This essay appears as part of a special series supported by the ANU Malaysia Institute
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In Malaysian politics, almost everyone has accused someone of khianat, or betrayal. Politicians who change allegiance are labelled traitors. Parties that abandon coalition partners are accused of betraying the struggle. Former adversaries who suddenly become allies are celebrated as pragmatic by some and condemned as unprincipled by others. Yet many of those making such accusations have themselves negotiated with yesterday’s enemies.
Political betrayal has become so commonplace that the more difficult question is no longer simply who betrayed whom, but what betrayal actually means in a political system where alliances are constantly being renegotiated.
Since the 2018 general election ended more than six decades of uninterrupted Barisan Nasional (BN) rule, Malaysia has experienced an extraordinary period of political recombination. Pakatan Harapan (PH), BN, Perikatan Nasional (PN) and their component parties have competed against, negotiated with, governed alongside and broken away from one another. The distinction between government and opposition, reformists and establishment, or political friends and enemies, has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Almost every major political bloc has, in one form or another, “married” a former rival.
In an earlier commentary for Malay Mail, published in July 2026, I argued that Malaysia’s recurring accusations of khianat reveal a deeper political culture in which parties, constituencies and electoral mandates are frequently treated as possessions of political elites. Political disputes are consequently framed around questions of ownership, loyalty and obligation, often at the expense of public accountability.
This article extends that argument by examining how the language of betrayal has evolved alongside Malaysia’s increasingly fluid coalition system. It asks why political loyalty continues to carry such moral weight when the actors involved in invoking it have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to accommodate former adversaries. It also examines how accusations of betrayal shape the boundaries of legitimate political competition and divert attention from the democratic responsibilities of parties and elected representatives.
From political realignment to moral betrayal
The hype of Malaysia’s contemporary khianat politics cannot be separated from the political transformation of 2018. PH’s victory was made possible by an alliance that would once have seemed unimaginable. Mahathir Mohamad, whose leadership had defined much of Malaysia’s previous political order, joined forces with Anwar Ibrahim and parties that had spent decades challenging his government. Bersatu, established by former UMNO leaders, became part of a coalition committed to ending BN’s dominance.
The reconciliation between Mahathir and Anwar marked a significant political shift. Their rivalry, dating back to Anwar’s dismissal and imprisonment in 1998, had shaped Malaysian politics for two decades. Yet they set aside their differences to pursue a common goal, that is to end BN’s rule.
At that moment, cooperation between former adversaries was not widely presented by PH supporters as betrayal. Instead, it was understood as strategic necessity. The common objective of removing BN appeared sufficient to legitimise compromises that might otherwise have been condemned. Instead, the meaning of political loyalty was interpreted as contingent upon political objectives.The contradiction became more pronounced following the Sheraton Move in February 2020, when Bersatu’s departure from PH and the realignment of parliamentary support contributed to the collapse of the elected government. Muhyiddin Yassin subsequently became prime minister through a new governing arrangement.
For many PH supporters, the episode later is seen as a form of betrayal of the 2018 electoral mandate. They had elected a coalition with particular reform commitments, only to see that government displaced through negotiations among political elites rather than through another election.
Yet focusing on the actions of individual defectors obscured the deeper political tensions that had weakened PH from within. These included unresolved leadership succession, competing political ambitions, internal disagreements and uncertainty over the coalition’s ideological direction. The proposed transfer of power from Mahathir to Anwar remained contested, while Bersatu’s position within the coalition became increasingly difficult to sustain.
The term khianat in this context captured the anger and sense of betrayal felt by supporters, but it offered only a partial explanation for the government’s collapse. It identified those perceived to have broken political commitments without fully accounting for the internal divisions and structural weaknesses that made the coalition vulnerable in the first place.
The selective morality of coalition politics
Malaysia’s subsequent political developments demonstrated further how selectively the accusation of betrayal could be applied. After the Sheraton Move, Muhyiddin’s government depended on cooperation among parties with competing interests, including Bersatu, UMNO and PAS. Their accommodation was presented as a workable governing arrangement, even though these parties had previously contested one another.
That arrangement eventually fractured. In August 2021, Muhyiddin resigned after losing his parliamentary majority, following the withdrawal of support by sections of UMNO. Ismail Sabri Yaakob subsequently became prime minister under another configuration of parliamentary support.
Within three years of the 2018 general election, Malaysia had experienced three prime ministers and multiple governing arrangements. Political alliances were repeatedly reconstructed without the electorate being asked to choose a new government.
The 2022 general election introduced another contradiction. No coalition secured a parliamentary majority. Anwar eventually became prime minister through a unity government that brought together PH, its longstanding rival BN, and major political blocs from Sabah and Sarawak.
The political significance could not be ignored. PH had built much of its electoral identity around opposing UMNO and the BN establishment. DAP and UMNO, whose rivalry had been sustained through decades of ideological and communal competition, now found themselves governing together.
