I believe it’s just a procedural question, which should demonstrate how much a state of justice Thailand is. But the effect for Da Torpedos suffering will be Zero.
The KIO/KIA see the Burmese-Kachin conflict in racial terms and so they refused the CPB’s assistance in the 1970s. So did the Kokangs who mutinied against the CPB in 1989. Now where are they? The KNU is the first to fight on racial ground for secession since 1949 and they failed miserably. The Burma Army will stay in power so long as the ethnic armed groups in Burma base their struggles on racial basis. All rthnic groups should fight on the basis of democratic principles for equality, justice and fraternity.
Whether there is a coup or no coup, the anti-coup people, especially the reds, are ready for it. Of course, they are also waiting to see if the coup will get the usual “blessings” just like the latest one in 2006.
People are getting smarter now and can easily see who will benefit from the coup. They also know they get short-changed despite the rhetorics announced in the electronic media by the coup-makers.
Now the would-be coup leaders will have to think hard of what to do if people carry out the 10-point advice that Thida just issued.
We still seem to be on schedule for parliamentary elections in the next few months so it’s worth thinking who would benefit from a coup before these. (Afterwards is a different question altogether which obviously depends on the results.)
First, and the most obvious is the PAD who must now realize that their parliamentary hopes are unlikely to be realized. Without a Thaksin threat most of their mass support disappears or moves to the Democrats.
Second would be the UDD. If after their campaign for an even earlier election, the loss of life and arrest of their leaders, the population didn’t give their political allies either a majority or leadership of a coalition, it will seem to point to a defeat of their aims. This was why the Korat by-election was so intertesting.
The above may explain some of the statements being made during the last few weeks.
I really don’t believe there will be a military coup this year, and that’s because nothing will happen while the current coalition government holds sway and the military generals and admirals keep getting everything they can reasonably expect. For example, funding for Prem’s “birthday gift” project of the 70 billion baht armored calvary military base in Khon Kaen seems assured, and aren’t there also two German-made submarines in the procurement package?
However, I for one would be one of the thousands of protesters in the streets if they do attempt one. The key difference is the Red Shirt movement, which didn’t exist in 2006, and I do not believe the Army generals can really trust their own troops to engage in the crackdown that would be necessary to put down the popular revolt that would result. One or two hand picked battalions, yes, could be relied upon to initiate the coup, but not the rest of the Army necessary to sustain it once the masses take to the streets and start seizing provincial halls and government buildings (again as they did in May 2010). And of course, the Royal Thai Police, who are also well armed, could not be relied upon to take any action against the populace and might prove quite obstructionist.
Thought provoking in many ways. I had never looked at these numbers from that particular angle. Fascinating that since ’32 there have been three occasions when it was (~imprecisely) 14 years between “drinks”. And those are the only three occasions when it took more than six years for somebody to pull the trigger. Itchy trigger fingers for years 4, 6 and 14?!?
I think the reason you have 13 and not more is that your list counts the “successful” interventions since ’32. I think there were also coup “attempts” of one sort or another in 1912, 1917, 1949, 1951 (Manhattan), 1958 (self-coup?), etc. As ever, it depends how they get counted.
Any New Mandala readers who can put other interesting numbers on these matters will be more than welcome to jump in. And if anyone wants to counter the 48% chance of a coup in 2011 claim they can certainly feel free to show us their numbers…
As an aside, I once examined all of Thailand’s coup attempts in the 20th and 21st centuries to see if there were any discernible patterns that could make sense astrologically or in other ways. A curious little research sideline, I know. It turns out that they are distributed pretty evenly across the days of the week, times of the month, etc, and, at least with my modest exposure to such esoteric matters, I couldn’t discern any strong patterns (if they exist). And ambiguities about when a coup “starts” and “ends” only further muddied the waters.
Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Saturdays seem, I recall, to be favoured days. And I suppose everyone will, at the moment, keep an eye out for 9s…or 10s…
[…] the issue now, as she is facing jail time under increasingly harsh LM/Online Censorship laws: Interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, editor of Prachatai.com Also worth noting on New Mandala is the story about Fu-Fu's promotion to Air Force […]
Interesting that in Thai coup reports there is almost always no real indication of the political implications. Probably because it matters not a wit whether it’s General Chaiyasit or General Prem cooking it up, since the result is a foregone conclusion for us mere mortals who are content to earn an honest living. Let the lot of them rot in their own self-created hell! The best way to avoid violence in Thailand is to make damned sure we are not acting the martyr while the ‘elite’ sit back and pull our strings. We can send a much more powerful message to the stupid elite if we sit back and ignore their pathetic amateur dramatics.
This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation I have done on the probability of a coup in 2011.
Below are listed all the coups since 1932 (we are told there are 17 but I can only find references to 13) and the length of time between coups together with the average and standard deviation.
