Comments

  1. Lleij Samuel Schwartz says:

    While this is not the proper forum for an in-depth discussion of race and politics in America, for the benefit of those New Mandalans who are not knowledgeable in American politics, I must comment on George Thomas’ misinformation concerning the recent Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder. To claim that Shelby County v. Holder was a knee-jerk xenophobic reaction to changing American demographics and that it “guts” the VRA is disingenuous, and I say this as an American of mixed-race who has experienced the institutional racism of our society first-hand.

    In reality, Shelby County v. Holder was a, mostly failed, attempt to reign in the cynical use of the racial and/or ethno-religious gerrymandering that has been used to fuel American political machines since the days of Tammany Hall. It should be noted that the majority of these political machines are operated for the benefit of one major political party, the identity of which I shall leave the reader to surmise.

  2. Marcus Coll. says:

    First of all Yingluck cannot quit right away, if she does she is technically at fault and given the record of the Thai kangaroo courts she will be banned from politics for the next 5 years.

    Secondly, Suthep is clear, he does not want to be part of any negotiation. Literally he said: In this fight, defeat is defeat and victory is victory. “There is no tie and They’re (Suthep’s election losing allies) aware that we are the owners of Thailand”

    Suthep is not interested in any form of democracy. He want to appoint his cronies to run the country for at least two years.

    Neither you nor Suthep can negotiate the future of Thaksin, that should be done by the voters. If Suthep wants change, he should go out to rural Thailand and make the case. Maybe next time his party will win an election; but having a Thai university professor on stage asking to sexually assault Yingluck does not win him much votes. Not with rural people and not with city folks.

  3. John L says:

    I think it would be fairer to say if the French hadn’t colonized Laos, the Thais would have.

    There is a referendum on Scotland separating from the UK at the end of this year.

  4. neptunian says:

    “Will Thaksin, Yingluck & gang respond with violence and spite?”

    AS far as any reader of NM knows, the only people who have really perpetrated violence has been the “Yellow Shirts” and the Democrats. Not forgetting the order for “shoot to kill” by Suthep!

    Nobody is buying into your lies, so you might as well write something else. Something intelligent maybe?

  5. Michael MacLeod says:

    I realize that comments from a farang about Thai politics are presumptuous, at best, but I offer the idea that the one promise the caretaker gov’t should make is that it will cease now, and in the future, any efforts to restore the rights and access to the country – unless it includes completion of his prison sentence – of Thaksin Shinawatra. I don’t say that out of animus, but because that’s the singular act that might unify Thai people, something that is sorely needed to push the country forward toward a great destiny and to avoid real trauma and the possibility of calamity.

  6. George Thomas says:

    That’s because the Latinos will soon outnumber the Anglos. They won’t have to resort to violence. Spanish already is paired with English in many venues. Stores cater to Spanish speakers; in some places, English is simply not used. These places are far from the border with Mexico. The Anglos don’t like this, but they stopped having babies, they moved out of the region, and Spanish is now part of the increasingly dominant culture. Even our Anglo politicians love to strut out their awful Spanish. Sort of like listening to 90 percent of the American Embassy staff speaking Burmese.

  7. Peter Cohen says:

    Moe Aung,

    It is not the Tatmadaw that is encouraging a Rohingya ‘Jihad’ as you suggest. Outsiders
    are doing more than just egging on the Rohingya, who are actively supported by Bangladesh and Malaysia. The Tatmadaw don’t need any excuse to clamp down on all their opponents, Bamar or Rohingya. You cannot ignore history, and the British role in Burma (a backwater of India for the British civil service), the British role in India, and later the formation of East Pakistan and its transformation into Bangladesh, with whom the Rohingya share ethnicity, culture and religion, and have crossed into, from what is now Burma, for centuries (and crossed back).

    A civilised solution under the Tatamdaw is not possible with the Bamar people, let alone the multitude of ethnic minorities, of which the Rohingya are but one. Yes, re-integration into Burmese society is one approach, assuming the Rokingya want to re-integrate and assuming the Tatmadaw want them to, which are both doubtful.

