I like Chris’s work. I used one of his images on my course guide this year. Some of it is confronting and some of it makes me uncomfortable (and I have seen it have that effect on others). I don’t think it is unreflexive, but we are certainly reflecting on it here. That’s good.
Per your suggestion and link, I looked at Coles “Re-incarnated German Sex Tourist Soi Dog at Soi Cowboy” painting and accompanying text. ( http://tinyurl.com/cjk3t2x )
It seems to me you’ve entirely missed Coles’ ironic overlay, ambiguity, subtext and complex, elliptical style. I find his portrait of the Soi Dog to be rather charming. The eyes are so plaintive. He seems a bit lost. Clearly in need of some attention, but after all is now a dog.
Malays in Malaysia came from the the Malay Archipelago – refers to the archipelago between mainland Southeastern Asia and Australia. The name was derived from the anachronistic concept of a Malay race.
So even if their origin is Indonesia during Parameswara time or before Melacca and any other states in Malaysia was established; they were only moving around their own region. Chinese and Indians did not originate from this region and were immigrants in those days. But all that is in the past and now we are all citizens of Malaysia. Chinese and Indians are not discriminated against basic human rights to live and practice their religion and culture in Malaysia. What has happend is the Malays and Bumiputeras are given special privileges from education, leadership and economic perspective to ensure the economy pie is spread more equally amongst all races. This may or may not have been the best way to manage the country but it was done. Moving forward hopefully we can look beyond race and give merit where its due especially in education. In term of religion, yes special privileges are given to Islam as it is the religion for the Malays but this does not discriminate others from practicing their religion.
I don’t have access to all the author’s data, but I would be surprised if migrant labourers were included in the calculation of the Gini for Thailand. If they were, I presume it would strengthen the argument about Thailand’s relatively poor performance on inequality (and underline the point about the large size of Thailand’s agricultural workforce).
I see AW has yet to respond specificly to your querry. But it is improtant. I imagine you are interested as you have embedded interest in migrant workers’ affair.
I do not have the benefit of reading the book or deep basic undrstanding of the issue. But it does seem that that elephant in the room is simply skirted around.
The farms in Northern Thailand are tended by Burmese (generic) peasants who are allowed to contribute but not to be taken in these statistics.If Burma gets fithy rich and these people do to need to come any more, the Thai farming as well as basic industry system would just have to bring in others to fill in this invisible slave strata.
And these are all calculated by finance alone with no reference to social and environmental loss which are uncountable and therefore, for academics, do not matter until a crisis happens.
Whatever is the system and earining power, so long as it is based on exploitation of less fortunate human or irreversible damage to the land one lives on, there will be finite expery time.
Thanks Keith. The argument of the book is that Thailand has been less successful than Malaysia in dealing with inequality. In general I agree but, as I indicate in the review, I think a stronger focus on the crucial 1980s (when the difference between the two countries was most marked) would have been beneficial. The book makes it clear that one of the key point of difference is the percentage of the labour force in agriculture – considerably higher in Thailand than in Malaysia. Given this argument, I thought there was some tension/ambiguity/ambivalence evident in the book’s citing of “peasant squeezing” actions as evidence of the Thai state’s failure on inequality. As I write at the end of the review “De-agrarianisation often isn’t very pretty, but economic disparity may well be the price to be paid for pursuing it as slowly as Thailand has over the past 50 years.”
How could Thailand have pursued the transition more effectively? I would put education high on the list together with much more effective rural industrialisation/enterprise development (rather than low-impact OTOP-style initiatives). Of course the big picture is the pace and style of industrialisation. As the book points also point out Malaysia (not to mention the developmental state examples you mention) has had a considerably more energetic and successful industry policy. I find Rick Doner’s discussion of this in The Politics of Uneven Development useful:
The underlying problem was Thailand’s weak engineering base: ‘the country’s ability to absorb new technologies and to raise the capacities of indigenous firms was much more limited than in the NIC’s at a similar stage in their development.’ Thailand’s more sophisticated manufactured exports came from foreign, not domestic, firms; the latter are heavily oriented to the domestic market and have much lower technical capabilities. The weakness of Thai-owned and managed companies, were confirmed by a 1999 Thai Ministry of Industry survey’s conclusion that most Thai firms competed mainly at the low end of global markets, where value added and product differentiation are minimal. Perhaps most troubling are Thai weakness in supporting industries – plastic parts and mold production – whose mid-range technology, relatively low entry barriers, and significant demand from foreign assemblers in autos and electronics make them reasonable, if not ideal niches in which upgrading might occur.