Assuming a normal distribution, I reckon there is a 48% chance of a coup this year.
Year Length of time between coups
1932
1933 1
1947 14
1951 4
1957 6
1971 14
1973 2
1976 3
1977 1
1977 0
1981 4
1985 4
1991 6
1992 1
2006 14
average length of time between coups: 5.29 years
standard deviation: 5.06
The KIO had an agreement with the CPB in 1968 which resulted in the KIA getting several hundred weapons. The agreement lasted 4 months. The KIO then fought the CPB until the mid 1970s.
After 1967 Chinese riots in Rangoon where thousands of innocent Chinese were slaughtered by the Burmese mob the CPB North-East military region started receiving massive Chinese military support in both weapons and so-called red-guard volunteers.
Even the anti-Communist KIA received the weapon assistance from the Chinese Communist through CPB. But later KIA refused CPB assistance and started negotiations with the Burmese Army. This is what CPB’s People Power Journal wrote about the thinking and rational of then KIA’s leader Maran Branseng.
If we keep on fighting, in the long run the Burmese will survive but we Kachins will cease to exist. There are more than 30 millions Burmese while we have less than one million Kachins. Even if we could kill ten Burmese for one Kachin at the end there will still be 20 millions Burmese but no Kachin left standing. We don’t want to fight a long war with Burmese.
That was in 1979. There were no Chinese investments in Kachin Land. Now nobody knows how much China has poured into those 18 hydro electric projects in the area. Conservative estimate is more than a billion dollar. Chinese will definitely not give rifles and ammo to KIA.
If Kachin-Burmese war breaks out again how long will it last and who will suffer ultimately?
[…] This post was mentioned on Twitter by freakingcat and kaewmala, New Mandala. New Mandala said: Interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, editor of Prachatai.com: This interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, edit… http://bit.ly/f0SQvp […]
Chis Beale has alerted me to 2 important errors in my (short) post #2
firstly it seems I mispelt Fu Fu as Foo Foo, ooops please forgive me
secondly I foolishly referred to the website of the Royal Thai Navy whereas of course Fu Fu, like his step-Dad, is a full or perhaps part time officer of the Royal Thai Air Force
again I ask if anyone can advise if Fu Fu is referenced/recognised on the RTAF website?
Steve:
That is exactly what I was referring to. Might you contact me directly at [email protected], if possible, to advise how I might “obtain” the very helpful material you produced? As well, does anyone have any idea whether a Thai language Word version exists?
Many thanks to all…
Frank
The Kachin News Group‘s new report has some details that may help to answer one of the key questions. Apparently:
KIA sources also said Brig-Gen Zeyar Aung, commander of Northern Regional Command, based in the Kachin capital, Myitkyina, told the KIA that he did not order the troops to enter KIA territory, but that the intrusion was an accident.
If it was a false start on the part of the local Burmese Army commander then he, and his men, sure did pay a high price for the error. And if this was some deliberate effort to test whether the KIA is actually prepared to defend its territory then I guess Zeyar Aung and his tacticians have their answer. Tense times.
I am slightly surprised that already seven or eight centuries ago we have in southeast Asia modern territorial states! I thought that the idea of territorial sovereignity was an invention following the peace treaty of westpahalia.
The anecdotes and some comments point into one important direction, which, however, should be though about a bit more. There is always and everywhere a complain that teachers or prof. for that matter are not sufficiently qualified. This is, to some degree, true everywhere. There is a law of nature, quite similar to the laws of gravity or thermodynamics that you have about one third of person doing an excellent job (far more then required), one third that do a proper job and one third that shouldn’t be there. You can’t change it! The important issue is thus not to try to get three thirds doing an excellent job, as this is simply impossible! Important is, which group is dominant, and how can it be achieved that at least those doing a proper job define the niveau.
Another, quite similar law of nature is that if politicians, bureaucrats or business (impact factors!) define what should go on at universities, then, surely the lowest third will become dominant. There are many highly qualified persons in southeast Asian universities. The important issue is, what are the structures that limit their impact, and how can these be changed. As a matter of fact, this issue is not limited to Malaysia or Thailand!
…well speak of the Devil and he appears…….ThanongK’s reply to the Eisel piece as seen on Twittter……..
======================================
ThanongK
This means that Eisel has missed the key player in Suvarnabhumi. I want to laugh.
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Court win for Da Torpedo
I believe it’s just a procedural question, which should demonstrate how much a state of justice Thailand is. But the effect for Da Torpedos suffering will be Zero.
Long shadow of war in Kachin State
The KIO/KIA see the Burmese-Kachin conflict in racial terms and so they refused the CPB’s assistance in the 1970s. So did the Kokangs who mutinied against the CPB in 1989. Now where are they? The KNU is the first to fight on racial ground for secession since 1949 and they failed miserably. The Burma Army will stay in power so long as the ethnic armed groups in Burma base their struggles on racial basis. All rthnic groups should fight on the basis of democratic principles for equality, justice and fraternity.