    “It doesn’t help when the Rohingya spokesmen insist on a prior ‘historical’ settlement in the region.” That is exactly what they insist on as I have said before, and will continue to lay claim to Burmese territory, by force of arms if necessary, because they do not want to re-integrate into Burmese society, and the Tatmadaw doesn’t seem to want them to either.

    A solution to the Rohingya issue will happen only when there is a democratic government in Burma, which respects the rights of all Burmese, including the rights of the Bamar, which you seem to frequently infer need less or no protection from human rights abuses by their government.

  8. Simon says:

    A lot of Scots would like to try.

  9. I’m surprised that many of you endorse such a thing as an ethnic divide between Central Thai and Northerners and Isaan people. We speak the same language, different dialects, and have much pretty much the same culture. If it hadn’t been for colonialist intervention, Thailand and Laos would today be one country. Can you imagine trying to separate England and Scotland? Well, some people can, but would it be feasible?

  10. Moe Aung says:

    The irony here of course is that Texas, the largest US state after Alaska, came about practically the same way the Rohingya tried unsuccessfully in Western Burma – the rebellion of American settlers wresting the state successfully from Mexico. Now the chickens are coming home to roost. The Latinos however probably won’t be resorting to armed rebellion, will they?

  11. Nomi says:

    Not sure if this is the appropriate place for this post, but this is just a simple Thank You post. New Mandala has been a refuge for me, through times when pressures of differing opinions grew overwhelming – or more bluntly descend into blind vicious accusations and insults. It is good to have a place where differing opinions can be aired mostly in a civilized manner. Thank you very much.

  12. Nomi says:

    *sigh* Why do I get the impression that Vichai is being deliberately provocative? Surely it does not hurt to respond with a little more politeness?

    But, please, Vichai, do not attribute what you made of my words to me. Being totally exasperated by the repeated vicious cycle of the past decade, I look indeed to the highest most beloved authority for inspiration. And took to heart, the clean, concise, brilliantly simple image of His Majesty, chastising humbled Chamlong and Suchinda. It was, as you pointed out, brilliantly “unbeтАкlieveable simplicity”, that solution that ended the 92 crisis.

  13. Vichai N says:

    Applaud Suthep Thaugsuban, or, excoriate the Kamnan. But the Kamnan had succeeded thus far, with his very massive and very peaceful weeks-long protests, to make his point: the sister and brother Yingluck and Thaksin Shinawatra are deeply corrupt, the Shinawatras are deeply self-serving and conflicted in their conducts of the Thai PM office, and, the Thaksin ‘magic’ could only be downhill from now on.

    Whatever happens tomorrow with the Kamnan’s ‘Shutdown Bangkok’ protests will not change the collapse of the ‘House of Thaksin’. There may be violence and blood spilled tomorrow.

    The extremist Red/Black Shirt elements are certainly around. The Beast had not been tamed: A threatening message for Red followers to abduct General Prayuth’s twin daughters was posted on the Facebook page of Sudchai Boonchai, leader of the not well-known Thaksin’s Friends Group. ( http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/389211/abduction-threat-on-prayuth-daughters)

    When the indiscriminate violent attacks do come, the Thai people already know who are responsible. The Thai people will already know who is ‘The Maestro’. The Maestro and his black shirted henchmen will have to answer for any limbs or lives lost, for any building or structure torched, and, and for any lethal or grievous outrages to the citizens of Bangkok.

    Will Thaksin, Yingluck & gang respond with violence and spite? Could be. Thaksin & gang had certainly done it before (Year2010 Red/Black Shirts deadly rampage at Bangkok). But a second time around will just be one too many … and the repercussions/reprisals to the Shinawatras & gang is anything but predictable.

  14. Moe Aung says:

    Some reservations I have about the gospel:

    In particular it will require a substantial movement of labour out of agriculture and into other, more productive, sectors of the economy.

    A prescription by McKinsey for Burma too.