Well, Marc, it seems you don’t find Coles’ work pleasing to your eye, taste, mind or moral standards. However, others find them interesting enough to buy his book, go to his shows and purchase his paintings. Such is the nature of art.
Surely Walker is making a rhetorical point, to make clear how discordant with Kuhonta’s analysis his treatment of Pak Mun is. If anything the victims of dam construction there represent the have-nots in the inequal distribution of income in Thailand that Kuhonta addresses in his book, whether or not one finds his comparative explanation with Malaysia credible.
Thanks Rupert for the link. The pictures and the texts are even below my worst expectations though. One of the most ridiculous descriptions can be found here: http://tinyurl.com/cjk3t2x
All I am seeing is that Chris is depicting brothels and bars with additional, and often ludicrous, information on the presmises and the girls.
What is the difference between Chris and dozens of other websites on the internet describing the red light areas in Bangkok?
One might get the impression that Chris only uses his pictures as excuse to talk about sex workers in Thailand.
Second, why is New Mandala promoting this kind of “expat hanging out in seedy bars in Bangkok and calls his pictures art”?
There is a common cliché on Thailand in the Western world: Sex industry and (white male) sex tourists. This cliché is manifested by the fact that a blog on Southeast Asia is promoting unreflexive pictures on the red light district in Bangkok.
Have you looked at Coles’ book, Navigating the Bangkok Noir? There are about a hundred of his paintings and quite a bit of text. While many people might not enjoy or like or even want to look at the paintings plus read the text, I think it’s a stretch to call either Coles, the paintings or the book “simple-minded”.
There’s a version online if you don’t have a copy already: http://goo.gl/9nlMx
One might like it or not -that is the good thing about “art”. For an academic blog however, Chris’ work is too simple minded. Referring constantly to Emil Nolde and Berlin is just another cheap way to set the “Bangkok noir” artist in a more elaborate veneer and to get some credentials.
By the way, everyone who actually knows a bit about Berlin in the 1920s would blatantly reject the attempt to compare Bangkok (present) and Berlin (1920s). The context, even concerning the commercialization of sex, is quite different.
I am astoundd to see how much time some folk are spending writing to an audience of about 18.
However I will add a point. When comparing odious strong men of history and the present none come near to the evilness of those behind the present project to destroy life on Earth, better known as Global Warming.
We will better serve humanity by identifying those behind the project of unlimited economic growth and expansion of capital ( are they the bankers & big business moguls perhaps?) and destroying their power.
[…] latest review of Imagining Gay Paradise: Bali, Bangkok and Cyber-Singapore is in Mandala. It’s an online academic journal so put on your thinking cap if you read it. But the writer has […]
“Paths to Development In Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China and Indonesia.”
By Tuong Vu.
Cambridge University Press.
2010.
p. 247-248, *original italics*:
“For communist parties in China and Vietnam, repression was inseparable from state building. Mass campaigns were designed not only to destroy class enemies but also to set up local state structures staffed by loyal cadres. It was not a few hundred or even thousands of counterrevolutionaries who were shot. It was a *percentage* of the total population *planned in advance* to be executed in the case of Vietnam’s “land reform”. Furthermore, most of those killed were only *potential* enemies as a *social class*, not individual opponents of the regime.
The systematic character of repression in these states is found not only in the way they defined their enemies but also in the way violence was organized. Similar to Suharto’s Indonesia where local military commanders collaborated with local Muslim groups to mass-murder or imprison every suspected communist, the struggle against potential regime enemies in China and Vietnam was launched in *every* village and urban neighbourhood. The victims of state violence did not go to district or national capitals to protest and be shot by the police; violence was *brought* to them in their homes and often carried out by neighbours or members of their own families.
