PHOTO: MAY CO NAING

Ethnic solidarities in Myanmar: coalitions or movement?

The social revolution bound up in the resistance to the coup has opened, in a partial yet meaningful way, avenues for Myanmar to transcend entrenched racial and class dynamics.

This post is an adapted version of an article that appears in a special edition of the Journal of Contemporary Asia on “Revolution and Solidarity in Myanmar” (Vol 54 No 5).

Before the 2021 military coup, solidarity between the Bamar majority and other ethnic groups in Myanmar was scarce. Successive governments and military regimes failed to address ethnic demands for an inclusive nation leading to over 70 years of conflict. The political transition during the 2010s did little to alter perceptions of Bamar dominance and eroded ethnic trust in the National League for Democracy (NLD) as a political partner.

The 2021 coup marked a radical rupture, as cooperation between the Bamar-led pro-democracy movement and the country’s ethnic armed forces became essential to defeating the military. Many revolution leaders and ordinary Bamar have expressed solidarity for the ethnic struggle, challenging Bamar supremacy. Pencilo, a writer with millions of followers, stated in a now-deleted Facebook post in 2022 that: “Before the coup d’etat, … I was influenced by chauvinism and the propaganda of military dogs. After the coup, my thoughts changed completely. I started to see ethnic grievances and resentment.”

Building on the concept of a “revolutionary situation” and Burman-ness as racial and class privilege, we ask: how have new forms of Bamar solidarity towards other ethnic groups challenged unequal structures of racial privilege since the coup?

Our argument draws on David Graeber’s claim that revolutionary moments disrupt “unequal structures of imaginative identification” and open up new “horizons of possibility.” Evidence from semi-structured interviews we conducted with 18 participants from 11 different ethnicities, indicates that this claim has found some confirmation in Myanmar’s revolutionary situation.

We argue that Myanmar’s “revolutionary situation” has catalysed a profound rethinking of racial views. Mona El-Gobashy’s conceptualisation of a revolutionary situation as a fundamental shift in power relations fits with the Myanmar crisis, where the majority’s engagement with ethnic demands represents a major rupture. This shift is reflected in emerging processes of solidarity-building, both institutionally and from the grassroots. Revolutionary institutions have become more inclusive, demonstrating a higher sensitivity to ethnic concerns. Moreover, the unprecedented grassroots resistance to the coup highlights a deep societal transformation.

We conceptualise these evolving inter-ethnic dynamics as revolutionary responses to entrenched ethnic and class supremacy. Central to this transformation is the class contradiction of racial privilege, which opens up the “possibility of solidarity” across racial divides. Following Graeber, we contend that this revolutionary situation has disrupted the structures of Bamar supremacy, enabling many Bamar to view the world from an “unfamiliar” perspective.

To assess the quality of changes in Bamar attitude towards ethnic minorities, we propose a solidarity-building spectrum inspired by Mario Diani’s distinction between “coalition networks”, which are temporary, and goal-oriented and “movement networks”, which are rooted in shared goals and a sense of collective identity. These two types of networks represent the opposite ends of the spectrum. Between the instrumental focus of a coalition network and the deep commitment to social justice of a movement network, we identify two intermediate levels of solidarity: empathy and privilege awareness.

In our article recently published in a special edition of the Journal of Contemporary Asia on revolution in Myanmar, we explore whether the new forms of solidarity that have emerged since the coup extend beyond instrumentalism, empathy or privilege awareness. We argue that a commitment to social justice holds the potential to transcend ethnic divides and foster new political identities, which in turn increases the likelihood of establishing a functional alternative political order.

Institutional solidarity-building: instrumental coalitions

Our findings indicate that institutional solidarity-building in post-coup Myanmar largely reflects an instrumental “coalition network”. Political collaborations between the Bamar elite and ethnic stakeholders have introduced unfamiliar forms of institutional solidarity primarily through the National Unity Government (NUG), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the NUG’s foundational document, the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC). These institutions have demonstrated some awareness of ethnic concerns, but responses remain mixed. While some interviewees acknowledged the NUCC as a significant institutional advancement, many respondents have criticised the NUG for perpetuating Bamar dominance.

The NUG’s rushed formation, dominated by NLD figures in key decision-making roles while most ethnic ministers were relegated to deputy roles with limited authority, raised doubts about its priorities. A Kachin politician observed to us that “the NUG is the only option we have (…) but I don’t know how much we can change them. Most Bamar ministers have no experience with dialogue on federalism and the ethnic nationalist movement.” Moreover, many respondents saw the NUG’s efforts to legitimise itself, including apologies for past injustices and the symbolic recognition of Rohingya citizenship, as attempts to gain international support rather than expressions of genuine solidarity.

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Some interviewees highlighted the inconsistency of two NUG ministers, pointing to their denial of the Rohingya genocide during the NLD’s tenure. As a Rohingya respondent put it: “The ones who are in decision-making positions are the ones who lied when in power”. While subsequent steps, including the appointment of a Rohingya to the NUG cabinet and apologies by one of the ministers, marked progress, scepticism remains.

In addition, several interviewees noted that while the FDC presents an ambitious federal vision reflecting ethnic demands for greater autonomy and inclusion its vague terms and the slow pace of constitution drafting undermine its potential. Positive federal policies, such as those in health and education service provision, demonstrate the NUG’s progress in sharing resources without interfering with local delivery.

Yet entrenched structures of privilege appear largely unchanged. As a Zomi activist observed: “Instead of coming together to form a federal system, the Bamar think they are the owner of the country, that federalism will happen if they are willing to give it.” Overall, despite moves that are “unfamiliar” to pre-coup discourse, most interviewees view institutional solidarity building as instrumental and still tied to Bamar supremacy.