For supporters of the unity government, this represented a necessary compromise following an inconclusive election. For critics, it suggested that electoral promises and ideological differences could be subordinated to the pursuit of power. Neither interpretation can be dismissed entirely.
When no coalition wins a parliamentary majority, negotiations are necessary to form a government, even if that means working with former political rivals. This, however, is different from defections that bring down an existing government. This is because the two situations raise different questions about political legitimacy and electoral accountability.
But the broader question that I wish to address in this article remains unanswered. What principles then determine when political realignment is legitimate and when it constitutes betrayal?
If cooperation between former adversaries is acceptable when necessary for stability, why should similar negotiations elsewhere automatically be characterised as treachery? The answer frequently depends on which political actors benefit.
A realignment that secures one’s preferred government is more readily described as responsible leadership. One that removes it is condemned as betrayal. Political loyalty, under these circumstances, becomes less a consistent democratic principle than a language through which competing elites defend their claims to authority.
Why khianat remains politically powerful
The appeal of khianat lies partly in its moral meaning. Unlike the relatively neutral vocabulary of coalition bargaining, political disagreement or realignment, khianat implies the deliberate violation of trust. It suggests that an obligation existed and that someone knowingly broke it.
This connects with the broader political significance of amanah, a concept associated with trust, responsibility and obligations held on behalf of others. Yet these concepts can be interpreted differently depending on the political relationship being emphasised.
A politician may be accused of betraying a party leader, a coalition partner, an electoral mandate or the public. These relationships are not necessarily equivalent, and their obligations can conflict.
Whose trust is really being protected here? Malaysia’s political system has long exhibited characteristics associated with patronage and personalised authority. Political organisations operate through formal institutions, but informal networks of reciprocal obligation, leadership protection and access to resources remain influential.
Within such arrangements, political loyalty can become inseparable from expectations of continued access to office, influence and institutional support. Accusations of betrayal therefore serve several purposes.
They simplify complex conflicts by identifying individuals who can be blamed for political ruptures. They reinforce internal party discipline by portraying disagreement as disloyalty. They also allow political leaders to preserve claims of moral legitimacy even when their own decisions contradict previous commitments. They also redirect accountability.
Rather than explain disagreements over policy, leadership succession, seat allocations or access to resources, political actors can recast these conflicts as struggles between loyalty and treachery.
This is where the language of betrayal becomes politically consequential. It does not only describe political conduct. It determines which conduct is considered acceptable and whose claims to legitimacy deserve recognition.
A leader who withdraws support from a coalition may be condemned as a traitor, while another who negotiates a comparable realignment may be praised for political courage. The difference lies not necessarily in the democratic consequences of their actions but in the political networks interpreting them.
Coalition survival and the erosion of political alternatives
Malaysia’s post-2018 experience also reflects a deeper transformation in its party system. For decades, BN dominated a relatively predictable electoral order. Opposition parties could cooperate against BN while presenting themselves as alternatives to the governing establishment.
The end of BN’s dominance disrupted that arrangement without producing a stable replacement. Malaysia has increasingly become a political system in which several competing blocs possess significant electoral support but cannot necessarily govern independently. Coalition bargaining is therefore no longer an exceptional response to political crisis. It has become a central feature of government formation and survival.
This development is not inherently undemocratic. Coalition governments are common in parliamentary systems, and negotiations among political parties can accommodate diverse interests.
The difficulty arises when the public narratives used to justify electoral competition remain disconnected from the realities of coalition politics. Parties continue to campaign around apparently clear political divisions, even though their willingness to negotiate after elections suggests considerably greater flexibility.
PH maintains its reformist identity while governing alongside BN. UMNO seeks to rebuild its political standing while participating in a government led by Anwar, a figure whose political career has long been intertwined with opposition to the old establishment.
PAS and Bersatu have faced their own tensions over leadership, representation and the direction of opposition politics. These contradictions became particularly visible in 2026.
The breakdown in cooperation between PAS and Bersatu, alongside renewed discussions involving PAS and UMNO, demonstrated how quickly political relationships could be reconsidered.
The tensions culminated in October when the Registrar of Societies (RoS) cancelled PN’s registration following an internal dispute. The High Court subsequently granted a stay of the deregistration, allowing the coalition to continue its activities pending judicial review.
At the same time, BN and PAS reached a seat-sharing arrangement for the November Malacca state election, demonstrating that new electoral accommodations could emerge even while existing coalition relationships remained unsettled.
These developments do not necessarily mean ideological differences have disappeared. PAS, UMNO, Bersatu and PH continue to represent different political constituencies and competing positions on significant national questions. Rather, they demonstrate that ideological differences do not always determine coalition boundaries.
Electoral calculations, leadership interests and access to government can encourage cooperation across previously defended political divisions. This creates a democratic dilemma.
When political alliances become increasingly provisional, voters may find it difficult to determine whether their electoral choices will translate into the governing arrangements they expect. The issue is then that parties frequently provide insufficient explanations of what those changes mean for their policy commitments and relationships with voters.
Can loyalty be legislated?
