Pagan was not a “failed” King just because you say so and I did not say “he only built pagodas”. Ne Win is hardly comparable to King Pagan; that you would compare the two is pitiful. You seem to be impressed with Nats which do go back to the Pagan era, but not impressed with the Pagan era itself. You are confusing me (rather hard to do) with Moe Aung or other Burmese latent nationalists, as I made no comment on Burmese cockfighting at all in my prior posting. Please read it again. Make up your mind and thank you for Myanmar 101. If I need expert opinion of merit, Professor David Steinberg lives three blocks away from me. Perhaps the recent election has clouded your head with pre-nascent postmodernism. I assure you Myanmar has a very long way to go, and not because of King Pagan (Bagan).
He may have been a good soldier, but he certainly was not a good ruler. He created the basis for the rule of Than Shwe, — another lost generation for ordinary citizens.
Burmese culture has a list of ten qualities that make a good ruler. Did he have any of them? Or did the other military chief have them?
Dear Peter, I do not understand how you can praise a “failed” King like Pagan so much, just because he built pagodas. Even General Ne Win built a large pagoda, as he grew older. — Regarding cock fighting: it is an ancient and well established feature of Myanmar culture – at the lower end, where you also find Nat worship, toddy drinking, smoking of opium.– The fact that cock fihgting is not described in Western literature is quite irrelevant.
Many of the 37 Nats were addicted to cock-fighting (and drinking toddy), while they were still alive as human beings. This goes back at least to the Pagan era. Some of these Nats are quite popular. At the village level, it was (and still is) a popular past time. I think it may not be rare, even today.
Good on you, Sally. Glad it all went so smoothly and peacefully in the event with the right result. Hoping the actual transfer of power will happen just as smoothly and peacefully too.
They are just asking for freedom & democracy, not secession, the latter being against the law. Even so, why under Singaporean & Chinese (!!!) patronage?? I’m Penangite and the different races have grown up well together. And as a matter of fact, the Chinese in Penang no longer are in the majority. Even if they are, why is China in the equation?
Surely it would be rather remiss of us if we forget the ‘battleground’ both literally and metaphorically remains not so much the ethnic minorities facing the NLD as their having to grapple with the Tatmadaw.
Too much credit is given to the party in power very good at going through the motions replete with the trappings of parliamentary committees and the service of peace brokers but lacking the political will as the ethnic peoples themselves have expressed their opinion by way of the ballot box.
Chaiyasit was “kicked upstairs” to the Supreme Commander job in the October 2004 reshuffle, and was replaced as Army Chief by Prawit Wongsuwan. You can find a useful summary of the political maneuverings in Chambers’ “Knights of the Realm” on pages 259-60. Despite the name, the Supreme Commander position (in its post-1960 incarnation as a permanent position) is in fact less powerful and desirable than that of Army Chief. The OCtober 2104 reshuffle was primarily a victory of Prem over Thaksin, as they competed to stack senior military positions with factional allies.
Emjay – it is NOT AT ALL “hard to know what to say about the rice scheme”. What the entire episode reveals is the massive political chasm between the Lao Isarn masses – who have never really thought of themselves as Thai, and never really been accepted as such by Bangkok and southern Thailand. The latter justifiably take great umbriage at having to foot the bill for outrageously expensive populist policies benefitting those they not only look down on as peasants, but also look down on as barely Thai. Humpty Dumpty is broken, and all the kings men, and all the king’s horses can not put poor old Humpty back together again.
‘No chance of a viable counter-attack’ against the 2006 coup writes Farrelly in the full version of his shortened article here. But hang on – was n’t Thaksin close family relative General Chaisit, just about to be promoted from Army Chief to Supreme Commander of the entire miltary ?
It’s hard to know what to say about the rice pledging scheme.
Once one side or the other latches onto an issue to gain advantage it disappears into the fog of rhetoric, statistics and outright lies.
Obviously there was a lot more involved than the “several million baht” the article disingenuously refers to, but subsidies are not intended to be profitable and income redistribution programs for farmers operate everywhere in advanced economies and the costs of such are not usually viewed as “losses”.
The problem for Thai politics and the increasingly hollow discourse surrounding it is this endless round of corruption accusations volleyed back and forth like the victim games played in venues where identity politics have done a similar job of defusing real political conflict.
The bottom line has got to be the simple recognition that corruption is not the real problem in Thailand but merely a symptom of the much greater problem with rule of law, and beyond that the refusal of people like the author of this piece to get involved in a real political struggle for democracy in Thailand.