People-led solidarity-building: from empathy to commitment to social justice

We also explored how individual or collective expressions of solidarity challenge “unequal structures of imaginative identification” and whether they signal a “movement network”. Our analysis focuses on the solidarity efforts of four Bamar sociopolitical groups: the political elite, social media influencers, progressive groups, and the public.

Many interviewees viewed political leaders as motivated by instrumentalist goals rather than a genuine commitment to addressing Bamar supremacy. While some revolution leaders like Min Ko Naing expressed empathy for minority oppression, contrasting with previous Bamar elite indifference, several respondents saw this as opportunistic. They doubted the elite’s ability to comprehend the ethnic desire for freedom.

Many social media influencers, reflecting on their previous blindness to ethnic struggles, apologised or recognised their privilege in response to the military’s crackdown. For instance, activist Me Me Khant tweeted in 2021 that: “For the amount that my privilege has sheltered and provided me, I pledge to work twice more for our collective liberation.” Some interviewees recognised these influencers’ potential to cultivate empathy and raise awareness of privilege among their large followings. However, many felt that solidarity attempts with the Rohingya in particular, appeared performative. As an internally-displaced Rohingya interviewee noted, social media influencers who “did not risk their lives in the protests and first expressed empathy and apologies to the Rohingya after the coup, (…) are only respecting the views of their followers.”

In contrast, respondents identified two Bamar progressive groups—civil society activists and People Defence Forces (PDF) soldiers—as promoting a “movement network” with transformative potential. Interviewees noted that some young Bamar activists, such as Thet Swe Win, who were critical of the NLD before the coup, have a clearer understanding of structural inequalities than politicians. As one Tavoyan activist put it: “People are not just against the military coup, but they fight against any discriminatory structure. Ethnic people suspect they are being used for political gains, so we need this kind of work to build trust.”

However, some respondents were sceptical, believing the chauvinistic mindset ingrained in Bamar society might limit trust in these activists. In contrast, most trusted the PDFs’ empathy and commitment to social justice. In Karen State, reciprocal empathy developed as PDF soldiers, initially seeing the Karen as insurgents, were treated kindly and realised their misconceptions. Meanwhile, the Karen community is working to convince older generations that young Bamar PDF soldiers are trustworthy. A KNU liaison officer suggested that this change in attitude will last, as it is rooted in “unity, friendliness, and understanding developed on the ground level”. Other respondents hoped that many will return to their own lives after the revolution, with the capacity to influence the majority.

Many respondents believed that the coup has prompted the Bamar public to reflect on their privilege and the need for social transformation. A Rohingya respondent argued that public apologies to the Rohingya challenged notions of racial supremacy: “We never expected to have apologies. Now, they [the Bamar majority] are treating people equally (…). Before, because they are Bamar, they feel it is their country (…). Now they understand citizenship. It is a good change of mindset.” One Kachin politician added that solidarity extended further: “this enabled the Bamar public to move beyond empathy and realise the need for political and societal change by rejecting a Bamar-led military regime while accepting the idea of multiculturalism.”

However, interviewees generally felt that the Bamar public’s awareness of privilege remains limited, with progressive views largely confined to the younger generation and a small segment of the population. Changes in attitude may also be superficial, especially among those living away from conflict zones. Additionally, some pointed out that sustaining any transformation in attitudes will require robust political institutions and an equitable education system that avoid perpetuating systemic inequalities. At the same time, some interviewees believed that the younger, progressive generation lacked the authority needed to advance solidarity effectively.

Diverging imaginations of the future

Finally, we explored how these forms of solidarity shape resistance actors’ imaginations of the future and what “horizons of possibility” they have opened.

First, the institutional dynamics of a “coalition network” reveal a long-standing horizontal majority–minority divide. Despite forming coalitions, deep divisions persist over the role of revolutionary institutions and whose interests they should prioritise. For instance, the polarisation between the old-guard Bamar leadership and the more inclusive NUCC on procedural matters stalled the constitution drafting, exposing diverging visions of political authority. While these divergences limit institutional solidarity, they have not hindered military cooperation. In addition, ethnic armed actors also have diverging visions of the future with various degrees of support (or lack thereof) for the revolution and differing intra-state dynamics. These divergences also impact institutional solidarity, but the coordinated inter-ethnic offensive against the military since late 2023 may signal a more unified ethnic front, with the potential to change the conflict’s trajectory. Yet, it remains unclear if these efforts can move beyond the instrumental goal of defeating the military from politics and address inter-ethnic mistrust.

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Second, the dynamics of the people-led “movement network” highlight a vertical divergence in imaginations of the future between conservative Bamar leadership and progressive groups. Bamar PDF soldiers in Karen State criticised the leadership for failing to move beyond instrumentalism and called for further steps towards a just society. In our interviews, their commitment to federalism sometimes appeared to surpass their loyalty to the NUG: “We, the youth, will work with ethnic groups to attain their goal if federalism is denied,” said one solider. At the same time, the diversity of PDFs also implies that others may have different political ideologies and personal opinions.

Old patterns of inter-ethnic relations are being challenged, with Gen Z’s progressive views forming a “movement network” advocating for social justice and an end to racial domination. Yet, the imagination of a collective identity that transcends ethnic categories remains problematic as ethnic categories are not contested—and may have become more firmly entrenched.

Nonetheless, the Bamar group’s internal divide also reflects a class cleavage between ordinary citizens and the elite, a cleavage that also exists within minority groups. This is a positive shift for social emancipation because the potential for class solidarity between Bamar and non-Bamar ordinary citizens represents a new horizon that Myanmar’s revolutionary situation has opened. Although ethnic categories themselves are enduring, the possibility of a conversation on privilege and class solidarity represents a significant rupture from the past. They are key to the re-imagination of racial views.

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