Coup talk in Thailand
Quite likely ‘YABZ’ is reading it all wrong.
What if in Thailand’s case ‘Military regimes’ are the norm and the ‘democratically elected regimes’ are the aberrations?
Coup talk in Thailand
Whether there is a coup or no coup, the anti-coup people, especially the reds, are ready for it. Of course, they are also waiting to see if the coup will get the usual “blessings” just like the latest one in 2006.
People are getting smarter now and can easily see who will benefit from the coup. They also know they get short-changed despite the rhetorics announced in the electronic media by the coup-makers.
Now the would-be coup leaders will have to think hard of what to do if people carry out the 10-point advice that Thida just issued.
Coup talk in Thailand
We still seem to be on schedule for parliamentary elections in the next few months so it’s worth thinking who would benefit from a coup before these. (Afterwards is a different question altogether which obviously depends on the results.)
First, and the most obvious is the PAD who must now realize that their parliamentary hopes are unlikely to be realized. Without a Thaksin threat most of their mass support disappears or moves to the Democrats.
Second would be the UDD. If after their campaign for an even earlier election, the loss of life and arrest of their leaders, the population didn’t give their political allies either a majority or leadership of a coalition, it will seem to point to a defeat of their aims. This was why the Korat by-election was so intertesting.
The above may explain some of the statements being made during the last few weeks.
Coup talk in Thailand
I really don’t believe there will be a military coup this year, and that’s because nothing will happen while the current coalition government holds sway and the military generals and admirals keep getting everything they can reasonably expect. For example, funding for Prem’s “birthday gift” project of the 70 billion baht armored calvary military base in Khon Kaen seems assured, and aren’t there also two German-made submarines in the procurement package?
However, I for one would be one of the thousands of protesters in the streets if they do attempt one. The key difference is the Red Shirt movement, which didn’t exist in 2006, and I do not believe the Army generals can really trust their own troops to engage in the crackdown that would be necessary to put down the popular revolt that would result. One or two hand picked battalions, yes, could be relied upon to initiate the coup, but not the rest of the Army necessary to sustain it once the masses take to the streets and start seizing provincial halls and government buildings (again as they did in May 2010). And of course, the Royal Thai Police, who are also well armed, could not be relied upon to take any action against the populace and might prove quite obstructionist.
Coup talk in Thailand
Thanks yabz,
Thought provoking in many ways. I had never looked at these numbers from that particular angle. Fascinating that since ’32 there have been three occasions when it was (~imprecisely) 14 years between “drinks”. And those are the only three occasions when it took more than six years for somebody to pull the trigger. Itchy trigger fingers for years 4, 6 and 14?!?
I think the reason you have 13 and not more is that your list counts the “successful” interventions since ’32. I think there were also coup “attempts” of one sort or another in 1912, 1917, 1949, 1951 (Manhattan), 1958 (self-coup?), etc. As ever, it depends how they get counted.
Any New Mandala readers who can put other interesting numbers on these matters will be more than welcome to jump in. And if anyone wants to counter the 48% chance of a coup in 2011 claim they can certainly feel free to show us their numbers…
As an aside, I once examined all of Thailand’s coup attempts in the 20th and 21st centuries to see if there were any discernible patterns that could make sense astrologically or in other ways. A curious little research sideline, I know. It turns out that they are distributed pretty evenly across the days of the week, times of the month, etc, and, at least with my modest exposure to such esoteric matters, I couldn’t discern any strong patterns (if they exist). And ambiguities about when a coup “starts” and “ends” only further muddied the waters.
Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Saturdays seem, I recall, to be favoured days. And I suppose everyone will, at the moment, keep an eye out for 9s…or 10s…
This old post may thus prove relevant.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, editor of Prachatai.com
[…] the issue now, as she is facing jail time under increasingly harsh LM/Online Censorship laws: Interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, editor of Prachatai.com Also worth noting on New Mandala is the story about Fu-Fu's promotion to Air Force […]
Coup talk in Thailand
Interesting that in Thai coup reports there is almost always no real indication of the political implications. Probably because it matters not a wit whether it’s General Chaiyasit or General Prem cooking it up, since the result is a foregone conclusion for us mere mortals who are content to earn an honest living. Let the lot of them rot in their own self-created hell! The best way to avoid violence in Thailand is to make damned sure we are not acting the martyr while the ‘elite’ sit back and pull our strings. We can send a much more powerful message to the stupid elite if we sit back and ignore their pathetic amateur dramatics.
Coup talk in Thailand
This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation I have done on the probability of a coup in 2011.
Below are listed all the coups since 1932 (we are told there are 17 but I can only find references to 13) and the length of time between coups together with the average and standard deviation.