Thank you both for engaging; you make some good points. My argument here is not so much that ethnic people no longer have a voice without many of these ethnic parties but that they no longer have the same voice. Many ethnic parties have proved dynamic platforms for ethnic voices and inter-ethnic political engagement over recent years; emerging political visions have been built, to good effect, around specific ethnic rights and interests; they have worked to represent the margins from being marginalised culturally as well as politically by the centre. Without many of them many ethnic voices will struggle to be heard in the same way and I hope this implication came across.
Having said that, as I acknowledged in some detail in the final third of this post, ethnic parties have had and still have a significant influence on a whole range of issues and in a range of ways. Indeed, there is now nothing new about strong ethnic sub-committees at NPD and state levels working on ethnic rights, so there seems little doubt we will see these again. How these ethnic parties will mobilise on the margins remains to be seen but I feel, given the right support, we could be seeing some very positive developments on that front, especially within this more positive and permissive political context.
How the NLD will respond to this is perhaps still more interesting. In many ways ethnic politics has been reconstituted with these elections and it will take some time for the country to adjust to this, to view the NLD as another, just bigger ethnic party; above all, for the party itself to do so. I very much hope that it will change to reflect its membership; that its leadership will change to reflect it’s membership. But this is asking a lot at least in the short term, sustainable or not, despite what the pace of change might suggest. However, as you now point out Moe Aung, there are other proposed strategies for including ethnic voices which is an exciting prospect and a possible entry point for unrepresented ethnic parties; much will depend on the scale and practical commitment to such initiatives.
What is going to be particularly interesting is to observe how the NLD will work as a vehicle for minority voices and national transformation – a potential clash of interests for some issues, peoples and regions; if any one party can pull it off it is the NLD but much of the pressure will fall on NLD ethnic representatives pulled one way by the party and the other by the people. This would seem to be the new battleground for ethnic politics and one which ethnic parties and ethnic voices will be watching closely.
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Notes on a Naypyitaw cockfight
Pagan was not a “failed” King just because you say so and I did not say “he only built pagodas”. Ne Win is hardly comparable to King Pagan; that you would compare the two is pitiful. You seem to be impressed with Nats which do go back to the Pagan era, but not impressed with the Pagan era itself. You are confusing me (rather hard to do) with Moe Aung or other Burmese latent nationalists, as I made no comment on Burmese cockfighting at all in my prior posting. Please read it again. Make up your mind and thank you for Myanmar 101. If I need expert opinion of merit, Professor David Steinberg lives three blocks away from me. Perhaps the recent election has clouded your head with pre-nascent postmodernism. I assure you Myanmar has a very long way to go, and not because of King Pagan (Bagan).
Review of General Ne Win: A Political Biography
He may have been a good soldier, but he certainly was not a good ruler. He created the basis for the rule of Than Shwe, — another lost generation for ordinary citizens.
Burmese culture has a list of ten qualities that make a good ruler. Did he have any of them? Or did the other military chief have them?
Notes on a Naypyitaw cockfight
Dear Peter, I do not understand how you can praise a “failed” King like Pagan so much, just because he built pagodas. Even General Ne Win built a large pagoda, as he grew older. — Regarding cock fighting: it is an ancient and well established feature of Myanmar culture – at the lower end, where you also find Nat worship, toddy drinking, smoking of opium.– The fact that cock fihgting is not described in Western literature is quite irrelevant.
Many of the 37 Nats were addicted to cock-fighting (and drinking toddy), while they were still alive as human beings. This goes back at least to the Pagan era. Some of these Nats are quite popular. At the village level, it was (and still is) a popular past time. I think it may not be rare, even today.
A silent minority
Thanks Felix for spotting that one. It is SNLD – Shan ‘Nationalities’ League for ‘Democracy’ – as you point out.
Still better than Thaksin?
Hahaha, you lose emjay.
The tour group and the vote
Good on you, Sally. Glad it all went so smoothly and peacefully in the event with the right result. Hoping the actual transfer of power will happen just as smoothly and peacefully too.
Still better than Thaksin?
What Emjay ? A link for Humpty Dumpty ??!! You must be joking.
A rage against history
“…Thirty years ago the part played by Muslims inflicting evil on others in the world’s total misery was minimal. What share is it now?”
Wondering if this accounted for Muslims on Muslims violence (e.g sectarian violence, etc)
Wielding the pen as a torch for freedom
They are just asking for freedom & democracy, not secession, the latter being against the law. Even so, why under Singaporean & Chinese (!!!) patronage?? I’m Penangite and the different races have grown up well together. And as a matter of fact, the Chinese in Penang no longer are in the majority. Even if they are, why is China in the equation?
Wielding the pen as a torch for freedom
Penang should secede. Under Singaporean and Chinese patronage.
Royalty and democracy in Thailand
So Prem is to blame for Thailand’s subsequent mess ?
Still better than Thaksin?
Thanks for that Chris.
Do you have a link for that?