    Certainly the farming sector can be modernised and productive for both domestic consumption and exports. Farm mechanisation even lowtech can bridge the urban rural divide, a pressing issue in agricultural nations. The skew towards industrialisation and urban bias can be detrimental to such a country. Japan and Korea did not neglect their farmers leaving them in medieval circumstances. Megacities and SEZs have their downside, not just crowding and congestion but drugs and crime regularly attributed to the underclass.

  15. Bialao says:

    Thank you very interesting.

    “While it generated considerable debate among Thai economist, there is no evidence that it encouraged any sustained protest from farmers.”

    In the same period were there not a series of assassinations and persecution of people especially in the Northeast believed to be communist or communist sympathizers?

    Was the general atmosphere one where you could not protest, simply because it was too dangerous?

    Also did the punishing agricultural policy of the era encourage communist/socialist sympathies?

    I guess these questions are all trying to get at what impact on political sentiments these policies actually had, because I don’t think it is adequate to say “there is no evidence that it encouraged any sustained protest.” That doesn’t explain much and it suggests the idea (which may not be true) that the people were indeed too idiotic or uninformed to know that government policies were reducing their income.

  16. Tam Salkim says:

    I love this:
    “We see a significant risk that another multi-year cycle of political instability has begun,” Credit Suisse said.

    … as if we’re not still hot and heavy in the cycle of political instability directly caused by the 2006 coup.

  17. Resident says:

    Inequality is the key, correct. And like the previous discussion, this is interesting. However there is no way to ascribe the clear long term trends to a specific policy or leadership over this period. One must include the external environment and it’s influence, I.e. Riding the wave or perhaps asin thaksinomics (and other leaders during same period) “rebranding” trends and jumping in front of a long term parade.

    It is easily arguable that the overall long term Thai policy environment has pushed the Thai economy, which in fact has missed numerous opportunities over the past decades has lagged others. Relative to debt, perhaps the yearly inability to disburse more then 50% of budgets has had a moderating effect.

    Point is the data is interesting, but a narrow view leading to a conclusion that Thaksinomics was better for Thai is unsupported. Recent events affecting the Thai rice sector might even suggest the opposite as populist budget games have proven themselves unsustainable to disastrous in many parts of both developed and developed world.

    The hypothesis is not disproved, but that really does not confirm much of anything. Suggest more rigorous approach.

  18. Vichai N says:

    ” … Since then governments (not just Thaksin!) have increasingly adopted policies of subsidising agricultural production, rather than taxing it.” – AW

    That is true AW. But governments may be finalizing realizing that tampering with agriculture (rice) price market mechanisms is very counter productive, discouraging farm productivity improvement leaps; discouraging innovative solutions and market-focused (small-scale) farm management techniques.

    For decades to the Japanese, rice is a sacred crop. But now even the “Japanese Begin to Question Protections Given to Homegrown Rice”

    http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/business/international/japanese-begin-to-question-rices-sacred-place.html?_r=1

    ” … kept on life support by subsidies, production controls and tariffs, these (Japananese) farmers grow mediocre rice year after year … Now an increasing amount of this rice has nowhere to go, as Japanese favor bread over their traditional staple. The government will soon raise subsidies that encourage farmers to divert their rice to animal feed …”

    Remember that Cohen song’s line “I have seen the future and it is murrrderr.” Will Thailand’s rice industry be murrrderred by inane price-support subsidies?

