, tourist resorts etc. Personally I wouldn’t want to hazard a guess as to whether that would make a material difference to election results. On the other hand giving Burmese workers votes might make a difference in Phuket and Samui, where Thai is rapidly becoming a minority language!
Songsuda Yodmani and the 2014 coup
Khun Songsuda is also well known for defending her father’s brutal and greedy dictatorship. No need to pan her. She is the best promoter the anti-coup group could hope to find.
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
All these talking-heads are great and I would imagine that Andrew Walker and his academic colleagues are doing all they can to highlight their own expertise but there are two very important questions that must be addressed if this endless analysis is to have much meaning
1) What political action will be necessary to defeat the Thai junta and their associates in the anti-democracy alliance?
2) What is the role of intellectuals – if any – in helping achieve that?
If the answer to 2) is nothing other then career-enhancing monologues then 1) becomes an irrelevance.
Video: Andrew Walker on latest Thai coup
As usual – very high quality analysis from Andrew.
I’ve only got one question. Recently on NM there was a post stating that the electoral system is distorted by the fact that voters are registered in their place of birth, i.e. their family origin home – rather than where they are currently living at the time of an election. This of course gives electoral weight to the North, especially Isarn, that it would not under a system which registered voters according to where they are currently living (or so it was argued). I’m just wondering what Professor Walker’s thoughts are on this.