The kind of repression carried out by most authoritarian regimes pales in contrast with these cases. Most authoritarian regimes can kill their opponents or suppress occasional antigovernment demonstrations, but few dare to define their enemies in systematic terms.”
Spoil them with “Kong Thun Moo Bann” A village A Fund, a money from lay people-middle-income’ tax, which they didn’t have to repay (hope they will spend on buying a new cell phone and pay for AIS service?). Funnelling money from lottery to head of monk in rural temples (a very influent on voters) for free (some even ask for the promised money they didn’t recieve from TRT MPs ). A very tricky business of Taksin’s money, and not too difficult to understand why only Taksin understand them most?
Also, AW’s suggestions regarding specific and sound state policies for encouraging rural industrialization would need to be situated within an analysis of the actual capacities of the Thai government for effective implementation of developmental state policies– along the lines of South Korea, Taiwan, etc.
AW writes: “Isn’t Thailand’s inequality problem largely a result of a peasantry that has been insufficiently displaced? Doesn’t the fundamental failure of the Thai state lie in the fact that it hasn’t pushed hard enough to move people out of agriculture and into industry?”
Andrew: I doubt that you are arguing for a revitalization of elite land grabbing in Thailand.
So, what specific state policy interventions are you suggesting, for encouraging a shift of rural Thai farmers out of agriculture?
Andrew, can you clarify whether (as I assume) migrant workers are not included in calculations of the Gini coefficient? According to the IOM, as of 2011 “approximately 3.1 million migrants working in Thailand… comprise about 8 per cent of the labour force.” To the extent that migrants are not included in Gini calculations, it seems that the state can bring about a relatively lower Gini coefficient among the politically more consequential national population, while maintaining much higher inequality between nationals and migrants. In so far as that’s the case, can it be said that state efforts to simultaneously 1) tackle inequality and 2) foster economic growth depend on building up a population of politically less-consequential (i.e. democratically excluded) population of migrants?
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Would you like Tsa Pi with that?
├С’chin for drinking water & Hka for water/river etc.
German expressionism and the Bangkok night
I like Chris’s work. I used one of his images on my course guide this year. Some of it is confronting and some of it makes me uncomfortable (and I have seen it have that effect on others). I don’t think it is unreflexive, but we are certainly reflecting on it here. That’s good.
German expressionism and the Bangkok night
Re: Marc
Per your suggestion and link, I looked at Coles “Re-incarnated German Sex Tourist Soi Dog at Soi Cowboy” painting and accompanying text. ( http://tinyurl.com/cjk3t2x )
It seems to me you’ve entirely missed Coles’ ironic overlay, ambiguity, subtext and complex, elliptical style. I find his portrait of the Soi Dog to be rather charming. The eyes are so plaintive. He seems a bit lost. Clearly in need of some attention, but after all is now a dog.
Evidence of racism in Malaysia?
Malays in Malaysia came from the the Malay Archipelago – refers to the archipelago between mainland Southeastern Asia and Australia. The name was derived from the anachronistic concept of a Malay race.
So even if their origin is Indonesia during Parameswara time or before Melacca and any other states in Malaysia was established; they were only moving around their own region. Chinese and Indians did not originate from this region and were immigrants in those days. But all that is in the past and now we are all citizens of Malaysia. Chinese and Indians are not discriminated against basic human rights to live and practice their religion and culture in Malaysia. What has happend is the Malays and Bumiputeras are given special privileges from education, leadership and economic perspective to ensure the economy pie is spread more equally amongst all races. This may or may not have been the best way to manage the country but it was done. Moving forward hopefully we can look beyond race and give merit where its due especially in education. In term of religion, yes special privileges are given to Islam as it is the religion for the Malays but this does not discriminate others from practicing their religion.
Review of The Institutional Imperative
I don’t have access to all the author’s data, but I would be surprised if migrant labourers were included in the calculation of the Gini for Thailand. If they were, I presume it would strengthen the argument about Thailand’s relatively poor performance on inequality (and underline the point about the large size of Thailand’s agricultural workforce).