Keeping afloat after the ‘red wave’
Surely it would be rather remiss of us if we forget the ‘battleground’ both literally and metaphorically remains not so much the ethnic minorities facing the NLD as their having to grapple with the Tatmadaw.
Too much credit is given to the party in power very good at going through the motions replete with the trappings of parliamentary committees and the service of peace brokers but lacking the political will as the ethnic peoples themselves have expressed their opinion by way of the ballot box.
Going viral in Cambodian cyberspace
Interesting
Royalty and democracy in Thailand
Chaiyasit was “kicked upstairs” to the Supreme Commander job in the October 2004 reshuffle, and was replaced as Army Chief by Prawit Wongsuwan. You can find a useful summary of the political maneuverings in Chambers’ “Knights of the Realm” on pages 259-60. Despite the name, the Supreme Commander position (in its post-1960 incarnation as a permanent position) is in fact less powerful and desirable than that of Army Chief. The OCtober 2104 reshuffle was primarily a victory of Prem over Thaksin, as they competed to stack senior military positions with factional allies.
Still better than Thaksin?
Emjay – it is NOT AT ALL “hard to know what to say about the rice scheme”. What the entire episode reveals is the massive political chasm between the Lao Isarn masses – who have never really thought of themselves as Thai, and never really been accepted as such by Bangkok and southern Thailand. The latter justifiably take great umbriage at having to foot the bill for outrageously expensive populist policies benefitting those they not only look down on as peasants, but also look down on as barely Thai. Humpty Dumpty is broken, and all the kings men, and all the king’s horses can not put poor old Humpty back together again.
Royalty and democracy in Thailand
‘No chance of a viable counter-attack’ against the 2006 coup writes Farrelly in the full version of his shortened article here. But hang on – was n’t Thaksin close family relative General Chaisit, just about to be promoted from Army Chief to Supreme Commander of the entire miltary ?
Sex robots and the sex trade
“We hate most in others what we dislike in ourselves”
Still better than Thaksin?
It’s hard to know what to say about the rice pledging scheme.
Once one side or the other latches onto an issue to gain advantage it disappears into the fog of rhetoric, statistics and outright lies.
Obviously there was a lot more involved than the “several million baht” the article disingenuously refers to, but subsidies are not intended to be profitable and income redistribution programs for farmers operate everywhere in advanced economies and the costs of such are not usually viewed as “losses”.
The problem for Thai politics and the increasingly hollow discourse surrounding it is this endless round of corruption accusations volleyed back and forth like the victim games played in venues where identity politics have done a similar job of defusing real political conflict.
The bottom line has got to be the simple recognition that corruption is not the real problem in Thailand but merely a symptom of the much greater problem with rule of law, and beyond that the refusal of people like the author of this piece to get involved in a real political struggle for democracy in Thailand.
Keeping afloat after the ‘red wave’
Thank you both for engaging; you make some good points. My argument here is not so much that ethnic people no longer have a voice without many of these ethnic parties but that they no longer have the same voice. Many ethnic parties have proved dynamic platforms for ethnic voices and inter-ethnic political engagement over recent years; emerging political visions have been built, to good effect, around specific ethnic rights and interests; they have worked to represent the margins from being marginalised culturally as well as politically by the centre. Without many of them many ethnic voices will struggle to be heard in the same way and I hope this implication came across.
Having said that, as I acknowledged in some detail in the final third of this post, ethnic parties have had and still have a significant influence on a whole range of issues and in a range of ways. Indeed, there is now nothing new about strong ethnic sub-committees at NPD and state levels working on ethnic rights, so there seems little doubt we will see these again. How these ethnic parties will mobilise on the margins remains to be seen but I feel, given the right support, we could be seeing some very positive developments on that front, especially within this more positive and permissive political context.
How the NLD will respond to this is perhaps still more interesting. In many ways ethnic politics has been reconstituted with these elections and it will take some time for the country to adjust to this, to view the NLD as another, just bigger ethnic party; above all, for the party itself to do so. I very much hope that it will change to reflect its membership; that its leadership will change to reflect it’s membership. But this is asking a lot at least in the short term, sustainable or not, despite what the pace of change might suggest. However, as you now point out Moe Aung, there are other proposed strategies for including ethnic voices which is an exciting prospect and a possible entry point for unrepresented ethnic parties; much will depend on the scale and practical commitment to such initiatives.
What is going to be particularly interesting is to observe how the NLD will work as a vehicle for minority voices and national transformation – a potential clash of interests for some issues, peoples and regions; if any one party can pull it off it is the NLD but much of the pressure will fall on NLD ethnic representatives pulled one way by the party and the other by the people. This would seem to be the new battleground for ethnic politics and one which ethnic parties and ethnic voices will be watching closely.