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I have just paid the residents of my soi to manufacture and deliver a pre-emptive pardon to the highest authority in the land. Most of said soi residents have no idea who I am, and have never actually seen me, It appears, however, that they like both the color of my money and the swashbuckling manner with which I tell them complete porkies about how rich I am going to make them all. (There really is no point in giving charity unless one is completely assured of an eventual heavy return on the investment.) The idea is that I will be able to walk scot-free the next time I am caught red-handed in King Power.

I am not in any sense a specialist on the Deep South of Thailad. Most all of my research has been on Islam in Indonesia and on the compartive study of ethnic and religious conflict. I was in the region for a brief time a couple of weeks ago. I would appreciate any comments on the following tentative observations.

Ponkok were described as the “core” “center” and “heart” of the Malay-Mus;im community. The absence of mass Muslim organizations such as the Indonesian NU and Muhammadiyah is striking.

Pondok range from quite modern, inter-net savy “schools” that teach at least 50% secular subjects to very traditional schools that teach only religius subjects and rely heavily on Jawi text.

The pattern of attacks on institutions and persons, Buddhist monks, Thai Gov schools by Muslims, and Pondok, Mosques and Imams by Buddhists is typical of religious violence throughout the world.

Theoretical literature would lead to the hypothesis that separitist insurgency and communal violence are merging. This is a very dangerous sign.

The Thai authorities appear to be contemptuous of Muslim-Malays describing them as simple people not much interested in civilization. They focus development activities on subsistence agriculture, fish and poultry production and speak of “winning hearts and minds”

This combined with efforts to arm and train Thai-Buddhist paramilitaries do not bode well for the future.

I am familiar with trans-national jihadi movements and saw andheard almost nothing to indicate that these figure significantly in the conflict.

Does the title “Taksin” instead of “Thaksin” point to royal aspirations on behalf of the man?

“…what is considered to be appropriate activity for monks changes over time, both in and out of politics.”

Not just over time, but within the sangha at any given time. Looking to Burma there has been a lot of international attention on the involvement of monks in the September 2007 protests. Some observers saw this as the legitimate expression of Buddhism while those monks who chose not to participate must have been either afraid or illegitimate “government monks.”

However, one of the most respected monks in the country, U Nyanissara (Sitagu Sayadaw) locked the doors of his monastery during the protests and forbid resident monks from leaving to participate in the protests. This has not led any widespread dismissal of him as a “government monk.”

Also, Burma’s 2008 constitution has a clause (Chapter IX art. 2a) which forbids members of “religious orders” from voting. Some observers have seen this as an attempt to disenfranchise monks who “clearly” side with the opposition. However, this clause was also put in the 1947 constitution (Chapter VI art. 76.4) reportedly at the request at the time of the sangha itself in order to keep the sasana untainted by politics.

There’s also divergence on this issue between sects, like the Thudhamma and Shwegyin; the former having no official prohibition against involvement in politics while the latter having made an explicit policy to stay out of politics.

But even within a given sect there is divergence. For example, U Thuzana, nominal head of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army is a member of the Shwegyin sect, although in his role as head of the DKBA he is clearly much involvement in politics. At the same time however, U Thuzana enforces an explicit regulation of “no politics” at his compound in Myaing Gyi Ngu (which also happens to be the DKBA headquarters). The late Thamanya Sayadaw was also in the Shwegyin sect and enforced a “no politics” policy around his hermitage on Mount Thamanya, but his ‘politics’ (i.e. photo taken with Suu Kyi and reported rebuff of Khin Nyunt) have been much commented on.

Thomas Borchert wrote: “I would suggest that what is considered to be appropriate activity for monks changes over time, both in and out of politics”

Great post. Someone should definitely write an objective history of monks supporting Thaksin. Include the extrajudicial killings of the “Drug Wars” by all means, too.

Monks of Theravadan Buddhist lineages have been involved in politics for two millenia (See Mah─Бvih─Бra and Abhayagiri) largely to secure patronage and survive as a monastic lineage.

But that is history not theology (empirically vs. normative).

Most monks would no doubt agree that involvement in politics and affairs in the “mundane path or world” (lokiyamagga) would only hinder their progress towards higher spiritual goals, particularly if they ended up legitimizing killing during as Phra Kitthivuttho did during the Cold War or other Thaksin supporting monks did by supporting extrajudicial killing during the so-called “Drug War.”

Yes. But I think the point is that this is a young girl who is going out for a cake being greeted by senior officials. Obama has quite a different political role. I guess one would compare her better with Princess Anne’s daughter going out rather than to the president of a major country.

Excellent essay, Tom. You’ve encapsulated a great deal of information in this short piece, and while certainly you’d qualify it were it a longer essay, this is admirable.

I wonder about one reference, in which you point out the recent liberal fascination with monks doing liberal activism, such as the ordination of trees, etc. Having read Andrew Walker and Tim Forsyth’s book fairly recently, I’m reminded of some of the horrendous attitudes expressed by such monks towards the shifting cultivators of the upland plateaus (Tai and non-Tai alike). Such an attitude, which is rarely included in descriptions of such monks by westerners, certainly makes the issue of monkish political beliefs a bit more complex.

I wonder if framing this question with primary reference to current Thai political troubles necessarily deforms any general answers we might arrive at were the question frame comparatively, or more generally. It seems that perhaps the political beliefs that monks have, or indeed that any normal person in Thailand (or Cambodia, or anywhere else, really) have, do not neatly map onto the supposed liberal-conservative, red-shirt-yellow-shirt divides.

Thanks again for this post.

Several years agao, during a meeting of the Malysian Social Science Association, one person said, after a long, rather inconclusive discussion of development, globalizatioon, post-modernity etc. “I think, we should have again a look at Marx”. Although after 1989, the sucess of deregulated globalization and the popularity of post-modernism as well as “post-colonialism”, there was a general consensus that socialism is now out, the need for marxist analysis and socialist politics in Southeast Asia (including Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and elsewhere is evident. Neither as dogmatic or exegetic approach, but as an analysis addressing the issue: Socialism or barbarism. This can provide a meaningful base for comparative studies as well as critical praxis. The initiative in Malaysia should be followed.

Erratum: Sinohydro didn’t construct the Three Gorges project, it was only involved in doing so.

Susie,

I’m not sure how the multilateral initiative you reference could be ‘taken’ as part of the bilateral communication between the Mississippi River Commission and the Mekong River Commission given that the MRCs would presumably be more focused on water resource management as opposed to the broader issues of “economic development in the Mekong sub-region as well as health and education” that the Greater Mekong Sub-region summits focus on.