Review of The Institutional Imperative
I see AW has yet to respond specificly to your querry. But it is improtant. I imagine you are interested as you have embedded interest in migrant workers’ affair.
I do not have the benefit of reading the book or deep basic undrstanding of the issue. But it does seem that that elephant in the room is simply skirted around.
The farms in Northern Thailand are tended by Burmese (generic) peasants who are allowed to contribute but not to be taken in these statistics.If Burma gets fithy rich and these people do to need to come any more, the Thai farming as well as basic industry system would just have to bring in others to fill in this invisible slave strata.
And these are all calculated by finance alone with no reference to social and environmental loss which are uncountable and therefore, for academics, do not matter until a crisis happens.
Whatever is the system and earining power, so long as it is based on exploitation of less fortunate human or irreversible damage to the land one lives on, there will be finite expery time.
Review of The Institutional Imperative
Thanks Keith. The argument of the book is that Thailand has been less successful than Malaysia in dealing with inequality. In general I agree but, as I indicate in the review, I think a stronger focus on the crucial 1980s (when the difference between the two countries was most marked) would have been beneficial. The book makes it clear that one of the key point of difference is the percentage of the labour force in agriculture – considerably higher in Thailand than in Malaysia. Given this argument, I thought there was some tension/ambiguity/ambivalence evident in the book’s citing of “peasant squeezing” actions as evidence of the Thai state’s failure on inequality. As I write at the end of the review “De-agrarianisation often isn’t very pretty, but economic disparity may well be the price to be paid for pursuing it as slowly as Thailand has over the past 50 years.”
How could Thailand have pursued the transition more effectively? I would put education high on the list together with much more effective rural industrialisation/enterprise development (rather than low-impact OTOP-style initiatives). Of course the big picture is the pace and style of industrialisation. As the book points also point out Malaysia (not to mention the developmental state examples you mention) has had a considerably more energetic and successful industry policy. I find Rick Doner’s discussion of this in The Politics of Uneven Development useful:
German expressionism and the Bangkok night
Well, Marc, it seems you don’t find Coles’ work pleasing to your eye, taste, mind or moral standards. However, others find them interesting enough to buy his book, go to his shows and purchase his paintings. Such is the nature of art.
Review of The Institutional Imperative
Surely Walker is making a rhetorical point, to make clear how discordant with Kuhonta’s analysis his treatment of Pak Mun is. If anything the victims of dam construction there represent the have-nots in the inequal distribution of income in Thailand that Kuhonta addresses in his book, whether or not one finds his comparative explanation with Malaysia credible.
German expressionism and the Bangkok night
Thanks Rupert for the link. The pictures and the texts are even below my worst expectations though. One of the most ridiculous descriptions can be found here: http://tinyurl.com/cjk3t2x
All I am seeing is that Chris is depicting brothels and bars with additional, and often ludicrous, information on the presmises and the girls.
What is the difference between Chris and dozens of other websites on the internet describing the red light areas in Bangkok?
One might get the impression that Chris only uses his pictures as excuse to talk about sex workers in Thailand.
Second, why is New Mandala promoting this kind of “expat hanging out in seedy bars in Bangkok and calls his pictures art”?
There is a common cliché on Thailand in the Western world: Sex industry and (white male) sex tourists. This cliché is manifested by the fact that a blog on Southeast Asia is promoting unreflexive pictures on the red light district in Bangkok.
German expressionism and the Bangkok night
Re: Marc
Have you looked at Coles’ book, Navigating the Bangkok Noir? There are about a hundred of his paintings and quite a bit of text. While many people might not enjoy or like or even want to look at the paintings plus read the text, I think it’s a stretch to call either Coles, the paintings or the book “simple-minded”.
There’s a version online if you don’t have a copy already: http://goo.gl/9nlMx
German expressionism and the Bangkok night
One might like it or not -that is the good thing about “art”. For an academic blog however, Chris’ work is too simple minded. Referring constantly to Emil Nolde and Berlin is just another cheap way to set the “Bangkok noir” artist in a more elaborate veneer and to get some credentials.