  19. Peter Cohen says:

    Alyf,

    Nobody is forcing Malays to have non-Malay friends or even like Malay people, and vice-versa, nobody is forcing non-Malays to engage in interaction with Malays. You misread the intent of most of the commentaries posted here. The point is don’t ram Islam down the throat of those who don’t want it, nor disallow non-Muslims the use of the word
    “Allah” in prayer, as has been used by
    East Malaysian Bumiputera, Indonesian Christians, Arab Christians, and others,
    for quite some time. This is not an issue
    of segregation, except perhaps the forced
    segregation of those Malays and non-Malays who disagree with religious fascism imposed upon them without their approval. I do not recall anyone picking friends for you here; what I do recall is that there have been numerous, and valid, suggestions that
    UMNO/BN and Perkasa and individual bigots cease preying upon innocent Malaysians, telling them what they should and should not
    believe, and interfering in the private and free religious practices of Malaysians, which last I checked, was enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution. I don’t think anyone cares whether you celebrate Deepavali, Hari Raya, Christmas, Chinese Lunar New Year, or Hannukah, I think want Malaysians don’t want
    is someone else telling them what they must celebrate or practice, and I don’t see anyone here telling you to do any of the sort. As you should be free to choose and associate with whomever you please, so should ALL Malaysians. Unfortunately, the Malaysian Government and its cohorts want to limit the free associations of some Malaysians, and not others.

  20. Hi Bialao, this issue is discussed, at some length, in my book Thailand’s Political Peasants. Thailand, like many other countries, has moved from taxing agriculture to subsidising it. Here is an extract, from a paper I am currently working on, exploring some of the implications of the high rate of “tax” Thai farmers used to pay:

    As a major exporter of rice since the mid-nineteenth century, Thailand has never faced an extended food problem in the simple sense of food shortage. Consistent production surpluses have meant that Thailand has been a major rice exporter since the second half of the nineteenth century. However, around the middle of the twentieth century rice pricing became a focus of government policy in order to meet two basic objectives: to increase government revenue and “to hold down the cost of living in urban areas” in order to secure low wages in the “infant industrial sector” (Ingram 1971, 255). Starting in the 1950s, these linked policy objectives were achieved by placing a heavy tax burden on the country’s farmers.

    Following World War II, direct government intervention in the rice trading system had the effect of “reversing the prewar policy of reducing the tax on the farmer” and placed an “extremely heavy” tax burden on them (Ingram 1971, 92). The rice premium introduced in 1955 was the most important and long-lasting intervention. The premium was an export tax on rice which generated government revenue, lowered the domestic price of rice and reduced the returns received by farmers. During the 1950s it comprised between 11 per cent and 17 per cent of total government revenue (Ingram 1971, 246). In 1966 it cost farmers 13 times as much as their direct tax commitments (Bertrand 1969, 179). One study from 1965 suggested that the farm gate price of rice would increase by up to 80 per cent if the premium was abolished (Usher 1967, 220–3) while another suggested a more modest rise of between 23 and 59 per cent for the decade leading up to 1972 (Feeny 1982, 113). This was a politically attractive “tax” for the government to impose because it operated indirectly and the disproportionate tax burden on farmers was virtually invisible. While it generated considerable debate among Thai economist, there is no evidence that it encouraged any sustained protest from farmers.

    The rice premium was not politically volatile in the short term but it had long-term political implications because it compounded Thailand’s core agricultural problem: low productivity. As a result of the artificially low rice price many farmers were discouraged from investing in new production technology. This is particularly evident in relation to fertiliser use which remained extremely low well into the 1960s. Under the price structure created by the rice premium “the application of fertilizer [was] simply uneconomical” (Bertrand 1969, 181). In Thailand, one kilogram of nitrogen fertiliser cost the equivalent of 6.7 kilograms of un-milled rice whereas in Japan it cost only 1.4 kilograms of rice (Ingram 1971, 256). As a result Thailand had one of the lowest rates of fertiliser use in Asia. Of course, during this period there were some improvements in agricultural technology. These included expanded irrigation, greater use of farm machinery, and modest uptake of improved rice varieties. However, Thailand’s overall performance was lacklustre. Between 1960 and 1975, Thailand’s rice yield increased by only 10 per cent, compared to 26 per cent in Malaysia, 28 per cent in South Korea, 34 per cent in the Philippines and 49 per cent in Indonesia (IRRI 2013).

    The rice premium started to be phased out in the second half of the 1970s and was abolished in the 1980s. Since then governments (not just Thaksin!) have increasingly adopted policies of subsidising agricultural production, rather than taxing it.