Assuming a normal distribution, I reckon there is a 48% chance of a coup this year.
Year Length of time between coups
1932
1933 1
1947 14
1951 4
1957 6
1971 14
1973 2
1976 3
1977 1
1977 0
1981 4
1985 4
1991 6
1992 1
2006 14
average length of time between coups: 5.29 years
standard deviation: 5.06
Long shadow of war in Kachin State
The KIO had an agreement with the CPB in 1968 which resulted in the KIA getting several hundred weapons. The agreement lasted 4 months. The KIO then fought the CPB until the mid 1970s.
Long shadow of war in Kachin State
Kachin-Burmese War again? How long will it last?
After 1967 Chinese riots in Rangoon where thousands of innocent Chinese were slaughtered by the Burmese mob the CPB North-East military region started receiving massive Chinese military support in both weapons and so-called red-guard volunteers.
Even the anti-Communist KIA received the weapon assistance from the Chinese Communist through CPB. But later KIA refused CPB assistance and started negotiations with the Burmese Army. This is what CPB’s People Power Journal wrote about the thinking and rational of then KIA’s leader Maran Branseng.
If we keep on fighting, in the long run the Burmese will survive but we Kachins will cease to exist. There are more than 30 millions Burmese while we have less than one million Kachins. Even if we could kill ten Burmese for one Kachin at the end there will still be 20 millions Burmese but no Kachin left standing. We don’t want to fight a long war with Burmese.
That was in 1979. There were no Chinese investments in Kachin Land. Now nobody knows how much China has poured into those 18 hydro electric projects in the area. Conservative estimate is more than a billion dollar. Chinese will definitely not give rifles and ammo to KIA.
If Kachin-Burmese war breaks out again how long will it last and who will suffer ultimately?
Interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, editor of Prachatai.com
[…] This post was mentioned on Twitter by freakingcat and kaewmala, New Mandala. New Mandala said: Interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, editor of Prachatai.com: This interview with Chiranuch Premchaiporn, edit… http://bit.ly/f0SQvp […]
Air Chief Marshall Fu Fu’s promotion gets leaked
Chis Beale has alerted me to 2 important errors in my (short) post #2
firstly it seems I mispelt Fu Fu as Foo Foo, ooops please forgive me
secondly I foolishly referred to the website of the Royal Thai Navy whereas of course Fu Fu, like his step-Dad, is a full or perhaps part time officer of the Royal Thai Air Force
again I ask if anyone can advise if Fu Fu is referenced/recognised on the RTAF website?
The Devil’s Discus – in Thai
Steve:
That is exactly what I was referring to. Might you contact me directly at [email protected], if possible, to advise how I might “obtain” the very helpful material you produced? As well, does anyone have any idea whether a Thai language Word version exists?
Many thanks to all…
Frank
When in doubt, wear red
р╣Др╕Юр╕гр╣И will be a fashionable label in Siam Square before the year is out. Simply a “must have” for every well heeled hi-so celebre.
Long shadow of war in Kachin State
The Kachin News Group‘s new report has some details that may help to answer one of the key questions. Apparently:
If it was a false start on the part of the local Burmese Army commander then he, and his men, sure did pay a high price for the error. And if this was some deliberate effort to test whether the KIA is actually prepared to defend its territory then I guess Zeyar Aung and his tacticians have their answer. Tense times.
Cambodia is not a province of Thailand
I am slightly surprised that already seven or eight centuries ago we have in southeast Asia modern territorial states! I thought that the idea of territorial sovereignity was an invention following the peace treaty of westpahalia.
Bumiputera graduate unemployment and Malaysia’s world class education system – a recipe for disaster
The anecdotes and some comments point into one important direction, which, however, should be though about a bit more. There is always and everywhere a complain that teachers or prof. for that matter are not sufficiently qualified. This is, to some degree, true everywhere. There is a law of nature, quite similar to the laws of gravity or thermodynamics that you have about one third of person doing an excellent job (far more then required), one third that do a proper job and one third that shouldn’t be there. You can’t change it! The important issue is thus not to try to get three thirds doing an excellent job, as this is simply impossible! Important is, which group is dominant, and how can it be achieved that at least those doing a proper job define the niveau.
Another, quite similar law of nature is that if politicians, bureaucrats or business (impact factors!) define what should go on at universities, then, surely the lowest third will become dominant. There are many highly qualified persons in southeast Asian universities. The important issue is, what are the structures that limit their impact, and how can these be changed. As a matter of fact, this issue is not limited to Malaysia or Thailand!
Cambodia is not a province of Thailand
…well speak of the Devil and he appears…….ThanongK’s reply to the Eisel piece as seen on Twittter……..
======================================
ThanongK
This means that Eisel has missed the key player in Suvarnabhumi. I want to laugh.