By the way, everyone who actually knows a bit about Berlin in the 1920s would blatantly reject the attempt to compare Bangkok (present) and Berlin (1920s). The context, even concerning the commercialization of sex, is quite different.
Counterpunch: Pol Pot wasn’t so bad
I am astoundd to see how much time some folk are spending writing to an audience of about 18.
However I will add a point. When comparing odious strong men of history and the present none come near to the evilness of those behind the present project to destroy life on Earth, better known as Global Warming.
We will better serve humanity by identifying those behind the project of unlimited economic growth and expansion of capital ( are they the bankers & big business moguls perhaps?) and destroying their power.
Review of Imagining Gay Paradise
[…] latest review of Imagining Gay Paradise: Bali, Bangkok and Cyber-Singapore is in Mandala. It’s an online academic journal so put on your thinking cap if you read it. But the writer has […]
Counterpunch: Pol Pot wasn’t so bad
“Paths to Development In Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China and Indonesia.”
By Tuong Vu.
Cambridge University Press.
2010.
p. 247-248, *original italics*:
“For communist parties in China and Vietnam, repression was inseparable from state building. Mass campaigns were designed not only to destroy class enemies but also to set up local state structures staffed by loyal cadres. It was not a few hundred or even thousands of counterrevolutionaries who were shot. It was a *percentage* of the total population *planned in advance* to be executed in the case of Vietnam’s “land reform”. Furthermore, most of those killed were only *potential* enemies as a *social class*, not individual opponents of the regime.
The systematic character of repression in these states is found not only in the way they defined their enemies but also in the way violence was organized. Similar to Suharto’s Indonesia where local military commanders collaborated with local Muslim groups to mass-murder or imprison every suspected communist, the struggle against potential regime enemies in China and Vietnam was launched in *every* village and urban neighbourhood. The victims of state violence did not go to district or national capitals to protest and be shot by the police; violence was *brought* to them in their homes and often carried out by neighbours or members of their own families.
The kind of repression carried out by most authoritarian regimes pales in contrast with these cases. Most authoritarian regimes can kill their opponents or suppress occasional antigovernment demonstrations, but few dare to define their enemies in systematic terms.”
Counterpunch: Pol Pot wasn’t so bad
Well, the other 800 kg gorillas present in Southeast Asia included the USSR and China.
The rebellion of Thailand’s middle-income peasants
Spoil them with “Kong Thun Moo Bann” A village A Fund, a money from lay people-middle-income’ tax, which they didn’t have to repay (hope they will spend on buying a new cell phone and pay for AIS service?). Funnelling money from lottery to head of monk in rural temples (a very influent on voters) for free (some even ask for the promised money they didn’t recieve from TRT MPs ). A very tricky business of Taksin’s money, and not too difficult to understand why only Taksin understand them most?
Review of The Institutional Imperative
Also, AW’s suggestions regarding specific and sound state policies for encouraging rural industrialization would need to be situated within an analysis of the actual capacities of the Thai government for effective implementation of developmental state policies– along the lines of South Korea, Taiwan, etc.
Review of The Institutional Imperative
AW writes: “Isn’t Thailand’s inequality problem largely a result of a peasantry that has been insufficiently displaced? Doesn’t the fundamental failure of the Thai state lie in the fact that it hasn’t pushed hard enough to move people out of agriculture and into industry?”
Andrew: I doubt that you are arguing for a revitalization of elite land grabbing in Thailand.
So, what specific state policy interventions are you suggesting, for encouraging a shift of rural Thai farmers out of agriculture?
Review of The Institutional Imperative
Andrew, can you clarify whether (as I assume) migrant workers are not included in calculations of the Gini coefficient? According to the IOM, as of 2011 “approximately 3.1 million migrants working in Thailand… comprise about 8 per cent of the labour force.” To the extent that migrants are not included in Gini calculations, it seems that the state can bring about a relatively lower Gini coefficient among the politically more consequential national population, while maintaining much higher inequality between nationals and migrants. In so far as that’s the case, can it be said that state efforts to simultaneously 1) tackle inequality and 2) foster economic growth depend on building up a population of politically less-consequential (i.e. democratically excluded) population of migrants?