The introduction of Malaysia’s anti-party-hopping law in 2022 represented an attempt to address political instability arising from defections. The legislation sought to prevent elected representatives from changing party affiliation without consequences for their parliamentary or state assembly seats.
The democratic rationale was that the voters should have some assurance that representatives elected under a particular political platform will not subsequently transfer their allegiance in ways that undermine the electoral mandate. However, the legislation also revealed the difficulty of regulating loyalty within a parliamentary democracy.
The 2024 controversy surrounding six Bersatu parliamentarians who declared support for Anwar’s government while initially remaining members of their party illustrated this problem. Their decisions raised questions about the relationship between party affiliation, parliamentary support and voter expectations. Yet the constitutional framework did not automatically treat every change in political support as a defection requiring a vacant seat.
Elected representatives are accountable to their political parties, but they are also representatives of their constituents. Their responsibilities cannot be reduced entirely to obedience to party leadership. Political parties themselves may abandon commitments or enter alliances that voters did not anticipate.
Hence, should representatives remain loyal to a party that has substantially altered its political direction? Should disagreement with party leadership be treated as betrayal even when it concerns important policy principles?
These questions cannot be resolved simply by demanding loyalty. More so, the anti-hopping law addresses certain individual defections without preventing parties from changing coalition partners. A political party can remain institutionally intact while negotiating a fundamentally different governing arrangement. The legislation therefore protects particular dimensions of party affiliation but cannot guarantee that voters will receive the government or policies they expected.
Who is actually being betrayed?
The central weakness of Malaysia’s khianat politics therefore is its tendency to privilege relationships among political elites over relationships between political representatives and citizens.
A politician who abandons a party may face immediate condemnation. A party that abandons an electoral promise may face far less sustained scrutiny. Coalition leaders can demand loyalty from their members while negotiating arrangements that substantially alter the political commitments on which those members were elected. This suggests that political loyalty is often understood vertically, between followers and leaders, rather than democratically, between representatives and voters.
In my earlier Malay Mail commentary, I described how this logic encourages parties to behave as though they possess constituencies, votes and political institutions. The deeper issue is that the relationship between political authority and democratic consent becomes inverted.
Parties are supposed to seek temporary authorisation from voters to govern. Yet coalition negotiations can proceed as though electoral support is an asset that political leaders are entitled to transfer or exchange.
This is especially consequential when coalition bargaining involves access to ministerial positions, institutional appointments, development allocations and other political resources.
While such negotiations are not inherently illegitimate, the concern is whether these negotiations produce transparent public benefits or primarily serve the interests of political elites.
Beyond betrayal, towards GE16
To sum up, Malaysia’s coalition politics is unlikely to return to the relatively predictable arrangements that characterised much of its earlier political history. The fragmentation of political support, growing importance of regional parties and continued competition among major political blocs make negotiation unavoidable.
But coalition politics requires democratic justification, not merely parliamentary arithmetic.
Parties should explain which commitments remain non-negotiable, which policies justify their alliances and what voters can reasonably expect from any governing arrangement.
Political leaders should also explain why changes in coalition relationships are necessary and how those changes remain consistent with the mandates they previously sought. These expectations become especially important when parties campaign against one another before elections but subsequently negotiate cooperation. Voters cannot exercise meaningful democratic choice if the relationship between electoral promises and governing arrangements remains opaque.
As GE16 approaches, Malaysia’s political parties will undoubtedly continue to invoke khianat. The Sheraton Move will remain a reference point, and competing politicians will seek to establish which leaders have remained faithful to their parties, coalitions or political struggles.
The anticipated divide will be between those willing to account for their political decisions and those who continue to use accusations of betrayal to avoid doing so. This requires distinguishing between political loyalty as a personal obligation and democratic legitimacy as a public responsibility.
The former concerns relationships among politicians. The latter concerns the authority citizens temporarily grant to those who govern. Malaysia’s recurring political crises reveal what happens when these relationships become confused.
Political actors defend their claims to parties, constituencies and coalitions as though those claims exist independently of voters. Electoral mandates are invoked when convenient and reinterpreted when political survival requires it.
The language of betrayal in this context helps sustain this arrangement by transforming disagreements over power into moral disputes over loyalty. Malaysia’s post-2018 political transformation has normalised the possibility that yesterday’s enemies will become tomorrow’s partners. What remains insufficiently normalised is the expectation that political parties must explain why these arrangements serve the public interest.
As I argued previously, the fundamental problem with khianat politics is that it displaces the relationship between political power and voter sovereignty. GE16 may produce another rearrangement of political alliances. It may change the balance of power among existing parties or generate yet another coalition that would previously have seemed improbable, or it could also be status quo.But if voters are once again asked to judge politics primarily through accusations of loyalty and betrayal, the more important questions will continue to remain unanswered. The issue is never as simple as who betrayed whom. It is why political parties remain so preoccupied with betrayal among themselves while facing so little pressure to explain what they have delivered, compromised or abandoned on behalf of the voters who placed them in power. And, that is the irony of the Malaysian politics in post-2018.
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